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aajiiqatigiinniq  decision-making through discussion and consensus
adaakw Nisga’a customary property law
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adoption simple simple adoption
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ayuukhl Nisga’a ancient legal code
ad medium filum aquae to the middle thread of the stream
agai fenua custom 
ahi kā continual presence
ahu whenua common Māori land trust
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amérindien Indian
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ara korero customary meeting
aranga  well-being
ara tiroa customary duty to work for local chief
ari’i paramount chief
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aronga mana council of chiefs
arrondissement hors du 
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Assemblée Nationale the lower house of the French Parliament; Québec’s provincial 
Legislature
Assemblée Territoriale Territorial Assembly 
autochtone indigenous
avatittinnik kamatsiarniq  responsibility and care on land, animals and environment
baccalauréat secondary school diploma
bloc de constitutionnalité entity of constitutional norms
bona fide in/with good faith
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certiorari writ issued by a superior to inferior court requiring the 
production of  a certified record of a particular case tried 
by the latter court
chambre d’annulation section of the Court of Appeal, able to quash a lower court’s 
decision
collectivité territorial territorial collectivity
Code civil du Bas-Canada Civil Code of Lower Canada
Code de l’indigénat code restricting the colonial subjects’ civil rights
Code Napoléon Civil Code of Emperor Napoleon I
collectivité ultraphérique Outermost region
compétence  régalienne competence of Crown/state
Congrès  Congress of New Caledonia
Conseil Constitutionnel Constitutional Council 
Conseil d’Etat State Council, the supreme administrative court 
contrat social social contract
corvée labour service
Cour de Cassasion Cassation Court, the supreme private law court in France
cour de comptes court of auditors
coutume de Paris customary law in Île-de-France and New France 
coureur du bois fur hunter
cul-de-sac blind alley
culture de convergence interculturalism
décret degree
de facto in fact, actually
de jure of right, by right and just title
demesne lands not granted out in tenancy but reserved by the lord 
for his own use and occupation 
departement d’outre-mer overseas department
doctrine legal writing
dominium ownership, property, sovereignty, title
droit commun national law
Eeyou istchee Grand Council of the Crees
encomienda Spanish plantation in the South America
erga omnes in relation to everyone, obligation to all states
Établissements français d’Océanie
 French Establishments of Oceania
exception de inconstitutionalité exception of inconstitutionality
fa’a’amu customary adoption
failautuhi village clerk and treasurer
faipule chairman of the village council
fait accompli deed accomplished (irreversibly) 
fakamau’agu customary tribunal
faufa’a mata’eina’a patrimonial land
fangihinga  funeral ceremony  
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fari’ihau feudal land
fatogia customary land tax
faux amis wrong friends, similar words in different languages, which 
have a different meaning
fono faka kole village council
fono faka palokia district council
fono laki royal council, council of ministers
fono royal royal council
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gendarmerie military police
General Fono meeting of Tokelauan chiefs
grand-chef great chief
Groupement de droit particulier local 
 customary title lands’ category 
Grundnorm basic norm
hapū tribal grouping, subtribe
hari tuupaapaku  translation of human remains
haut conseil High Council
He Korokai Oranga  Māori Health Strategy
Hodenosaunee People of the Longhouse, Iroquois Confederation
hui gathering
ikajuqtigiinniq  working together for a common cause
ihumatuyuk traditional knowledge expert
imperium jurisdictional presence
indigène indigenous
insinnaqtun immersion school
in situ in place
in statu nascendi in state of birth, a territory entitled to statehood
inuit qaujimajatuqangit Inuit traditional knowledge
Inuit Uqausinnik Taiguusiliuqtiit  
 Inuit Language Authority
Inutuqait Miamiksijiit Angngutiksanik  
 Elders Advisory Committee 
inuuqatigiitsiarniq  respect and care on other people
ius civile civil law
ius positivum positive law
ius cogens peremptory rules of international law that are binding on 
all without exception
ius sanguinis the right of blood; a person’s citizenship is determined by 
the citizenship of the parents
ius soli person’s citizenship is determined by place of birth
iwi group of hapū 
Journal Officiel Official Journal
jurisdiction de renvoi right to hear an entire court case again
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jurisprudence case law
kaiga  extended family, family land 
kai moana  sea food
kai tiaki  trust for minor or disabled person
kaitiaki  environmental steward
kaitiakitanga  environmental stewardship principle
kanohi ki te kanohi face to face, customary dispute resolution session
karere  Māori police
Ka tika ka ora Māori Health Provisional Work Programme
kauhanganui  Great Council
kaumatua  elder
kaupapa  fundamental principles, plan, tactics, strategy, methods
kawa  Māori procedure
kāwanatanga governance, governorship
χθόν land
kīngitanga Maori kingdom
kivalu prime minister
kōhanga reo language nest, preschool
kōkiri to advance-unit of devolution philosophy 
komiti committee
kotahitanga unity through consensus, Māori parliament
koutonui council of hereditary chiefs
kovana governor
kuia female elder
kungax  Nisga’a customary law
kura hourua partnership school
kura kaupapa māori Māori immersion school
kutuga clan 
laïcité the state ideology of secularism in France
λαϊκός belonging to people, to parish
Lálém Te Stó:lō Sí:yá:m Stó:lō House of Justice
lavelua ruler of Uvéa
leges imperii laws of government
legitima gobernatio legitimate government
leveki mangafaoa trustee of family unit
lingua franca  common language of communication
locus  place
loi ordinaire  ordinary law
loi organique  organic law, law under constitutional review
loi du pays law of the country, a statute / bylaw in New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia. 
mahinga kai food gathering place
manaakitanga looking after one’s neighbours
mana power, authority, ownership, status, influence, dignity
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mana atua sacred power of gods
mana motuhake self-determination
mana tuku iho inherent status, mana through descent
mana whenua tribal power, power associated to land
mana tangata power of the people
mana tūpuna inherited chiefly power
mana wairua spiritual or cultural values/beliefs/practices
manahune local chief
mangafaoa family unit
marae local community, meeting place, buildings
masse indivise property held in common
mata’iapo district chief
mātaitai customary fishing reserve
matapule district chief
mātauranga  knowledge
matootao cold fireplace, dead tradition
matua whāngai special children’s programme
ma’ukava  respect
mauri force of life
modus operandi method of operating
midewiwin Ojibwa’s Grand Medicine Society 
mixité mixture
muru forgiveness
mūtoi indigenous police; customary law officer
ngā pou mana foundations of control and authority
Ngā ringa whakahaere o te iwi Māori 
 National Association of Māori Healers
ngati extended family
Ngāti Tumatauenga tribe of the god of war, New Zealand Army
nuevos leyes new laws, Spanish legislation in the 16th century
nuku village land
nunalingni iqqaqtuijit community judge
Nu Tireni New Zealand
occupation possession
Office québecois de la langue française 
 The Office of the French Language in Quebec
opinio juris subjective element comprising customary international 
law
opinio necessitatis opinion of necessity, a belief that custom conforms a legal 
obligation
ordonnance ordinance, regulation
O’taite Tahiti 
pā fort, occupation site
paihere tangata joining together for common goals
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Paix des braves The Great Peace of Montreal
Pākehā New Zealander of European descent
palabre customary council
parlement regional court of appeal in pre-revolutionary France 
partage amiable agreement on common lands
patu-iki chief of chiefs, king
pays d’outre-mer overseas land
per incuriam court decision is given in error
petit-chef small chief
pieds-noirs French population in Algeria
pijitsirniq  serving families and communities
piliriqatigiinniq working together for a common cause
piqujaq customary law
πολίς Greek city-state
Pōrīnetia Farāni French Polynesia
poroporoaki farewell feast
potlatch gift-giving festival
pouvoir constituant constituting power
praesumptio similitudinis presumption of similarity
prima facie at first sight, so far as can be judged from the first disclosure
procès-verbal customary organ’s decision
propriété claniques clan title
publicité foncière property register
puke kolo village chief
pulenuku village mayor
pulu’i’uvea chief of customary police
Puni Kōkiri Ministry of Māori Development
purangi  green stone
pūtea trust for small or uneconomic interests
qanuqtuurniq  being innovative, resourceful
qaugiminilik  traditional knowledge expert
qua considered as
qulliq Innuktun school
qwi:qwelstóm kwelam t’ey Stó:lō alternative justice program
ra’atira chief
rangatahi  council member
rangatira chief, leader
rangatiratanga exercise of power, authority derived from the gods, exercise 
of chieftainship
rapporteur reporter of bill
ratione materiae subject-matter, court’s authority to decide a particular case
raupatu confiscation of land
rawa  resource
reducción Jesuit mission in South America
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réduction Christian indigenous settlement in New France 
région outre-mer Overseas Region
règlement decree
reo māori Māori language 
reo ma’ohi Tahitian language
res nullius a thing which has no owner
rohe geographical territory of hapū/iwi
rongoā Māori traditional Māori healing
rūnanga council of hapū/iwi, court
rūnanganui tribal council
section contentieuse litigation section in Conseil d’Etat
seigneurie feudal fief in New France
sénatus-consulte degree voted by the Senate, having a status of law
sigidimhaunuk matriarch
simgiyut hereditary chief
smómíyelhtel alternative justice assistant
souveraineté partagée divided sovereignty
specialité legislative legal exception in overseas territories
status quo ante existing state of affairs before
statut civil coutumier customary title
structure d’intercommunalité municipal agglomeration
sui generis Of its own kind, peculiar
sukumowati Mi’kmaq customary law
Sûreté Provincial Police of Quebec
tabula rasa empty picture
taha hiremgaro mental health
taha tinana physical health
taha whānau family health
taiapure system of customary fishing
take ōhākī land allocated through the wish of a dying chief
take raupatu land acquired by conquest and occupation
take tipu ancestral land passed down according to Māori custom
take tuku gifted land
takiwa zone of traditional authority
tangata kaitiaki/tiaki Māori official for customary fishing
tangata whenua people of land, Māori
tangi funeral
taniwaha  spirit-being
taonga treasure, valued possession
taonga tuku iho asset inherited from earlier generations
taonga tūturu Māori artifact
tapere district
tapu sacredness, spiritual power, protective force
tavana president of the District Council
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teama grand chief
Te Ao Auahetanga Hauora Māori 
 Māori Health Innovation Fund
Te kaitiaki o Te Aho Matua Māori advisory body for education
τέλος end, goal
Te Māngai Pāho Māori Broadcast Agency
Te Ohu Kai Moana Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission
te parau taroa royal regulation
terra nullius territory over which no state possesses sovereignty
terre coutumière customary land
territoire d’outre-mer overseas territory
tertium comparationis common comparative denominator 
Te Taura Whirii te Reo Māori Māori Language Commission
Te ture whakaimena o te awa o Waikato 
 customary law on Waikato River
Te Whare Ahupiri Justice Department of the Māori Parliament 
tikanga  customary, correct ways of doing things
tikanga Māori customary law
tikanga rua customary nest, a policy to create a Māori house to 
parliament
tino rangatiratanga exercise of paramount authority and power, sovereignty, 
autonomy
tirigiisuusiit prohibition, obligation
tohunga skilled person, artisan, expert, priest, wizard
to’ohitu court of appeal
tribu tribe
tricolore the national flag of France
tuiagaifo king/queen of Alo
tuisigavé king/queen of Sigavé
tuku whenua allocation of land use rights
tunngararniq  fostering good spirit by being open, welcoming and 
inclusive
tūpuna  ancestor
tūpuna ara ancestral river
turangawaewae rights of a tribe and its individual members to land
tū tangata people standing tall – policy 
ulu chairman of General Fono 
umialik group leader
urupā  burial place 
usucaption acquisition by prescription
uti posseditis retaining possession of a thing; the pre-existing boundaries 
are honoured
utu  retaliation
vice versa  reciprocically
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vis-à-vis  face to face
Volksgeist spirit of the people 
wāhi tapu special, sacred places 
wāhi whakahirahira significant site
wairuatanga spirituality
vaka district
waka canoe, confederation
waka umanga a special corporation of local administration
wānanga tradition
whakakotaki shared traditions and aspirations
Whakakohitanga The National Māori Congress
whakamana  information
whakapapa genealogy, ancestry
Whakatataka Tuarua Māori Health Action Plan
whānau extended family group, family trust
whanaungatanga kinship, relationship
whāngai  customary adoptions 
whatakotahi shared traditions, aspirations
whenua rangatira unchallenged lands
whenua tōpū tribal trust
whenua tupuna ancestral land
21
Introduction1. 
General introduction1.1. 
He aha tem ea nui o tea ao?
He tangata, he tangata, he tangata.1
Indigenous rights are among the most challenging legal questions. Many indigenous groups 
have struggled for a long time to get their voices heard. A long history of encounter, its gains 
and losses, past wrongs and redress and an increased self-esteem of the indigenous peoples, 
together with the development of legal theory on the subject in international and municipal 
law have guaranteed that the question has remained at the forefront and that the  Indigenous 
presence cannot be denied. A significant landmark has been the coming into force of the 
long-prepared United Nations’ Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on 13 
September, 2007. It has been estimated that there are approximately 370 million indigenous 
people representing over 5,000 peoples in 70 countries, spread over all continents.2 Their 
status and conditions differ from one to another - they live in independent countries which 
want to justify the existence of their unitary state and common culture. 
The significance of nation states has changed remarkably during the last few decades. 
Globalisation, supranational structures and transmission of influences have reduced the 
significance of nation states. Despite this, they remain as proper subjects of international law. 
The indigenous peoples form a challenge to this pattern. What is their role in society? How 
can the unitary state’s structure and state ideology cope with the first people with whom they 
share a common history, a people loaded with a heritage of past grievances, one searching 
for remedies and new ways to express particularism, a right to difference? A major tension 
between the Western liberal tradition and indigenous self-understanding has been the 
question on right to difference. The Western major political ideology has stressed the equality 
of all citizens. This has been also related in the past to the Western civilising mission: an idea 
that sees Indigenous cultures and communities as backward, or at most, as noble savages – an 
idea which has its reflections to this day. At the same time, the Indigenous communities have 
found new strength by expressing their specific nature as first peoples. They demand a right 
to difference and asymmetry of political and legal structures.
This comparative research has two major poles: the unitary states and the Indigenous 
peoples’ place within them. I will compare two geographical theatres – the Americas and 
Oceania - and three different models of unitary state: France as a stereotypical, strict unitary 
state; New Zealand as a unitary state based on the union of two peoples; and Canada as a 
federal state. They are intertwined by colonial past, the interaction of British and French 
1   “What is the most important thing in the world? It is people, people, people” (A Māori proverb).
2   Lâm (2000), Preface, p. xx; International Workgroup for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).
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influence, modern encounter and globalisation. Despite the differences they have common 
denominators, foremost the challenge of unitary state. Law defines the place of the indigenous 
peoples in a unitary state. It has traditionally reflected imported settlers’ laws and views. 
Therefore, the surface of legal system seems to be at first sight a monolith haven of positive 
law. But beyond the surface the image is different. The legal pluralism is out there. It could 
be defined as the existence of multiple legal systems in one geographical area. John Griffiths 
has defined that legal pluralism refers to a normative heterogeneity attendant on the fact that 
social action always takes place in the context of multiple, overlapping semi-autonomous 
social fields.3 Even the customary, traditional, unorthodox structures of law coexist in unitary 
states with indigenous peoples. Important questions are: How much do the legislators tolerate 
this pluralism? Is it a durable solution for national-level challenges? How much there is legal 
import from third countries? 
The key aspects to compare are, first, the study of change, which means historical 
understanding of legal plurality’s development in society with focus on the Indigenous 
question. In this research there is a common historical determinant of colonial encounter, 
but instead of stressing a common theoretical tool or unifying goal, the emphasis is in the 
presumption of pluralism, how it appears, how it works, and what its place is in the change 
of legal and political system.  The change is historical. I will introduce in chapter 1.2.4. the 
methodology of Fernand Braudel on different vertical levels of historical change (individual, 
social and geographical time), which find their equivalents from different aspects of legal 
change. Despite the differences between the legal systems to be compared, I will analyse the 
possible similarities in stages of legal change. These are encounter, assimilation/segregation, 
integration, reconstruction and urban stage. The direction of change is from unitary state to 
an asymmetric, plural state. 
The second aspect is the forms of legal plurality and their relation to society. Legal plurality 
is approached here horizontally through different sectors and dimensions of society: through 
the plurality of law and justice; administration and self-determination, family law, education, 
media and social law; land, resources and environmental law; and culture, including identity, 
names, objects and symbols, language and religion. The purpose of this kind of classification 
will be described in chapter 1.5.
The third aspect is the contextuality, which also tries to find answers for why there is legal 
pluralism and legal change. The contextual aspects of history, geography, culture, religion and 
morality, and language all influence and shape the relation of law and society. I will return to 
this question in chapter 1.2.4.
The Indigenous peoples demand the right to difference. 4 If there is recognised difference, 
there is also de jure pluralism. In a unitary state it can signify difference in unity, an 
asymmetrical model of a unitary state. In this research asymmetry appears in three different 
meanings: as an opposite to the symmetric form of a unitary state with equal rights for all 
(as used in the French administrative law); as recognition of difference, but stressing the 
common goals and responsibilities of a unitary state (e.g. Canadian liberal political theory); 
3   Griffiths (1986), p. 38.
4   “Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples 
to be different, to consider themselves different, and to be respected as such”. United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous peoples, Preamble.  
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and imbalance between traditional and dominant society (cultural theory). The fourth 
possibility is a dynamic model of co-existence, which does not take for granted the betterness 
of the European legal and political system. 
There are generally two major possibilities for Indigenous peoples: to live inside a modern 
state or to secede. Many former colonies have since World War II chosen the latter option. 
Many Indigenous people, however, do not have this opportunity. They are often numerically 
small groups and most of them live as minorities in their traditional areas or are scattered all 
over the national territory, in growing numbers in urban centres. There is the question of how 
to cope with the tension of reality and aspirations. Therefore, another major question in this 
research is the evaluation of the development from a Eurocentric system towards a plural and 
asymmetric system. Is it a realistic option?
The Many Faces of Law1.2. 
1.2.1. Comparison: Similarity or Difference?
I will compare here three different countries, legal systems and many different Indigenous 
realities. One could, however, expect that there are also common denominators to be 
compared. Two central theoretical problems of comparative law are the epistemological 
question of why to compare and the ontological question about what can be compared. 
One possible answer to these questions is a broad definition, which represents a macro 
law approach and approaches the sociology of law. Accordingly, comparative law looks at 
the world of law and the environment in which it lives; it provides knowledge about law as 
rules, law in context and law as culture, which allows an understanding of legal phenomena 
and their interactions in society. Understanding the phenomena around us necessitates the 
comparison.  Viewed broadly, comparative law and sociology of law are committed to the 
single enterprise of understanding law in interaction with the society and context.5
The functional method has been the traditional approach of comparative law. The function 
is a common question to all compared systems, a conceptual construction that enables a 
meaningful and disciplined comparison of legal systems. A functional researcher has to 
become acquanted with the methods, practices and customs of a particular country so that an 
overall view of law can be formed as a reliable picture. This method developed since the first 
international conference of comparative law in Paris (1900) on the similarity of comparable 
legal institutions and the problems in different systems. In the background was the idea to 
show that all forms of law are in some sense similar. To be able to compare - according to this 
definition - there is a need of tertium comparationis, a common comparative denominator. 
The objects of comparison must share common characteristics which serve as a common 
determinator. Zweigert and Kötz excluded from functional comparison the strong moral and 
ethical aspects of social life - religion, historical tradition, cultural development or people’s 
character. To them, the search for similarities included also some basic dangers: choosing 
a factual approach may find similarity in accidental divergencies of facts. The compared 
5   Nelken, & Feest (2003), pp. 76; Örücü (2004), pp. 11, 19.
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categories can also be imprecise and open to different interpretations. Zweigert and Kötz 
tried to yield this by developing a special syntax and vocabulary with concepts large enough 
to embrace the heterogenous institutions. The solutions found from different legal systems 
had to be separated from their context and national voices to satisfy the special legal need.6  
The prototype of this functional method, searching for similarities, has been rightly 
criticised from many directions. To mention some of them, Günter Frankenberg has attacked 
the neutral legal comparison as being one with no real basis: functionalism does not take 
enough notice of the concepts, legal techniques, professional ethics or politics, through which 
the dominant culture directs single researcher’s work. Michaela Graziadei estimates that 
functionalism, working with models and a hypothesis, is clinical and external. Pierre Legrand 
has criticised functionalism’s obsession with legal rules. His keyword is difference, instead of 
similarity. To him, the legal comparison is hermeneutic explanation and meditation, or critical 
metalanguage. Jaakko Husa has also strongly concentrated on similarity as a needless tool of 
the functional method, including methodological intolerance. An alternative is a moderate 
legal comparison, which supports the aim of strict comparability and gives explanations 
for revealed similarities and differences. It sees the legal comparison as a means of legal 
understanding and communication. The method of legal comparison is pluralistic, stressing 
deconstruction and difference and the significance of the other, that is, someone different 
from one’s own experience. It is, therefore, evident that the pluralism of approaches enriches 
the research. There are many inter-related levels of comparison and most work has to proceed 
on a number of levels that cannot be kept artificially separate. The virtue of an emphasis on 
difference is that it points towards a richer comparative law, one aware of the way the world is 
changing. The legal comparison can open the door into holistic communication.7 
1.2.2.  Legal Positivism v. Legal Pluralism
The traditional Indigenous world view and modern law seem at first sight to contradict each 
other in many ways. Modern law is predominantly positive law, based on intentional human 
action, which is continuously amendable. Western science and law have worked out the idea 
that it is possible to change the world and law. The roots of legal positivism can be traced 
to Thomas Aquinas, who first laid the principle of making law for all subjects. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, legal centralism took the throne of law and brought 
forth the legal ideology of modernity. The nineteenth century evolutionism saw law and legal 
systems as the most advanced and civilised forms of normative ordering which was linked to 
growing ethnocentricity. While people had been subjectified as free individuals, the external 
nature was objectified as a mechanism obeying causal laws and the political community as a 
6   Zweigert & Kötz (1998), pp. 39-40, 43-45; Legrand & Munday (2003), pp. 104-108; Örücü (2004), pp. 21, 
31; Örücü & Nelken (2007), pp. 221-222.
7   Twining (2001), p. 178; Harding & Örücü. (2002), p. 15; Husa (2003), pp. 7-10, 14-15, 17-20-24; Legrand & 
Munday (2003), p. 112; Örücü & Nelken (2007), p. 147. Ralf Michaels describes the functional method as 
“both the mantra and the bête noire of contemporary comparative law”. Cf. Michaels (2010), p. 340.
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centralised state apparatus. Traditional law, closely tied up with moral and religious norms, 
was surpassed and subordinated by expressly enacted positive law.8 
H.L.A. Hart summarised the basic features of positive law as follows: the laws are 
commands of human beings; there is no necessary link between law and morality; analysing 
the meaning of legal concepts is worth pursuing and differs from historical and sociological 
inquiries; the legal systems are closed logical systems which can be objectively analysed; and 
moral judgments cannot be established by rational arguments. To him, the regress of the chain 
of legal norms is closed by an ultimate rule of recognition. The fact and the statements possess 
a truth-value. An internal point of view includes the acceptance of the rule as a legitimate 
standard for behaviour. This forms a developed legal system of a health society. A similar 
expression used by John Rawls is a well-ordered society, which is designated to advance the 
good of its members and is effectively regulated by a public conception of justice.9
The modern legocentric (state-centred) model relies on law’s exclusive attachment to 
the state as being dominant, technically superior and more powerful than the other forms 
of institutionalised ordering. Its normative claim is that the state has the sole and supreme 
authority in a given territory or space and a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The 
law is always a product of official institutions. This rational-bureaucratic and instrumental, 
universal, secular and self-contained view has often excluded non-state law, e.g. indigenous 
and religious law, outside the definition of law.  There are, however, strong arguments that 
all human societies have law in the sense of principles and processes. There are variations 
in law. Fritz von Benda-Beckmann mentions as morphological variations the following: the 
extent to which general legal cognitive and normative conceptions have been institutionalised 
and systematised; the extent of knowledge, interpretation and application of law; the basic 
underlying legitimation of legal systems ranging from theoretical construction of Kelsen’s 
Grundnorm; the extent to which legal rules are defined as mandatory; how the normative 
relation between rules and decision makers’ relative autonomy towards general rules is 
expressed; the technology of transmission; social and geographical scope for which validity is 
asserted; and differences in substantive content.10 All these dimensions indicate that the law 
is not a monolith. 
The tendency to assert the uniformity and superiority of law is often fuelled by those in 
positions of power, reinforcing the positivism. This evolutionary programme has defined the 
limits of acceptable law. These approaches can be regarded as self-protection mechanisms on 
the part of Western secular, state-centred legal establishments.11 Werner Menski estimates that 
mainstream legal communities do not see that the global harmony and understanding will 
only be achieved by greater tolerance of diversity. Much of the debate on globalisation is still 
inspired by the theme of a civilising mission in the name of universalism and human rights. 
It means a Western-focused process of development in a linear fashion, moving towards 
8   Benda-Beckmann (2002), pp. 52-53; Tuori (2002), p. 11; Menski (2009), pp. 151-152; Husa (2011), p. 4; Ius 
positivum as a notion was in use in Europe at least since the twelfth century. 
9   Hart (1997), pp. 19-20, 67, 268-272; Rawls (1971), p. 453; Menski (2009), pp. 151-152.
10   Durie (1996), p. 449; Benda-Beckmann (2002), pp. 49-50; Twining (2001), p. 52; Twining (2009), pp. 49, 
507.  
11   Friedman (1977), p. 1; Legrand & Munday (2003), p. 27-29, 31, 35; Tamahana (2008), pp. 375, 381, 410. 
According to J. Griffith, “Legal centralism is a myth, an ideal, a claim, an illusion.”
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global uniformity. The positivistic models of legal study fail to grapple with global socio-legal 
realities. It is problematic to talk about law as a phenomenon living a purely independent, 
meta-social life. The law is a social product. There is also under way the disengagement of 
law and state: legal pluralism is everywhere and it is multiplying - it is even inherent. Law 
cannot be viewed as solely emanating from the state: a deeper awareness of interlegality can 
help to understand how law functions in a pluralistic global context. Understanding the 
law requires multiple lenses and the analysis of law must be sensitive even to informal and 
unwritten concepts, that is, to reach a more rich and full picture of law in context.12 Séan 
Patrick Donlan has also indicated that legal pluralism has strong roots even in European law. 
It was normative before the nineteenth century. This coexistence began to change during the 
eighteenth century, when the national legal systems began to strengthen as part of the unitary 
states’ ideology. This was further supported by the rise of the positive law a century later. The 
customary and religious laws were banished to the private realm.13   
Legal pluralism as a universal phenomenon can be applied to legal orders, systems, codes 
or other bodies of rules, sources of law and to single rules or principles. A legocentric legal 
pluralism is widely recognised, but often the concept is associated with non-state law. The 
early pioneers of holistic and culturally orientated interpretation of law were two Frenchmen, 
Jean Bodin and C.S. de Montesquieu. The historical school of the nineteenth century 
in England and Germany stressed the particularity of national law.14 Later Eugen Ehrlich 
emphasised living law, whose sources of knowledge are above all modern legal documents, 
the direct observation of life, of trade and other activities, of habits and customs, and of all 
organisations – both legally acknowledged and overlooked or marginalised.15
The custom is the oldest form of law. It is mostly unwritten, but is related to human action 
and need to resolve disagreement, like in written law. It exists in intimate interdependence 
with social practice. Jeremy Webber sees as important the understanding of different 
normative orders although it is not useful to search for full agreement which is not possible.16 
Also for Werner Menski a peaceful co-existence in a globally interconnected world demands 
giving space and recognition to different visions. Despite the globalising effects, the plurality 
and diversity are going to prevail. Based on this plurality, the method must acknowledge 
a situation-specificity. A socio-legal focus with a pluralist orientation must challenge the 
predominance of authoritative law-making by rulers and nations-states. The legal system 
could be understood as a body of rules in specific contexts. Law itself is internally dynamic 
from the start. A universal definition of law is only feasible if it accounts for the plural 
phenomenon of law itself. In Menski’s model the state positivism; society and socio-legal 
12   Menski (2009), pp. 6, 11, 26, 83.
13   Donlan (2010), pp. 3, 10, 19-25. 
14   Twining (2001), pp. 20, 225-226; Legrand & Munday (2003),  pp. 83, 86-90, 94; Cotterrell (2006), p. 93; 
Twining (2009), p. 478. Norbert Rouland has estimated that there exist more than 10,000 distinct legal sys-
tems in the world. Cf. Joseph (2009), p. 83.
15   Ehrlich (1913), p. 399; Das lebende Recht ist das nicht in Rechtsätzen festlegende Recht, das aber doch das 
Leben beherrscht. Die Quellen seiner Erkenntnis sind vor allem die moderne Urkunde, aber auch die un-
mittelbare Beobachtung des Legens, des Handels und Wandels, der Gewohnheiten and Gebräuche, dann 
aber alles Verbände sowohl der rechtlich anerkannten als auch der von dem Rechte übersehenen und über-
gangenen, ja sogar der rechtlich mißbilligten. Cf. Ehrlich (1913), p. 399. 
16   Twining  (2000), p. 139; Webber (2009), pp. 581-582, 584, 623-624.
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approaches; and the religion, ethics and morality with natural law features form together a 
triangle of law-making sources. Legal pluralism signifies all scenarios and conflict situations 
where none of the three above-mentioned major law-making sources rules absolutely. The 
laws of the world comprise, however, an enormous plurality of triangles in time and space. 
Foreign legal transplants and ethnic implants are not located in the space of the triangle, 
but are closely attached to it from the outside and strategically implanted at a particular 
point in the periphery. To achieve a more profound, globally conscious, plurality-focused 
understanding and approach, we have to look at the internally complex structures of law as a 
whole and the constantly changing plurality of interactions of various plural elements across 
time and space in individual situations.17 
1.2.3. Mixing Law: Family Tree, Legal Culture and Tradition
The idea about legal families is partly based on Max Weber’s neo-Kantian heritage. The 
reification of rigid categorisation and taxonomy in the traditional family tree model of 
legal cultures is, however, today outmoded and strongly West-orientated. In recent decades 
there have been added the legal cultures of great world religions and socialist law. The last-
mentioned can be today regarded as a relic. This taxonomy gives a too narrow picture of 
legal systems. The whole world does not follow one rule system, language, culture or law: 
the reality is more pluralistic. All around the world, different legal cultures have developed 
their own ways of law-talk. All Eurocentric comparatists may fall into the legal families trap 
because they tell only about legal systems’ general style and method.18
The using of the legal cultures’ concept means a wish to escape from mere “law in 
books” and a hope to place law in a wider society of cultural contexts. It is an integrally 
methodical framework in the general methodology of the comparative study of law, which 
is characteristically restricted to a certain system or geographical area. Sociologically 
inclined scholars insist that the surrounding society shapes and reshapes law.19 For Lawrence 
Friedman social forces are constantly at work on law. A legal culture is rooted in general 
culture. It points to differences embedded in larger networks of social structure and culture 
which constitute and reveal the place of law in society.20 John Bell has defined the legal culture 
as “a configuration of values, concepts, practices and institutions, through which individuals 
interpret and apply legal norms.”21 According to Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, to 
distinguish legal systems one must locate them and their cultures within the broader context 
of societal culture to which they belong.22 Roger Cotterrell sees that the concept of legal culture 
stretches on the one hand towards broad comparison and the recognition of wide historical 
tendencies and movements, and on the other, recognise familiar themes of legal pluralism 
as understood in its social scientific sense. Instead of legal culture he favours the concept of 
17   Menski (2009), pp. 4-5, 15-16, 184, 186, 188. 
18   Riles (2001), pp.54-55; Harding (2002), p. 49; Menski (2009), pp. 3, 129.
19   Nelken & Feest (2003), pp. 8-25; Husa (2012), pp. 5, 8.
20   Friedman (1977), p. 15.
21   Bell (1995), p. 70.
22   Hoecke & Warrington (1998), p. 498.
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legal ideology, which is to him an overlay of ideas, beliefs, values and attitudes embedded in, 
expressed through and shaped in practice, and tied in a specific way to legal doctrine.23
In comparative research the legal culture is understood and studied in a broader context 
than positive law or the extended socio-legal framework. There is a need to ask what shapes 
the ideas understood as legal culture. A comparatist has to concentrate on problems of 
meaning, identity and tradition, and in this way offer a particular focus on legal discourse. A 
neutral standpoint between legal cultures can be a problem: there is a need to identification 
by difference. Also Ronald Dworkin insists that interpretive theories are by their nature 
addressed to a particular legal culture, generally to a culture to what their authors belong. 
The metaphors, narratives and myths are a glue of social and cultural life, which knit together 
different domains where concepts and relations exist and provide an overarching framework 
guide to interpretation. The law is an excellent storehouse of stories about us in ways that 
build reality.24 
An alternative concept of speaking about legal reality is legal tradition. John Merryman 
has introduced an alternative notion of legal tradition as “a set of deeply rooted, historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the 
polity, about the proper organisation and operation of a legal system, and about the way law 
is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected and taught”.25 Most traditions are not closed 
but interact between each other. While Merryman’s definition is closer to socio-legal studies, 
Patrick H. Glenn combines history-sensitive comparative law with a heavy dose of legal 
anthropology. For him the concept of tradition, a body of self-conscious information, describes 
better the temporal connection between the past and present. A tradition allows one to step 
outside of the system, still remaining within law. It is a process of human communication, 
involving an extension of the past to present. In many cultures this takes place by spoken 
word, recalled by human memory. It is the way the Indigenous law is expressed, although the 
Western, written law has the advantage of physical duration.26  
The Indigenous peoples have always followed their own customary means of identity 
where kinship relations, tradition and historic continuity are essential. There does not exist, 
however, a pure form of Indigenous culture or tradition: many Indigenous peoples have 
suffered from radical discontinuity.The massive European settlement has been debilitating for 
Indigenous law whose identity practices are multilayered, open-textured and affected by the 
experience of colonialism. The influence of traditional community on law is at its strongest 
when other types of community are least involved. Law’s relation to traditional community is 
focused on providing basic conditions for co-existence. The most important indicator of the 
23   Cotterrell (2006), pp. 84, 88-89; 
24   Rosen (2006), pp. xii-xiii, 9, 132; Twining (2001), p. 40; Nelken & Feest (2003), pp. 9, 28; Webber (2009), p. 
614; Husa (2012), p. 10. 
25   Merryman, (1985), p. 2.
26   Glenn (2010), pp. 5-13. Among the other definitions of legal traditions could be mentioned that of Ghis-
laine Otis, according to which it is a living heritage that organises the consciences, thoughts and practices 
of tradition’s contemporary practioners. Cf. Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), p. 136. Jaakko Husa has 
indicated that the notions of legal culture and legal tradition are epistemologically not so different after all. 
Similarly, a French law dictionary sees the legal tradition as just one component of legal culture, covering 
all law-related beliefs, doctrines, practices and techniques that have current authority and legitimacy based 
on their real or alleged transmission from the past. Cf. Husa (2012), pp. 11-12; Arnaud (1993), p. 619. 
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interdependent character of Indigenous identity today is the state. The Indigenous peoples’ 
relation to Western tradition is within the states complex and variable. The legal exchange can 
best succeed, if found, in a guaranteed middle-ground. The interaction of law and custom, and 
status and identity is part of the irreparable historical experience. Part of a state’s crisis is its 
losing grip on indigenous peoples. The non-European legal systems must be studied in their 
own right and in the spirit of respect for plurality - the hegemonistic claims of official law are 
bound to fail in social reality. A traditional society offers a challenge to Western thought with 
static forms of social order by being creative and dynamic. In legal tradition, the information 
from the past tells us which particular characteristics are fundamental in defining social 
identity. Each generation increases the scope of information. Identities represent the current 
preoccupation in the world. They are interrelated, receiving information from each other and 
forming an epistemic community in a network. Even ideas of nationality or statehood are 
rooted in this model to a particular tradition.27   
The Indigenous law, or chthonic legal tradition (Glenn), is the oldest “legal family/
tradition” whose most particular feature is the orality of form and substance. Indigenous 
law rejects formality in the expression.  The Indigenous peoples use oral traditions to 
chronicle important information, which is stored and shared through a literacy that treasures 
memory and the spoken word. The transmission of the oral tradition by remembering is a 
dynamic, daily process. It allows for a constant recreation of their systems of laws and their 
reinterpretation meets the contemporary needs. The oral custom may remain consistent over 
time and be reliable for explaining the background and can be treated as a different intellectual 
exercise from conventional historical work. However, some critics hold that memory can be 
unreliable and oral custom is based on recycled memory entrances potential to error and 
changeable over time. The dispute resolution is usually informal and the chiefs and councils 
rule through consensus, as an expression of a link with past generations.28  
The Indigenous law has also sacred and aesthetic dimension. All indigenous cultures and 
societies have creation stories that remind them of origins and belonging to land by telling of 
the ancient law of Indigenous groups which is a covenant or gift of Creator. The pantheistic 
religiosity is holistic feature of Indigenous society. The worldview is built on circles of family, 
tribe/clan, nation and universe where the communal character of society, social harmony 
and web of beliefs are important. The law is an ever-present, although almost imperceptible, 
social glue, inextricably interwoven with all community’s beliefs.29
Law is on the move. Many complex processes have increased interaction and 
interdependence across national and cultural boundaries, often operating at sub-global levels. 
This co-existence means many different types of interrelations and social practices. At the 
substantive level all legal systems are mixed. Global migration patterns and multiple exchanges 
27   Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP, 1995), Vol. 4, p.454; McHugh (2004), 
pp. 219-221; Menski (2009), p, 17, 65; Webber (2009), p. 609; Glenn (2010), pp. 12-15, 34-45, 54-55, 86-
90.
28   Borrows (2002), pp. 8-11; Glenn (2010), pp.  62-63. Chthonic comes from the Greek χθόν (land). The con-
cept is also widely used in the French language: “autochtone... qui est issu du sol même où il habite, qui n’est 
pas venu par immigration ou n’est pas de passage”.  Rey-Debove, Josette & Rey, Alain, ed. (2007), p. 182.
29   Imai & Logan & Sherin (1999), pp. 120-121, 129; Little Bear & Boldt & Long (1984), pp. 5-8; Borrows 
(2002), pp. 14-15; Webber (2009), p. 614; Glenn (2010), pp. 63-67.  
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have over time created transnational, inherently plural, multiethnic and multicultural legal 
environments. While Lawrence Friedman sees the borrowing of other people’s law as a just 
method of speeding up the process of finding legal solutions to similar problems, Alan Watson 
stands for autonomy of law from other social phenomena. The latter’s argument is that a large 
proportion of law – an independent authority - in any society is based on legal transplants, 
transmitted by lawyers, and owe its form and content to its origins in other times and places. 
Both stress the need for legal transfers to be somehow domesticated to fit into their new 
context. Pierre Legrand, who is against the idea of legal transplants, sees that the best that can 
be achieved is to give people a taste of otherness.30 
Transmigration of law has followed the paths of colonisation, settlement, occupation, 
expansion and encounter. These processes have included imposition, reception, imposed 
reception, co-ordinated parallel development, infiltration, imitation and variations of these. 
Structure and substance can be transposed more easily than legal cultures which are part of 
socio-culture. Today many legal systems in both ordinary and extraordinary places are in 
transition. Indigenous presence is such an extraordinary place, not covered by conventional 
comparative law. Even the indigenous peoples have formed transnational linkages. When 
elements from different internal logics come together, the usual outcome is a mixed or mixing 
system.31
1.2.4. Contextual Aspects
According to Ernst Rabel, the information about foreign legal systems is only valuable in so 
far as it is contextualised. The law operates on the basis of social reality, and therefore, the 
context is of fundamental importance for the understanding of legal sources.32 The contextual 
aspects approached here are history, geography, culture, religion and morality, and language.
History, the past and temporal aspect, is always present when speaking about society and 
its law. The law is part of previous social and economic order. By including this temporal 
framework the national legislator aims at the future, looking for desired social, political and 
economic change. There is, at the same time, a danger of idealising the past: it cannot be directly 
coped with by the present conditions. The historical events and decisions are fundamentally 
unique, even though they strongly influence the later solutions and phenomena. In the state-
indigenous relations history is strongly present. It is used continuously to explain and to justify 
legal acts and decisions or demands of redress, and to ask questions about the Indigenous 
self-understanding. 
History has the element of change. Legal change can involve a wide variety of aspects of 
law which may depend on social movements, revolutions, evolutions or great individuals. 
30   Watson, (1993), pp. 89-90, 297; Legrand  & Munday (2003), pp. 437, 440; Nelken & Frees (2003), pp. 12-13, 
22, 36, 40; Menski (2009), pp. 5, 51; Twining (2009), pp. 504-505.  Legrand’s idea has echos of Montesquieu, 
who believed that the close relationship between law and society are themselves similar. Watson sees that 
Montesquieu overestimated the extent to which environmental factors hinder legal borrowing. 
31   Twining (2001), p. 240; Harding & Örücü (2002), p. 13; Legrand and Munday (2003), pp. 468, 472, 489; 
Örücü (2004), pp. 156-157.
32   Riles (2001), p. 199; Hoecke (2004), p. 1.
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History is touched by different agents of change: among these bearers of change are the states, 
national, international and transnational bodies, non-governmental organisations, economic 
actors and individuals. The law is reshaped by change but at the same time it also plays a part 
in constituting, filtering and changing the balance of forces in society. Different local patterns 
have been influenced by various historical impacts of exchange.33 
According to Fernand Braudel time obeys different speeds. It is related to human action, to 
its length and pace. Braudel employs the terms individual (temps court/histoire traditionnelle), 
social (conjuncture/histoire lentement rythmée) and geographical time (longue durée/histoire 
lente). Individual time measures agitation of surface, human action on which the actor is 
immediately conscious; social time determines the rhythm of action on which the individuals 
are not necessarily aware and which is related to economies, states and societies; while the 
geographical time has dimensions which permit in time and place essential comparisons, 
experimentations and experiences according to a preconceived aim. This kind of history is 
half-motionless (demi-immobile). The underlying structures of different civilisations cannot 
be changed without fundamental change of tradition. The retrospective reality presents itself 
as a laboratory of experiences, of comparisons between places and times, capable of replace 
us to the perspective of continuity, rules of tendency and repetitions.34
When speaking about time, we must take into consideration its different meanings. 
The Indigenous cultures do not traditionally share the Western, linear time-concept. The 
Indigenous notion of time is an envelope, an environment, which surrounds us as we live. 
For many - if not all - Indigenous peoples time stands still:  there is no past and no future, 
no distinction between the dead, the living and yet to be born. A conservationist indigenous 
tradition is that of inter-generational equity. But even there is a change: from life to death, 
from summer to winter. The world dies every winter: yet it must be made to re-live and all 
have an obligation to make it re-live. The world must be re-cycled and continue to support all 
the beings who seek to live within it. The nature of tradition controls the perception of change 
where the past is brought to the present.35
Geography is another important contextual determinant since Montesquieu. The process 
of legal encounter takes place in geographically confined social space. For Roger Cotterrell 
geographical locality is significant as a plausible identifier of community where it identifies 
a high intensity of interaction within the population and developed communication 
networks.36 Also William Twining defines different levels of law in geographical means: the 
world-wide aspects of law are global, international, regional or transnational; inside the states 
can be diversified inter-communal, territorial state, sub-state or religious law or non-state 
law. Another dimension is the mental geography: the legal orders are made up of complexes 
of social relations, ideas, ideologies, norms, concepts, institutions, people, techniques and 
traditions.37
For Indigenous peoples the territory and its ecology are dynamic and holistic. They 
describe the way societies have existed and become to experience their life and challenges. 
33   Legrand and Munday (2003), p. 498; Nelken & Feest (2003), pp. 12-14, 21-24.
34   Braudel (1979), p. 13; Braudel (1980), pp. 3-4, 21-33; Braudel (1990), pp. 16-17, 266.
35   Glenn (2010), pp. 79-81.
36   Cotterrell (2006), p. 70.
37   Twining (2001), pp. 139, 172.
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This holistic structure is a circle which demonstrates the interconnected life forces. The 
Indigenous peoples are intertwined in a complex network of relationships.38 They live in two 
kinds of environment: some of them have encountered early the European settlers or have 
lived in a region with good opportunities for settlement and farming, while the other nations 
have been isolated by sea or arctic climate. The knowledge of place is complimentary to its 
forces. In Twining’s map the indigenous law and law on indigenous peoples can be found 
from all geographical levels.
A third contextual element is culture. The nineteenth century historical school in Germany 
proclaimed the deep embeddedness of law in culture. For von Savigny law was a summation of 
prior binding rules or Volksgeist. The law was a symbol of cultural inheritance where custom 
played a significant role in the formation of law. Also in English common law the law was 
portrayed as dependent on inherited cultural conditions. In modern times, Pierre Legrand 
has spoken about the importance of legal culture as mentalité informing the law, and in which 
legal practices and doctrines exist and are given meaning.39 
Culture is a difficult concept to open as it is broad, all-embracing, vague and elusive. 
Raymond Williams has distinguished the following: a developed state of mind, processes of 
development, and the means (or outcomes) of these processes. Between the traditional and 
dominant society there is always some form of cultural asymmetry. Masaji Chiba has criticised 
the Western legal analysis of overlooking socio-cultural factors in their interaction with law, 
therefore becoming too legocentric. The whole structure of law as an aspect of culture should 
include all regulations which the people observe as law in their cultural tradition, including 
the value systems. The cultural origins of law and its continuing interlinkedness with state 
may be viewed as another form of reception of law. The social world divides up into particular 
and distinct cultures. An individual needs cultural meanings to understand choices in the 
context which to him or her makes sense. Therefore, multiculturalism may open new, creative 
and alternative ways of thinking. Law is inextricably intertwined in culture, specific to a 
particular society and interlinked at many levels and most of its concepts are culture-bound. 
Law lives in plurality which is not completely of its own making - it is about plurality of voices 
and values, negotiations of difference and diversity. There the comparative law may reduce 
our ignorance of non-Western legal cultures and traditions.40 
In another stage, the culture presses its demand for consideration as a concept in political 
philosophy. There are efforts to consider the implications of multiculturalism for Liberalism. 
An idea that culture is brought explicitly into legal interpretation is a reversal of the law 
dominating culture. One dimension of law vis-à-vis culture is law’s stewardship of culture. 
Protection of the heritage of a distinctive culture can be considered as a part of the collective 
cultural wealth of society as a whole. As a matter of tradition the culture is expressed in 
social relations of community, themselves traditional in character. Culture can also embrace 
38   Imai & Logan & Sherin (1999), p. 156.
39   Sheleff (2000), p. 4; Cotterrell (2006), p. 103.
40   Williams (1983), pp. 11, 100; Chiba (1986), p. 4; Kymlicka (1996b), pp. 105, 108, 112; Rosen (2006), pp. 
6-7, 23; Örücü & Nelken (2007), pp. 71-72, 194-195; Menski (2009), p. 605; Twining (2009), pp. 483-484. 
“Culture appears to be a present, ill-defined, all-inclusive system, which may present some advantages over 
the notion of system, but again appears as a particularly western construction which in no way advances 
any idea of normativity”.  Cf. Glenn (2010), p. 163.
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an affective bond: a sense of attachment, which is diffused and often evoked symbolically in 
affective social relations of community. The paradox of culture in relation to law is that it can 
be in conflict with itself: the different types of social relations of community may conflict with 
each other.41
Religion and morality are usually excluded outside the scope of positive law. The Age of 
Enlightenment brought up modern rationalism, which saw religion as primitive and pre-
critical thinking, as a childhood thought. Émile Durkheim, however,  argued in Des formes 
élémentaires de la vie religieuse (1912) that religion is too powerful a form of culture to be put 
beyond the scope of science or to disregard. He explained religion as a real system of power, 
authority and meaning. He wrote that rituals’ collective nature creates a state of consciousness 
which transcends the bounds of individual and private experience. Ritual time renews the 
foundations of society and regenerates the life of its beliefs.42 
Moral precepts find their voice in different legal systems. In some cultures law represents 
a form of morality, in others it backs up morality or undermines morality. Shared value or 
belief can create a strong social bond, which provides a basis as an identifier of community. 
Together with religion they have a strong influence in many non-European legal cultures. 
Even Western legal theory has never been entirely removed from spiritual and the religious 
and is culture-specific in its own way. The world is characterised by a diversity of deep-rooted 
belief systems, where the religious cultures aims to make people good through law. But 
manifestations of religion may also cause remarkable upsets. Linked to symbolic ethnicity, 
the symbolic religion has become a political tool which affects the identity construction 
of the whole community. A group or society in terms of community of belief may resist 
significant reshaping of law. In indigenous society the sacred as the fundamental core of 
society guarantees that the existence does not change. Religion is constantly present. All 
creatures, as part of nature, enjoy its sanctity. The natural world is sacred and, therefore, there 
is no secular world.43    
Language is an essential part of law. The legal texts differ significantly from general texts. 
Legal language’s most important functions are achieving justice, transmitting of legal messages 
and reinforcing the authority of law. Written language is the major form of enforcing positive 
law in society but its use as legal language differs in each country. A good example is case 
law: in common law countries court decisions are broad, often revealing the background of a 
decision in detail. French case law is very different: it only lists the legislation referred to and 
a statement of reason in a fixed form, without forgetting the aesthetic value of the language. 
The transmitting of legal messages can have interferences: they may be incomplete or closed, 
may not reach the public, may be misunderstood, or maybe different realities do not meet 
adequately. Further, a language is not neutral as there are specific hermeneutics. Languages 
are sign specific and reflect the cultural environment of their birth. 44 Written language is 
not the only form of legal expression. Although the indigenous oral tradition can be seen 
as poorer in expression, leaving a gap for understanding, the speech act is often reinforced 
by a semiotic act where letters, pictures, signs and sounds have legal aspects. The language 
41   Cotterrell (2006), pp. 99-100, 102, 104.
42   Paden, (1992), pp. 16, 29-34. 
43   Rosen (2006), p. 23; Menski (2009), pp. 131, 606; Glenn (2010), pp. 77-78, 82.
44   Mattila, (2006), pp. 31, 33-35, 39-40, 46-48; Pozzo and Jacometti (2006), p. 69. 
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is often connected to religious and ritual functions. The traditional Indigenous way to use 
the language is to memorise different rules.45 This kind of memorising, the oral witness of 
customary law, has only recently been given value in Western societies.   
The two most wide spread legal languages in the world are English and French. Legal 
English is a global language, which has adopted concepts from numerous languages and 
cultures. Historically it is a mixture of old Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, Latin and French 
elements in terminology. Connected to common law legal culture, it is not based solely 
on written statute law and is more open to external influences. Due to global use, the legal 
English concepts do not always have the same meaning everywhere and for historical reasons, 
the legal language includes language rituals and repetition. Case law often makes English 
legal language wordy. French, on the other hand, is based on Latin, which together with 
Greek has strongly influenced its vocabulary. French has developed through a long struggle 
as public legal language. As a diplomatic language it has influenced the other legal languages, 
including English.  French legal texts are constructed in a logical and methodical way. They 
are written to lay down broad maxims of law but include also certain petrified phrases and 
stylistic measures like the drop of articles and inversion. Modern legal French has aimed to 
modernise legal language by clarification of texts and the struggle against the anglicisms.46 
The major challenges between the English and French legal languages are based on 
different philosophical and conceptual approaches. Common law has aninductive and 
pragmatical approach, while French civil law derives rules and dogmas from broad principles 
in an ordered and methodological manner. In court decisions is used indirect speech. have 
Due to the Norman conquest English and French plenty of similar vocabulary, but in legal 
language the expressions are faux amis, not always compatible. They demand contextual and 
semantic information on legal registers and their places in respective legal cultures. Polysemy 
means that there are several meanings, and on the other hand, there are concepts which exist 
only in the other language. 47 Further, there are different types of legal English or French: 
there are differences between Canada and India, and Canada and France. Also Indigenous 
languages are increasingly used as legal languages, among them Māori and Inuktitut. Typical 
to both languages is the ambiguity of words, which stresses the importance of context, history, 
culture and religion. There is also uncertainty in orthography.
Legal Environment1.3. 
1.3.1. France: Domain of Civil Law
The royal ordonnances of Louis XIV were the first indications of a centrally directed, national 
law (droit commun) in Europe that was written in a national language. The regional customs 
were written down. The law expanded to the extent of the creative power. The codification 
of private law under Napoléon I (1804) was the world’s first national, systemic and rational 
45   Cf. Borrows (2010), pp. 13-15, 24-27.
46   Mattila, (2006), pp. 207-210, 221-238, 244.
47   Montesquieu (1977), book xxix, s. 16; Cairns & McKeon (1998), pp. 192-197. Steiner (2002), p. 16; Legrand 
& Munday (2003), pp. 158, 164-166; Pozzo & Jacometti (2006), p. 72. 
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codification of law whose influence has been world-wide. The distinctiveness of French civil 
law lies in its values, legal procedure, form of legal rules, and attitude to law (mentalité). 
Three distinct features of French law are the importance of codification, the statement of 
rules in general terms and the relative unimportance of judicial decisions. French law is 
largely based on legislation which provides a coherent and self-contained framework for 
the solution of contemporary social problems. On the other hand, French administrative 
law lacks codification in the sense of a restatement of general principles, and is a case-based 
system, operating in similar ways to common law.48 
French law makes a distinction between formal sources and influential sources of law. 
Formal sources are authorities which a lawyer is obliged to consider as binding statements of 
law: the Constitution, European Union law, international treaties, legislation, custom and the 
general principles of law. The non-binding interpretation and statement of law includes case 
law (jurisprudence) and legal writing (doctrine). The distinction between these two groups 
of sources lives in their constitutional status. The legislation is an expression of the general 
will, because the legal sovereignty resides in the people which have approved by referendum 
the Constitution and the amendments to the sovereignty of France. Its representatives in 
Parliament enact laws and ratify treaties. The executive can also enact regulations by the 
authority of the Constitution or the parliament. Customary law has geographically limited 
significance while the general principles of law are values which underlie enacted law. 
Behind the constitutional texts there are conventions - rules of constitutional morality - that 
establish the rights and duties of political actors. They have often filled the gaps in the written 
Constitution. Many important constitutional obligations in France are conventional and are 
enforced by political legal pressures. The provisions on fundamental rights mentioned in the 
preamble of the Constitution have also a conventional background. All obligatory sources of 
law have their origin in the direct or indirect decisions of the people, which confer on them 
a legitimate authority as sources of law. Outside this general will, the non-binding sources 
of law are merely legal professionals’ views, but have still an influential role in shaping the 
understanding of law.49
France has had 15 constitutions since 1791. The Constitution of 1958 was born as an 
answer to the problems of the Fourth Republic. The principal interest of drafters was to create a 
workable set of institutions. Before 1958 there were only three levels of constitutional sources: 
written constitution, laws and administrative texts implementing the acts. The constitutional 
reform of 1958 created a more complex hierarchy where law lost its primacy and its domain 
of intervention was reduced drastically. The authority of Constitution was strengthened by 
the creation of constitutional control. Because France belongs to the European Union, the 
international treaties and European legislation were later given supremacy over ordinary 
statutes but the Constitution remained paramount and must be amended if the European 
law is in contradiction with it. The republic participates in the European Union and exercises 
its competences according to the treaties which must be ratified by the president or by a law 
48   Bell & Boyron & Whittaker (1998), pp. 1, 5, 7-8; Glenn (2010), pp. 143-146.
49   Bell & Boyron & Whittaker (1998), p. 13; Bell (2001), pp. 58-61. 
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of the parliament. The Constitution accepts a limitation of sovereignty but the condition of 
reciprocity reduces the supremacy of European law vis-à-vis municipal law.50   
The laws are divided into the following: loi organique, which supplement the Constitution 
on matters related to the organisation of public powers; loi référendaire, which authorise a 
referendum; ordinance, which is the executive’s regulation; and loi ordinaire, an ordinary law. 
Large parts of French legislation have been codified since 1804.The constitutional reform of 
1958 created a permanent divide between the executive domain and the legislative domain. 
Article 34 enumerates a long list of matters on which Parliament enact laws, amended by 
decrees (décret), but also limits the scope of parliamentary legislation in order to free the 
government to take charge of the direction of the nation without being bound by detailed 
instructions from the parliament. As continuation to Third Republic’s decree-laws, the 
Constitution delegates to the executive legislative powers to give ordonnance. The government 
needs the parliament to validate its statutes.51  New Caledonia and French Polynesia have so-
called laws of the country (loi du pays), which are approached more in detail later. 
In 1977 the Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) defined bloc de 
constitutionnalité, that is, all constitutional norms which the Constitutional Council takes 
into account when reviewing the constitutionality of laws. Bloc includes the Constitution of 
1958; the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 which contain a list 
of classical liberal principles on the freedom of the individual, property and equality; the 
Preamble of the 1946 Constitution, which contains social and economic rights; and since 
2005, the Charter of the Environment. The bloc de constitutionnalité affirms respect for the 
fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the republic. 52  
In France the power is divided between the President, Prime Minister, bicameral Parliament, 
courts and Constitutional Council. The French system could be defined as semi-presidential. 
The presidency has, however, developped the most central polical actor in France who 
guarantees the national interests, supervises that the Constitution is respected, and secures 
proper operation of the government. The president’s duties also include appointments and 
large emergency powers. Besides the strong President the Prime Minister has a secondary role: 
he/she directs the operations of the government, is responsible for national defence, ensure 
execution of laws, and exercises regulatory and appointment powers besides the President. 
The Government is chosen by the President, who is entitled to preside over its meetings. The 
50   Constitution (1958), art. 5, 8, 16, 54-55, 88-1, 88-2.; CE (1998), Sarran, Levacher et autres; CC, Décision no 
2004-496 DC du 10 juin 2004;  Bell (2001), pp. 15-16; Hamon & Troper (2007), pp. 448-464, 761, 767-770; 
Marrani (2013), pp. 75-84; The Fourth Republic’s Constitution wanted to prevent the return to the decree-
laws of the pre-war period; Conseil Constitutionnel’s decision led in 1992 to a change in the Constitution 
due to the Maastricht Treaty.  
51   Constitution (1958), art. 34, 37-38; Cairns & Keon (1998), p. 15; Bell (2001), pp. 16-17; Steiner (2002), p. 
11. 
52 CC, Décision no. 77-88 DC du 23 November 1977. The Constitutional Council has referred since the mid-
1970s to principles of constitutional value, which include the values of the republic; the equality of all ci-
tizens before law; the right to vote; the right to organise political parties; the right to personal status; and 
the collective rights of local government. The Declaration of 1789 names as rights of man: liberty, property, 
security, resistance to oppression and the right of equality. The preamble of 1946 contains provisions on the 
equality of sexes and equal access to education and training.  Cf. Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen de 1789 (DDHC), art. 2-3, 6, 13; Constitution (1946), Préambule, § 3, 12-13; Constitution (1958), 
art. 3 al. 4, 4, 72-75
1. Introduction
37
Government is responsible to the Parliament which has two houses, the National Assembly 
and the Senate. There are 577 deputies elected for a five-year term and 346 senators for a six-
year term representing both the Metropolitan and Overseas France.53  
In France there exists a parallel system of judicial and administrative hierarchies of courts 
based on the separation of powers. During ancien régime there were 15 local parlements, 
which interpreted the local customary law. The revolution introduced the separation of 
powers and sought to prevent the judiciary being able to obstruct the national parliament. 
Today, there are judicial bodies with elements of a supreme court: Cour de cassation, Conseil 
d’Etat and the Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnelle). Cour de cassation quashes 
(casser) the rulings of the courts of appeal for error of law in private law cases and ensures 
that the law is interpreted in a uniform way throughout the country. It is a jurisdiction de 
renvoi, which means that it must hear the entire case again both as to the facts and to the 
law. Conseil d’État was established as Royal Council in 1319. Being originally a consultative 
body, it became an administrative court in 1799. Today it is a large administrative organ 
where the sixth section (section contentieuse), forms the proper court and the investigation is 
made in the subsections. Conseil d’Etat has three major functions: to work as a court of first 
instance when dealing with the decisions of the national government and the conformity of 
administrative decisions with the Constitution; as a court of appeal for the questions of local 
elections; and as a court of cassation, which is the most common form of its function. In the 
most important cases the Conseil d’Etat imposes its own decisions or opinions (régler l’affaire 
au fond).54  
The Constitutional Council was created in 1958 as an additional mechanism to ensure a 
strong executive by keeping parliament within its constitutional role. Its role has, however, 
increased significantly. In 1974, 60 deputies or senators were allowed to appeal to the 
council, but an even more significant change took place in 2008, when the constitutional 
reform granted the council power to exercise a posteriori constitutional review. The council 
is an election court, returning officer and advisor of the president. It gives opinions on the 
constitutionality of treaties, examines the constitutionality of organic laws and parliamentary 
standing orders, and polices the boundaries of the legislative competences of Parliament and 
executive. It has to decide whether certain freedoms are fundamental in the constitutional 
sense, the extent of the freedoms, and how far the existence of a freedom or right limits 
the scope of legislation. A provision declared unconstitutional by the Council cannot be 
promulgated or implemented.55
53   Constitution (1958), art. 5, 8, 24, 49; Hamon & Troper (2007), pp. 628-629, 645-647, 665-668; Marrani 
(2013), pp. 13-24; The government has, however, freedom in weighing its confidence before the parliament 
(art. 49 al. 1).
54   Constitution de l’An VIII (1799), art. 52; Loi du 27 novembre, 1790; Vernier (1993), pp. 72-73; Cairns & 
McKeon (1998), pp. 37-41; Bell (2001), pp. 30-32; Le Conseil d’Etat de l’an huit à nos jour (1999), p. 12. 
Cour de Cassation was created as Tribunal de Cassation during the revolution. It ensured that the courts 
did not deviate from the text of the laws.  
55   Constitution (1958), art. 34 al. 7, 62; Loi constitutionnelle no. 2008-724 du 23 juillet 2008, art. 29; Bell 
(2001), pp. 30-32; Vernier (1993), pp. 72-73; Cairns & McKeon (1998), pp. 37-41; Harmon & Troper (2007), 
pp. 824-862; Fabbrini (2008), pp. 1303-1304. The new article 61-1 has created in French constitutional law 
exception de inconstitutionnalité. According to a “double filter mechanism” only Cour de Cassation and 
Conseil d’Etat may apply the Constitutional Council on law’s constititutionality.   
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Case law is non-binding but influential source of law. Every decision must be based on 
legislation:  a precedent only has value in the light of the formal source of law. In the absence 
of clear legislation, a decision may be based on the principles of equity, reason, justice or 
tradition. The French law reasons from the rights: if there is a right, a remedy can be found. 
The legal structure is described in terms of concepts and the way fact situations fit into 
concepts. The Code of Civil Procedure demands that each judgment must have five elements: 
basic information on the decision, a list of sources, reasons of arguments, actual decision, 
and executive formula. The decisions are generally short with references to sources used and 
scarce background information. In terms of procedure the French legal tradition is formalist, 
but allows a degree of latitude in the characterisation of facts and the interpretation of rules 
in individual cases. Judges have a significant authority and the highest courts have recently 
acquired the role of giving advisory rulings and own legal doctrine on points of law to the 
lower courts. Although there are gaps in the legislation, the law sets limits to the judges by 
prohibiting them to make regulatory decisions.56 
On the other hand, since administrative law was neither codified nor legislated, Conseil 
d’Etat as the supreme administrative court has actively created a backbone for the development 
of rules governing the action of the administration. The courts’ rules and techniques are 
based on judicial practice, legal writing and customary law. The main form of interpretation 
is textual. The Constitutional Council determines the correct meaning of the right or liberty 
in disputed law by using three major techniques of interpretation: a limiting interpretation, 
where the council removes juridical effect from disputable legislative provisions or exclude 
from possible interpretations those that would make it contradict the Constitution; a 
constructive interpretation, where the council adds provisions to the law that are designed to 
make it consistent with the Constitution or make a legal clause convey more meaning to the 
text; and a guideline interpretation, where the council defines and specifies the authorities 
responsible for implementing the law and the modes of application necessary for conformity 
with the Constitution.57  
1.3.2.  New Zealand: Britain Overseas
New Zealand is a unitary constitutional monarchy with one of the purest forms of 
Westminster-style parliamentary sovereignty. It was first established as a political and legal 
entity in 1840, when the representatives of the British Crown and a number of Māori chiefs 
signed the Treaty of Waitangi. The treaty gave the British Crown sovereignty over the islands 
in exchange for certain guarantees. New Zealand was for a long time dependent on Britain: 
56   Code Civil (2003), art. 5; Code de procedure civile, art. 455. McCormick & Summers (1997), p. 103; Bell & 
Boyron & Whittaker (1998), pp. 14-15. Les fonctions judiciaires sont distinctes et demeuront toujours sépa-
rées des fonctions administratives. Les juges ne pourront, à peine de forfeiture, trouble de quelques manière 
que ce soit, les operations des corps administatifs, ni citer devant eux les administrateurs à raison de leurs 
fonctions.” Loi des 16-24 août 1790, art. 10. This principle has partly blurred with the constitutional reform 
of 2008 concerning the Constitutional Council.
57   Dorsen (2003), pp. 153-154; McCormick & Summers (1997), p. 112; Bell & Boyron & Whittaker (1998), pp. 
27-31. 
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only in 1947 did the Legislature adopt the Statute of Westminster (1931), which made of it de 
jure independent to legislate.58 
New Zealand’s common law system has two sources of law: statutes and case law. The 
British parliamentary system with a common law tradition has influenced greatly New 
Zealand’s legal system and the historical constitutional documents and acts of British 
Parliament have been incorporated into New Zealand’s law. A special feature of New Zealand’s 
constitutional law is the unwritten, evolving and flexible constitution. The Constitution Acts 
are not formally entrenched, i.e. they have no superior position among the statutes, and there 
does not exist any list of constitutional documents. The governmental White Paper (1985), 
based on the Canadian constitutional model, suggested the promotion of the Bill of Rights 
and the Treaty of Waitangi as supreme law but the parliament was unwilling to give up the 
tradition of unwritten constition. The Parliamentary Advisory Panel delivered its report on 
the constitutional reform on 5 December 2013. The panel does not support enactment of a 
supreme, written constitution, but wants to promote the Māori rights and to broaden the 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 to include the economic, social, cultural, property and environmental 
rights.59
The oldest domestic legal document is the Treaty of Waitangi (1840), which was for a long 
time neglected, but has since the 1970s had an important influence on the Pākehā-Māori 
relations and modern legislation. The Constitution Act 1852 created the parliamentary system 
of New Zealand. It was repealed together with the act adopting the Statute of Westminster and 
other related acts when the parliament enacted the Constitution Act 1986, which encompasses 
most of the constitutional law of New Zealand but not many constitutional conventions under 
which power is wielded. It locates a full sovereign authority to New Zealand by declaring that 
no act of Parliament of the United Kingdom thereafter extends to New Zealand as part of its 
law.60 The conventions as rules of the Constitution include relations between the legislature 
and the executive, the prime ministers’ office, the cabinet and the opposition. 61
Although New Zealand was for a long time more closely connected to the mother 
country than Australia or Canada, the repatriation of the country’s legal system took place 
at approximately the same time as in Canada. The Constitution Act 1986 was followed by 
an electoral reform and the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which ensures with some limitations the 
following rights: freedom of religion, speech and assembly, protects against discrimination, 
58   Treaty of Waitangi (1840); Statute of Westminster, 1931, Preamble, s. 3; Mulholland (1985), p. 16; Williams 
(2006), p. 122. Crown is in the Commonwealth countries a synomym for the state or government.
59   Mulholland, (1985), pp. 1, 16; Palmer (2008), pp. 286, 289; A Report on the Conversation (2013). Many 
feared that a constitutional bill of rights would elevate judicial power over parliamentary power and be thus 
anti-democratic.
60 Constitution Act 1986, s. 15(2); Mulholland (1985), pp. 16, 20. Pākehā means New Zealander of European 
descendance. Among other constitutional statutes are the Judicature Act (1908); Imperial Laws Application 
Act (1988), which incorporates to the New Zealand’s constitution a number of British statutes, including 
Magna Charta (1215), Habeas Corpus Act (1679), Bill of Rights (1689) and Act of Settlement (1701); New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990); Electoral Act (1993); and Supreme Court Act (2003). the constitution in-
cludes besides the written statutes and treaties orders-in- council (including the Cabinet Manual of 2008), 
letters patent (including Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand, 1983) 
and unwritten constitutional conventions. 
61   Mulholland (1985), p. 25; Maddex (2008), p. 316. The conventions are in common law systems not enforce-
able in the courts.
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and extends to persons accused of crimes fundamental rights of due process, including access 
to legal counsel and a fair trial.62   
The common law is the traditional source of New Zealand’s law although it has gradually 
lost its primacy to enacted statutes. In its basic structure the common law follows the British 
example with the importance of precedents.  Despite the common law background there has 
been a move towards the codification of law. The original form of political and administrational 
system included a bicameral General Assembly and six provincial Legislatures. The General 
Assembly consisted of the sovereign, a House of Representatives with elected members and 
the Legislative Council with nominated members. The General Assembly had powers to 
enact laws for the peace, order and good government of New Zealand. The Upper House 
was abolished in 1950 and today the parliament consists of the sovereign and the House 
of Representatives. The term of the parliament is three years and the representatives are 
elected from two kinds of electoral districts, the general electorate or Māori electorate. Its 
summoning and dissolution belong to the governor-general. The bill is usually proposed by 
the cabinet or individual MP. All acts of the House of Representatives follow a same form, 
including an analysis and interpretation of sections. All bills must receive a royal assent of 
the sovereign or the governor general. All legislative power is vested in parliament or derived 
from it. It has delegated legislative powers to associated states and power to make bylaws and 
statutory regulations to regional and local bodies and authorities. The bylaws can be quashed 
or amended by the Supreme Court.63 The customary law has had growing significance mostly 
through indigenous law, although it has not always been given much weight in the state’s 
legal orders. The most visible part of custom is many legal Māori expressions, used widely in 
legislation and courts.   
New Zealand is a unitary state without strict separation of powers. The powers of the 
Crown are exercised by the Sovereign in right of New Zealand (Queen Elizabeth II) and 
by the Governor-General as her representative. The governor-general’s powers are in reality 
attributed to him/her only in the most formal terms and are in substance entirely exercised 
by the prime minister. The governor-general must be a New Zealander, who is appointed for 
a 5-year term. He/she has several nominal powers: the right to assent a bill; the right to make 
regulations in the executive council or alone; the prerogative power of mercy; the power to 
appoint ministers on the advice of the prime minister; the right to act as commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces (Ngāti Tumatauenga); and the right reserve a bill for royal assent and to 
dismiss a minister. The sovereign has a formal council, the Executive Council, chaired by 
the governor-general. The council has the power to make regulations, notices and orders as 
Orders in Council. It has a formal role: it executes or gives valid legal effect to decisions made 
elsewhere. 64   
62   New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990), ss. 8-27; Sharp & McHugh (2001), p. 207. 
63   Constitution Act (1986), ss. 14-17; Mulholland (1985), pp. 23-24, 66-67, 76-77, 82-87. The Privy Council 
has defined that a precedent does not bind, when it is inconsistent with a superior court’s decision and 
when the previous decision is given per incuriam. In conflicting decisions there is the possibility of choice. 
JCPC, Attorney-General of St. Christoph Nevis & Anguilla v. Reynolds, [1980] 2 WLR 171; The Parliament 
got full sovereignty from the British Parliament with the New Zealand Amendment Act (1947) and the 
New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act (1973).
64   Constitution Act (1986), ss. 2-3; Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zea-
land (1983); Mulholland (1985), pp. 21-23. 
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The de facto executive is the Cabinet and its departments. The Prime Minister forms a 
Government by nominating ministers. The ministers of the Crown must be members of the 
legislature. They are responsible collectively for Cabinet decisions and individually for the acts 
of their respective departments. Otherwise the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet rest 
largely on conventions. The prime minister chairs the cabinet which is the central governing 
committee of the country. It is supported by several committees who prepare the proposals 
to the Government. The ministers make all vital policy decisions and their respective 
departments put up options for the minister to consider in determining the policies.65  
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London was the court of last appeal for 
New Zealand until 2004. A law reform began in the 1980s and in 1995 the Court of Appeal 
became de jure the highest court. In 2003 the Parliament officially ended the right of taking 
legal appeals to the Pricy Council and established the Supreme Court of New Zealand. The 
Supreme Court has the  jurisdiction to hear appeals from civil proceedings and certain 
criminal proceedings, but appeals can be heard only with the court’s leave. It consists of a 
chief justice and 4-5 other judges, appointed by the governor-general. The Court of Appeal 
has still a remarkable role while only a few cases have so far reached the Supreme Court. 
All judges of higher courts are appointed by the governor-general. Under its British-style 
government, New Zealand’s Parliament is supreme in its authority to make laws: no true 
judicial or constitutional review by the courts is possible. Further, nothing stops the legislation 
from being passed by parliament to abrogate the effect of a court decision. 
On the other hand, both Labour and National Cabinets have allowed the Court of Appeal 
to make definitions, distinctions and predilections. These abilities resemble a law making 
role. The courts must first interpret literally the words used by legislation. All acts must be 
given fair, broad and liberal construction and interpretation to best ensure attainment of the 
objectivity of act, according to its “true intent, meaning and spirit”. If a law is ambiguous, the 
courts must interpret it in a manner consistent with the act, which is subject to change by 
a simple majority vote in the legislature. Only if there is no clear meaning, may a purposive 
approach be used.66 The Supreme Court’s and the Appellate Court’s decisions now resemble 
more the Canadian judgments, including the title, background information, a summary of 
lower courts decisions, a long part of motivation and major aspects and a short final decision. 
The dissenting opinions are often included to the judgment. A special feature in New Zealand’s 
court system is the courts and a tribunal related to Māori people. They are the Maori Land 
Court and Maori Appellate Court and the Waitangi Tribunal.
65   Constitution Act (1986), s. 6; Mulholland (1985), pp. 27-29. 
66   Mulholland (1985), pp. 44-47, 50, 57-58; Christie (1997), p. 48. Spiller & Finn & Boast (2001), pp. 101-
102, 200; Maddex (2008), p. 316. The Privy Council, originally evolved from the Committee of Trade and 
Plantations, is not technically a court. It tenders advice to the Queen in Council, which is referred back to 
the court where the application came from; The Māori were generally against the change. Their represen-
tatives demanded that the Constitution should be first rearranged, including the Treaty of Waitangi, as a 
prerequisite for the establishment of the Supreme Court; The Acts Interpretation Act (1924), s. 5(j), gave to 
the courts a rule: “Every Act, and every provision or enactment thereof, shall be deemed remedial, whether 
its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything  Parliament deems to be for the public good, or to 
prevent or punish the doing of anything  it deems contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive 
such fair, large, and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object 
of the Act and of such provision or enactment according to its true intent, meaning and spirit”. 
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1.3.3. Canada: A Hybrid System 
Canada is a federal constitutional monarchy with a hybrid legal system due to historical 
reasons. The French law, used in the province of Québec, traces back to the New France 
period (1608-1763), when Eastern Canada was a French colony. First a profusion of sources 
prevailed in the new world. There was mixité and a lack of formal coordination. Following the 
royal policy the legal system developed towards a more centralised model. The most important 
source of law was since 1664 coutume de Paris, added by royal ordonnances. A codification of 
Québec law took place in 1866 with Code civil du Bas-Canada, following the model of Code 
Napoléon. The civil law’s latest reform took place in 1994. The sources of law in Québec form 
a bi-systemic legal system: while the property and civil law are based on the French model, 
public and criminal law are based on British common law. Unlike the common law system, 
the civil law system has as main sources written law and doctrine.67
The predominant system of law in Canada is the common law, due to the long British 
rule. It has same rules on sources as in New Zealand and it is the main system in all provinces 
and territories, with the exception of Québec. In federal level both legal systems are used. 
There is no distinction between federal and provincial common law and, unlike in the United 
States, although there are differences among the provinces. The conventions and custom have 
a significant role in constitutional law.68 
The supreme law in Canada is the Constitution. The Constitutional history of Canada 
starts with the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Constitution follows the British model and is 
an amalgamation of several elements being both written and unwritten. Its backbone is two 
imperial statutes: the Constitution Act, 1867, establishing the Canadian federation, and the 
Constitution Act, 1982, which repatriated the Canadian constitution from the Westminster 
Parliament. They are largely self-sufficient instruments. The first-mentioned is minimal, 
including only the necessary provisions to accomplish the confederation and its member 
provinces.69 
In the 1970s, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau drove for repatriation of the Canadian 
Constitution to end the Westminster Parliament’s final say. With the Constitution Act, 1982 
the constitutional emphasis in Canada has been significantly shifted from the diversity 
of provinces to the diversity of the nation under pan-Canadianism. It has brought to the 
Constitution a domestic amending formula and binding human rights instrument. The 
province of Québec has not ratified the latter Constition Act. The Supreme Court has, however, 
stressed in this constitutional cul-de-sac the exercise of authority by the British Parliament, so 
that the refusal of Québec does not render the Constitution ineffective.70 
The Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) is a simple federal statute, applicable only to federal 
laws but the Constitition Act, 1982 includes the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which has 
constitutional status, and the courts require its interpretation generously to give full measure 
to the rights and freedoms it guarantees. A presumption of constitutional validity for laws is 
67   Gall (1983), pp. 131-140; Mattila (2006), pp. ix, 194-195. Acadia located in the present Maritime Provinces. 
Most Acadians live today in New Brunswick. 
68   Gall (1983), pp. 26-35.
69   Hogg (1985), p. 3; Maddex (2008), p. 82.
70   Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), s. 32; Hogg (1985), p. 5.
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incompatible with the innovative and evolutionary character of the Charter as a constitutional 
instrument. The fundamental guarantees in the Charter emphase the rights of individuals, or 
individuals as a member of a group. The Constitution Act, 1982, includes a non-exhaustive 
list of other constitutional texts.71 
The unwritten principles of the Constitution were defined by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in 1997. They are the conventions, royal prerogatives and unwritten principles of 
federalism, constitutionalism and the rule of law. Other sources are conventions on responsible 
government, representation by population, judicial independence, parliamentary supremacy 
and the implementation of the Bill of Rights.72
Following the English example, there is no explicit separation of powers under the Canadian 
Constitution. The general executive power is vested in the queen and the governor-general 
representing her. As the monarch’s representative, the governor-general formally summons 
the House of Commons and dissolves it for elections. The functions of the Prime Minister 
and Government contain both executive and legislative responsibilities. The Prime Minister 
selects from the members of Parliament the ministers and dismisses them. He/she selects 
a Cabinet to make Government policy, sets the agenda and presides at Cabinet meetings. 
The Prime Minister is both the chief executive and the chief legislator. The ministers are 
individually and collectively responsible to the Parliament.73
Both the federal state and provinces have parallel, separate powers to legislate as defined 
in the Constitution Act, 1867. The federal parliament consists of the queen and two houses: 
the House of Commons and the Senate. The members of the lower house are elected from 
308 ridings with a overrepresentation for the Atlantic Provinces and Québec. The senators are 
appointed by the governor-general on the advice of the government and hold office until the 
retirement age of 75. Each province has its legislature. In the case of a conflict between the two 
legislative branches there will be applied the Supreme Court’s doctrine of federal paramountcy. 
The federal law is accordingly superior in the case of operational incompatibility.74
71 Constitution Act (1982), s. 52, Appendix; Hogg (1985), p. 7; Maddex (2008), p. 84. The listed constitutional 
texts are Manitoba Act, 1870; Rupert’s Land and North-Western Territory Order, 1870; British Columbia 
Terms of Union, 1871; the Constitution Acts of 1867, 1871, 1886, 1907, 1915, 1930, 1940, 1960, 1964, 1965, 
1974, 1975(1) and 1975(2); Prince Edward Island Terms of Union (1873); Parliament of Canada Act, 1875; 
Adjacent Territories Order, 1880; Canada (Ontario Boundary) Act, 1889; Alberta Act, 1895; Saskatchewan 
Act, 1905; Statute of Westminster,1931; and Newfoundland Act, 1949. The list gives content to the suprema-
cy and entrenchment clauses, which define the Constitution as the supreme law and binds the amendment 
of the Constitution to its inner authority.  Canada has also several constitutional amendments in force: the 
amendments of 1983, 1985, 1993 (New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island), 1997 (Newfoundland, Quebec), 
1998, 1999 and 2001. In the corpus of constitutional texts is also included two English statutes related to the 
status of the monarchy: the English Bill of Rights, 1689, and the Act of Settlement, 1701. The Constitution 
Act, 1982 refers also to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which is important to indigenous people. From the 
list are excluded all pre-confederation legal instruments; the amendment procedure requires in general 
amendments the assent of federal parliament and 2/3 of provinces, representing 50% of total population. 
Cf. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 38.
72   SCC, Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), ss. 49-82.
73   Constitution Act (1867), s. 9; Hogg (1985), pp. 3-4; Maddex (2008), pp. 84-85. The Governor General’ s of-
fice is not mentioned in the Constitution, but is based on royal prerogative. 
74   The Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 17, 91-92; SCC, Smith v. the Queen (1960), pp. 795-797;  Maddex (2008), p. 
85
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The Constitution Act, 1867, gives scant direction for the court system. It authorises 
the legislature to “provide for the constitution, maintenance, and organisation of a general 
court of appeal for Canada and for the establishment of any additional courts for the better 
administration of the laws of Canada”. The court system still bears an imprint of the British 
judicial system. It is hierarchical with three judicial levels: the lower provincial courts; 
provincial courts; and federal courts. The court system is unitary throughout Canada. The 
Supreme Court of Canada, established in 1875, is the highest court for Canada, and each 
province has its superior court. The Privy Council was until 1935 the last instance of criminal 
appeals and until 1949 for all other appeals. The Supreme Court has a Chief Justice and eight 
elected Puisne Justices who are appointed by the Prime Minister. Three of the Justices represent 
the civil law Québec.75 The court has always accepted the practice of dissent and separate 
opinions, which are published together with the majority decisions. The court decisions are 
lengthier than in New Zealand. They have as follows: the title and a short summary of the 
facts and judgment; the facts; sources and literature; a lengthy and detailed motivation and 
discussion on major aspects and themes; separate opinions with a similar structure; and a 
short final decision.
The Canadian courts have a task to interpret the constitutionality of statutes. The question 
can be raised by individuals, governments, governmental organisations, or any legal person. 
Their decisions constitute precedents for later cases. They can determine, whether the federal 
or provincial government has the authority to legislate in certain instances, and they can 
declare laws unconstitutional if these do not meet the standards of the Charter. The Supreme 
Court receives appeals from the provincial and territorial superior courts and from the Federal 
Court of Canada. It has a specialised, limited jurisdiction and ultimate power of judicial 
review on federal and provincial laws’ constitutional validity. If they are against the division 
of power provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, the parliament or provincial legislatures 
must live with the result, amend the law, or obtain an amendment to the Constitution. If the 
law is declared to be against the Constitution, the Parliament or Legislature can prepare a 
temporarily valid act by using an override power related to distribution of powers or Charter 
grounds. It is called the notwithstanding clause and is based on the s. 33 of the Charter. 
According to this constitutional compromise the Parliament or Legislature may declare a 
law or part of a law to apply temporarily “notwithstanding”, i.e., countermanding sections of 
the Charter, and nullifying any judicial review by overriding the Charter protections for five 
years. This is done including a section in the law clearly specifying what rights are overridden. 
They must be fundamental rights, legal rights, or s. 15 equality rights in the Charter. The 
clause has been used most often by Québec.76
75    Constitution Act (1867), ss. 96, 101; Hogg (1985), pp. 166- 171. 
76   Constitution Act, 1982, s. 33; Strayer (1988), pp. 33; Maddex (2008), p. 86. Notwithstanding Clause of the 
Constitution. The Federal Court of Canada has only a specialised, limited jurisdiction. It is in no sense su-
perior to the superior courts of the provinces.
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The Indigenous Communities1.4. 
There is no global definition of an Indigenous people. Globally there are a number of different 
concepts to describe the original peoples. Also in the common law world there various 
concepts are used of Native, Aboriginal, Indian, First Nation, Indigenous and Chthonic. In 
the French language the most commonly used term today is autochtone, an equal concept to 
chthonic, although sometimes indigène or amérindien are also used. In this research I use as 
the main concept Indigenous as it is the most widely used concept in English language and in 
international legal instruments. I use also the other expressions in their original contexts.   
When describing the Indigenous peoples, the United Nations has used the definition of 
Special Reporter José Martinez Cobo which is a mixture of objective criteria and subjective 
factors.77 The indigenous peoples are descendants of the original inhabitants of territories. 
They have distinct cultures and a strong sense of self-identity. Land is an essential element of 
indigenous culture which as a definitive factor distinguishes them from other peoples. Land 
is inherited and its transmission to future generations is a vital feature of indigenousness. The 
land rights are an expression of tribal unity and perpetuation. Other distinguishing features 
of indigenous peoples are possession of common ethnic or cultural characteristics, historic 
connection to a territory, and being pushed into a non-dominant position by a later-arriving 
population. There has been for a long time also disagreement as to whether an indigenous 
group should be called as people or peoples (in French population / peuple). Many states 
rejected for a long time their definition as a people due to its implications in international law 
to the right of peoples to self-determination. The Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, saw 
the term peoples reflecting the indigenous groups’ own, distinct identity.78
1.4.1. France: Invisible Minorities
Until 1998 the French law did not recognise distinct ethnic groups and even today the only 
constitional exception is the Kanak. The Indigenous people live in four territories: New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and the French Guiana.
New Caledonia is both ethnically and historically different from other territories. Its 
historical population, known collectively as Kanak, are Melanesians whose forefathers arrived 
5,000 years ago from Southeast Asia. They speak historically 28 different languages and are 
divided into 39 different clans with a matrilinear family structure. The basic unit is a clan 
under the grand chief (teama) which posesses the customary land which is still the sacred 
77 “Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from 
other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations 
their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.” Cf. Cobo (1986). In the 
early days of the UN Working Group which drafted the Declation on Indigenous People several countries 
still denied the existence of Indigenous peoples in their territory.
78   Summers (2004), p. 5; Eide & Krause & Rosas (2001), p. 103; Knop (2002), p. 239; Castellino & Allen 
(2003), pp. 200-201.
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foundation of Kanak life and society. Previously there was no political unity between the 
clans. Each hereditary chief, assisted by advisory councils, had absolute power and they were 
considered as sacred persons. Also the nobility had great influence, acting as chief ’s vassals 
ruling the villages, i.e. the political system was feudal. Today the 99,000 Melanesians represent 
45 % of the total population. New Caledonia has become a land without majority.79  
French Polynesia consists of approximately 130 islands in seven larger groups. The islands 
were first populated by Polynesian tribes who are closely related to Māori ethnically and 
linguistically. The islands were neither historically nor geographically united. The local chiefs 
were called according to their rank ari’i, ra’atira and manahune. Together with marae (meeting 
place), understanding about tapu (sacred) and mana (power) they show the close relation of 
Polynesian peoples and their culture in France and New Zealand. The indigenous presence 
is strong in French Polynesia: in 2007 census 173,000 people, or 67%, were ethnically of 
Polynesian origin. Some 216,000 people (83%) had at least some degree Polynesian origin. 80 
Wallis and Futuna is a geographically isolated territory of two archipelagos 200 km 
distance from each other. The islands were settled by a Polynesian population arriving from 
Tonga and Samoa around A.D. 300. Today most of the 13,000 people in the islands belong still 
to the Polynesian ethnic group. A majority of Wallisians and Futunans (17,000) live, however, 
in New Caledonia, where they form 9% of the total population. The islands are still formed of 
three traditional kingdoms Uvéa (the king or queen is called lavelua), Sigavé (tuisigavé) and 
Alo (tuiagaifo). The elected rulers, chosen by fono laki (royal council), have traditionally held 
the executive and legal power. The royal power has been interpreted as tapu (sacred). They 
have been advised by fono laki, whose members belong to aliki (noble families).81 
Besides the three above-mentioned Pacific territories, French Guiana is the only other 
French overseas territory having indigenous people and the European Union’s only Indian 
minority. Before first contact with Europeans in the sixteenth century there lived an estimated 
30,000 Indians, but due to the consequences of encounter, their total number dropped to 1,500 
by around 1900. Until the 1950s the authorities believed that they would become extinct, but 
then – due to a better health environment – their communities began to recover again. Even 
today their connection to settlers, who have overwhelmed them and live on the coastal strip, 
are limited and sparce.The Indian tribes (amérindien), which form the indigenous minority 
live in the villages of the barely accessible interior and close to the Surinamese border on 
the coast.  Today, there are approximately 7,000 Indians (3-5%) belonging to Arawak, Carib, 
Emerillon, Kali’na, Palikar, Woyampi and Wayna tribes and three different language families. 
Kali’na, living on the coast, are more integrated with the main society.82
 
79   Ntumy (1993), pp. 616, 620; Faberon & Agniel (2000), p. 158; Rau (2005), pp. 45-51, 60-62.
80   Siikala (1982), pp. 207-209; Recensement 2007 des langues (2008).
81   Ntumy (1993), p. 622; Rohm (2006), pp. 15-19. 
82   Arnoux (1996), p. 1616; Préfecture de la région Guyane; Guyane Française: composition ethnolinguis-
tique. 
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1.4.2. New Zealand: Polynesian Presence
There are today six indigenous groups in New Zealand and its associated states and territories. 
The largest group are the Māori - a collective name for 42 groups of Polynesian origin - whose 
ancestors arrived in New Zealand /Aotēaroa around A.D. 900. They lived in about 600 small 
basic kinship units (hapū), which united under the common iwi (people) when waging war 
or making peace with their respective boundaries (rohe) and realms (takiwa). The precedence 
of iwi to hapū took place only after the mid-nineteenth century. The other units were whānau 
(extended family) and waka (canoe / confederation of the iwi). The Māori society worked 
on the balancing of opposites: it recognised both male and female descent lines, and senior 
and junior family lines. Therefore, an individual could belong to several tribes. The Māori 
counted their ancestry from the landing places of their canoes where they had arrived for 
the first time. A chief of iwi was called ariki (paramount chief). The power of ariki was based 
on chiefly lineage and territorial possession. At the hapū-level the chief was called rangatira 
and at the whānau as kaumatua (male elder) or kuia (female elder). A Māori kingdom was 
created only in 1858.  The warfare between the tribes was common and the Māori built many 
fortifications (pā) to defend themselves.83
The Māori identity was born during the encounter with the Pākehā, when they needed 
to show unity. That is why the settlers often understood them as one group. The numbers 
of Māori have increased from near extinction in 1891 (44,000) to 565,000 New Zealanders 
(15%) identifying recently as Māori. They call themselves as tangata whenua, the people of 
the land. The most Māori live on North Island, and most of these in the three largest cities. 
Although there are today over 80 iwi, many urban Māori do not identify with any specific 
iwi.84 
The Moriori are a small and ethnically mixed group of Polynesian people on the Chatham 
Islands, north of North Island. They are related to the Māori and arrived from the northern 
Pacific region. In isolation the culture developed in a distinct way. Many of them were 
enslaved and killed by the Taranaki Māori in 1835, who forced those who remained into 
mixed marriages. Today their identity is recovering: on the Chatham Islands there are about 
1,000 descendants.85 
The Cook Islands and Niue are associated states and Tokelau an associated territory 
of New Zealand. People in the Cook Islands are ethnically related to both the Māori and 
the indigenous people in French Polynesia. They call themselves the Cook Island Māori. 
The northern islanders are ethnically a more distant Polynesian group. Before the colonial 
encounter the southern and northern islands were separate socio-political entities. There 
were two ariki, who had supreme mana based on the tapu character of their rule. Since the 
1820s there were also waka (village councils). The Indigenous systems were variations of 
an Eastern Polynesian regime with hereditary chieftainship loosely based on the principle 
of matrilinear primogeniture. The titles were similar to Māori: ariki, rangatira, mata’iapo. 
On the northern islands the focus was on the councils of elders. The islands were divided in 
three tapere (confederations of Takitumu, Te Au-o-Tonga and Puaikura), including a number 
83   Barlow (1993), pp. 6, 33, 59; Ritchie (1995), pp. 74, 117-118; Belich (1996), p. 95.
84   Durie (1996), pp. 53, 56-57; Havemann (1999), p. 6; 2006 Census Data.
85   Smith (2005), p. 19; Boast (2010), pp. 624-625.
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of genealogically related ngati (extended family). The land was common and inherited by 
families. Today 18,000 Cook Islands Māori live on their home islands, and more than 50,000 
in New Zealand and 15,000 in Australia.86
The population in Niue and Tokelau was greatly reduced by the Peruvian and Tahitian slave 
traders in the mid-nineteenth century. This was partly the reason for why the islands asked 
British protection from the 1870s onwards. In Tokelau the king of Fakaofo had a paramount 
position until the late nineteenth century and the ancient order was common for all atolls. 
Both people have common Samoan descent. On Niue they have further historical connections 
with the Cook Islands and Tonga and in Tokelau with Tuvalu. Today the population on the 
island of Niue is 1,700 and on Tokelau 1,500 but there are many more in the New Zealand. 
The traditional social structure is based on family and tribal structures which are alive also in 
New Zealand. The supreme chiefs are elected. Also the former patu-iki (chief of chiefs, King 
of Niue) was elected. The elders have in their system an important formal power, which is 
based predominantly on custom and social respect.87  
1.4.3. Canada: Three Strands of Indigenuity
According to the census of 2006 Canada had 1,138,000 indigenous people (3.6%). They form 
85% of population in Nunavut, 50% in the Northwest Territories (NWT), 25% in the Yukon 
and 15% in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. About 50% of them live in their traditional areas and 
reserves, but growing numbers live in non-traditional urban surroundings. About 53 % of all 
indigenous people (625,000) in Canada have an official status as Native people. The largest 
and the most heterogeneous group of indigenous people in Canada are the First Nations, 
or Indians. In 2006 there were 697,000 (2.2 %) First Nations people, of whom 300,000 (43 
%) still live on reserves. The largest number of Indians live in Ontario (158,000), British 
Columbia (130,000) and Manitoba (101,000), and they form a significant minority in NWT 
(31%), Yukon (21%), Saskatchewan (10%) and Manitoba (9%).88
In Canada it is important to distinguish the status Indians and non-status Indians. The first-
mentioned belong to the recognised First Nations. They form a very diverse group, belonging 
to 52 larger communities and are members of 630 recognised First Nations living on 2,800 
reserves and in major urban centres. There are also a significant number of those Indians who 
have by themselves or through their ancestors have lost their Indian status for various reasons. 
Another possibility is that their tribes have not made a treaty with the federal government or 
previously with the British Crown. The geographically most widespread First Nations’ group 
are the Algonkins (including the Cree and Ojibwa), who extend from the Rocky Mountains 
to the Atlantic. Northern major group is the Athabaskan in western provinces, Yukon and 
Northwest Territory. In the Westernmost Canada are located Tlingit, Tsimshian, Salishan 
86   Reforming the Political System of the Cook Islands (1998), p. 55; Gilson (1991), pp. 6-7, 11-13; Siffons 
(1999), pp. 58-59; Cook Islands Government.
87   Ntumy (1993), 158, 296-297; Smith (1993), pp. 38-39; Angelo (1995), p. 413; Huntsman & Hooper (1996), 
p. 264; Hoëm (2004), pp. 19, 49, 57.
88   Statistics Canada. 
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and Kutenai groups. The Siouan tribes live in southern Saskatchewan and Manitoba. A major 
group in the East are the Iroquois in Ontario and Quebec.89
Before the encounter a majority of Indians were hunters and gatherers. The political 
systems had great differences and some tribes or nations formed leagues. The major farming 
and sedentary groups were the Iroquois and Huron who lived in palisade villages. The Iroquois 
had a developed legal and political organisation. Their league was founded by Dekanawida 
and his disciple, Hiawatha in 1451. The Great League of Peace was governed by a council of 
50 chiefs representing participant tribes, with each tribe having one vote. The decisions had 
to be unanimous. The Great Peace was a jural community, charged with maintaining  peace 
through trade relations, ceremonial words of condolence and ritual gift exchange. Tribes 
maintained a considerable degree of autonomy in internal affairs. Despite many historical 
changes the league and its political structure still exist.90   
The French Crown and the Catholic Church supported mixed marriages with Indigineous 
people. They believed that it would promote their assimilation with the European population. 
The outcome was, however, a new mixed people. The first Métis were coureurs du bois, fur 
traders and their families. The word Métis refers often to the mixed population in Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta due to their distinctive ethnogenesis in the Red River territory, 
although there are Métis organisations all over Canada. In 2006, 390,000 Canadians (1.2 %) 
identified themselves as Métis. A major part of Métis live in central and western Canada: 
86,000 in Alberta, 74,000 in Ontario, 72,000 in Manitoba, 59,000 in British Columbia, and 
48,000 in Saskatchewan. Proportionally their presence is strongest in NWT (9%), but also 
significant in Manitoba (6%) and Saskatchewan (5%).91  
The Métis were during the nineteenth century permanent wage labourers, small farmers 
and fur traders. The political history of the Métis is connected to Louis Riel. The Colony 
of Red River and Assiniboia in present day Manitoba, administered by the Hudson Bay 
Company (HBC), had become a major French-speaking Métis settlement before the 1860s. 
HBC decided in 1869 to cede the Métis’ area to Canada. Riel became the president of the 
provisional government of the New Nation until the province of Manitoba was created in 1870 
and the Manitoba Act was included in the Canadian Constitution. Many promises were soon 
broken and many Métis moved further. Riel returned to lead a new provisional government 
in Saskatchewan in 1884-1885 which the Canadian government defeated after a short military 
campaing, and Riel was hanged. Métis were not accepted as Indians in the treaty processes 
which advanced their impowerishment. The socially oriented governments of Alberta took 
a specific direction from the 1920s and in 1938 the province of Alberta created for Métis 
farming settlements, most of which still exist. The Métis were constitutionally recognised 
only in 1982.92
The Inuit form four major groups in the Canadian Arctic, living in Nunavut, Nunavik 
(Québec), Nunatsiavut (Labrador) and Inuvialut (Northwest Territories). The total number 
of Inuit was in 2006 approximately 51,000. Of these, 49% (25,000) live in Nunavut, where 
they form 85% of the population. Other significant concentrations of Inuit live in northern 
89   Dickason (1994), pp. 63-67; Report of Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2004), p. 3.
90   Snow (1996), pp. 57-65. 
91   Statistics Canada (2006); Lawrence (2004), pp. 83-84; McHugh (2004), p. 250.
92   Dickason (1994), pp. 263-264, 268-272; Sealey & Lassier (1997), p. 14; Lawrence (2004), p. 85.
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Québec (11,000), Labrador (5,000) and NWT (4,000). Their ancestors arrived to present-day 
Arctic Canada around 2,000 BC. The cooling of the climate during the thirteenth century drew 
them to areas where they lived when the Canadian government took interest in them. They 
adapted a life that suited Arctic conditions, living in delicate balance with the natural world. 
They were semi-nomadic hunters and maritime people, depending on maritime mammals 
for food and clothing. The Inuit’s basic social unit was a family and the camps consisted 
of extended and interrelated families led by a leader. The Inuit governed themselves by a 
flexible system of consensus where the legal system was based on oral tradition of passing on 
legends, songs, parables and hunting narratives. In their cosmology the world was populated 
by spirits, which could be influenced only by shamans. The Inuit were recognised in the SCC 
decision Re Eskimos (1939).93 
Search of Plurality1.5. 
In this first part I have described the research object, the methodological tools and general 
state-law contexts. The indigenous peoples have during the last few decades sought a remedy 
for past grievances. They search for difference, which casts a challenge to unitary states’ 
political and legal systems. Despite different forms of government, the states have the same 
challenge to solve: how to find a workable structural and legal solution that would satisfy 
all parties and preserve the state’s unity. I have chosen to compare at the macro level three 
different states, France, New Zealand and Canada. Despite their different state structures, they 
are historically and geographically intertwined and have the same indigenous question before 
them. Instead of functional similarity the focus is on the presumption of plurality. It means 
the study of change, forms and aspects of legal pluralism and its relation to society. Another 
question is the asymmetry of the legal system: development from Eurocentric systems to 
plural, asymmetric systems.
The dominant Western legal school has been for a long time legal positivism, which has 
been a project of “pure law”, excluding the customary, traditional and moral factors outside 
of its scope. The reality is, however, more plural. Globalisation and rediscovery of different 
legal families and subcultures have asked to revise the total image. The classical taxonomy 
of Western-dominated family trees and functional comparison based solely on a positivist 
search for similarities cannot answer the question as to why there is the pluralility of legal 
system and what it means. The approach demands also the use of contextual tools to help this 
understanding: historical dimension, geography, culture, language and even religious and 
moral aspects.
Legal culture/legal tradition classification is an approach, which brings forth a more rich 
and balanced image of law. The indigenous (chtchonic) legal systems have a unique place 
among the legal families. Despite their oral character, they have still their own role in modern 
societies. Several scholars have stressed the importance of understanding and co-existing. 
Instead of one dominant law-making source the different elements, including the positivist, 
93   SCC, Re Eskimos (1939), 2 D.L.R. 417; Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 107-109; Statistics Canada. Inuk 
means “a man”. The previously used Eskimo comes from an Algonkian word meaning “he eats it raw”.
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social/socio-legal,  religious/ethical/moral factors, legal transplants and influences form 
in the complex field of legal pluralism the total image. They give space to different visions 
and aspects. To achieve deeper, plurally focused understanding one must look at internal 
structures as a whole and changing place of interaction through time and space in individual 
situations. 
The dominant legal systems in this research represent the two large “legal families” - 
civil law and common law. France is closer to the classical separation of power with a strong 
presidency, while the two other countries have, following the British model, no clear division 
of powers. The Queen is the symbolic head of state, while the Parliament and majority-based 
executive lead the political life. Basically the French system as a civil law system stresses the 
centrality of legislation, while the case law is more central in common law systems. In fact, 
the role of courts’ opinion has increased in France recently due to constitutional reforms and 
EU law. In New Zealand the direction has been towards a more statute based system and 
there does not exist true judicial or constitutional review by the courts. Canada, as a hybrid 
system, has more clearly both elements. The legislation is divided between the federal state 
and the provinces, but the case law has great importance in determining the content of law. In 
France and Canada the Constitution is the supreme law. The difference is that Canada follows 
like New Zealand the British model, where also the unwritten principles have a significant 
place and there is no single written supreme law. New Zealand is more closely tied to British 
heritage: there is no written constitution and the unwritten constitution is not a supreme 
law.
There does not exist one, universally recognised definition of the indigenous peoples. This 
is evident also at the national level. France does not recognise de jure ethnic-based minorities. 
The only exceptions are the Kanak in New Caledonia, whose sui generis status is constitution-
based. De facto there, however, are indigenous peoples, who belong to Amerindian, Polynesian 
and Melanesian groups. New Zealand is based on the union of the European and Polynesian 
population and their existence has been always recognised. Similarly there are a number 
of Polynesian groups living in the associated states. Canada first recognised the existence 
of Indians in the Constitution of 1867 as belonging to federal jurisdiction, but the final 
recognition of indigenous peoples, including the Inuit and Métis, took place only in 1982. 
There is some comparative research on the political and legal development of common 
law countries’ Indigenous peoples (Armitage, Havemann, Karsten, Knefla & Westra, 
McHugh, Sheleff) but the research between the common law and civil law systems in this 
sphere is almost non-existent.  The structure of this research is based on two fundamental, 
international legal instruments, which have a special place in describing the important 
aspects of indigenous life. Both were born in cooperation with the Indigenous organisations 
and, therefore, reveal their own aspirations. The first of these instruments is the International 
Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (1991, Convention 169), which is the only truly binding international 
agreement on Indigenous peoples for those coutries, who have ratified it. Although none of 
the three countries to be compared here have ratified the Convention, its themes express well 
the most important aspects of Indigenous quest world-wide and is therefore useful.  
The other international legal instrument – which all three countries have ratified – is the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples (2007), which was the 
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result of long process. It has a more advisory character and suggestions to member countries 
how they should treat their Indigenous peoples. It has similar themes as the ILO Convention: 
they both express the questions which are globally important to Indigenous communities. It 
is yet quite early to say how much this non-binding legal instrument has an influence on the 
countries to be compared. Four common law countries - United States, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand - were the most hesitant to ratify the Declaration and also France expressed 
during the long process its reservations. Nevertheless, all major questions included to in the 
Declarations are important questions also for the countries compared.
From these two legal instruments I have distinguished more than 100 keywords on 
specified themes. From them have chosen the following main themes: 1) administration and 
self-determination (Declaration, Preamble, art. 3-5, 9, 18-20.1., 21, 23, 33.2.-34, 36; ILO 169, 
Preamble, art. 4.1., 5(b), 6.1.(b)-(c), 7.1., 8.2., 32-33); community (Declaration, Preamble, art. 
3, 5, 9, 14, 16, 17.2., 20.1., 21-24, 29.3., 32.3., 35-36, 44; ILO 169, Preamble, art. 1.1.(b), 2.2(b), 
7.2., 24-31); land and environment (Declaration, Preamble, art. 5, 8.2.(b), 20.1., 23, 25-29.2., 
32, 36; ILO 169, art. 4.1., 7.3.-7.4., 13-19; law and justice (Declaration, art. 5, 27, 34, 40; ILO 
169, Preamble, art. 8.1., 9.1.-9.2., 10.1.; and culture (Declaration, Preamble, art. 3, 5, 8.1.-2.
(a), 11-15.1, 16, 27, 31, 32.3., 33.1., 34, 36, 40; ILO 169, Preamble, art. 1.1.(b), 2.2.(b), 4.1., 
5(a), 7.1., 7.3., 10.1., 30).94
In Chapter Two I will analyse the background of unitary state and the Indigenous 
question. I will first characterise the historical development of the unitary state through its 
basic elements – sovereignty and nation-state. From there I continue to the problematic of 
the twentieth century state-ideology and devolution: the questions of self-determination, 
autonomy and the possibility of secession. The second part considers the Indigenous rights, 
a long road from noble savages and tabula rasa through the colonial period to modern 
aspects of international law concerning the Indigenous peoples. The third part is related to 
the constitutional principles in the three countries compared. Especially France has a strong 
state ideology, which has an effect on the Indigenous groups’ legal status. The fourth part 
concerns the opposite force in unitary states: the process of devolution.
Chapter three brings forth the first dimension in legal pluralism and the historical change: 
law and justice. This refers to pluralism in the enactment of laws and bylaws, the existence of 
customary law, the Indigenous influence on courts’ adjudication and case law, the existence of 
Indigenous courts, alternative dispute resolution and the enforcement of law. These examples 
show the complexity of all three legal systems when they try to cope with legal pluralism. 
Beyond the positive law surface can be found a creative although challenging co-existence of 
legal realities. 
Chapter four concentrates on administrative law and the question of self-determination. 
Part of the nation-building has been the strengthening of unitary states through treaty-
making but also through subjugation and negligence. Despite this development there has 
94   United Nations Declaration  on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), Preamble, art. 3-5, 8.1.-2.(a)-(b), 
9, 11-15.1., 16, 17.2., 18-20.1., 21-29, 31-36, 40, 44; Convention  Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries (1991), Preamble, art. 1.1.(b), 2.2.(b), 4.1., 5(a)-(b), 6.1.(b)-(c), 7.1.-7.4., 8.1.-8.2., 
9.1.-9.2., 10.1., 13-19, 24-33. In 2007, only four countries in the UN General Assembly voted against the 
adoption of the Declation on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: the United States, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand.  All of them eventually joined the declaration. The last of them was New Zealand.
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always existed a parallel, Indigenous way to administrate, which has never completely 
disappeared. The latter part of the twentieth century forms a different story: the strengthening 
and recovering of Indigenous presence and self-determination in administrative law. I 
will consider the modern settlement process, citizenship, electoral rights, taxation and the 
emerging of new Indigenous structures.
Chapter five is related to the questions of Indigenous community. Its central aspect is the 
family law, including the questions of gender, marriage, inheritance and adoption – one of 
the traditional strongholds of customary law. Other importants questions are the right to 
education, which was for a long time a tool of assimilation and integration to broader society; 
Indigenous media as a means of language and information; and the health and social services, 
where the inequality of society and its legislation has been evident.
Chapter six is related to one of the most important features in Indigenous identity – land 
and environment. The title and right to ancestral land is a complex question of redress of 
historical grievances, lost promises and attempts to find a balance in modern society with 
these demands. To the question on land is closely related the question on the use of land – 
resource management and the care about the environment, which has in the holistic worldview 
of the Indigenous peoples a profound place. Modern society creates both opportunities and 
challenges for Indigenous use of land and balancing with traditional values.
Finally, chapter seven deals with perhaps the most difficult aspect vis-à-vis the Indigenous 
peoples and law: culture. Culture - covering here the questions of identity, names and symbols, 
cultural objects, language and religion - has often signified a collision of values and identities, 
misunderstandings which led to forced cultural harmonisation by law. The redirection and 
recovery of legal pluralism in the field of culture and Indigenous identity are considered in 
this chapter, as well. The concluding remarks form the last part of this research.
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Unitary State and the Devolution of Powers2. 
Basic Principles2.1. 
2.1.1. Sovereignty
The theoretical foundation for the family of states was laid in opposition to the claims of the 
papacy. A theory of papal supremacy was fully established in canon law during the thirteenth 
century. The popes fought with the German emperors on earthly power, but also supported 
each others’ claims.1 The raising French nationalism was the first to challenge this power 
concentration. Its most renowned representative was lawyer Jean Bodin who formulated his 
theory of sovereignty in De Republica (1576). The central authority was everywhere taking 
the form of strong personal monarchy over all rival claimants. Bodin based his theory on 
the idea that the concentration of power with the king is an essential condition of the state: 
sovereignty is a principle of internal political order. The central manifestation of sovereignty 
is the power to make the laws and the legislative power is a general power to command 
the others, comprising both the legislative power and constituent power. Only imperial laws 
(leges imperii) are not made by king but are the fundamental laws of state. Although Bodin 
believed that a king is bound by customary fundamental law, his scope was in reality extremely 
narrow. Possible forms of state are monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. The unity of a legal 
system requires the unification of power in a single ruler or ruling group. Bodin resisted the 
distribution of powers because all other powers would be in conflict with the power to make 
law. The sovereignty is indivisible: a truly sovereign authority must have all the power so that 
a state could legitimately work. Outward uniformity should be enforced wherever possible. 
Toleration should be, however, granted wherever a religious minority had become too strong 
to be repressed conveniently.2
The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) was an important moment in the creation of nation states. 
The territorial sovereignty gained strength as the Catholic Church and Holy Roman Empire 
declined. Hugo Grotius built his theoretical edifice on the foundation of territorial or state 
sovereignty. He saw it as an effective domestic legal order with the capability to create and 
enforce normative order within its territory as an essential attribute of internal sovereignty. 
The external attribute was for him a requirement that the sovereign state can independently 
conduct its own foreign relations. Emmerich de Vattel developed a theory of nation state, 
consolidated by monarchical rule and bound by common cultural, sociological and ethnic 
characteristics. Statehood and nationhood converged as mutually reinforcing concepts 
1   Khan (1996), pp. 19-21.
2   Brierly (1961),  pp. 8-10; Bodin (1992), pp. 1, 18, 27, 103-104, 118; The government is for Bodin a legitima 
gubernatio, where the highest power is derived from and defined by a law superior to itself. Here he fol-
lowed the medieval tradition of the nature of law. Despite certain limitations to the sovereign’s power, Bo-
din’s theory paved theway for absolutism.
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and political phenomena, based on the exclusivity of territorial domain and hierarchical, 
centralised authority. De Vattel used a strict dichotomy individual/state, where the state had 
precedence. A state includes those political bodies, societies of men who have united together 
and combined their forces in order to procure their mutual welfare and security.3
The road to absolutism reaches its culmination with Thomas Hobbes. He describes 
a hypothetical state of nature, which would exist if there were no common power able to 
restrain individuals, no law and no law-enforcement. If all restraint were removed, every man 
would constantly be open to violent invasion of his life and property. The civilised life would 
be impossible and risky. The The civilised men see the need to get out of this condition: there 
are natural rights which are man’s liberty to use his own power for the preservation of his 
own nature. Only in the state of nature the right to life entails the right to do anything. But 
the right to life can be deduced directly from the internal impulsion. The impulsion operates 
in man as such and the right is natural to man as such. The laws of nature act as prescriptive 
rules which any reasonable man can see as necessary. If men were in a state of nature, the 
law of nature would entitle them to use the right of nature to the full, but would also to 
require them to seek some better means for preserving themselves. The reasonable men see 
that they have to give up the right. This requires an agreement or contract. As appetitive 
creatures they have to transfer them to some person or body who can keep the agreement and 
protect them. The transfer of rights and powers constitute an obligation of the individual to 
the recipient authority. The sovereign decide how much of men’s powers the sovereign needs 
to have. He determines the public good. Without full obligation the men are in constant 
danger of relapsing towards a state of nature. They should in their self-interest acknowledge 
full obligation to the sovereign. Therefore, it is the might that makes the sovereign, and the 
law is merely what he commands. Since the days of Hobbes, a view of an absolute, indivisible 
and perpetual power in state served as a vehicle to rule out challenges to the state power. It 
posited a power that is the source of legal author or external to, above the authority wielded 
by judges.4
John Locke introduced the idea of popular sovereignty, moving the focus onto people as 
the sovereign. This located the sovereign in the state an not in a single person. John Locke 
explains, like Hobbes, political society by reference to a state of nature and a social contract. 
He, however, has a different meaning to the state of nature and political society. The state of 
nature is subject to a natural moral law. It is a condition in which the executive power of the 
law of nature remains exclusively in the hands of individuals. People are born totally ignorant 
3  Anaya (2004), pp. 21-22; Khan (1996), pp. 38-39, 63-64. Grotius followed the ideas of Aristotle in internal 
sovereignty, who described in Πολιτικά man’s natural progression from the individual to the community 
(πολίς), only where he could fullfill the promise of his life.
4   Brierly (1961), p. 12; Hobbes (1974), pp. 189-217; Curry (2004), pp. 51, 66. Patrick Capps sees as two foun-
dational components in the logic of the social contract the conception of the individual which has certain 
generic interests and an account of problems which occur when social beings are close in proximity to each 
others. Cf. Tsagourias, (2007), p. 25; A distant echo of the Hobbesian idea of people can be found e.g. in 
ICJ’s case Nottebohm (1955), where nationality is defined as “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of re-
ciprocal rights and duties”.  Cf. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ  Reports 1955, s. 4;  In Hobbes’ 
model the moral law leads to obligations in inner forum but does not lead to political stability. In a larger 
community this leads due to different interpretations to disagreement.  
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of everything surrounding them and there are no inborn ideas. It is a condition where is 
freedom but no tolerance. It is ruled by the laws of reasons, according to which the men have 
the right to keep and defend life, freedom, health and property. Everyone has also a right to 
punish anyone who has made harm according to the executive right of the law of nature. The 
dark side of the natural state is the selfishness of the individuals of reason. Men are expected 
to do their best to replace it and they are able to do so. A state or threat of war is an incident, 
inseparable from human life: “In the beginning, all the world was America”, like the West 
Indies still living the primitive, Old Testament stage. The state of war leads free men to make 
an agreement, to protect the community, even those who are not participating in political 
decisions. The initial step is for individuals to consent to establish civil society: they unite into 
one political community, a Commonwealth. A second step for the majority is the consent to 
form a government which is entrusted to use its powers for public good.5 
For Montesquieu, nature has order in all its parts. In social world is an underlying order 
paralleling nature. Laws are necessary relations deriving from the nature of things. All beings 
have their laws. There are some natural laws, but as a result of possessing free will man 
obeys his laws less unfailingly than other beings. The true laws are born only in the state as a 
consequence of the state of war. Montesquieu believes in causation: the legislator’s function 
is to take the pulse of his society to discover which laws will ensure health and stability. 
There is a need to pay attention to the nature and principle of the established government, 
the extremes of climate and the quality of the soil, the size of polity, the occupations of the 
inhabitants of the country, the degree of liberty the constitution will bear and the practiced 
region. They constitute the spirit of laws. The character of society is its general spirit. This 
leads to a relativist idea that each people must be different in character. Even the religions 
are related to the environment. Montesquieu distrusts political change. To guarantee a well-
functioning society the three branches of government must be separated from each other.6
Jean-Jacques Rousseau had an ideal picture on the original condition of men as survivors, 
who gradually joined together. They are of nature good. To survive the men have to create a 
society, an entity created by the total surrender of each person’s rights and prerogatives to the 
whole. A contract establishes the people. Everyone’s rights and liberty are surrendered to the 
collective, and each is protected by the strength of the whole. A man gives up his natural rights 
in return for social rights. People have a common good, discoverable by reason, expressed 
by general will which is always right and all residents are bound by it. The sovereign is the 
republic, the body of persons who are citizens. The sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable. 
The people or the sovereign pass the laws. The higher order sanctions the making of laws 
according to interests. On the other hand, the state is a higher entity than the citizens that live 
in it, with a will of its own. The citizens are citizens only in the act of exercising the sovereign 
power, but are subjects in private affairs and obey collectively made laws as individuals. A 
government is established to execute the legislative commands of the people, to apply the law 
5   Locke (1988), pp. 187, 191, 237, 301, 333; Tsagourias (2007), p. 27. Locke’s popular sovereignty was an im-
portant model for both the American and French Revolutions. 
6   Montesquieu (1977), pp. 98, 101, 103, 289-290, 321. Relativism served Montesquieu also as a means to pro-
mote the specificity of the French case.
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to individual cases and to see that there is an intermediate body between the sovereign and 
the subjects.7 
John Austin wrote in 1832 that no government is both  a sovereign and subject at once. 
He denied the original sovereign status given to tribal societies as he considered them 
disobedient and “extremely barbarious”. A.V. Dicey developed this further by distinguishing 
legal and political sovereignty: the legal sovereignty is vested exclusively in the Crown, and 
the political sovereignty describes the relations between the Crown and its subjects which 
are consensual in a dynamic sense. The absolute will of the legislator might be tempered by 
constitutional conventions, non-enforceable principles or rules affecting the exercise of the 
sovereign power. They serve well where the political actors recognise and act upon a rule that 
serves a constitutional purpose.8 
Carl Schmitt approached in the 1920s the role of collective political action through 
pouvoir constituent, by defining it as a political will which determines the form of the political 
existence as a unity and indicates the existential validity-ground for the Constition. In his 
thinking the state creation belongs to the exercise of pouvoir constituent. The founding act 
may involve violence, civil strife, revolution, liberation struggle or armed conflict.9 
The idea of sovereign people became central to Western liberal theories in the post-World 
War I period. It describes an aggregate of particular and extensive claims that states habitually 
make for themselves in their relations with other states. The idea of popular sovereignty is 
used only in part. A people can be sovereign only when no individual is raised above others. 
The sovereign power can only be located in the institutions it has established. The sovereignty 
of people has become the possession of political power by citizens. In modern states the 
popular sovereignty is practiced through the representative system of legislative power. This 
part of Rousseau’s vision has endured as useful in providing a democratic corrective to the 
centralising tendency of the state.10 
7   Décret du 19 novembre 1792; Rousseau (1960), pp. 41-69, 243-256; Curry (2004), pp. 91-93. “Trouver une 
forme d’association qui défende et protégé de toute force commune la personne et les biens de chaque asso-
cié, et par  laquelle chacun, s’unissant à tous, n’obéisse pourtant qu’à lui-même, et reste aussi libre qu’aupa-
ravant. Tel est le problem fundamental dont le Contrat social donne la solution.” Cf. Rousseau, p. 243; From 
Rousseau’s ideas the French revolution found mission to spread its message.The Convention declared in 
1792 that France would accord  “brotherhood and aid to all peoples who wanted to recover their liberty”.
8   McHugh (1991), p. 16; McHugh (2004), pp. 205, 231-232, 356. Dicey’s doctrine can be interpreted so that 
the indigenous people’s consent is needed today for constitutional conventions concerning them.
9   Schmitt (1928), pp. 75-76; Tsagourias (2007), pp. 215-216. “Verfassungsgebende Gewalt ist der politische 
Wille, dessen Macht oder Autorität imstande ist, die konkrete Gesamtentscheidung über die Art und Form 
der eigenen politischen Existenz zu treffen, also die Existenz der politischen Einheit im ganzen zu bestim-
men. Aus den Entscheidungen dieses Willens leitet sich die Gültigkeit jeder weiteren verfassungsgesetzli-
chen Regelung ab...Eine Verfassung...beruht auf einer, aus politischem Sein hervorgegangenen politischen 
Entscheidung über die Art and Norm des eigenem Seins.” Schmitt (1928), pp. 75-76. 
10   Brierly (1961), p. 48; Curry (2004), pp. 94, 96. 
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2.1.2. State
The development of unitary nation states began in Europe with the development of centralised 
authority. The unity was thought to be organic, based on shared national identity. For John 
Stuart Mill the modern, liberal and democratic state demanded a common worldview, ideals, 
goals and language. The democratic institutions could not function in multinational states. 
Therefore, it was inevitable that lesser nations would disappear. At the same time, these nation 
states were fictions, built on the conscious process of nation-building. Great founding acts of 
states were based on the coming together of conglomerates of people, taking the right to 
form a state and to be its only basis and justification. Stability problems were partly solved by 
elevating the people over populace and empowering institutions instead of people.11 
A classical nation-state emerged from an ethnic community that furnished it with 
distinct identity. As trans-temporal communities, nation-states tended to find their roots in 
a culturally homogenous community in the past. A nation was a historical entity, having 
its roots in a founder culture from which the public language and the basic constitutional 
material are received. Its instruments were citizenship policy, language laws, education policy, 
public service employment, centralising power, national media, symbols and military service. 
The settlers took to new continents their nationality and allegiances.12
Lassa Oppenheim wrote that “states only and exclusively are subjects of the Law of Nations.” 
The processes of globalisation have since those days, however, changed fundamentally the 
significance of national and societal boundaries and generally made them less important. 
International relations, which traditionally focused on relations between nation states, have 
expanded to include non-state relations across frontiers and the operation of the global system 
as a whole. The state competes today with other states and supra-, international and non-state 
actors which challenge the Westphalian legal order.13 On the other hand, new nation states 
are still formed and are not vanishing.
Statehood is a foundation of international law. An international legal personality identifies 
it as a member of a category of legal persons who share legally-defined qualities. A state is 
a territory with defined borders and a legal concept that denotes the political society based 
in the territory. The purpose and role of every state is to control activities within its borders. 
The sovereignty is related to the formal independence of decision-making and the freedom to 
exercise independence in practice. The practice is to express the relationship between a state 
and its territory in terms of the state’s sovereignty over its territory.14  
According to the doctrine of intertemporal law the legal effect of conduct is to be 
determined in accordance with the law as it was at the time of conduct. It requires that 
states keep up with the changing demands of the law. One of the different means to acquire 
a territory was at first the models of acquisition. They were granted - as by Pope Alexander 
VI in 1493 -, ceded by one ruler to another, sold, or exchanged. It could also happen by 
11   Evans (2003), p. 210; Curry (2004), pp. 98, 111, 113; Buchanan (2007), pp. 390-391.
12   Kymlicka (2002), pp. 363-364; Curry (2004), pp. 75-77. 
13   Oppenheim (1905), p. 27; Twining (2001), pp. 8-9; Smits (2006), p. 744. The central idea in the Westphalian 
legal order was the principle of sovereign states in their relation to each others.
14   Evans (2003), p. 206, 218; Lowe (2007), pp. 136-139. The concept of territorial sovereignty has its back-
ground in Roman rules for the acquisition of property. 
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conquest, although the justification of an act contained also a risk of moral objection. They 
were, however, merely the factual background which ensured that the occupation by the new 
sovereign was not challenged by the former sovereign, and that it was the assertion of its 
rights by the new sovereign that was the effective cause of the change of sovereignty.15
A territory not already under the sovereignty of some other recognised state (terra nullius) 
could be acquired simply by occupying it, as happened in the case of Australia. States adopted 
the position that the first state to take the land should have title to it. Effective control means 
that the area could be controlled from the occupied area. However, much of the process of 
colonisation was conducted through agreements with the Indigenous populations of the 
colonised territories. The acquisition of title by occupancy was severely restricted by the 
English law fiction where all lands in the realm were originally possessed and owned by 
the crown. The treaties provided a legal basis to obtain the sovereignty. Elaborate legal and 
theological arguments were developed in an attempt to legitimise the colonial endeavour. 
Many of the agreements were trade agreements. Over the years the network treaties and 
contractual agreements became overlain with layers of governmental activity. During the 
Age of Explorations the discovery was used as a legitimate reason to acquire a title to certain 
territory. This was often accompanied by symbolic acts. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
ruled in 1928 that the discovery alone does not establish sovereignty. Three years later the 
court held that an effective occupation, to create a title to territory, must be followed by action 
and exercise of authority. In the exceptional conditions of the arctic and other remote regions 
have been often used the principles of discovery, symbolic annexation, effective occupation, 
continuity, contiguity and geographical unity.16  
There are also other determinants to a state than its territory. The Montevideo Convention 
on Rights and Duties of States defines the state in article 1 as follows:17
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into 
relations with the other states. 
The convention was a child of its time, but is still a useful framework. First, a state must 
have a permanent population. There is no definition of how large the population must be: the 
populations of independent states vary greatly in size. The population must also be relatively 
stable, although even this principle is flexible (Western Sahara case). Population is connected 
to the question of nationality or citizenship. Citizenship is often either territorially based 
(jus soli), or based on descent (jus sanguinis).18 This question is of vital importance when 
discussing the Indigenous locus and status in society.
15   Lowe (2007), pp. 140-142; Brierly (1961), p. 155. Later, according to the Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recog-
nition (1932) the states should refuse to recognise those situations, treaties or agreements which may be 
brought about contrary to the covenants and obligations. 
16   PCA, Island of Palmas (1928); PCIJ, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (1931); McNeil (1989), p. 11; Evans 
(2003), p. 128, 139, 142-143; Lowe (2007), pp. 142-144. A more exceptional case was the Clipperton Island 
case, where Spain had discovered the uninhabited island, but France proclaimed sovereignty on it in 1858. 
In an arbitration between France and Mexico it was stated that the condition of occupation was an actual 
taking of possession which consisted in an act or series of acts by which the territory is reduced to posses-
sion. France won the case. 
17   Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933), art. 1.
18   Lowe (2007), pp. 153-154.
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Secondly, there is a defined territory. A new state must demonstrate its title through 
the claims of a previous sovereign. The borders of state extend around its land, sea, and air 
territory. The legal principles governing the determination of borders are the same principles 
that govern title to territory although there are several international disputes on the matter. 
Coastal states have sovereignty over an area of sea as an automatic adjunct of their sovereignty 
over their land territory. A twelve-mile territorial sea extends from the coastal State’s baselines, 
and is under the sovereignty of the coastal State.19
The third characteristic of state in the Montevideo Convention is the existence of 
government. This means an effective government in control of the territory and population 
that form the basis of the state, i.e. the public authorities have the monopoly of legitimate force 
within the territory. To be a government some degree of constitutional order is necessary.20 
Finally, the fourth criterion, called the capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states – the concept of legal personality - can be defined as a condition of state, but also as 
a consequence of statehood. The position makes more sense when one views this criterion 
as emphasizing the question of capacity. Article 2 of the Montevideo Convention stipulates 
that “the federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law”. The 
parts of sovereign states have all the other elements of state, but they are not sovereign states 
in international law because they lack the capacity to act on the international plane. This, 
however, is a relative criterion. While states remain the only subjects of general competence, 
the concept of the subjects of law is dynamic. Even the non-independent territorial entities 
may have some capacity of relations with the other states. Since World War II there has been 
two major shifts, which have modified the traditional criteria of statehood: the decolonisation 
movement and the break-up of several independent states. In most of the cases and in UN’s 
policy they have followed the uti posseditis doctrine, according to which the pre-existing 
boundaries are preserved.21
Other criteria for a state are legitimacy and recognition. The main implication of the 
requirement of legitimacy must have emerged towards statehood in a manner that is consistent 
with the principle of self-determination. According to the third article of the Montevideo 
Convention, the state is a fact, and the act of recognition simply recognises the fact of the 
existence of state. The recognition is a political instrument. There are many examples of de 
facto states which have no de jure recognition.22
A jurisdiction means a state’s authority over persons, property, events and circumstances. 
Municipal law determines the extent of state’s jurisdiction. A territorial jurisdiction means 
a complete and exclusive jurisdiction of a state over its national territory. There are three 
categories of jurisdiction: 1) jurisdiction to prescribe, or authority of a state to make laws; 2) 
19   Evans (2003), p. 222; Lowe (2007), pp. 151-152. The first and undisputed occupation of land which is res 
nullius, may give rise to a title (Roman dominium). The three-dimensional principle of space came from 
private law: cujus est solum est usque ad caelum et ad inferos. 
20   Evans (2003), pp. 222-223; Lowe (2007), p. 156. 
21   Montevideo Convention (1933), art. 2; Copter & Delcourt & Klein & Leurat (1999), pp. 414-420; Castellino 
& Allen (2003), p. 8; Lowe (2007), p. 148, 157-159. The doctrine of uti posseditis originates from ius civile in 
Roman law where it was a basic tenet of the praetor for promotion and maintenance of order.
22   Montevideo Convention (1933), art. 3; Lowe (2007), pp. 159-166. Among these one-sidedly proclaimed 
states can be mentioned Somaliland, Azania, Transdnistria, Abhazia and South Ossetia. An indigenous 
example could be the Iroquois Confederation or the Māori Kingitanga.
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jurisdiction to adjudicate, or state’s authority to subject persons or things to the process of 
courts; and 3) jurisdiction to enforce. According to the nationality principle, a national owes 
allegiance to his country.23 
A Federal state is a political system which includes a constitutionally entrenched division 
of powers between the central government and two or more subunits, the constituent 
territorial units having permanently surrendered the control of foreign affairs and some 
important powers to the federal government, while authority in internal matters is divided by 
the constitution between the federal government and the member units of the federation. A 
federal government possesses a direct authority and jurisdiction over the citizens of units. It 
is the only unit in international law.24 
One model for federalism is an American-style territorial federalism, based on regional-
based units. There the national minorities, including the indigenous peoples, can achieve self-
government only outside the federalism. The original idea of this model of federalism was to 
prevent factions and to ensure the separation of powers within each level of government. 
In another model, multination or ethnic federation, some countries embody the desire of 
national minorities to remain as culturally distinct and politically self-governing societies 
(nationality-based units).25 
In a federal system which contains both regional-based and nationality-based units may 
be demands for some form of asymmetrical federalism, i.e. for a system in which some federal 
units have greater self-governing powers than others where the national minorities try to build 
their own societal cultures. Often the Western liberal democracies’ nation building makes a 
sharp division between state and ethnicity. As nationality and identity have different meanings 
for the existing state and its minorities, the active national minorities want asymmetry for its 
own sake, as a symbolic recognition that they are a unique nationality-based unit.26 For the 
majority the collective goals and the recognition of minority rights may require restrictions 
on the behaviour of individuals that may violate their rights. The espousing collective goals 
on behalf of a national group can be thought to be inherently discriminatory.27 
The stability of a multicultural society is affected by group factors associated with 
cultural, historical or institutional traditions, that is, a culture of the rule of law, a culture 
of civic equality, the presence of ethnic nationalism, overarching loyalties and a tradition of 
elite cooperation. Some constitutional institutions are more readily subject to engineering, 
including the following: the institutions of devolved power, mechanisms to share equitably 
executive, legislative, judicial and bureaucratic representation, institutions of cultural 
promotion and oversight institutions. The ability to operate multinational institutions 
successfully is dependent on the presence of favourable primary factors. The rule of law is one 
23   Boczek (2005), pp. 76-78, 80.
24   Kymlicka (2002), p. 94; Boczek (2005), p. 64.
25   Suksi (1998), p. 25; Kymlicka (2002), pp. 98-99, 102. A good example of nationality-based units is the prov-
ince of Québec.
26   Kymlicka (2001), pp. 23-24, 28-30. There has been also critic against Kymlicka’s theory for just dublicating 
the existing pattern and stressing too much individual rights. Cf. Abelson & James & Luszlig (2002), pp. 
220-223, 233.
27   Taylor (1992), pp. 58-59. Taylor also use definitions “first degree diversity” (stressing uniform idea of state) 
and “second degree diversity” (recognising more plural means of defining the country’s identity). Cf. Taylor 
& Laforest (1993), pp. 181-184. 
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of the major factors capable of strengthening stability in multicultural states. Such a state also 
needs civic equality and flexibility. Nationalism can be both a unifying and dividing force.28
An associated state is in UN terminology a former non-self-governing territory or a former 
trust territory which has reached a full measure of self-government by a free association with 
an independent state within the meaning of the General Assembly decolonisation resolution. 
Association is one example of implementing the right of self-determination. Usually the 
associated state is granted full independence in domestic affairs, but continues to depend on 
the metropolitan power in matters of foreign policy and defense. According to UN guidelines, 
the association had to be freely chosen by the population of the territory, with the people’s 
right of unilateral termination, and must promote the development of the associated state and 
the well-being of its population. To be legally effective, an association agreement had to be 
approved by a special GA committee and by the Trusteeship Council. Trusteeship Council’s 
work has been completed, although there are some states of this kind. Typical characteristics 
of an associated state are a degree of permanence, willingness to observe international law, a 
certain degree of civilisation, a certain degree of sovereignty and functions as a state.29 
Another term used is the non-self-governing territory, which refers to territories whose 
peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. The UN Charter calls that 
the states administering those territories ensure their advancement, develop self-government, 
take due account of the political aspirations of the people, and assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances 
of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement. The UN General 
Assembly has interpreted article 73 of the Charter in an extensive manner in the name of 
the right of self-determination of peoples, asserting to itself the competence to supervise the 
implementation of its provisions and to decide, whether a territory has reached the stage of 
self-government. The General Assembly has defined this kind of territory as “geographically 
separate and distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it”. The 
presumption is supported in a situation where the territory has been arbitrarily placed in a 
position or status of subordination to the metropolitan state. New Caledonia is one of the 
territories on the UN list. Resolution 1514 opens therefore up an option for independence. 30
2.1.3. Self-Determination, Autonomy and Secession
The right to self-determination gained prominence in discourse of international politics after 
World War I. President Wilson linked the principle with Western liberal democratic ideals 
and the aspirations of European nationalists. The concepts was also used in the communist 
camp, but there it referred to Marxist precepts of class struggle. The protection of minority 
rights had its high tide in the 1920s and 1930s, when the League of Nations’ minority 
treaties aimed to enable ethnic minorities to maintain the cultural, linguistic, religious 
and other particularities as group rights that distinguished them from the rest of the state’s 
28   Magnet (2001), pp. 423-428.
29   Magnet (2001), pp. 38-39; Brownlie (2003), pp. 75-76. The Cook Islands and Niue belong to this class. 
30   Charter of the United Nations (1945), art. 73; The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples (1960, Resolution 1514); Boczek (2005), p. 93.
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population. The self-determination was vaguely implied in the provisions of mandate system. 
The inherently weak treaties were destabilised by Germany as a pretext for invasion, and 
after World War II the minority rights were not included in the UN Charter. Instead came 
contracting for liberal, universal human rights norms focusing on individual rights.31
The principle of self-determination of peoples is built on three main structural elements: 
state, people and self. Statehood as τέλος of self-determination is representative of the era of 
decolonisation. A people means a group of beneficiaries or right-holders. Self is decisive for 
the determination of the identity of a people and state. The intertwined elements of process 
construe together the meaning of self-determination. The self-determination can be divided 
in two parts: a) internal self-determination, which refers to an internal situation in a state 
where the population is entitled to enjoy self-determination in its own state; and (b) to 
external self-determination which refers to the people’s relation to other peoples in full self-
determination without external interference.32 
The self-determination of peoples is mentioned twice in the UN Charter.33 It has led to a 
number of UN resolutions and court decisions, including the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries (1960), the two international Covenants on human 
rights (1966), the decisions on Namibia and Western Sahara by the International Court of 
Justice, The Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Frienly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
Declaration of Principles of the Final Act of Helsinki (1975) and the African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights (1981).  The right to self-determination of peoples developed as 
an international legal right. The International Court of Justice has found that the right of self-
determination has an erga omnes character as one of the essential principles of contemporary 
international law. Nevertheless, it is limited in the United Nations practice to colonial and 
overseas non-self-governing territories and may be exercised by a territory only as a unit, 
within the administrative boundaries inherited from the colonial power, without disruption 
of the territorial integrity of the new state (uti posseditis). For a long time there so-called blue-
water or salt-water thesis has dominated, according to which decolonisation concerns only 
those peoples separated by sea from their mother country. It has been increasingly replaced 
by the Belgian thesis, according to which all peoples are intitled to self-determination. In 
the international law of human rights, the right of self-determination for all peoples can be 
found from article 1(1) of the two UN Covenants of 1966. It differs from the other rights 
of the Covenants on account of its collective character.  That is why it has been used by 
the Indigenous peoples in the international forum. The right expressed is interpreted as a 
collective human right to democratic government, or internal self-determination. The 
concept of people is used only in the demographic sense of all the population of the self-
determination territorial unit as such. The right of self-determination was also incorporated 
as one of the seven basic principles of international law in the Friendly Relations Declaration. 
Under Western influence, “the emergence into any other political status freely determined 
by a people” was declared to be a mode of implementing the right of self-determination. The 
31   Charter of the United Nations (1945), art. 1-4; Anaya (2004), pp. 98-99; Buchanan (2007), pp. 410-411.
32   E.g. Hannum (1990), p. 49; Suksi (1998), pp. 82-86; Tsagourias (2007), pp. 209-210. 
33   Charter of the United Nations (1945), art. 1.2, 55.  
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Helsinki Final Act and the African Charter have brought forth the concepts of internal self-
determination and peoples.34
The right of self-determination implies a free determination by the people of the 
territory of their future political status. There are four possible modes of implementing the 
right: establishment of a sovereign independent state; free association with another state; 
integration with another state; and other political status freely determined by the people 
of the territory. The self-determination as organisation of territorial authority is related 
to the principle of democratic governance as a fundamental structure for achieving good 
governance. This is supported also in article 25 of the ICCPR, according to which rights to 
participate in public affairs, vote and access equally to public services belong to democratic 
self-determination rights. The modern concept of self-determination means also the right to 
freely pursue economic, social and cultural development, and the right to free disposition of 
natural resources.35
Self-determination is usually described in broad lines as a right of peoples. When it is an 
accepted principle, even jus cogens of international law, it is restricted in relation to minorities 
and indigenous peoples. The doctrine of state sovereignty also limits the implementation 
of self-determination. Some countries, like France, do not even recognise the existence of 
minorities. When a group entitled in international law to secession opts instead for self-
determination, when an appropriate international legal process has determined that the 
status granted by the state in question has violated the group’s right, or when the granting of 
autonomy is the best prospect for stopping persistent and serious rights violations, a claim to 
intrastate autonomy should be acknowledged.36
In Will Kymlicka’s liberal project self-determination is defined as a capacity to maintain a 
societal culture, to live within it and according to its unique traditions. Societal culture means 
here a culture which is able to sustain a unique and separate way of life or political entity, being 
the basis for the public life of a community. Self-determination is the creation of space that 
can function as a meaningful context of choice for a people to whom the dominant or public 
culture is too alien to provide meaningful life choices. To Kymlicka persons confined within a 
larger state have good grounds for demanding regional autonomy and self-government.37 
Autonomy means less than full self-determination but more than mere minority rights. Its 
subject is a recognised group and its collective rights. It needs a balance between territorial 
state and legitimate expressions of national or cultural identity on which smaller groups will 
34   UN Resolution 1541 (1960); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR,1966), art. 1(1); 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR, 1966), art. 1(1); ICJ, Case Concerning East 
Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995, Rep. 90; Nowak (2005), pp. 6-9, 14; Spiliopoulou-Åkermark (1997), p. 
28; Lâm, pp. 116-117. The right to all people refers besides the peoples under colonialism or alien subjuga-
tion, domination and exploitation to those living in independent states; Resolution 1541 stresses geograph-
ical, ethnic and cultural difference from the majority. 
35   ICCPR, art. 1; Aikio & Scheinin (2005), p. 14; Nowak (2005), p. 24.
36   Anaya (2004), pp. 13-14; Aikio & Scheinin (2005), p. 15; Buchanan (2007), p. 403. 
37   Kymlicka (1996b), pp. 80-87; 104-108. In Kymlicka’s model the indigenous claims are limited to defined 
land space. It preserves the status quo. What is outside the reserve land is the settler state unburdened by 
further claims; Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz list characteristics relevant to self-determination: a com-
mon character, group culture, a definition of membership, importance of membership for one’s self-identi-
fication, membership as belonging and pervasive culture. Cf. Kymlicka (1996b), pp. 82-85.
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continue to insist. An increasing type of autonomy is the territorial autonomy where the 
autonomy is geographically defined. But the autonomy can also be non-territorial. It can be 
cultural autonomy, protection of the minority’s identity, language and education. In personal 
autonomy the subjects are members of a group and their rights. In functional autonomy 
selected state functions and rights are transferred to private minority group organisations. 
Autonomy may serve to realise the internal self-determination. When the people are 
granted enough room for preserving their identity the autonomy works as a means to avoid 
secession.38 
According to Steve Curry a state needs political unity combined with the ability of the 
people to re-imagine itself on new terms. A state loses its justification the moment it ceases 
to be the expression of community interests. The disintegration of a state can in the ultimate 
sense lead to a secession of the state.39 The reasons can be various. The secession needs a 
strong territorial base for a collectivity, a distinct society and a disadvantaged relationship 
between the centre and the collectivity. There may be quests to preserve a distinct culture, 
self-defence or rectify past injustices. These interacting variables can make separatism at a 
certain historical moment a meaningful option. Still, the secession is today an exceptional 
choice. In international law it is only tolerated as an ultimate remedy in a situation of 
marked oppression. Norms of interstate conduct are an important barrier against secession. 
A potential secessionist territory has often historical roots and is viable as an independent 
state and needs a psychological boundary between itself and outsiders. In international 
case law the recognition has major importance. Because the self-determination is linked 
to the fundamental interest of just peace, the exercise of alleged right to self-determination 
leading to the creation of independent states might gravely endanger international peace. 
The international community wants to promote the exercise of self-determination under 
conditions safeguarding the broader interests of the maintenance of global stability and just 
peace. Recognition of external self-determination depends on the assessment of the prospects 
of the emerging domestic legal order and of its consistency with the broader values of the 
international community.40
38   Suksi (1998), pp. 13-24, 28, 86, 90.
39   Curry (2004), p. 136.
40   Heraclides (1990), pp. 13-14, 16, 19, 29, 32; Kymlicka (1996a), pp. 355, 364, 367; Tsagourias (2007), pp. 
220-222, 224. Only three post-war constitutions recognised theoretically a right to secession, in Burma, 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. An exceptional case was the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, where 
the departure of a majority from the geographically divided country was recognised as fait accompli. In 
the advisory opinion of the ICJ in Construction of the Wall case the recognition of a people as a source 
of authority is a major moment for the existence of the right of self-determination. ICJ, Construction of a 
Wall, 9 July 2004, s. 118. The Supreme Court of Canada defined in Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998) 
the objectives of stability and integration are as the major factors determining the legal obligations of both 
parties (s. 96).
66
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
Indigenous Rights 2.2. 
2.2.1. Noble Savage 
The era of explorations forced to define the status and nature of the encountered Indigenous 
communities. The first question was whether Indigenous people were human. In 1493 
Pope Alexander VI defined that Indians are as peaceful people humans and are able to be 
Christianized.41 Also Paul III declared (1537) that the Indians ought to be treated as true 
men, capable of understanding the Catholic faith.42 Urban VIII (1639) even threatened with 
excommunication those who would deprive the Indians of their liberty or property.43 Bishop 
Bartolomé de Las Casas became the most renowned defender of Indigenous rights in the 
sixteenth century with his History of Indies, which influenced the Spanish nuevos leyes, 
restricting the slavery in encomiendas. Francisco de Vitoria outlined the basic concepts of 
Indigenous peoples. He saw that state equality was applicable to all states. The Indigenous 
peoples were in a peaceable possession of their goods and should not be deprived of it under 
the pretext that they would not be the true proprietors: they were the true owners of their 
lands with dominion in both public and private matters. However, he accepted, like Thomas 
Acquinas, a just war when there was a just cause. But if the Indians were innocent, no such 
cause existed. A just war was more acceptable to Dominican father John Major, according to 
whom the Christian states could legitimately take to arms in cases of Indigenous resistance 
to gospel. 44
The Renaissance image of Indigenous people was mostly negative. Dominical friar 
Domingo de Betanzos described in the 1530s their idolatry with a view that Indians are brutal 
animals who cannot learn the mysteries of faith. There were also exceptions, like Michel de 
Montaigne, who wrote that they have, despite their immaturity, a common trait with the 
Europeans - the use of reason. The Salamanca Divines and Hugo Grotius confirmed that 
the legal principles governing the conduct of European princes extended to their activity in 
non-Christian parts of the world. Grotius, however, saw that all peoples have the ability to 
enter into treaty relationships. The Indians had a right to their property and possession. He 
accepted in the footsteps of Vitoria only peaceful conversion by preaching the gospel. Samuel 
Pufendorf was even more critical of foreign intervention to Indigenous society.45
The Indigenous peoples’ fate was formed by the “doctrine of three C’s”: civilisation, 
Christianisation and commerce. The ages of Absolutism and Enlightenment, brought forth 
a dual view on Indigenous societies. On the other hand, they lived in pre-social conditions 
without proper laws. Lacking the political development to qualify as nation, they were 
incapable of self-government. Thomas Hobbes described them as “savage people... who 
except the government of small families... have no government at all; and live at this day 
41   Alexander VI (1493). Alexander VI based his judgment on St. Augustine, who had explained that strangers 
who have man’s external appearance or customs and who know their origin, are without doubt descendants 
of Adam. Cf. Augustine (1972), pp. 661-664.
42   Paul III (1537).
43   Urban VIII (1639).
44   Morse (1985), pp. 20-22; Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), pp. 112, 114; Anaya (2004), pp. 16-
18. 
45   Montaigne (1965), p. 214; Dickason (1993), pp. 46-47; Morse (1985), pp. 23-24.
2. Unitary State and the Devolution of Powers
67
in the brutish manner”. To justify the acquirement of new territories there was gradually 
developed a theory of terra nullius, where discovery was employed to uphold colonial claims 
to indigenous lands. This doctrine underpinned especially the Australian jurisprudence until 
the 1980s.46  
On the other hand, indigenous people were noble savages, pure children of nature. The 
French missionaries in Canada in the early seventeenth century, especially the Jesuits in their 
influential Jesuit Relations, published mission reports and defended the viable civilisations 
of Iroquois tribes. In the background was religious motivation, but at the same time they 
expressed strong cultural relativism.47  Rousseau described aristocratically the first societies 
governed: “The savages of North America govern themselves still in that way in our days, 
and are very well governed”.48 Neither did Montesquieu support the idea of spreading 
European ideas and religion to other continents.49 Locke’s principle of contractual treaty of 
commonwealth recognised the existing rights of the Native government. Those who have the 
supreme power to make laws in European countries can have no more power than what every 
man naturally may have over another. When Indians signed treaties with non-Indians the 
bonds they established were for specific purposes. Locke also recognised Indians’ proprietary 
rights, although he saw that they could lose the right due to their inefficient use of land: a right 
to own property demanded work to make the land profitable.50 
Emmerich de Vattel defined the law of nations where the discrete body of law dealt 
exlusively with states. For him the nation and state became interchangeable terms. Among the 
free and independent nations, each nation should be left alone to judge its own obligations, 
including its citizenry. Vattel articulated the doctrine of state sovereignty which was later 
employed in justifying an unequal power relationship between Indigenous peoples and 
colonial/settler states. The establishment of European colonies in North America was in just 
limits entirely lawful, and once under the rule of another, it was no longer a state, or under 
the law of nations. The establishment of colonial administrations necessitated a conscious 
effort to reproduce the conditions for the centralised states they represented back home. 
One of the conditions was cultural uniformity. Popular sovereignty became a vehicle to 
transmit European cultures to indigenous peoples. That led to “white man’s burden”. Popular 
sovereignty as a unifying concept brought with it cultural imperialism. The nation-building 
dealt often with national chauvinism, which implied a process of national integration, an 
amalgamation or a melting-pot of peoples. Assimilation and protection went hand in hand. 
On the other hand, the sovereignty was distinguished in European legal systems from property 
rights. The acquisition by a colonising European power did not necessarily entail acquisition 
of proprietary land. According to the principles of British colonial and international law, 
the local peoples land rights continued under their own systems of law after the acquisition 
46   Kymlicka (1996b), p. 22; Castellino & Allen (2003), pp. 199, 202; Anaya (2004), pp. 22, 29.  The notion of 
terra nullius was finally overruled in Mabo (2) v. Queensland (1988), where the Native title was recognised. 
Also ICJ took opinion in the Western Sahara case on the question. There must be taken into regard the 
freely expressed wishes of the people of the territory notwithstanding their character or political status im-
mediately before the colonisation. ICJ, Western Sahara.
47   Thwaites (1897), Vol. XXI, p. 55; Vol. L. p. 171.
48   Rousseau (1960), p.282. 
49   Montesquieu (1977), pp. 289-290, 337.
50   Locke (1988), pp. 273, 287, 298.
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of sovereignty by the British Crown and became enforceable in common law courts. This is 
called the doctrine of continuity.51
2.2.2. Marshall Trilogy and the Colonial Policy
The so-called Marshall trilogy of the United States Supreme Court decisions, named after 
Chief Justice John Marshall, has been important for common law countries. The cases defined 
the status of Indian nations. In Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) the court heard an appeal where 
two parties had a claim to same piece of land. Marshall CJ ruled that the law of land was settled 
by the principle of the acquisition of sovereignty through discovery and subsequent conquest. 
Such law served as the basis of the sovereignty from which the court held its authority. A 
purchase from Indians on behalf of the federal state at best amounted to a purchase of, or 
negotiation of compensation for the loss of, the Indians’ right of usage which the government 
could terminate at will. This position continued the doctrine of classical sovereignty where the 
sovereign is the ultimate source of law within the state. Marshall approached the act of state 
doctrine, developed in common law countries, to deal with issues raised by the relationship 
between sovereign nation-states. Sovereignty of the United States was transferred by a treaty 
and by the rights of war from the sovereignty of Great Britain in North America. The discoverer 
asserted a sole right to settle or acquire non-European lands. The Crown placed itself into 
a relationship of superiority over Indigenous peoples. The Indians had established a prior 
possession, having rights of occupancy, subject only to remaining in peace with the sovereign 
and an exclusive right of the federal state to extinguish their title. Marshall’s doctrine was 
used as a guide to the proper legal procedure for dispossession.52
In 1831 the Cherokee Indians fought for recognition of their status as a sovereign and 
independent nation, having ultimate and original jurisdiction on and in lands recognised 
as their sovereign territory in a succession of treaties made with the United States. The laws 
of the state of Georgia purported to seize the land still occupied by the Cherokee and to 
extend the operation of all its laws to Indigenous territory. On the basis of the United States’ 
sovereignty, Marshall had to develop a new principle based on the act of state doctrine which 
would be consistent with recognition of Indian jurisdictions, rights to land, autonomy and 
governments. He forged a doctrine of domestic dependent nations. The tribes had by making 
treaties placed themselves under the United States protection and were part of the territory. 
Also in Worcester v. Georgia (1832) the court recognised that the Cherokee were as a nation in 
possession of usufructuary title. The decision validated their claim to autonomy and recognised 
their right to make treaties, freely entered into by both parties and binding in law. The pre-
contract rights to land, resources and self-government became a burden to the title and acts 
of the federal state which could be annulled by any act explicitly abrogating the treaties on 
51   Eide & Krause & Rosas (2001), p. 96; Anaya (2004), pp. 21, 23; Curry (2004), pp. 89, 98-99; McHugh (2004), 
p. 216; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 258-260.
52   USSC, Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. William McIntosh (1823); Curry (2004), pp. 55, 60-62. The same rea-
soning can be found in Brennan J’s  ruling in Mabo v. Queensland (1988). Both acknowledge the indigenous 
title, but limit the extent of rights because the settle state’s inherent sovereignty is incompatible with their 
holding of title or enforceable rights.
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the part of the United States.53 The doctrine of domestic dependent nations recognised the 
independent existence of indigenous nations, their government and laws before discovery, 
and a non-unitary relationship that was akin to protectorates in international law.
The nineteenth century positivist international law continued the early modern age’s 
legocentric doctrine where Indigenous peoples were closed outside the political community. 
The international law treated Natives as uncivilised and therefore, outside of its scope. The 
law of nations did not apply to “organized wandering tribes”. The social evolutionism and 
legal positivism’s assertion of law’s capacity to shape and regulate conduct favoured the policy 
of assimilation which became a self-serving justification for more pragmatic ends. It aimed 
at a culturally undifferentiated population where the Indigenous people would disappear as 
distinct communities. The Indigenous law was treated as subordinate to the official law of 
the state. The Indigenous people were to walk the path to maturity and become part of the 
European story. The policy of assimilation was tied to the settler-state’s own image. The law 
became a means of dissolving tribalism and opening access to indigenous land. There was 
interplay between law as an instrument of cultural transformation and Indigenous resistance 
to change.54
During the nineteenth century the colonial countries adopted a policy of guardianship 
over Indigenous peoples. The British and French colonial powers had a different policy, 
though: while the English common law developed a pattern of administration along the 
lines of a simple protectorate and the system of indirect rule, the French civil law principle 
preferred the direct control of the mother country. The British system of indirect rule was 
content to prohibit repugnant customs opposed to justice, equity and good conscience, 
while the French colonial legal regulation limited the customary rule to private rights and 
duties. Where custom had been retained, it could be replaced if people themselves chose to 
accept European law by opting for it through some form of registration. France needed the 
colonies to spread its civilising mission but also for economic and demographic reasons. The 
colonies became laboratoires de modernité. The British jurisdiction recognised the capacity 
of non-Christian rulers to grant the Crown an imperium or jurisdiction in certain territory. 
There were two kinds of imperium: territorial sovereignty and extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
Many cases of the late nineteenth and early twenteeth centuries recognised that the treaties of 
cession between the Crown and “uncivilised” polities were arrangements concluded between 
two sovereign powers, and some of the indigenous peoples had even a structure which 
reminded of European structures. Despite the recognition of original tribal sovereignty it 
had in common law interpretation disappeared in the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty. The 
53   USSC, The Cherokee Nation vs. The State of Georgia (1831); USSC, Samuel A. Worcester, in error, vs. The 
State of Georgia (1832); Curry (2004), pp. 62-64. Despite the Supreme Court’s doctrine the Cherokee were 
forcibly relocated from their traditional areas in 1838. This process is known as “the Trail of Tears”. Some 
later Supreme Court decision, like Tee-Hit-Ton (1954), neglected the existence of an Indigenous settled 
system of law. In the 1970s, the politics began to turn again. In 1972, President Nixon spoke of Indian self-
determination as the basic principle for United States Indian Policy. The new legislation, including the Self-
Determination and Education Act (1975) and Indian Child Welfare Act (1978) reflected this policy. The 
residual tribal sovereignty was reconfirmed in the USSC case Martinez (1978). 
54   Roberts (1963), pp. 67; Anaya (2004), p. 29; McHugh (2004), pp. 217-218; Branting & Kymlicka (2006), p. 
61.
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Crown’s de jure sovereignty was regarded as absolute. A retroactive reversal and adoption of 
a divided sovereignty model was not feasible.55
During the 1870s was developed the trusteeship doctrine as part of the civilising mission. 
In Britain the doctrine signified that the Crown could unilaterally establish jurisdiction over 
the natives and its own subjects inhabiting in uncivilised territories. Towards the end of the 
nineteenth century the Crown could erect jurisdiction over its subjects unilaterally where 
no stable native polity existed in uncivilised territory. This doctrine led to special legislation, 
like the Pacific Islanders Protection Act (1875). Despite the stand of the common law courts 
that the government’s formal relations with non-Christian people were non-justiciable, the 
Crown was gradually ready to recognise in protectorates the division of sovereignty over 
territory. The external sovereignty belonged to Crown, while the Indigenous peoples could 
preserve the internal sovereignty. The Indigenous political forms were, however, subordinated 
and marginalised. Where a European country had assumed the sovereignty, the indigenous 
people were a legal unit only – if so recognised - within the municipal law. Also France moved 
from assimilation towards this kind of association at the turn of the twenteeth century. The 
protective role of the international community was continued during the League of Nations 
with the “sacred trust of civilisation”.56
 After the World War II the social scientists believed in the end of ethnicity as a primordial 
form of group organisation, rooted in history, fixed in content and pre-modern in form. 
The constructivist model explained that the ethnic identity could be chosen, changed 
or maintained. The ethnic groups were constantly recreating themselves in a process of 
construction or invention. Also the legal liberalism challenged the indigenous particularism 
in the 1960s, treating all citizens as equal and focusing on the welfare state and civil and 
political rights. Many governments proposed to remove the special legal rights and status of 
Indigenous peoples. These theories were challenged in the era of self-determination.57 
55   Curry (2004), pp. 77-78; McHugh (2004), pp. 203, 205, 293; Daughton (2006), pp. 5, 10, 13; Menski (2009), 
pp. 448, 454-456. Two examples of this interpretion in Privy Council’s case law are Re Southern Rhodesia 
(1919), where was recognised king Lobengula’s sovereignty over the Mashona and Matabele tribes, and 
Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land Board (1941), which recognised the original sover-
eignty of Māori Tribes.
56   Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), art. 22; Roberts (1963), pp. 30-32; Anaya (2004), pp. 31-33; 
McHugh (2004), pp. 209-210, 212. 214, 295. From 1891 the British Protectorates became an arrangement 
between personal imperium of extraterritorial jurisdiction and a full authority of territorial sovereignty. 
In the background was the Berlin African Conference, which declared the obligation of colonial powers 
to watch over the preservation of native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their 
moral and material well-being. Cf. Final Act of the Berlin Africa Conference (1885), art. 6; In the Island of 
Palma Case the Permanent Court of International Justice denied the validity of the treaty making power of 
indigenous peoples. Cf. PCIJ, Island of Palma (1928), s. 831, 856.
57   McHugh (2004), pp. 220-224, 354.
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2.2.3. Modern Developments and Discussion 
By the mid-1970s the nation-states were abandoning the policy of assimilation. The movement 
of self-determination reflected both international and domestic pressure. The international 
community increasingly learned to value and promote the integrity of diverse cultures within 
existing state units. The ethnically homogenous nation-state was giving way to the model 
of a plurinational or pluricultural state. The Indigenous peoples demanded respect for their 
presence and claims, including the recognition of their status. The Treaty negotiations with 
themes of inner self-determination and self-government, and the claim processes with 
rehabilitation of past grievances appeared on stage. The claims placed historical emphasis 
on the validation of authority of the traditional territory-based aboriginal polities. Many 
cases opened the door to doctrinal development, articulating principles for the conduct of 
the relations between governments and Indigenous peoples. In the 1980s and 1990s in the 
politics of many countries’ a dramatic change took place. It has led to a legal recognition of 
Indigenous rights and self-determination, although there have also been setbacks. The process 
has been demanding: it has asked the governments to adopt a new cultural orientation. The 
Indigenous governance has become a subject to ongoing constitutional audit by settler-states. 
The post-recognition period, started in the 1990s with the policy of reconciliation, has been 
characterised by mutual dialogues and agreements. The Indigenous groups have placed new 
demands on their outmoded structures and processes. On the other hand, they have been 
required to adopt constitutionalised forms and find means to resolve their internal disputes. 
The Indigenous affairs are increasingly legalised. The international law has recognised the 
rights of Indigenous groups and individuals premised on their self-identification practices as 
groups and individuals within the groups. This self-identifying status is also strongly present 
in the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.58  
The only binding international legal instrument referring specifically and collectively to 
indigenous peoples is the ILO Convention No. 169. It is could be a unique universally binding 
standard on Indigenous land rights if it would be more commonly ratified.  It combines rights 
as enforceable minima with social goals as aspirational maxima. The Indigenous peoples’ 
relation to land has collective character, including the spiritual and cultural dimensions. The 
Convention declares that “indigenous peoples have the right to retain their own customs and 
institutions where they are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national 
legal system and with internationally recognised human rights.” James Anaya estimates that 
a large majority of the norms contained in the convention are an expression of customary 
international law. Other important forums for indigenous issues have been the UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP) which prepared the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007), The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues as the subsidiary organ of ECOSOC 
– one of the principle organs of the UN, and the Organisation of American States and its 
Human Rights Court and Interamerican Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
58   Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples (2007); McHugh (2004), pp, 308, 315-316, 321, 355-
360, 363.
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(draft).The United Nations declared the years 1994-2004 as Decade of Indigenous Peoples 
and again since 2005.59
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities protects the existence and identity of minority members. It asks the 
states to adapt their legislation and make it effective concerning the protection and support of 
minorities. The minorities have a right to effective participation in cultural, religious, social, 
economic and public life.60 As most international legal instruments, it however, recognises 
only the individual rights of cultural minorities. 
There are several modern definitions on Indigenous rights. Benedict Kingsbury has 
identified five grounds for the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights. They are human 
rights and non-discrimination claims, minority claims, self-determination claims and claims 
as Indigenous peoples, including those based on treaties or other agreements between 
indigenous peoples and states.61 In relation to self-determination claims, the Harvard Project 
on American Indian Economic Development (1992) has identified as denominators for 
effective governance stable institutions and policies, fair and effective dispute resolution, 
separation of politics from business management, competent bureaucracy and cultural match. 
Self-government is an overarching political dimension of ongoing self-determination while 
self-determination and economic prosperity are inextricably linked. The core idea is that 
government functions according to the will of the people which is governed. With greater 
self-government leaders are more accountable to the members of the community and their 
decisions are more likely to be in tune with the cultural values of the community.62
Angus Fleras and Yale Belanger have defined different models of indigenous self-government. 
Fleras classifies them as statehood, nationhood, community, and institution models. 1) The 
statehood may strive for absolute sovereignty, which means complete independence and 
territorial autonomy with internal and external autonomy, and without external interference. 
2) In the nationhood model the sovereignty is shared and the independence is partial with 
internal autonomy. 3) Municipal or community self-government is functional. It follows the 
model of communal administration and is limited to internal jurisdiction. 4) The institutional 
model is the weakest form of self-government, which Fleras connects to urban Indigenous 
people. It can reach a nominal sovereignty, which has participation and representation rights. 
It participates in the decision making and the institutional accommodation.63 Belanger’s four 
pathways to Indigenous self-government are   mini-municipality with delegated, limited 
bylaws mainly over local concern; adapted federalism as a negotiated mix of jurisdictions 
59   Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1991), art. 8(2), 13(1); 
UN Resolution A/Res/59/174 (2004); Knopp (2002), pp. 242, 255-256; Castellino & Allen (2003), pp. 206, 
215; Anaya (2004), pp. 61-62. WGIP has been replaced by an expert mechanism.
60   UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minori-
ties (1992), art. 1, 1(2), 2(1)-(3). The Declaration was influenced by the Copenhagen Document of CSCE 
(1990) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages of the Council of Europe (1992). 
“Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities have the right to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in 
public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination. Cf. art. 2(1).
61   Kingsbury (2001), 189.
62   The State of Native Nations (2008), pp. 20-21, 70.
63   Macka & Fleras (2005), pp. 52-55.
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and authorities over internal, cultural and external matters; third order of government as a 
negotiated mix of jurisdictions and authorities over internal, cultural and external matters; 
and nation-to-nation model with inherent and negotiated comprehensive separate and shared 
powers.64 Still, many of these determinants are today weak or lacking. Many Indigenous 
groups are institutionally hollowed out. Their languages have fallen into near distinction, 
they have limited land space left and their culture is mixed. In this light Jacob Levy views the 
rights to self-determination and self-government as being at best instrumentally justified.65 
Curry abandons the mere self-determination model. He demands for indigenous peoples 
the right to exercise sovereignty as a people, as a sovereign nation. This right would be limited 
by competing interests that morally burden the exercise of the sovereign rights. The exercise of 
sovereignty affects the law and other constitutive matters of society. It involves a retrospective 
re-imagining of the terms of engagement. Non-Indigenous citizens of settler states have to 
accept alteration to their ways of doing things to give way in some measure to Indigenous 
people’s ways of doing things. The exercise of indigenous sovereignty must include the right 
to reserve consent until terms of engagement are agreed, and to reserve the right to lay claim 
to land and resources. There must be also a presumptive right to secession. Curry estimates 
that the three major questions which limit this process are the existing property rights of 
non-Indigenous individuals and communities, the positive law and the Indigenous challenge 
to Western democratic liberty. He admits that an idea about Indigenous sovereignty emerges 
as a complex arrangement of self-government alongside constitutional recognition, legal 
integration and negotiation. Its starting point is the recognition of sovereign right.66
A new specific problem emerged with the urban indigenous groups whose weight has 
increased significantly. Their fluidity forms a major challenge to governments. The territorial 
orthodoxy still holds that the control of a geometrically delimited space is the necessary and 
sufficient condition of power and legal order. Another model is the personality of laws. The 
basis is in personal membership in an ethnocultural or national group. The communalised or 
ethnicised law can translate into personal or cultural autonomy for a non-territorial ethnic 
group. This is a considerable choice for those people, whose connection to tribal membership 
is often weak but who still identify themselves as being Indigenous. They argue that their 
situation is a direct outcome of colonialism. They want to partake in indigenous self-
governance. Still, the response of national governments has been often that of neglect. Since 
the 1980s the situation has been gradually changing. The question about the juridical origins 
of the government’s constitutional relationship with the tribal nations has shown on the other 
hand that the justification is not only historical and political association, but also a dynamic 
process. Many groups have become involved with service delivery, establishing contractual 
relations with governments and municipalities in welfare-related matters.67
64   Belanger (2008), p. 160.
65   Macedo & Buchanan, pp. 120-123.
66   Curry (2004), pp. 149-154, 157. 
67   McHugh (2004), pp. 439-441; Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), pp. 137-139. Vice versa, there are also 
some cases, where non-indigenous people live in territories which are handed over to indigenous people 
and are partly under the latter’s jurisdiction. Cf. Sechelt and Westbank First Nations in Canada. 
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The Constitutional Principles2.3. 
The constitutional principles have different significance in the compared countries. In France 
these principles have had since the revolution great importance and constitutional law, case 
law and legal science have all developed them further. New Zealand and Canada have their 
background in unwritten principles of the English Constitution. Canada has later developed 
domestic doctrine through the Constitution Act, 1982, and case law, while New Zealand still 
follows the English doctrines refined during the nineteenth century. Therefore, the focus in 
this subsection is on France and Canada.
2.3.1. France
The French Revolution wanted to take distance to the disunion of ancien régime. The creation 
of new, centralised system of administration and the promotion of the French language 
were among the means to reform the state. Although the development towards a more 
centralised state had begun since the sixteenth century, the revolution was a great turning 
point: an amalgam of expressions of national fervour and commitment to democratic ideals. 
The constitutional law was introduced as the regulator of public power. The concern was 
predominantly with the division of institutional competence. Today bloc de constitutionnalité 
(cf. section 1.3.1) includes many expressions of French constitutional principles. These 
principles are due to historical reasons and based on revolutionary idealism more dominant 
in France than in the common law countries (with the exception of the United States).68
2.3.1.1.  Une république indivisible 
The unitary state of France does not formally recognise the existence of ethnically distinct 
minorities. The preservation of unity, a nation one and indivisible, has been central to its 
“Jacobin” tradition.69 Bodin used for the first time the notion of sovereignty which integrated 
the country as a centralised territorial state under an absolutist king who was above the 
law, yielding unlimited and undivided authority over his subjects. The king had all the 
power that a government could legitimately exercise and restraints on his power were mere 
recommendations of prudence and good government. The monarchy tried to unite the 
heterogeneous kingdom.70 Rousseau defined the sovereignty as inalienable and indivisible. But 
unlike the predecessors and successors, he and Montesquieu did not exclude the possibility 
68   Sheleff (2000), p. 57; Bell (2001), p. 9; Dorcen (2003), p. 387. Similarities between France and the United 
States in this question can be explained due to a similar revolutionary background and strong reciprocical 
overseas influence during the late eighteenth century. “La France est une République indivisible, laïque, 
démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de 
race ou de réligion”, cf. Constitution (1958), art. 1.
69   Debbasch (1996), pp. 360, 362; UNHRC, Mission to France (2008), p. 7. 
70   Bodin (1991), pp. 56-57, 100-102. Bodin created the notion competences of the Crown (competences régali-
ennes), which has become current again in New Caledonia and French Polynesia when defining the share 
of competences.
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of a federal republic as a form of constitutional structure.71 With the revolution, a more rigid 
form of indivisibility was included to the early constitutions.72 The later constitutions have 
repeated the theme that only the people may decide to cede a territory.73  
  According to Hannah Arendt, in the French Revolution the power belonged to the 
people, which was the source for the legitimacy of power. The fathers of the revolution sought 
for laws absolute legitimation from transcendent source. The general will became a substitute 
to the king’s will, a source for power and authority. The people’s power was understood as an 
irresistible landslide power of nature. The danger in this ideology was that the people’s will 
aimed at forming a unity which would level down the differences of opinion.74
Tzvetan Todorov speaks about French exceptionalism. Legacies of 1789 are the belief in 
distinct history, culture and society. Ethnocentrism is seen in this ideology as a mission and 
the nation as a distinguishable whole. The principle of all sovereignty rests essentially in the 
nation. While the Western model of nation-state is not pure, the solidarity of nation goes 
deeper - it is sustained by a  legal framework. The French nationhood was born artificially 
from two different geographical areas and several distinct provinces, based on the people. 
Consciousness of being France was a child of growing central authority. There was born the 
nation as an imagined landscape, an identity based on myth. The nation was an artefact of the 
state. Therefore, the commitment to an imagined community must be renewed constantly.75 
The indivisible republic assures equality of all citizens before the law without distinction 
of origine, race or religion. The Constitional Council has referred to the preamble of the 1946 
Constitution which allows only those restrictions to sovereignty which are necessary to the 
organisation and defence of peace. The indivisibility means that the people itself is indivisible. 
The Constitution recognises only the French people, composed of all French citizens without 
distinction of origin, race or religion. The Constitution also prohibits advantaged collective 
rights to a distinct group defined by origin, culture, language or belief. The state has the 
monopoly on legislative, governmental and administrative powers. In principle, all delegation 
of legislative power is forbidden, but the state has the power to define and change the limits of 
its competence.76 Therefore, both the powers of the European Union and New Caledonia are 
included in the Constitution which is the supreme law.
A logical consequence of this ideology is that France has no national minorities in the legal 
sense. The French policy has stressed integration on a voluntary basis, creating a common 
identity, an integration of all individuals who share a common cultural and historical legacy 
- a process of long acculturation. According to Pierre Bourdieu, the identity is determined by 
71   Rousseau (1960), p. 243-253.
72   Constitution de l’an I (1793), art. 7-8; Constitution de l’an VIII (1799), art .1. A Girondin view from the 
early days of the revolution: “le gouvernement fédératif ne convient pas à un grand peuple, à cause de la 
lenteur des opérations éxecutives, de la multiplication et de l’embarras des rouages”. Cf. Debbasch (1996), p. 
362.
73   Constitution (1946), art. 27; Constitution (1958), art. 53. 
74   Arendt (1963), pp. 156, 179.
75   DDHC (1789), art. 3; Todorov, (1993), p. 1-3, 240-246; Sheleff (2000), pp. 65-67.
76   Constitution (1946), Préambule; Constitution (1958), art. 1, 3; Malberg (1930), pp. 260-262; CC, Décision 
no. 76-71 DC du 30 décembre 1976; Décision no. 91-290 DC du 9 mai 1991, ss. 10-13. The controversial 
sentence in the bill was “...le peuple corse composante du peuple français.”
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legitimate authority, which imposes the proper definitions to all in society. These definitions 
of identity work as a system of classification for all groups.77
2.3.1.2. Secularism
One distinct feature in French constitutional law is laïcité, which is secularism that means a 
strict de jure separation of the state and religion. During ancien régime the Catholic Church 
had the monopoly on public worship, instruction, poor relief and hospitals and all the King’s 
subjects were legally Catholics. During the revolution the tide turned: in a few years all the 
privileges of the church were abolished. A new turn took place when Napoléon I made a 
concordat with the church in 1801. The catholic faith became “the religion of a great majority 
of the Frenchmen”. This policy continued until the third republic, where began a continuous 
struggle between the church’ supporters and secularists. The school laws (1882) had the 
objective to create a secular primary education for all while the law on associations (1901) 
laid down a general principle of freedom of association. The religious congregations could 
only be formed when specifically authorised by the law. 78 
 In the turn of the twenteeth century the republican supporters of laïcité gained power. 
Combes’ government introduced the separation of the church and state. The law came 
into force in 1905. Although it ended the privileges of the church, the outcome was more 
a compromise. The parishes became cult associations. They could use freely their churches 
but they transferred to departments’ and municipalities’ ownership. The state funding was 
restricted for special purposes and the religious education in public schools was abolished. 
With time there came several easements to the strict letter of the law. There were also some 
exceptions to the general rule: in former Italian territories the church buildings as well as 
those built after 1905 stayed the cult associations’ property. In Alsace and Lorraine, former 
Germany territory, the Concordat is still in force with public funding and public religious 
education. A third exception are French Guiana, Mayotte, and Wallis and Futuna. In the 1920s 
the French legislature allowed diocesan associations, which made the law more acceptable to 
the Holy See. In 1958 secularism was included to the Constitution but the private religious 
schools were allowed public funding with the condition that they accepted the national 
curriculum.79 
77   Hargreaves (1995), p. 162; Kuche (2004), p. 87. When accessing to ICCPR Convention in 1980 France gave 
a declaration:”In the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, the French Government 
declares that article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned”; UN Special Rapporteur Capo-
torti has emphasised that “international protection of minorities does not depend on official recognition of 
their existence”. Anaya, pp. 136-137.
78   Constitution de 1814, art. 5-6; Loi du 1 juillet 1901, titre III; Concordat de 1801, préambule; Lacouture 
(1940), pp. 3-6, 25-26; Miquel (1976), pp. 407-416; Doyle (1992), pp. 136-146.  
79   Constitution (1958), art. 1; Loi du 9 décembre 1905, art. 2; Loi no. 59-1557 du 31 décembre 1959, art. 4-5; 
Ordonnance no. 2000-549 du 15 juin 2000, art. 7; Proclamation relative aux cultes du 27 gérminal, l’an X de 
la République une et indivisible; Briand (1905); Bell (2001), pp. 149-150; Levêques (2005); Kedward (2006), 
pp. 3-11, 26, 28-29. The religious orders were authorised only in 1942, when a law of the Vichy regime im-
posed on them substantially the same requirements for formation as other associations; at the beginning, 
the law of 1905 broke off the diplomatic relations between France and the Holy See, but during the 1930s 
began a slow recovery.
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In France the state is neutral in relation to all creeds but their rights are respected. During 
Mitterrand’s presidency there was, however, a bitter struggle over confessional, private 
education. Mitterrand’s administration had to finally move towards a politics of consensus 
and since 2000 the it has been possible to arrange religious education during the school 
hours. Another challenge to the policy has been the Muslim student’s use of headscarfs. The 
French legislator has forbidden the openly religious symbols in public spaces (2004) and the 
hiding of faces on public places (2010).80 
 
2.3.1.3. Democratic and Social Republic
In the post-war left-dominance in politics the Fourth Republic brought to French constitutional 
law a strong social aspect. The list of fundamental principles in its Preamble is a rather vague 
category but is often referred to by the courts. The present Constitution asserts the democratic 
nature of its institutions: France is a democratic republic and the authorities must respect 
the principle. The people is a constitutional organ which appoints the holders of political 
authority, participates directly in certain political decisions and takes part in political life.The 
Constitutional Council has decided that the state has an exclusive and hierarchically superior 
competence to define and set the conditions for the exercise of fundamental freedoms, which 
are the same for all the territory of the republic. That competence cannot be transferred to 
territorial collectivities.81 
The fundamental freedoms guarantee the integrity of a citizen’s physical person. The 
Declaration of 1789 is an important constitutional document that defines their legal and 
philosophical basis. It also set the necessary limits on expressions of individual autonomy.  The 
citizens have an inseparable, sacred and natural right to participate in public affairs; freedom 
to do everything which does not disturb the others; freedom of thinking and consciousness; 
inviolability of the home; equality before the law; and the right to ownership, security and 
non-discrimination. The internal freedoms enable the citizens to acquire and develop their 
knowledge, beliefs, and fundamental philophical and religious attitudes, including especially 
the freedom of thought and education. The external freedoms enable the individual to act 
and to give practical expression to his/her fundamental freedoms and freedoms of thought 
through the freedom of association and press. The social and economic freedoms are included 
in the Preamble of 1946. They are related to  worker’s status (freedom and equality of workers 
before employers, freedom to belong to trade unions, right to strike, right to codetermination 
on working conditions, right to take part in the management of the firm, and right to 
professional training); economic rights (management of firm, nationalisation); and social 
80   Loi no. 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004; La rapport de la Commission Stasi sur la laïcité (2003); Loi no. 2010-
1192 du 11 octobre 2010; Kedward (2005), pp. 496-497, 556-557.
81   CC, Décision 84-185 DC du 18 janvier 1985; Cairns & McKeon (1998), p. 106; Steiner (2002), p. 8. 
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rights (state’s active role, guarantees for families, social insurance, equal responsibility for 
burdens, equal access to education, professional training and culture).82
2.3.1.4. Equality and Education
The Constitution preserves the revolutionary motto: liberty, equality and brotherhood. 
The republican tradition, which unites the various legal and political sources of the present 
Constitution, encompasses both formal and substantive equality. Privilege as such is outlawed, 
but the affirmative action created by law is not. The concept is used to designate prohibited 
grounds for differentiating between citizens with regards to the provisions of the law.83 
Equality has been frequently invoked before the Constitutional Council although it is 
mainly concerned with non-discrimination in relation to specific constitutional values. 
The council wants to ensure a rational relationship between the provisions of law and the 
constitutional or legislative objectives that they are intended to achieve. The conception 
of equality is limited and essentially formal. Equality before the law is concerned with the 
differences in the categories in which the law places citizens and in the rules that it applies to 
them.84 
The Constitution treats equality in a fragmented way due to the tension between conflicting 
values within the republican tradition which is a series of texts. Equality before law and equality 
in voting are the only directly relevant provisions on the matter. The principal text invoked in 
recent years is the Declaration of 1789 which mentions equal rights in birth, equal treatment 
by law, equal access to public offices and equality before public burdens. The preamble of 1946 
lists especially racial and religious equality, equality between the sexes, equality before public 
burdens and national disasters, and equal access to education and culture. The Constitutional 
Council has since 1973 built these fragmentary texts into a pattern. On the other hand, some 
scholars consider that equality is not a general constitutional value in a strict sense, but it 
creates specific constitutional and paraconstitutional principles binding the legislator to a 
greater or less extent.85 
Education has since ancien régime promoted the nationhood. The Ferry laws (1881-1882) 
made of public and secular primary schools both free and compulsory. On the other hand, 
the freedom to open private educational establishments was recognised in several phases. 
82   DDHC (1789), art. 2, 4, 6, 10-11; Constitution (1946), Préambule, § 5, 8-13; Morange (1988), pp. 40-41, 
86-87; Roche & Pouille (1993), p. 6; Cairns & McKeon (1998), pp. 115-120; Van Caenegem (2000), p. 182. 
DDHC was influenced by the Enlightenment and the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776); The rights in 
the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946 are as follows: “...le peuple proclame à nouveau que tout être hu-
main, sans distinction de race, de réligion ni de croyance, possède des droits inalienable et sacrés...” (§ 1), 
“La loi garantit à la femme, dans tout les domains, des droits égaux à ceux de l’homme” (§ 3), “La nation 
garantit l’égal accès de l’enfant et de l’adulte à l’instruction, à la formation professionnelle et à la culture. 
L’organisation de l’enseignement public, gratuit et laïque est un devoir de l’Etat (§ 13).
83   Bell (2001), pp. 200-201. The legislator is free to identify factual differences for introducing discrimination 
to legislation when they are rationally related to the purposes of legislation. This is called equality through 
differentiation.
84   Bell (2001), pp. 199-200.
85   DDHC (1789), art. 1, 6, 13; Préambule (1946), § 1, 3, 12-13; Constitution  (1958), art. 2-3; Luchaire (1986), 
p. 1229; Bell (2001), p.202.
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More contentious was the right of private educational establishments to obtain contracts of 
association with the state. Debré law (1959) finally ensured that many private schools could 
enjoy state subsidies, at the cost of some limits to their independence.86  
Freedom of education has been a notorious battleground due to the secular character 
of France. The preamble of 1946 defines the free and secular public education in all levels 
as a duty of the state and guarantees an equal access for children and adults to instruction, 
to professional training, and to the culture. Debré law provides that the state respects the 
freedom of education, and guarantees its exercise to lawfully opened private establishments. 
According to the Constitutional Council the freedom of education is a constitional value: 
the preamble of 1946 does not excludes the existence of private education, nor the granting 
of state aid which is permitted by the Constitution. Legal changes have reaffirmed the 
dominance of the state in the educational sector, which is upheld in the decisions of the 
Constitutional Council. The school reforms were not allowed to be interpreted as infringing 
upon the specific character of private establishments or their public funding.87 
2.3.1.5. Language Rights 
In France there is an exceptionally strong bond between the language and state but the 
predominance of the French language has a short history. In the beginning of the Modern 
Age it was spoken predominantly in the province of Île-de-France and a variety of regional 
languages dominated elsewhere. The promotion of the French language began together with 
the birth of the nation-state. Bodin wrote that compelling subjects to change their language 
is a mark of sovereignty. The ideals of revolution associated for the first time the language 
and nation together. The regional languages belonged to the past heritage of ancien régime. 
The united and indivisible republic needed symbols of unity - the linguistic diversity was an 
obstacle to national unity and the reach of satisfaction.88
The French Revolution was characterised as struggle between the Monarchist, rural, 
Catholic France of regional languages and the Republican, urban, secular France promoting 
the French language but it took a long time before the French language obtained a dominant 
position in society. Four major reasons for the decline of regional languages were the 
86   Sheleff (2000), p. 66; Bell (2001), p. 152; Histoire du français. 
87   Constitution (1946), Préambule, § 13; Loi du 31 décembre 1959, art. 1; Loi no. 85-97 du 25 janvier 1985; 
CC, Décision no. 84-185 DC de 18 janvier 1985; Décision  no. 94-329 DC du 13 janvier 1994; Décision no. 
77-87 DC, 23 November 1977; Favoreau (1981), p. 597; Favoreau & Philip (1991), pp. 374-375. Cf. reference 
260. 
88   Bodin (1991), p. 86; Sibille (2000), p. 15-16; The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and 
the French Dilemma (2002), p. 25; Hobsbawm (1990), p. 21. In 1789, only 12-13% of Frenchmen spoke the 
French fluently. Another 50% did not speak it at all; Hobsbawm has indicated that the combination of lan-
guage and nationalism was only a nineteenth century invention. Here France forms a clear exception. The 
Jacobin wing of revolution needed strong symbols for centralisation; France has 75 different languages. 55 
of these are spoken in the overseas territories.
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establishment of general public education in French (1882), the prohibition to use patois in 
public life (1902), the end of religious education in public schools (1905) and the army.89 
A new phase in the promotion of the French language began in the 1970s. In the 
background was the concern of the advancement of the English language. French was made 
a compulsory language in all advertising and for commercial purposes and the use of foreign 
expressions was prohibited when possible (1975), and for all musical works performed in 
France was created a French language quota (1986). The ratification process of the Maastricht 
Treaty hastened the process nationally and the Constitution was amended in 1992: “The 
language of the Republic is French” (art. 2). The consequent legislation (1994) proclaims that 
“French language is the fundamental element of the personality and heritage of France. It is 
the language of education, work, trade and public services, and the privileged link of states 
which form the Francophone community”. All foreign and regional language texts must 
include a translation in French. The Constitutional Council ruled that French, as the official 
national language, had to be regarded as the language of the public services.90
The Constitutional status of the French language has prevented the ratification of the 
European Charter for Regional Languages, which promotes the protection of languages, 
maintenance and development of cultural wealth and traditions, right to use regional and 
minority languages in private and public life, interculturalism and multiculturalism, and the 
principles of democracy and cultural diversity within the framework of national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. In 1996 Conseil d’Etat ruled that the Charter’s articles related to 
media and cultural activities and facilities were in line with the Constitution. Education in 
regional and minority languages was defined as voluntary. On the other hand, the articles on 
judicial and administrative authorities and public services were seen as problematic in the 
light of the Constitution due to their public and binding character. The Council saw that the 
regional and minority languages’ status was largely assured by the internal law. The French 
government signed the Charter in 1999 but the Constitutional Council found it incompatible 
with the Constitution on the ground that its provisions recognised an inalienable right to 
practice a language other than French in both private and public law.91
A modest recognition of regional languages began during the Vichy regime in 1940, but 
only Deixonne law (1951) opened the public schools for regional languages on a voluntary 
basis. In 1975 the instruction of regional languages was extended to all levels of the school 
89   Loi no. 11696 du 8 mars 1882; Loi du 1 mai 1902; Loi du  9 décembre 1905; Sibille (2000), pp. 18, 25; The 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the French Dilemma (2002), p. 31; Kedward 
(2006), pp. 14, 22-23; Debène (2011), p. 307. Bernard Barère, member of the Committee of Public Salvation 
compared the multilingualism to the tower of Babel: “La monarchie avait des raisons de rassambler à la tour 
de Babel; dans la démocratie, laisser les citoyens ignorant de la langue nationale, incapables de controller les 
pouvoirs, c’est trahir la patrie... Chez un peuple libre, la langue doit être une et même pour tous.” Cf. Leclerc 
(2007), s. 8.1.1.
90   Constitution (1958), art. 2; Loi no. 75-1349 du 31 décembre 1975; Loi no. 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986; 
Loi no. 94-665 du 4 août 1994, art. 1; CC, décision no. 94-345 DC du 29 juillet 1994, s. 29; Johansson 
& Pyykkö (2005), pp. 173-174. “La langue de la République est le Français”, cf. Constitution (1958), art. 
2; France has three national organs to control the application of language legislation: DGLFLF (general 
control), Office for Checking the Advertisements, and CSA (communication and media).
91   European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), Preamble; CE, Avis no. 359461 du septem-
bre 1996, s. 3-4; CC, Décision no. 99-412 DC du 15 juin 1999, s. 5, 7-8; Benoît-Rohmer (2001), p. 3; Judge 
(2007), p. 141.
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system. In the French case law Conseil d’Etat has ruled that applications to the courts could not 
be drafted in a regional language. Later it ruled that letters could not be addressed and notices 
or formal administrative documents not produced in a regional language. The Constitutional 
Council has held that the teachers cannot be required to teach in a language not compulsory 
elsewhere according to the principle equality.92
The main point in official French language policy is that there should be no discrimination 
between different languages. Freedom of communication rules out the use of  other languages 
in dealings with the administration and public services. The concern is to protect the freedom 
of everyone involved in public communication. In 1981 President Mitterrand gave a political 
promise to promote the use of regional languages. President Sarkozy finally returned the to 
theme over 20 years later. The Academy of France and the Senate were against the proposed 
constitutional reform, but it was amended in 2008 with the new article 75-1 which recognises 
the regional languages as a part of the French heritage.93 The article has symbolic and 
cultural value but it improves the image of France before the European and international 
community.
2.3.2. New Zealand: Unwritten Principles
New Zealand’s identity as a nation state is based on the agreement of two peoples, Pākehā 
and Māori. Symbolism of this agreement, based on the Treaty of Waitangi, is shown on New 
Zealand’s coat of arms, where a Pākehā woman with the country’s flag and a Māori warrior 
are placed around the symbols in the heraldic field, including the four stars of the United 
Māori Tribes from 1835. Above is the true ruler of the country, the British Crown.94 Despite 
the stress on mutual agreement, the Treaty of Waitangi was widely forgotten until the 1970s. 
Unlike France or Canada, New Zealand has no written constitutional principles and the 
unwritten principles are based on classical English values and conventions. 
The two classical unwritten constitutional principles of English law, which have influenced 
also both New Zealand’s and Canada’s legal system, are the popular sovereignty and the rule of 
law. The popular sovereignty was based on the Magna Charta (1215) and the division of royal 
and parliamentary power. In the modern sence the popular sovereignty began to develop 
after the Glorious Revolution (1688). The principle means the supremacy of the law making 
body: the parliament may enact all laws. The English constitution has weak separation of 
powers but there exists a checks and balances system of constitutional control. A special 
character is the “fusion of powers”, i.e., the executive and legal branches are intermingled. The 
constitutional system of the queen has a formal role. She is only “head of dignified part of 
the constitution” and has a right to be consulted, to encourage and warn. The other principle, 
the rule of law, refers to all laws and governmental acts conforming to the principle. It means 
92   Loi no. 51-46 du 11 janvier 1951; Loi no. 75-620 du 11 juillet 1975, art. 12. Cf. CE, Quillevère, Novembre 
1985; Kerrain, 10 juin 1991; Le Duigou, 15 avril 1992; CC, Décision no. 2001-454 DC de 17 janvier 2002.
93   Constitution (1958), art. 75-1; CC, Décision no. 2001-452 DC du 6 décembre 2001; Leclerc (2007), s. 9.2.1.; 
Debène (2011), p.312.
94   Smith & Neubecker (1981), p. 157.
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also equal application of law. No person is punishable in regard to body or goods without a 
breach of law.95
In New Zealand’s law the Constitution Act 1986 refers to sovereignty.  The Queen in Right 
of New Zealand is the head of state, represented by the governor-general while she together 
with the House of Representatives forms the parliament. The parliament has full power to 
make laws and has parliamentary control of public finance. There are two opposing views: the 
continuing view sees the power of parliament as unabridgable, while the self-embracing view 
sees the parliamentary omnipotence as momentary – in a selfcontained state the parliament 
can redefine itself for the future. The Bill of Rights Act 1990 has directed political sovereignty 
in the latter direction. It gives judicial enforceability by protecting individual rights and 
liberties against interference by the parliament or the executive. Power of the parliament 
is also restricted by substance, manner and form, which affect the procedure and format of 
statutes. Local circumstances have tended to be against the importation of rule of unqualified 
parliamentary supremacy. To the sovereignty is related also the challenge of how to guarantee 
the Māori rights. Because New Zealand’s sovereignty is based on historical agreement between 
the two peoples, the Treaty is the only basis by which the British sovereignty on the islands 
may be justified. The Waitangi Tribunal has held that the cession of Māori sovereignty was 
conditional and qualified by the retention of tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty).The Crown 
must - when exercising the sovereignty - respect and guarantee that principle. 96
The Representative democracy means that while the sovereign reigns and has nominal 
powers, the government rules, but only as long as it has support of the democratically elected 
parliament.The principle includes also the Māori political representation, cemented as a 
general norm by the cultural value of egalitarianism. The principle of the rule of law is as well 
inherited from Britain. It means that no citizen is above the law and that government should 
be conducted according to legal authority. In the British system – and also in New Zealand – 
the doctrine is closely connected to the sovereignty of the parliament and the independence 
of judiciary. Both the courts and parliament act as a check on potential abuses of executive 
power, and they both derive their authority from the rule of law.97 The courts’ status has been, 
however, weaker in New Zealand than in the other common law countries, which lessens the 
possibilities to check the government’s actions.
2.3.3. Canada
The Confederation of Canada was born in 1867 when the loyalist British colonies sought 
closer co-operation, and reached the present limits in 1949, when Newfoundland joined it. 
The federal state was a compromise between federal and provincial needs, and despite the 
95   Bagehot (2004), pp. xi, 4, 9, 11; Dicey (2010), pp. 3-35, 107-122.
96   McHugh (1999), pp. 54-55, 59; Keith (2008); Palmer (2008), pp. 283-285; WT, Ngai Tahu Report (2001), pp. 
236-237; The continuing view can refer to the doctrine of implied repeal , which reduces the human rights 
legislation as an interpretative guide for courts. The basic and human rights legislation has in New Zealand 
no constitutional status.
97   Keith (2008); Palmer (2008), p. 282-285; Webb (2009), p. 446. In the case when the government has no 
parliamentary support, the governor-general’s role increases. He/she must rely on the parliament instead of 
the government.
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early emphasis on strong federation, the identity of Canadian mosaic, based on the union 
of British and French Canadians is uncertain, not only due to Québec’s separatism, but also 
because of growing demands in other provinces and among the Indigenous peoples. The vast 
geography has shaped strongly the Canadian identity.98 
2.3.3.1. Fundamental Principles
In Reference Re Secession of Quebec (1998), the Supreme Court of Canada defined the five 
fundamental constitutional principles: federalism, constitutionalism, rule of law, democracy 
and protection of minorities. They are all intertwined and have their roots in the birth of 
Canadian Confederacy. Canada is a federal and multicultural state which is asymmetrical. Its 
idea is to acknowledge, protect and develop territorial diversity. It makes possible asymmetric 
rights for different entities and means legal respect for underlying political and cultural 
realities. Nevertheless, Canada confronts the tensions between distributive and identity-
based objectives. For the Anglo-Canadians the national identity resides at the federal level, 
being regulative and distributive. On the other hand, for Québecois the collective identity as 
a distinct national group operates at the provincial level and to be a Canadian is primarily 
a matter of secondary identity. Therefore, the federal level stands in Canada for balance of 
political, cultural and economic advantages.99
The gaining of full sovereignty has been in Canada a slow and gradual process. The 
British North America Act (1867) created “one Dominion under the name of Canada”. The 
residue power was left to the federal Parliament. In many ways the original federation was 
more centralised than in the United States, and the parliamentary sovereignty has remained 
an important factor in Canadian constitutional theory. The Statute of Westminster (1931) 
rendered the dominions de facto independent. It retained only two controls over Canada: the 
power to amend certain provisions of its constitution and to keep its final court of appeals 
in Britain. The latter control was abolished in 1949. Prime Minister Trudeau wanted to 
gain for Canada full sovereignty. He saw the new constitution as a means of national unity 
and as a way to formally bind French and British Canada as single political unity and to 
advance the national unity by the equality of the two founding peoples. In 1982 the British 
Parliament passed the Canada Act which gave Canada the right to internally amend its own 
98   Henriksson (2006), pp. 275, 333-334. Confederation is somehow a misleading concept, while it usually sig-
nifies a union between independent states; The expression “mosaic of Canada” derives from the American 
author Victoria Hayward (1922); Original purpose of Canada is expressed in the preamble of Constitution 
Act, 1967: “such a Union would conduce to the Welfare of the Provinces and promote the Interests of the 
British Empire”.
99   SCC, Reference  Re Secession of Quebec (1998), ss. 49-82; Simpson (1994), p. 88; Croisat (1999), p. 2; Chris-
tie (2000); Dorsen (2003), pp. 375-376. “It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice of Her 
Majesty’s Most Honourable Privy Council, to declare by Proclamation that, on and after the passing of this 
Act, the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall form and be One Dominion under the 
name of Canada; and on and after that Day those Three Provinces shall form and be One Dominion under 
that name accordingly”. Cf. Constitution Act, 1867, s. 3.
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constitution, abolished the remaining ties with the Westminster Parliament and repatriated 
the Constitution.100
The province of Québec did not ratify the new Constitution Act. Its representatives saw 
that the new Constitution included amendment formulas, which reduced the powers and 
rights of Québec and its National Assembly without the province’s consent. Québec resisted 
the majority rule and demanded a veto right in respect of constitutional changes. The 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that unanimous consent of provinces was not needed. The 
Constitutional crisis was tried to solve two times. Closer to success was the draft Meech Lake 
Accord (1987), which included provisions on the recognition of Québec as a distinct society; 
provincial role in immigration and in appointments to the Supreme Court; limitation of the 
federal spending power; and extended the right to compensation for amendments that would 
centralise powers. Accord was carefully drafted to give the provincial powers to all provinces. 
It included a veto over constitutional amendments in a form of unanimity requirement, 
conferring a veto on all provinces. The First Nations, who felt that they had been passed 
over, were in the key role in upsetting the planned accord. A new attempt was made after 
a thorough preparation in 1992. The draft Charlottetown Accord would have created three 
poles of Canada increasing substantially the rights of Francophones and Indigenous peoples. 
In the final referendum the unity and equality were raised against the asymmetric rights of 
linguistic and ethnic minorities. On 26 October 1992 the Accord was defeated.101
The Canadian constitution includes, like in France and New Zealand, the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. A statute can be in violation with the Constitution Act, 1982, 
if it is rational, non-disproportionate, minimally intrusive means of achieving a pressing 
and substantial state objective. Section 33 allows the federal parliament and the provincial 
legislatures to enact legislation which operates notwithstanding ss. 2 and 7-15 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. The Supreme Court has accepted limit on these constitutional rights 
if it deals with a pressing and substantial social problem and the government’s response to the 
problem is reasonable and demonstrably justified.102
The integrity of Canada has been challenged several times since the 1960s by Québec’s 
separatism and demand for distinct society. The federal government met the most difficult 
challenge in 1995, when the referendum of Québec on sovereignty was defeated narrowly 
by 54,000 votes. In 1997 the Prime Minister of Canada and the provincial Premiers gave the 
Calgary Declaration, which reaffirmed the Canadian identity. The resolution of the House of 
Commons (2006) speaks of Québec as “a nation within united Canada”. The Supreme Court 
defined in 1998 its negative stand on the unilateral secession of Québec from Canada. In 
Reference re Secession of Québec, the court stressed the need for bilateral negotiations and the 
common opinion of federation, although it expressed the respect for the will of the majority 
100 Union Act (1840), art. 3, 12; Constitution Act (1867). s. 3; McInnis (1969), pp. 253-258, 263-269; Hogg 
(1985), pp. 86-87, 190, 258; Beatty (1994), pp. 94-96. 
101 Constitution Act (1982), s. 38(1)(b); Meech Lake Accord (1982), s. 2(1)(b); Charlottetown Accord (1992); 
SCC, Re: Objection by Quebec to the Resolution to Amend the Constitution (1982), p. 794; Metcalfe (1982), 
pp. 109-112;  Maddex (2008), p. 82. Section 38 of the 1982 Constitution defines the majority when amend-
ing the Constitution as 2/3 of the provinces and at least 50 % of the population; Elijah Harper, a Cree Chief 
from the Legislature of Manitoba, was with his delaying tactics a key figure in the fall of the Meech Lake 
Accord. 
102 Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 1, 33; SCC, R. v. Oakes (1986), ss. 62-79.
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of the territory’s population. The consequent Clarity Act (2000) defined the procedure for 
secession. A referendum must be arranged when a majority gives a clear expression of will. 
If the result is clearly pro-secession, the House of Commons will study the case. Secession 
is possible only through negotiations with federal and all provincial governments and it 
demands a constitutional amendment. The national government must take account of the 
charges of borders and the protection of Indigenous and minority rights.103
The Canadian constitutional law makes a clear distinction between the federal paramountcy 
in the cases of controversy and the constitutional supremacy. The Constitution of Canada is 
the supreme law of Canada. Laws inconsistent with the Constitution are expressly invalid. 
The Constitution is a safeguard for fundamental human rights and individual freedoms. 
It facilitates a democratic political system by creating an orderly framework within which 
people may make political decisions. Democracy, having both institutional and individual 
aspects, is a fundamental value, which expresses the supremacy of the sovereign will of the 
people. Its most visible, substantive goal is the promotion of self-government by exercising 
the right through the democratic process.  Democracy is a baseline against which the framers 
of the Constitution and later elected representatives have always operated. It reflects ideas 
of themajority rule, promotion of self-government and the accommodation of cultural and 
group identities, the popular franchise and the consent of the governed. The rule of law 
provides that the law is supreme over the acts of the government and private persons. That 
is, there is one law for all. It also requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of 
positive laws which preserves and embodies the more general principle of normative order, 
and that the relationship between the state and the individual must be regulated by law.104
The protection of minorities means in the Canadian constitution the protection of religious 
and linguistic minorities. After an unsuccessful attempt to assimilate the French population 
the British Crown published in 1774 the Quebec Act, which did not mention directly the 
French language, but de facto recognised the French language rights in public life and was 
published both in English and French. Although the English language became at the end 
of the eighteenth century the language of the majority, strong regional presence of the 
French language especially in Québec guaranteed the bilingual ideology of the country. The 
Constitution Act, 1867, confers to provinces a right to legistlate on education, but exercise 
of that competence should be made by respecting the rights of the Protestant and Catholic 
minorities’ denominational schools in Ontario and Québec. The Constitution Act also 
guarantees bilingualism and translation of legislation in federal parliament, and before the 
courts in Québec. The Manitoba Act, 1870, has guarantees for Francophones in the province. 
The Constitution Act, 1867, included also a provision, which conferred the right to legistlate 
103 Clarity Act, 2000, s. 1(3), 1(6), 2(3), 3(1), 3(2); Calgary Declaration (1997); SCC, Reference re Secession of 
Quebec (1998), ss. 2, 111.
104 The Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52(1); SCC, Reference re Secession of Quebec (1998), ss. 61-78; Venter (2000), 
pp. 59-60; Borrows (2002), p. 128. “Whereas Canada is founded on the principles that recognise...rule of 
law”; “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the 
provisions of Constitution is, to the extent of inconsistency, of no force or effect.” Cf. Constitution Act, 
1982, Preamble, s. 52(1). 
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on Indians and their lands.105 The difference for the French minority was that the relationship 
was less equal. They became Crown wards.
English and French may be used equally in parliamentary debates. The records and 
journals of the federal parliament and the official documents of federal and Québec courts 
are held in both languages, and both language versions have an equal standing. Nevertheless, 
the supremacy of the English language became apparent by the fact that the official languages 
of the nation were defined only in 1969, when Pierre Trudeau’s government introduced the 
Official Language of Canada Act. Trudeau was a fierce defender of federalism. The language 
policy was one the means to fight against the disintegrative elements in society. The federal 
legislation gives the English and French an equal and preferred status. The rights include a 
right to receive services in both languages in all federal offices and be heard in federal courts. 
The federal language of work is in geographically defined areas (Ottawa, Montréal) English 
and French, elsewhere either of the languages. The Governor in Council may regulate on the 
scope of bilingual public services. The discrimination based on language is prohibited and the 
officials are required to promote the bilingualism. The Commissioner of Official Languages 
supervises the policy and the federal courts have responsibility to correct the defects in 
national language policy.106
Bilingualism gained finally in 1982 a constitutional status in the Constitution Act, 1982. 
It recognised a full federal bilingualism. Both languages are equal in legislation. The legal 
and official documents are equally authoritative in both languages. All courts established 
by the Parliament may use either English or French. There is a right to receive service in all 
federal offices in both official languages. The Constitution Act, 1982 does not abrogate or 
derogate any other rights, privileges or obligations with respect to the official languages or 
any other languages in Canada. The minority language (English or French) educational rights 
are recognised.107
Each province and territory defines their language policy independently. British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland have 
English as their official language; Québec is unilingually French; Manitoba is predominantly 
English-speaking, but the French has an official status in provincial Legislature; New 
Brunswick and Yukon are officially bilingual; and Northwest Territory and Nunavut 
multilingual.108 Québec has the strongest protection of official language. L’Office québécois 
de la langue française is the watchdog of the provincial government in linguistic affairs with 
wide powers to supervise the respect of language legislation. The main legal instrument in 
defining the position of the French language is Charte de la langue française (CLF).109
105 Constititution Act, 1867, ss. 91(24), 93, 133; Quebec Act, 1774 (UK); Manitoba Act, 1867, s. 133. “English 
and French are the official languages and have equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions 
of the Parliament and government of Canada.” Cf. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 16(1). 
106 Official Languages Act (1988), s. 14, 43, 49-70, 76; Maddex (2008), p. 83.
107 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 16, 16(3), 18(1), 19(1), 20(1), 21-23.
108 Constitution Act, 1982, s. 16(1)-(2), 18(2), 19(2), 20(2); Manitoba Act, 1870, s. 23.
109 Charte de la langue française (CLF, 1977), s. 157-184.
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2.3.3.2.  Rights in the Constitution Act, 1982
The Constitution Act, 1982, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is similar 
in principle and content to the American Bill of Rights but there is a crucial difference based 
on the parliamentary sovereignty. Section 33 enables the Parliament and the Legislatures 
to override certain provisions. After the declaration is included, a statute will operate free 
of the invalidating effect of the Constitution’s provisions. They apply to governments and 
their institutions in relationship with individuals. It provides individual rights, including the 
freedom of association, religion, against discrimination of historically disadvantaged groups. 
The provisions apply to the relationship between an individual bearer of a right and the 
legislative and governmental institutions. Since 1972 the provinces and since 1977 the federal 
state have Human Rights Codes, administered by Human Rights Commissions, to address 
other fields of discrimination.110
The rights in the Constitution Act, 1982, partly overlap the constitutional rights 
mentioned above.111 The Constitution Act, 1982, applies to the parliament and government, 
the territories and governments of the provinces. The courts have explicit remedial powers 
to strike down laws inconsistent with it. A court must be guided by the values and principles 
essential to free and democratic society, which embody respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety 
of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. The underlying values 
and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution Act, 1982, and the ultimate standard against which a limit or 
freedom must be shown reasonable and demonstrably justified.112
110 Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 2, 15; Hogg (1985), p. 259; Venter (2000), p. 139.
111 Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 2-23, 35-36; Gall (1983), pp. 56-60; Beatty (1994), pp. 96-97, 121. “Every indi-
vidual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the 
law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability.” Cf. Constitution Act, 1982, s. 15(1); Six 
broad categories of rights are: the fundamental freedoms: of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, 
expression, peaceful assembly and association; democratic rights: election and decision-making; mobility 
rights: to leave and enter the country, and to reside and to gain a livelihood in any province; legal rights: 
right to individual life, liberty and security; equality rights: equality before the law, protection, equal benefit 
of the law and affirmative action; and the language rights of English and French languages. Part II includes 
the rights of Aboriginal peoples, where will be returned later, and Part III on equalisation and regional dis-
parities, including promotion of equal opportunities for the well-being, furthering economic development 
and providing essential public survices of reasonable quality.
112 SCC, R. v. Oakes, 1986, ss. 62-79.
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Decentralisation / Devolution2.4. 
2.4.1. France: From Centralisation to Decentralisation
There is a paradox in French identity - unity in diversity. Even Héxagone, or Metropolitan 
France, is historically divided. In the Middle Ages France was divided into feudal seigneuries. 
Since the reign of François I the direction was towards the centralisation of the state. The most 
ancient division of France was into provinces.The revolution swept away the old structures 
which were replaced by departments in 1790. Uniformity and decentralisation were the 
keynotes of the administrative organisation. The old administrative units were replaced by 
83 departments in 1790.113
The geographical structures of territorial administration have preserved the late 18th 
century structure. Since the early 19th century there were attempts to solve the weaknesses in 
French centralism. The building of modern regions began in 1919, and was continued by the 
Vichy regime. Weakening of France’s hold on colonies during the war and the international 
development strengthened the forces of self-government. De Gaulle had promised in the 
second conference of Brazzaville (1944) more autonomy to overseas colonies. Despite its 
careful wording the conference was a turning point in policy. The Fourth Republic (1946-
1958) created in French unitary state a federal dimension. Its constitution formulated the 
relationship between France and its colonies in a new way – as an equal union of peoples. 
The administrational division of overseas colonies was reformed:  some old colonies 
(Guadaloupe, Martinique, French Guiana and Réunion) became as overseas departments 
(départments d’outre-mer, DOM) integral parts of France. Their administrative structure 
was similar with the departments of Metropolitan France. The Pacific colonies became 
overseas territories (territories d’outre-mer, TOM). Even their administrative structure was 
similar with departments, but unlike DOM, they were not part of Metropolitan France. They 
followed Metropolitan France in criminal law, public liberties, political organisation and 
administration. In 1946 their inhabitants also gained French citizenship.114
Metropolitan France and all its former colonies formed the French Union, which lasted 
until 1958. It included Metropolitan France, associated states, associated territories and 
DOM/TOM. The President of the Republic was also the President of the French Union and 
the chairman of the High Council. The Union had its own Assembly, but all the essential 
decisions were made in the National Assembly in Paris. French Indochina was the first 
dependency to withdraw from the union in 1954, followed soon by others. The door for 
independence was open even for TOMs for a short while in 1958, but not for DOM. The 
dissolution of the union, the military catastrophe in Dien Bien Phu, the Algerian War and the 
crisis of democracy prepared the way to a profound constitutional reform. General de Gaulle 
113 Loi des 26 février-4 mars 1790; Miquel (1976), pp. 74-85, 142-143; Braudel (1990), pp. 61, 80; Doyle (1992), 
pp. 2, 4, 125. The two major cultural, linguistic and political areas of France have been pays d’oc and pays 
d’oïl; in 1776 France included 39 provinces and 15 jurisdictional areas of parlements, which were replaced 
by 83 départments.
114 Constitution (1946), art. 73-82; Loi du 19 avril 1941; Ordonnance du 10 janvier 1944; Betts (1991), p. 59-
61; Aubry (1992), p. 22; Moreau (1995), p. 1; Kedward (2005), p.196-198; Les régions de France. “La France 
forme avec les peuples d’outre-mer une Union fondée sur l’égalité des droits et des devoirs, sans distinction 
de race ni de réligion.” Cf. Constitution (1946), art. 73.
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was called back onto the stage. His proposal for a state with strong presidency received wide 
support in the referendum of 1958. The Fifth Republic was born.115
The new constitution followed the ideas of the revolution. The republic was indivisible, 
secular and equal. But something was changing at the same time. The decolonisation reached 
its final stage when Algeria gained its independence in 1962. The French Union was replaced 
by a looser French Community, where France took care of currency, defence, foreign policy 
and national security. The territories were promised the independence if they so chose and in 
1960 all territories of Sub-Saharan Africa gained independence and the French Community 
lost its impetus. After that date all territories which chose to stay under France were regarded 
as an integral part of the republic.116
The first efforts to reform the national administration were made during the Fourth 
Republic (1946-1958). Also de Gaulle realised - despite the strong stress on national unity 
and the indivisible character of France - that the highly centralised administration with 
departments, districts and communes needed reform. The firm intention was “to nationalise 
the regions, not to regionalise the nation”. Prime Minister Georges Pompidou introduced 
in 1964 prefects for each region with power in economic planning. The next step, however, 
failed. President de Gaulle ordered in 1969 a referendum on the creation of regional councils. 
In the inner political cul-de-sac the proposal was deemed to fail. The proposal returned, 
however, only three years later when the regions were created as economic units.117
In the early 1980s a new phase began in the debate on national identity. The social problems, 
the growing identity of different ethnical groups both in Metropolitan France and in overseas 
areas, and increasing support for regionalism all reflected the need to check again the direction 
at a national level. The ascendancy to power of François Mitterrand signified a visible change 
in policy. He used a definition droit à la difference (right to difference), which became a slogan 
for the new era of decentralisation in France. President Mitterrand’s major objective was to 
create territorial units, to spread the principle of the executive’s election to the departments 
and regions, and to remove the supervision. Decentralisation expressed relations existing 
between the central power and the local units. The definition of decentralisation rested on 
three elements: independent, elected local authorities; local, specific competencies; and 
mechanism of regulation to assure the prevalence of general interests and the co-ordination 
between several centres of decision. The reform of 1982 has preserved the legal personality 
of local and territorial administration. It has also confirmed a system where each territorial 
collectivity has proper, elected assemblies and executives. The duality allows the legislator to 
establish in regional and local levels other elected organs.The direct supervision of state has 
been replaced by administrative and budget control. This model of administration has three 
sectors: state’s proper responsibilities, common responsibilities and local responsibilities. 
115 Constitution (1946), art. 60, 63-64; Betts (1991), pp. 90-91, 97-102, 106-115; Lampué, p. 14; Gründler 
(2007), p. 451. The French Union followed the model of the British Commonwealth; The doctrine of (René) 
Capitant neglected the right of DOM to express their attitude to sovereignty. 
116 Miquel (1976), pp. 585, 588.
117 Loi no. 64-707 du 10 juillet 1964, art. 1, 22; Loi no. 72-619 du 5 juillet 1972; Décret no. 64-250 du 14 mars 
1964; Gaulle (1970), pp. 321-324; Miquel 1976, p. 594. The political left identified the regionalism with Vi-
chy ideology, but neither the right was willing to decentralise the state; Reform in Metropolitan Paris (1964) 
was a model for later economic decentralisation.
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Only responsibilities of national character or those defined by law can not be delegated. 
Despite the reform the regional and local administration operate under narrow constraints: 
their powers are limited by the principle of the indivisibility of the republic. On the other 
hand, the competencies are often tailored.118 
All units of local and regional administration are called territorial collectivities (collectivités 
territoriales). They are legal persons who have constitutional status, based on titles XII and XIII 
of the Constitution and further defined in the General Code of the Territorial Collectivities. 
The citizens participate democratically in the management of local affairs. The territorial 
collectivities can submit to referendum projects which belong to their competence or to ask 
consultation from the electors.119 
France is not a federal state, although the French Union had certain features of asymmetric 
federalism.  The terrorial collectivities are subordinated to the state: decentralisation must be 
in harmony with the unitary character of the state. They personify general interests in a given 
geographical area of national territory and they have representation in the national parliament. 
With the exception of New Caledonia and French Polynesia, they have no legislative powers, 
except for a limited period. As legal persons they can, however, make other regulations. The 
collectivities’ jurisdictions are strictly separate: they have jurisdiction over territorial organs, 
supervised by the representative of the state, who exercises administrative and legislative 
control. The local administrative collectivity can manage all proper interests, which are 
common to people, whose solidarity renders them legitimate. They have a limited budget 
of their own and they can raise taxes specifically pointed to them. If some competencies 
are transferred from the state to the collectives, also their costs will be transferred. The state 
can also use compensation to support equality between them. Conseil d’Etat has, however, 
stressed that the territorial units have no competence of competence. The legislation has 
aimed at developing the local democracy, to promote the new forms of co-operation between 
collectivities, and to reform the state in the new task created by the decentralisation. Since 
2004 the legislation has allowed a 5-year experimentation which has broadened the regions’ 
planning powers, including the co-operation between the territorial collectivities.120   
The Constitution enumerates as territorial collectivities the municipalities, departments 
and overseas collectivities (collectivité outre-mer, COM). They can be also classified as 
collectivities of Metropolitan France, overseas collectivities and New Caledonia. All territorial 
collectivities and their competences are created by law. The legislation sets the rules of local 
assemblies’ electoral systems and the fundamental principles of the free administration of 
local units, their competences and their resources. This principle, which has created a counter-
balance to the powers of the centre, has constitutional value. It has been also expanded in 
order to ensure that local authorities are genuinely independent, being administered by 
elected bodies, and possessing their own powers. All changes to territorial collectivities’ status 
118 Loi no. 92-125 du 6 février 1992, art. 2; Payé (1993), p. 269; Moreau (1995), pp. 2-4, 8-10, 14; Dorsen (2003), 
p. 387; Kedward (2005), 487. 
119 Constitution (1958), art. 72-75.1 ; Loi no. 82-213 du 2 mars 1982; Loi constitutionnelle du 28 mars 2003; 
Code général des collectivités territoriales (1996), art. L.O. 1112-1, 1112-15; Rouault (2007), p. 218. 
120 Constitution (1958), art.72-1, 72-2; Loi no. 82-213 du 2 mars 1982; Loi no. 92-125 du 6 février 1992; Code 
général des collectivités territoriales, art. L.O. 1113-1; CE, Imbert, 25 January 1978;  Favoreau & Philip 
(1991), pp. 524, 530; Moreau (1995), p. 2; Michalon, pp. 670-672; Rouault (2007), p. 222.
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have to be based on the consent of the electors in question. Powers delegated to them by law 
can be returned only by an organic law after the Constitutional Council’s review and after 
consulting the respective territorial assembly. The president of the republic has powers, by the 
proposal of government, or by both chambers of National Assembly to consult the electors of 
an overseas collectivity on the questions of organisation, competence or regulatory powers. 
The particular characteristics of overseas territorial collectivities are defined by organic law. 
The Constitutional Council controls the constitutionality of their status. The ordinances of 
overseas units must be submitted to the review of Conseil d’Etat, and to the ratification of 
National Assembly in 18 months’ period.121   
The republic recognises within the French people (au sein du peuple français) the 
populations of overseas in a common ideal of liberty, equality and brotherhood. There is 
a clear reference to the ideals of 1789 – the indivisible state, one people and the slogan of 
the revolution. The overseas collectivities, governed by articles 73-74, have been since 1982 
the laboratories of new decentralisation. They have a particular organisation, recognised 
proper interests, organisation based on specific status, defined by organic law. They are also 
mentioned in the Constitution and theTreaty on European Union, which confirms their 
special status in association with the European Union. The status of New Caledonia is based 
on Title XIII of the Constitution. Overseas collectivities (collectivité d’outre-mer, COM) have 
three major categories. The first category is the four Overseas Regions (région d’outre-mer, 
ROM) of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique and Réunion and the DOM of Mayotte 
which follow the legislation of Metropolitan France and belong to European Union. They are 
régions monodépartementales, i.e. they have only one department. The ROMs were created 
on the basis of DOMs in 1982. They have a prefect but two councils: the General Council 
and the Regional Council. The Regional Council may participate in international relations; 
it may be heard by the government on regional co-operational projects; and it has power to 
make initiatives to prime minister on legislation and regulations. The Regional Council has 
two consultative organs: the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Culture, 
Education and Environment. The Constitution has since 2003 allowed by a delegation of 
organic law the ROMs a right to modify regulations in limited subjects concerning their 
territories. All delegated powers are under the supervision of the administrative courts.122
The second category of COMs is mentioned in the article 74 al. 3. They are also called 
collectivités ultraphériques (Outermost Regions in European Union’s terminology). They 
are the COMs of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, Wallis and Futuna, Saint-Barthélemy and 
Saint-Martin. Each of them has its proper status, fixed by an organic law. Their normative 
competences are much wider than in the first category. A common determinator for these 
competences is a right to positive discrimination vis-à-vis the principle of equality in the 
republic. They do not belong to the European Union, but are in association with it.123 The 
121 Constitution (1958), art. 24 al. 3, 34, 72, 72 al. 4, 73-74 al.1; CC, Décision no. 79-104 DC du 23 mai 1979; 
Décision no. 82-149 DC du 28 décembre 1982; Décision no. 85-119 L du 8 août 1985; Moreau (1995), p. 9; 
Hamon & Troper (2007), p. 492. In 2008 Metropolitan France had 22 regions, 96 departments, 329 disticts, 
3,883 cantons and 36,689 municipalities. Cf. Les collectivités locales en chiffres 2008.
122 Constitution (1958), art. 72-74, 76-66; Loi no. 82-1169 du 31 décembre 1982; Loi no. 84-747 du 2 août 1984; 
Fourrat (2006), p. 10; Rouault (2007), pp. 240-241, 247. 
123 Constitution (1958), art. 74 al. 3; Rouault (2007), pp. 240-241.
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third category includes the Overseas Land (pays d’outre-mer, POM) of French Polynesia and 
the sui generis collectivity of New Caledonia. New Caledonia’s status is based on title XIII of 
the Constitution and the Accord of Nouméa. 
2.4.2.  New Zealand
2.4.2.1.  Realm of New Zealand
New Zealand was under Australian administration until 1840. In the turn of the twentieth 
century there was again some serious discussion about amalgamation to the Australian 
Commonwealth, but since 1901 New Zealand consciously built a separate identity with Prime 
Minister Seddon’s extension policy.The Realm of New Zealand is a wider term than the state 
of New Zealand. It is essentially centred around the person of the sovereign, who is the Queen 
in the right of New Zealand. The Realm of New Zealand includes New Zealand, the Cook 
Islands, Niue, Tokelau, the Chatham, Bounty, Antipodes, Auckland and Campbell Islands, and 
the Ross Dependency in Antarctica (also West Samoa until 1961). It means that all political 
entities within the realm have a common head of state. The governor general represents 
the queen in all realms but the sovereign states have also a parallel Queen’s Representative 
(High Commissioner) which means that there are in fact two Queens’ Representatives – one 
directly and the other through New Zealand. The common head of state means also shared 
values. This is expressly mentioned in the Joint Centenary Declaration between New Zealand 
and the Cook Islands, which speaks about ongoing commitment.124 Because the realm is so 
strongly centred around the sovereign’s personality, the possible constitutional change in the 
future for the republic would demand change to this personal and historical structure.
2.4.2.2.  Local Government 
New Zealand was originally a federal state, divided into provinces. The Constition Act 1846 
created the provinces of New Ulster and New Munster to meet better the settlers’ local needs. 
In 1852 the colony was divided into six provinces. Instead of representative assemblies the 
provinces received in 1851 only nominated councils but due to growing settler pressure the 
British Parliament established one year later a representative central government. When 
the central administration developed, the provinces were abolished in 1876 and there 
was established a local government system after the English model where the real control 
was exercised by the central government. In 1974 Local Government Commissions were 
established to oversee the efficient administration of local government. The large number 
of municipalities (over 800) was seen as a problem. In 1988 the local administration was 
reformed as part of the larger devolution process.Today there are 12 regional councils and 74 
territorial authorities. 
124 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, ss. 4-5, 12; Grimes & Waers & Sullivan (2002), p. 17; Townend 
(2003).
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The territorial authorities carry out some aspects of government in a limited, defined 
geographical area. Territorial bodies are either City Councils or District Councils. The 
Chatham Islands are excluded as sui generis case, due to their geographical isolation. It has 
a Territorial Council as its administrative body and the main officials are a mayor and chief 
executive. All their powers of the regional councils and territorial authorities are delegated 
by parliament and operate under the provisions of a statute. The territorial authorities’ work 
is based on regional schemes. The regional authorities can take over functions belonging to 
existing authorities. The Act makes also possible the establishment of community councils 
with comprehensive code for running the affairs. The regional and local government level is 
separated in legislation from the Crown. The legislation recognises therefore the existence of 
different communities and their identities, values, rights, and different solutions in services. 
The local authorities have powers in nuisance control, community activities, planning, 
community development, limited social welfare responsibilities and commercial trading 
activities. Thay have also the right to raise taxes to cover these obligations.125
2.4.3. The Provinces and Territories in Canada
Unlike France, Canada has been built since the beginning on plurality. Its touchstone has been 
the idea of two founding nations: the Anglo-and Franco-Canadians. This bipolarity broadened 
in the 1970s as multiculturalism. Canada began as a strongly centralised federation, but has 
gradually become one of the most decentralised. The Pricy Council, “the wicked stepfather of 
Confederation”, promoted in its case law the coordinate status of provinces. The federal power 
had also with time given up its power to disallow provincial statutes, enact remedial laws to 
correct provincial incursions on minority educational rights, or to bring local work within 
federal jurisdiction. Also the appointment of lieutenant governors and judges for provinces 
has become more formal. The Franco-Canadians have always been more doubtful towards the 
central government, even as a threat to their distinct culture, and the indigenous peoples have 
shared similar views. For the majority an acceptable federalism is a compact between equal 
territorial units, while for the Québécois and the Indigenous peoples it is a compact between 
peoples, which requires asymmetry between nationality-based units and regional-based 
units. There have been also voices to create an across-the-board decentralisation in Canada, 
or a looser confederation. This reflects the ideology behind the unsuccessful Charlottetown 
Accord, which would have created a three-dimensional government for Canada. In Canada 
a constitutional amendment requires the consent of both federal houses and either seven 
provinces containing 50 % of the population, or all ten provinces. The examples of Meech 
Lake and Charlottetown processes show that this is very difficult to achieve. 126
125 Constitution Act 1852 (UK), s. 2; Local Government Act 1974, s.87; Chatham Islands Council Act 1995, ss. 
2, 6; Local Government Act 2002, s. 23; Potaka (1999); Mulholland (1985), pp. 32-33; Havemann (1999), 
pp. 381-382; Spiller & Finn & Boast (2001), p. 66.
126 Hogg (1985), pp. 89-92; Kymlicka (2002), pp. 103-110. In Hodge v. the Queen (1883), the Privy Council 
ruled that the provincial legislative power was “as plenary and as ample within the limits prescribed by 
section 92 as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow”. The de-
velopment in the United States has been exactly the opposite. None of the 50 states in the United States are 
nationality-based and the centralisation has not been seen as a threat to national identity. 
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In the beginning the Dominion included only the newly re-established colonies of Ontario 
and Québec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. They were followed by Manitoba (1870), British 
Columbia (1871), Prince Edward Island (1873), Alberta and Saskatchewan (both in 1905). 
Canada reached its present form in 1949, when Newfoundland joined the federation. Canada 
has one -although hybrid - legal system, but 14 major legislative bodies and 11 jurisdictions. 
The Constitution Act, 1867, defines in ss. 92, 92A, 93 and 95 the scope of provincial powers. 
There are also special provisions for the original four provinces. When the other provinces 
joined the federation, their founding statutes were included to the constitutional law.127 
The Lieutenant Governor is the Queen’s reprentative in each province with similar functions 
as Governor-General, but the true executive power rests on provincial governments, led by the 
premiers. Each province has either unicameral legislature. Each Legislature may exclusively 
make laws in relation to matters belonging to their competence. In Québec the legislature is 
named after the French model Assemblée nationale (National Assembly). The provinces and 
territories are represented in the federal Parliament, all having its own quota of MPs in the 
House of Commons. In the Senate the provinces belong to four geographical divisions where 
only Ontario, Québec and the territories have individual quotas. The provinces have their 
own legislation and court structure.128 
To Canada belong three geographical entities, which are not provincies. Northwest 
Territories (1870), Yukon (1898) and Nunavut (1993) are called territories which were born 
for strategic, resource management and/or ethnic reasons. They have similar features with 
provinces, like Premier, Legislature, legislation and court system, but the major difference is 
in legal status. They are under Federal government and they have no inherent jurisdiction. 
They have only delegated powers based on three federal territorial laws. Only federal 
Parliament can amend or change their status.They cover 61% of Canada’s land space but have 
together only 100,000 inhabitants. The Crown’s representative is called commissioner (equal 
to lieutenant governors in the provinces). Each territory has one member in both houses of 
the federal parliament.129 
Conclusions2.5. 
Most Western countries have a common historical determinant in Christianity and medieval 
feudalism. The nation-states were born through power struggle between papacy, kings and 
their subjects. The early legal and political theorists of sovereignty built on need for unity. 
127 Constitution Act (1867), ss. 9, 17-18, 92-93. The exclusive powers of provincial legislatures are the direct 
provincial taxation; borrowing of money; provincial offices and officers; management and sale of public 
lands; timber and wood; public prisons; hospitals and other respective institutions; municipal institutions; 
licenses to the raising of revenues; communications undertakings wholly within a province; provincial 
companies; celebration of marriage; property; civil rights; administration of justice; punishment; explorati-
on for non-renewable natural and forestry resources; electrical energy; and education. Cf. Constitution Act 
(1876), ss. 92-93. 
128 Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 12, 22, 37, 58, 92, 96; Difference Between Canadian Provinces and Territories. 
Only Québec had a bicameral Legislature. Its upper house was abolished in 1968; Most adjudication occurs 
before provincial courts, where the judges are appointed by the provinces.  
129 A Comparison of Provincial and Territorial Governments; Difference Between Provinces and Territories.
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After centuries of dissolution there was social a need for stronger monarch and state. Bodin 
was an advocate for Absolutism, and Hobbes refined the theory by defining the hypothetical 
state of nature in negative means. There was need for social agreement to avoid everyone’s 
war against each other. The prescriptive laws of nature were replaced by laws as commands. 
The sovereign determined the public good. 
With Locke and Rousseau the character of sovereign changed. The people became the 
sovereign. Montesqueu and Rousseau did not see the state of nature anymore in negative 
means, but still the true law was possible only in organised society. Montesquieu developped 
an idea of nation-based special features which he called the spirit of laws. Rousseau created a 
transcendental general will, which was an important ideological background for the French 
revolution. The British legal theorists distinguished similarly the sovereign and subject, legal 
and political sovereignty.
The development of the unitary nation state was related to the development of central 
authority. It was based on shared national identity – which was in many cases a philosophical 
and legal fiction. The Westphalian and successive international law recognised only states as 
subjects of the law of nations. The sovereignty was classically obtained by different forms of 
acquisition, while the English common law was at least from the sixteenth century based on 
presupposition that all lands belong to the Crown, which obtained by treaties a legal basis 
for sovereignty. This is still true in New Zealand. The later international case law demanded 
besides the symbolic acquisition also the exercise of authority. 
The Western nation-states faced from the fifteenth century the need to define “the Other”, 
which in many cases was the Indigenous people. They were in European eyes either noble 
savages or ignorant people. The early justification to acquisition was sough from Christian 
teaching, which defended Indigenous people’s humanity and demanded justification for wars. 
Also later doctrines were based on Euro-centric views where major motives were civilisation, 
commerce and Christianisation. Essential for these new encounters was the question of 
whether Indigenous people were capable of making treaties and whether had they developped 
society and political structures. In most cases the acquisition was justified by treaties or war 
after which the pre-existent rights were extinguished. In some cases, however, the doctrine 
of tabula rasa was developped: there was no organised society or law, and therefore, no need 
to negotiate. Important in the United States was the Marshall-trilogy, which recognised the 
indigenous peoples as sovereign dependent nations, but at the same time justified the process 
of dispossession. The indigenous peoples were isolated both in municipal and international 
law. The British and French policy was similar: both aimed first at assimilation, while the 
common law system was generally more flexible towards the existence of previous customary 
law. The nineteenth century brought the ideas of progress and social evolutionism but 
towards the turn of the century the focus changed to more protective and associate models. 
This protective role continued until the World War II. In the post-war situation the collective 
and ethnic rights were not popular and it was attempted to integrate the Indigenous peoples 
to larger society. This changed only from the 1970s with international development and 
awakening of indigenous peoples themselves. The 1980s and 1990s meant dramatic change in 
Indigenous peoples’ development and the general atmosphere. The post-recognition period 
has been globally a period of increased legalisation of rights but also the setting of limits to 
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change. Many Western legal and political theories also focus the newly defined status quo 
instead of legal change. 
France, New Zealand and Canada have all their own constitutional narratives to justify 
the unitary state: the change though revolution, creation of a new nation between the Pākehā 
and Māori and the English- and French-speaking Canadians. The French constitutional 
ideology has several specific features: the unitary state was created as a counterbalance to the 
disintegration of ancient régime, whose features of linguistic pluralism, the strong position 
of established religion and privileges were denied. The indivisibility, monolingualism and 
secularism are exceptionally central in themes in French constitutional law while Canada has 
recognised since the beginning its role as a mosaic. Its vast geography and two strong ethnical 
groups have influenced the constitutional law. New Zealand has no written constitution which 
offers its system more flexibility but at the same time creates problems: the only justification 
for New Zealand’s existence is the agreement with the Māori people, but the treaty has no 
constitutional status. All three countries have as a common feature strong focus on the rule 
of law and parliamentary sovereignty and a strong emphasis on human rights. The main 
difference lies in New Zealand, where the human rights have no constitutional status. There 
is, however some political pressure to change the situation.130
In the French constitutional law there is only one people, no recognised minorities and no 
inequal differences. The paradox is however, that France is an artificial structure: it is plural 
and divided. This was recognised gradually from the nineteenth century in modest attempts 
to decentralise the administration. The Fourth Republic even had structures which reminded 
federal states. In Canada the starting point has been different. The bipolarity has developped 
into multiculturalism, finally recognising more openly also the existence of the indigenous 
peoples. New Zealand separated early from Australia and was like Canada, originally a federal 
state, but later the central power strengthened its positions. 
Mitterrand’s precidency started the new decentralisation – administrative but not political 
decentrisation. In this more flexible model the overseas territories were offered the role of 
“laboratories” for careful legal change. Despite unitary state they have always been a different 
category in relation to Metropolitan France. Canada has gone through difficult identity crisis. 
Established as a strong federation to the basement of British loyalist colonies, its power 
has moved gradually in the direction of provinces, which have their proper jurisdictions. 
After the repartiation of the Constitution, the federal Government has fought against the 
disintegrative forces in Québec and failed twice to negotiate a constitutional agreement on 
the nation’s future. Unlike France, the devolution of powers is inherent in Canada, part of 
its constitutional ideology, but at the same time also its paradox and challenge. The realm of 
New Zealand has in the unitary state features of a loose federation, where the sovereign’s role 
is more marked.
130 Both France and Canada have been influenced by the United States in their human rights documents, while 
New Zealand’s direct model has been Canada. And many of the ideas which gave birth to the United States, 
came from England and France. 
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France3.1. 
3.1.1. Spécialité legislative
During ancien régime France had several provincial legislatures, although droit commun 
already existed. After the revolution the delegation of legislative power was prohibited, based 
on the principles of indivisible sovereignty and general will. This concentration of legislative 
power has been later confirmed by the Constitutional Council, which has e.g. denied a right for 
Corsica to have own statutory powers without explicit constitutional authorisation. The total 
picture is not, however, as monolithic as it looks like in the first sight. Even in Metropolitan 
France there exist certain particularisms in legislation, as for example the exceptions in 
Paris, Alsace-Moselle and Corsica indicate. In fact the French legal system has always made 
a distinction between Metropolitan France and the overseas territories. Inside of the latter-
mentioned category there is a fundamental distinction between overseas departments and 
overseas territories.1  
The oldest French legal document dealing with spécialité legislative was Code Noir justifying 
forced labour in the Caribbean colonies (1685-1946). Properly speaking, the practice was 
consolidated by Louis XV and continued by the drafters of the revolution’s constitutions and 
other legal documents. The geographical, economic and ethnic particularities led to different 
legal treatment of overseas colonies. Sénatus-consulte of 3 May 1854 confined to the emperor 
a competence to take by a decree legislative command in colonies, excluding Martinique, 
Guadeloupe and Réunion. In reality, the local executives (the governors and council) were 
the true legislators of the colonies. This system of legal pluralism lasted until the Constitution 
of 1946. It signified that the French laws and regulations were applicable in overseas colonies 
only when specially mentioned in statute. This gave the local governors broad regulatory 
powers. Although the Constitution of 1946 repealed the colonial system, the legal pluralism 
continued. According to article 72 “The French law is only applicable in the overseas territories 
by express dispositions.” The original wording of the Constitution of 1958 mentioned in 
article 76 that TOM preserved their status within the republic. This was later repealed and 
1   CC, Décision no. 91-290 DC du 9 mai 1991; Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), pp. 320-326. The 
name Lorraine (Lothringen) was replaced since the First World War in French administrative division by 
Moselle.
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the present article 74 says indirectly that TOMs have “a particular organisation considering 
their proper interests on the whole of interests of the Republic.”2 
After World War II the French government tempted to align the colonial rules to general 
legislation. Since 1946 the French legislation has applied in DOM/ROMs with full force 
(legislative assimilation) with a possibility offered in the article 73 of the Constitution that 
takes into consideration their particular situation. The particular statutes and restrictions 
ante-1946 are, however, in force, if not repealed or changed. In all other overseas collectivities 
is applied the principle of legal particularism for which the Constitutional Council has given 
a broad interpretation. The only statutes which must be uniform in the republic are the laws 
of sovereignty, including the constitutional block, organic laws, international conventions 
and the texts related to high jurisdiction; general principles of law, including the fundamental 
freedoms; and the laws which have no direct relationship to territorial organisation, including 
the criminal law. This interpretation, however, excludes the DOMs/ROMs, where the 
exceptions to general legislation are limited. The Constitutional Council has interpreted the 
legal particularism of overseas collectivities related to various domains. They include criminal 
law jurisdiction and process, mineral resources, elections, higher education, enterprises, 
public health, audiovisual communication and nationality. The constitution’s precent wording 
since 2003 specifies that in principle the laws and regulations are fully applicable in DOM/
ROM, but they may have differences due to their characters and particularities.3
All this does not mean that France has several legal systems. Between 1789-1998 there 
was only one legislature which could take into consideration the local special features in 
the limits of the Constitution. After the Accord of Nouméa the Congress of New Caledonia 
has been granted legislative powers to enact lois du pays (since 2004 also to the Assembly of 
French Polynesia), but even their limited competence is submitted to the French Constitution 
and judicial review of Conseil d’Etat.4
The national government has to consult with the territorial assemblies before their 
status can be changed. Often the initiative has come from the territorial assemblies. Until 
the constitutional reform of 1992 the national legislator and Conseil d’Etat had the right 
to intervene in all matters delegated to territorial assemblies. This reduced their scope of 
consideration to administrative actions. Today the legal particularism protects the difference 
of overseas collectivities of automatic application of French and EU statutes in the limits of 
national Constitution. Further, the Constitutional Council practices an effective control over 
the organic laws which deal with the changes in the respective collectivity’s status.5
2   DDHC (1789), art. 3; Constitution de 1791; Constitution de l’an I (1793); Constitution (1946), art. 72; 
Constitution (1958), art. 3, 73-74, 76; Décret du 8 mars 1790; Décret du 10 mars 1790; Sénatus-consulte 
du 3 mai 1854, art. 18; CC, Décision no. 71-46 DC du 20 janvier 1972; Décision no. 82-137 DC du 25 février 
1982; Décision no. 2001-454 DC du 17 janvier 2002; Aubry (1992), p. 9; Michalon, p. 631; Sem (1996), pp. 
125-126; Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), pp. 320-326; Peres (2002). Actually two of these 
statutes related to slavery: the Degree of 10 March 1790 confirmed it, while Sénatus-consulte of 3 May 1854 
prohibited it in three colonies. 
3   Constitution (1958), art. 73; CC, Décision no. 85-205 DC du 28 décembre 1985; Luchaire (1995), p. 1628; 
Matutano (2005), p. 520.
4   Rouault (2007), p. 238.
5   Constitution (1958), art. 34, 37, 74; CE, Saïd Ali Tourqui, 27 février 1970.
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In the Pacific region, the British missionaries attempted to develop a Western, codified 
legislation in Polynesia. Therefore, the Kingdom of Tahiti developed a system of statutory 
laws before annexation to France. Essential were the royal regulations (te parau taroa). The 
Pomare Code (1819-1880) was a collection of statutes which all chiefs and sub-chiefs under 
his sovereignty had to apply. It remained in force during the protectorate and was even revised 
and extended in relation to local administration. More than 50% of the code’s statutes dealt 
with the private sphere of law with a strong moral overtone. Several customary practices 
were prohibited. The code ordered the death penalty on infanticide, abortion and voluntary 
homicide. Sodomy led to life-long exile or forced labour. The code included also provisions 
on sexual aggression, drunkenness, tattoos, rebellion and conspiration.6 
All Tahitian statutes had to be confirmed by the governor and his council. Among them 
were statutes against compulsory education, breaking of Sabbath, damage of property and 
intermarriages. The Protestant missionaries continued to have strong moral influence on the 
content of the statutes. During the protectorate the French civil law began soon to replace the 
customary law in Tahiti. Since 1866 the French Civil Code replaced the Tahitian legislation 
in all questions except in land property and related questions, like succession. From 1843 
there were created the War Council as criminal court and Justice of Peace, and Tribunal 
of First Instance and the Council of Appeal for civil law cases. The court system developed 
during the subsequent decades: the office of procurer was created in 1847 and a professional 
judge was introduced in 1865. The degree of 1868 reorganised the administration of justice, 
including the Tribunal of Peace, the Tribunal of First Instance, the Tribunal of Commerce and 
the Superior Tribunal. The reform of 1933 preserved the system’s basic structure. An office 
of market judge was created in 1890 to the Tribunal of First Instance. In 1981 the Superior 
Tribunal (of Appeal) was renamed the Court of Appeal and the last Justices of Peace were 
annexed to its system. The Criminal Court was reformed the next year and a Children’s Court 
was created in 1984.7
In Wallis and Futuna the earliest statute was the code of Monseigneur Bataillon (1870), 
which was written by the head of Catholic missions on the islands, was a mixture of 
customary law and religious rules. According to it, the village laws were in force only by 
governmental consent. The main functionaries were the judges who could not judge their 
relatives. All residents of Uvéa were subject to customary law. The code was partly replaced 
in 1933 by a decree which brough the islands the French legal system. Already the treaty of 
1887 recognised de facto legal pluralism: the French citizens and the indigenous population 
followed different laws. This was continued by the decree of 8 August 1933, which organised 
officially the French law on Wallis and Futuna. The Justice of Peace dealth with the French 
subjects. When Indigenous people committed crimes against the French citizens they were 
also under the jurisdiction of the Justice of Peace. In the last-mentioned case the justice was 
consulted by an Indigenous assistant. The law of 1961 repealed a major part of the decree, 
6   Pomare Code (1819, Tahiti), laws I-XV, XIX; Boage (1952), pp. 6-7, 12. “The missionaries thought it proper 
from a consideration of the state of affairs in the islands, to recommend it to the king to call a meeting of 
chiefs of several Districts, that he might propose, and in conjunction with them, after consultation and 
agreement, settle certain laws and regulations, for the good of the people, and the better ordering of their 
civil affairs.” op.cit. Siikala (1982), p. 231.
7   Newbury (1980), pp. 90, 109, 127-129; Un peu d’histoire. 
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but continued the double legal system. The laws and statutes concerning New Caledonia, if 
they were extended by degrees to the islands before 1961, are still in force. The two systems 
coexist. There is, however, one exception: the criminal law follows the civil law system. The 
civil law system’s Court of First Instance, Children’s Tribunal and Work Tribunal are located 
in Mata Utu (Wallis). Their creation has been a result of the self-determination process in 
New Caledonia and negotiations between the two territories. The court of appeal is the Court 
of Appeal of Nouméa in New Caledonia but the final court for criminal law cases is today the 
Criminal Court of Mata Utu. The local judge may arrest a person for seven days’ examination 
before transfer for imprisonment to New Caledonia.8
3.1.2.  Loi du pays
The domain of law is reserved in the Constitution to national parliament. The general rule 
is that the regulations of terrorial collectivities are administrative statutes lower in hierarchy 
to laws and are therefore submitted to control of administrative jurisdiction. Both New 
Caledonia (1998) and French Polynesia (2004) have statutes called lois du pays (laws of 
the country). Agreement of Nouméa created for the first time a crack to the principle of 
normative unity. It gave for the Congress of New Caledonia an equal legislative power with 
the parliament of France. Lois du pays of New Caledonia and French Polynesia are, however, 
limited geographically to their respective territories and to defined subjects which do not 
belong to the state’s competence.9
According to the Agreement of Nouméa, some of the deliberations of Congress have 
legislative value which the executive prepares and executes. The government of New Caledonia 
and the members of the Congress may introduce lois du pays. The parliament cannot restrict 
New Caledonia’s Constitution-based legislative power. Unlike in the case of national laws, 
Conseil d’Etat has a role to check in one month’s delay all legal initiatives and bills related to 
lois du pays and if needed, to invalidate them. Thereafter they are transferred to the President 
of Congress, Government and High Commissioner. The Constitutional Council may check 
the constitutionality of lois du pays which refer to bloc de constitutionnalité, but only if a 
provision has been taken to a second reading. They are finally submitted to the Congress for 
deliberation. The Economic and Social Council and the Customary Senate must be consulted 
on the bills concerning their respective areas of competence. Lois du pays are adopted in 
public scrutiny by a simple majority of the Congress. A new deliberation may be demanded 
within 15 days after the adoption of the text by the high commissioner, government of New 
Caledonia, the President of Provincial Assembly or at least 55 members of the Congress. The 
8   Code du procédure penal (1958), art. 823 al. 1; Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 2, 5; Décret du 8 août 
1933, art. 4-5, 7-8; Décret du 19 février 1962; Décret du 26 décembre 1983; Décret du 27 décembre 1983; 
Arrêté du 2 décembre 1968; Ntumy (1993), p. 624; Payé (2001), pp. 231-232; L’histoire des institutions à 
Wallis et Futuna.
9   Constitution (1958), art. 34; Bausinger-Garnier (2001), p. 15; Payé (2001), pp. 362-363. Pays means histori-
cally rather a province and dates from the medieval France, when there was not yet a nation state but pays 
was one’s own “country”.
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Constitutional Council may intervene to invalidate legislation when the limits to legitimate 
discrimination have been exceeded.10  
The organic law of 27 February 2004 recognises for the first time a limited right for 
Polynesian Assembly to give statutes which are called, similarly to New Caledonia, lois du pays. 
Their scope is related to the domain of French Polynesia or to the participation of the territory 
to national competence, submitted to the judicial review of Conseil d’Etat. The Territorial 
Assembly may enact lois du pays. They may be challenged for a maximum of eight days after 
their adoption or day after voting on the second reading to Conseil d’Etat in delay of 15 days 
by the High Commissioner, the President of Assembly, six MPs or physical or artificial person 
with an interest, in delay of one month after the publication of law in the official journal of 
French Polynesia. Conseil d’Etat delivers in three months time a ruling on the conformity 
of lois du pays with the Constitution, organic laws, international engagements and general 
principles of law. Conseil d’Etat has also power to use exceptional means of control. Lois du 
pays may be submitted to a referendum by territorial government or Territorial Assembly. 
The High Commissioner oversees the legality.11
10 Accords de Nouméa (1998), ss. 2.1.3.-2.1.4.; Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 32, 35, 140; 
CC, Décision no. 2000-1 LP du 27 janvier 2000; Bausinger-Garnier (2001), pp. 58-60; Rouault (2007), pp. 
246-247. The possibility to refer to Constitutional Council has been used only rarely. In 1996 the Admi-
nistrative Tribunal of Nouméa declared itself disqualified to give opinion on the bills of loi du pays based 
on its double role in consultation and jurisdiction and the ECJ’s decision in Procola v. Luxemburg (1995). 
The Appellate Administrative Court of Paris rejected later the tribunal’s reasoning. Tribunal administrative 
de Nouméa, Sarran, 28 novembre 1996; CAA, Sarran, 23 mars 1999; In New Caledonia there were passed 
in 1999-2011 altogether 100 lois du pays. Many of them deal with local taxation and customs (in 50 lois du 
pays).  The other deal with working conditions (14), social affairs and social order (11), public services and 
administration (5), wages (4), professions (3), accommodation (3), culture (3), traffic (3), health (2), edu-
cation (2), investments (2), mining (1), meat products (1), and customary decisions (1); The competences 
of the Economic and Social Council and the Customary Senate include signs of identity; territory’s name; 
rules on assessment; collecting of taxes; fundamental principles of labour, trade unions and social securi-
ty; rules on access of foreign workers to market; customary status, regime of customary lands, customary 
negotiations, limits of customary areas, terms of designation to Customary Senate and Customary Com-
mittees; rules on hydrocarbon, nickel, chrome and cobalt; rules of provincial laws; rules on access to emp-
loyment; rules on status and capacity of persons, matrimony, succession and gifts; fundamental principles 
on rules of property, real estates, civil and commercial obligations and distribution between the provinces 
of the functions and facilities created by the territory. 
11 Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 14, 18-19, 39, 140, 151, 166-167, 179; Rouault (2007), 
p. 244; Magnon (2008), pp. 301-302. Loi du pays may be passed on civil law, the principles of commercial 
obligations, certain taxes, trade unions and social security, immigrants’ work permits, public health, social 
action and families; fundamental guarantees of public functionaries; development and town planning; en-
vironment; property; mining; local employment (in relation to art. 18 of the organic law); transfer of real 
estates; right of pre-emption; relations between the territory and the municipalities; agreements; publicati-
on of institutional documents; and matters listed in art. 39. The institutions of French Polynesia may par-
ticipate to the exercise of legal and regulatory competences in application of art. 14: status and capacity of 
persons; parental authority; matrimony; succession; gifts; research; breach of law; gambling; immigration 
(excluding the asylum, expulsion and EU citizens); audiovisual communication; and the financial services 
of post offices.  
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3.1.3. Indigenous Courts and Institutions
The establishing of customary organs was first suggested for New Caledonia in the bill of 1984. 
The next year was created eight customary areas (aire coutumière): Hoot Ma Whaap, Paicî-
Cèmuhi, Ajië Ara, Xârâcùù, Drubea-Kapumë, Nengone, Drehu and Iaai. They are further 
divided to 57 customary chefferies, 341 tribes and approximately 5,000 extended families. 
The customary areas have respective customary councils, which could consult the Regional 
Councils (today Provincial Councils) in customary questions. They formed a Consultive 
Customary Council of the Territory with the same functions. In 1988 was created the 
Customary Chamber whose domain was related to municipal and economic questions. The 
Consultive Customary Council became with the Accord of Nouméa the Customary Senate. 
Its present status is based on the organic law of 1999. The Senate has 16 members representing 
each customary area. It is represented in several Caledonian organisations as the expert of 
customary affairs. The senate must be consulted on the bills of loi du pays dealing with Kanak 
identity, identitary signs and custom. It may also be consulted on questions related especially 
to the competence of state. The Customary Senate must answer in two months’ delay. It may 
also make initiatives on Kanak identity, customary areas and its own regulations; is responsible 
on the role of customary affairs; gives legal definition to the Customary Councils and defines 
their form and legal force; and specifies the status of customary authorities and their role in 
social security and criminal mediation. The last-mentioned makes possible social control of 
customary authorities. The Congress has powers to regulate the mediation by loi du pays. The 
Customary Senate may itself ask the local Customary Councils to give opinion in one month’s 
time. They may be asked to convene by the High Commissioner, Government, President of 
the Assembly of Province or by a mayor. The officials of administration may ask interpretation 
on customary rules and minutes.12
In 1982 to Caledonian civil law courts was created a system of Customary Assessors who 
have deliberate voice when dealing with questions of customary status or customary lands. 
Each customary area appoints five assessors to the courts. There are always a minimum of two 
assessors to guarantee both parties customary representation. The assessors’ main duty is to 
give a declaration for the proof of customary law.13
The Pomare Code implemented on Tahiti and Moorea a network of 700 Indigenous judges 
and a British-style jury and magistrate. In 1824 appeared the Court of Appeal (To’ohitu). Seven 
of the district chiefs, who had become district judges, formed To’ohitu. With the protectorate 
the Indigenous judges’ jurisdiction was limited from 1865 to their own communities’ 
customary law. The Tahitian Assembly acted as the kingdom’s legislature (1843-1866) but 
was increasingly under French supervision. From 1847 the District Judges were appointed 
jointly by the Queen and the French Commissar, and their number was strongly reduced. 
In 1855 the District Councils were created which acted among other things as first instance 
civil courts and land courts. To’ohitu continued as a court of appeal of second degree (High 
Court of Tahiti). The decisions of both courts could be quashed by the French courts. In 
12   Accords de Nouméa (1998), préambule; Loi no. 84-821 du 6 septembre 1984; Loi no. 85-872 du 23 août 
1985; Loi no. 88-1028 du 9 novembre 1988; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 137, 144, 149-
150, 152; Payé (2001), p. 208; Bechtel (2002), p. 102.
13   Ordonnance no. 82-877 du 15 octobre 1982, art. 2-5; Bechtel (2002), p. 105. 
3. Law and Justice
103
1866 the Tahitian Assembly was forced to pass a law which ordered all cases to be judged 
according to French law. The Assembly was still able to hold the land question’s litigation 
partly under District Councils. The annexation of Tahiti to France in 1880 led to the gradual 
disappearance of Indigenous jurisdiction. From 1882 the civil law courts consulted indigenous 
assessors when the cases deal with the diminishing customary law questions. To’ohitu ceased 
to function in 1933. The last remnant of Indigenous courts is the possibility of using mūtoi 
(customary official) for defence in remote islands’ trials.14  
3.1.4. Customary Law
During the ancien régime France had 65 general and 300 local customs. In 1804, when the 
Civil Code was passed, the customary law lost in France officially all force as a legal source 
although much of it was injected into the new code. Further, the custom did not disappear 
totally from the colonies. The customary law is recognised by legislation on New Caledonia 
and Wallis and Futuna. The Accord of Nouméa and the law of 1961 on Wallis and Futuna 
recognise the validity of customary law in civil status, property and landowning besides the 
French law. The customary law varies in different customary areas. New Caledonia and Wallis 
and Futuna have parallel legal systems but in the courts at the territorial level the customary 
law has a subordinate position in relation to statutory law, as shows the consultative nature 
of its use. In its proper sphere of influence the customary law is, however, still dominant in 
Loyalty Islands, in Wallis and Futuna, and among the Indian communities of French Guiana, 
in certain sectors of life in Grande Terre, and it is alive in the family law of French Polynesia. 
The personal customary status of New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna has legal effects in 
the whole territory of the republic.15
The Kanak have been exempted from the provisions of personal status in the Civil Code 
since 1866. The Court of Appeal of Nouméa has allowed references to customary law since 
1920 and the government recognised the existence of parallel customary law system in 1934. 
Nevertheless, the customary law’s domain was restricted until 1998 and there lacked a valid 
structure to apprehend the oral customary law. There were unsuccessful attempts in 1953 
and 1971 to codify the customary law. Due to a lack of clear rules the courts used civil law to 
interpretate the custom. Only the judicial reforms of 1982 and 1989 created a real possibility 
to use customary law in civil law courts, thanks to customary assessors and more flexible rules 
14   Newbury (1980), pp. 183-184, 188, 190; Siikala (1982), p. 231; Rayboud (2001); Un peu d’histoire. In Hopu 
& Bessert v. France (1997), the litigants complained that they had no possibility to apply to Indigenous 
courts. UNHRC saw that France never abolished the Indigenous courts, including To’ohitu, but they ceased 
to function. Cf. Hopu & Bessert, s. 3.1. In the 1930s, the registration of customary land to individual lots was 
in final phase which diminished To’ohitu’s role. 
15   Accords de Nouméa (1998), art. 1.4.; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 7-19, 22; Ordonnance 
no. 82-877 du 15 octobre 1982; Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), p. 463; Payé (2001), pp. 416, 
426-427; Cour d’appel de Besançon, Mlles Narnada et Radjaswari c. M.P., 13 juin 1995. In Mayotte the Is-
lamic law had before 2010 competence related to an individual’s legal capacity, matrimony, succession and 
gifts. The change of territorial status to DOM and as an integral part of EU has led to the repealing of an 
independent mixed religious and customary system, including the polygamy. The Islamic courts’ role has 
been reduced to mediation and interpretation of religious law.
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which allowed the courts to make decisions on customary civil status (statut civil coutumier) 
and customary land. Although the Constitution limits the customary status to private law 
and even there only a dispute between two or more persons having customary status may be 
resolved by the customary authorities, the Agreement of Nouméa has a broader definition, 
including some rules on property and succession. In the organic law of 1999 those who do 
not have civil law status, preserve their personal status if they have not renounced it. New 
Caledonia has competence on customary status and its rules, title, institutions and the limits 
of customary areas. The children to customary parents acquire customary status law at birth. 
The customary status is possible to change to civil law status and also to reacquire if one’s 
ancestors had the status.16
The decisions (palabre) of Clan Councils, which acquired recognised status with 
the Accord of Nouméa, are called in New Caledonia procès-verbal. The decisions vary 
geographically, and their content was defined by the Congress in 2007.  A customary decision 
has to be published in written form in French. The clan chiefs’ status in the decision process 
is recognised and there are rules on decisions concerning the utilisation and exploitation of 
customary land. A customary decision has a quality of administrative decision, which creates 
rights for individual and community. A customary public officer, working for the Customary 
Area, executes the decisions and receives appeals against a decision, and has also a role in 
prevention of crimes and in their mediation. The Customary Councils clarify and interpret 
customary rules.17
French Polynesia forms an interesting exception in the Pacific region. After the conversion 
of Pomare II to Christianity in 1812, the king allowed the missionaries’ “civilisation work”, of 
which an essential part was the drawing up of laws following the Western model. The result, 
Code of Pomare, was introduced in the meeting of chiefs in 1819. In 1840 the royal house 
made an unsuccessful attempt to codify also the existing customary law and the customary 
law was soon limited to civil and criminal processes among the indigenous people. A new 
limitation took place in 1865 when the customary law’s scope was reduced to land questions, 
and the following year the French Civil Code became in force. King Pomare V promised in 
1880 that France would respect the existing Tahitian laws and customs and leave to indigenous 
jurisdiction the basic litigation. The law of 30 December 1880 did not, however, mention this 
promise. The law of 10 March 1891 made a reference to them only in a negative light. Loosing 
ground gradually the indigenous jurisdiction finally survived only in Rurutu, Rimatara and 
the Leeward Islands where it was officially repealed in 1945. Thereafter the whole of French 
Polynesia was integrated into French civil law system. The customary law has persisted only 
in family law, but has gained only limited recognition by the territorial courts.18 
On Wallis and Futuna the customary law was de facto the only system of law until 1933, 
when the French civil law was introduced. Even then the indigenous communities’ inner 
16   Constitution (1958), art. 75; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 8-19, 34; Loi no. 89-378 du 13 
juin 1989; Accord de Nouméa (1998), s. 1.1; Ordonnance du 15 décembre 1982; Cour d’appel de Nouméa, 
Arrêté du 20 février 1920; Arrêté no. 631 du 21 juin 1934; Ntumy (1993), pp. 619-620; Lafargue (2003), pp. 
36-38, 43, 48; Agniel (2008), p. 84.
17   Accord de Nouméa, art. 1.2.1-1.2.2., 1.2.4; Loi du Pays du 15 janvier 2007, ss. 3-5, 8, 19, 28.
18   Loi du 30 décembre 1880; Loi du 10 mars 1891; Newbury (1980), p. 127; Siikala (1982), pp. 231-232; Ntumy 
(1993), p. 639; Bechtel (2002), p. 107; Un Peu d’histoire. 
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affairs and criminal law stayed in the scope of customary law. The law of 1961 names as 
sources of law both the civil law (droit commun) and the customary law (droit local). The 
law mentions specially litigation between the citizens following the customary law and the 
customary property. It gives an opportunity for the parties of customary law cases to submit 
collectively to civil law jurisdiction. The customary law decisions can be challenged in chambre 
d’annulation of the Court of Appeal of Nouméa as the last resort, when there is a question 
of incompetence, excess of powers or other violation of law. The regulation of 20 September 
1978 created officially a customary jurisdiction to Wallis and Futuna, but its statutory form 
has remained a dead letter.  It is much alive but outside the scope of official judicial control. 
The courts have also recognised the validity of Wallisian and Futunian customary law in New 
Caledonia. In the litigation between two customs the civil law prevails, if the parties have not 
agreed to refer to either of the customary systems.19
The Indians of French Guiana were outside of French legislation until 1969 and the only 
known legal system there was that of customary law. Despite their integration to the civil law 
system, they continue to live under unrecognised customary law, which especially dominates 
the family, property and criminal law in the indigenous villages. The hereditary chiefs act as 
arbitrators. There have been intergenerational conflicts of values when the young people want 
to leave the traditional community.20
3.1.5. Indigénat and Customary Enforcement of Law
In New Caledonia the Kanak chiefs had during indigenat (1898-1946) a responsibility to keep 
order in tribal reserves with the help of Indigenous police. The Governor’s civil servants could 
also arrest and punish the indigenous people with fines or sequestration of goods without 
trial or a judge’s decision and Indigenous people could be taken to public work projects 
when needed. In Tahiti, the Pomare Code created since 1819 a system of policing and on the 
Palmerston Island was created a penitentiary. In French Polynesia the indigenous people were 
from 1880 French citizens and therefore under French laws. The law enforcement belonged to 
French police forces and the gendarmerie. In 1877, at the local level was created in a system of 
Indigenous police (mutoi), which helped gendarmerie in supervising road maintenance, tax 
collection and registration of statistics and land transfers. In 1969, on both Wallis and Futuna 
and in the southern parts of French Guiana the customary enforcement of law has remained 
important. Wallis and Futuna has a customary police (pulu) especially for land questions. In 
French Guiana the chiefs still have the main role in keeping the order in communities and 
they cooperate with gendarmerie.21 
19   Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 5; Décret du 8 août 1933, art. 7; Arrêté du 20 septembre 1978; Cour 
d’appel de Nouméa, arrêté no. 121 du 8 juin 1998; arrêté no. 28 du 12 avril 1999; Bechtel (2002), p. 105, 
Rohm (2006), p. xxvi; L’histoire des institutions à Wallis et Futuna. 
20   Arnoux (1996), pp. 1624, 1627; Peyrat & Gougis & Chine (1998), p. 79. 
21   Décision du 9 août 1898 (New Caledonia), ss. 22-24; Arnoux (1996), p. 1608; Aldrich (1993), pp. 73-74; 
Rayboud (2001); Rau (2005), p. 71; Aimot & Tamole (2007), p. 52.  
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New Zealand3.2. 
3.2.1. Legislation and Bylaws
The District Circuit Courts Act 1858 allowed rūnanga (indigenous councils) limited power 
to make bylaws to regulate civil injuries and lesser criminal offences which were enforceable 
in the Circuit Courts, presided by Resident Magistrates and assisted by Māori Assessors. The 
courts’ Māori Assessors had the authority to enforce bylaws in lesser matters and the resident 
magistrate in broader matters. In the late nineteenth century kingitanga (Māori kingdom) 
acted as parallel, alternative legal system.  In 1894 it enacted a Constitution, which defined 
the governmental and administrative structure of King Country and set out conditions by 
which Pākehā might secure lease of Māori lands. The bylaws-making power was returned 
in 1945 with the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act. The tribal Executive 
Committees were able to make bylaws on health, sanitation, control of animals, protection of 
meeting houses and burial grounds, meetings, tradition and general discipline in villages. A 
tangata kaitiaki/tiaki (official for customary fishing) has the power to make bylaws on non-
commercial customary fisheries.22  
The first statute to mention the Treaty of Waitangi - the founding document of New Zealand 
- was the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. In 1986 the Labour Government asked all departments 
to give recognition to the treaty in all aspects of their administration and in the preparation 
of legislation as part of the domestic law and applicable to all policies. The consultation with 
Māori was needed in all matters relating to the application of the treaty. Due to resistance of 
departments the government had to drop later the reference to treaty as domestic law, adding 
principles of treaty, requiring the inclusion of estimated financial implications to treaty 
recommendations and limiting the consultation only to appropriate Māori on significant 
matters. The later government guidelines were more reserved, maintaining a possibility of 
general reference to the treaty and a case-by-case approach and variety of legislative provisions 
elaborated on the meaning of the treaty generally or extensively.23  
In common law doctrine on parliamentary sovereignty the legislation is the paramount 
and unimpugnable expression of absolute sovereignty without limitations. Only in the 1980s 
did there appear a constitutional convention of legislative restraint. As a rule, consultation 
and agreement with Māori must accompany major statutory initiatives in treaty-related 
fields. This is visible in legislation. A significant period of treaty legislating was 1986-1993, 
concentrating on land, language and fisheries. The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 was 
followed by the Environmental Act 1986 and the Conservation Act 1987. All subsequent 
acts referring to the treaty have followed the same formula, including management, use, 
development and protection of resources, conservation, energy, ownership, protection 
of treaty claims, education and human rights. Several statutes characterise the treaty as a 
relationship or partnership between two founding nations. This active period ended with the 
Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 which acknowledges the importance of land relationship to 
22   Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act (1945), ss. 34-35; A Guide to the Fisheries (Kaimoana Cus-
tomary Fishing Regulations 1998 (2003), p. 13; Havemann (1999), pp. 384, 389. Māori kingdom and King 
Country are located in central North Island. Cf. section 4.2.4.
23   Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand law (2001), p. 83; Palmer (2008), p. 96. 
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Māori and promotes land retention. The post-1975 legislation has recognised that the treaty 
establishes a special relationship, embodies spirit of exchange of kāwanatanga (governance) 
to the protection of rangatiratanga (exercise of power), envisages spirit of partnership and 
goodwill, obliges the Crown to protect actively Māori interests, and confirms and guarantees 
all their taonga (treasure).24  
Like in Tahiti, the missionaries of LMS were active on the Cook Islands to creating a 
Christian and Western society. The resident and the General Council promulgated statutes 
which covered most aspects of public and private law. The federal parliament moved to 
majority rule in 1893. In 1899 it passed a criminal code for Cook Islands (Offenders’ 
Punishment Act). The Ariki Council replaced with regulatory powers the parliament after 
1901, when the islands were annexed to New Zealand. In the aftermath of World War II 
the Legislative Council (1946) was established to make ordinances in accordance with New 
Zealand’s legislation for peace, order and good government of all islands, and to impose 
taxes. In 1965 the New Zealand’s parliament enacted a Constitution for Cook Islands. The 
islands were granted legislative powers after 64 years’ interruption. Unlike in New Zealand, 
the Cook Islands and Niue have a constitution as the supreme law, whose change demands 
a 2/3 majority in local parliaments. The laws of New Zealand are not directly applicable, but 
must be implemented by the Cook Islands Legislature. The Governor General in Council was 
able to legislate for the territory when requested by the Legislature until 1981. Most articles 
in the Constitution may be amended by the local parliament. An amendment must be voted 
for twice in 90 days interval and receive a 2/3 majority. A major part of legislation is today 
enacted by the local parliament. It can also declare acts of the New Zealand’s parliament 
applicable in the Cook Islands or ask the New Zealand parliament to legislate for the islands. 
The local parliament has the right to delegate powers to pass bylaws, regulations or rules. The 
United Kingdom’s statutes which define privileges, immunities or powers of the members of 
the House of Commons, are applicable.25  
The Constitution of Niue is the supreme law of the island. The Constitution of Niue Act 
1974 has a similar status. A bill to change the Constitution or Niue Constitution Act 1974 
need a 2/3 majority in second and third readings. The interval for two readings is 13 weeks. 
Depending on the Constitution’s provision, there is a further requirement of referendum with 
a simple or 2/3 majority for the change. Statutes inconsistent with the Constitution are invalid. 
Like on the Cook Islands, the New Zealand’s statutes came part of Niue only by the consent of 
local parliament. Unlike on the Cook Island, the Governor General has still legislative powers 
when requested by the Assembly. the island’s statute law includes the consistent law of England 
as force since 14 January 1840, some British and imperial statutes in force since 1 January 
1967, pre-1974 New Zealand’s acts, which have not been repealed by the Assembly and Niue 
24   Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s. 4(2A); Te Ture Whenua Act 1993, Preamble;  Public Records Act 2005, s. 3; 
McHugh (2004), p. 417; Palmer (2008), pp. 95, 102-103. The preamble of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 
follows the wording of Waitangi Tribunal’s Te Ariawa Report (1983). 
25   Constitution of the Cook Islands 1965, art. 39, 46; Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, ss. 4, 41; Legislative 
Assembly Powers and Privileges Amendment Act 1979 (Cook Islands); New Zealand Laws Act 1979 (Cook 
Islands); Gilson (1991), pp. 65, 91, 200; Ntumy (1993), pp. 3-5. Certain amendments for the Constitution 
of the Cook Islands need collaboration with New Zealand’s parliament. A good example is art. 2, which de-
clares the Queen of England as the Head of State. A change needs in New Zealand’s parliament a 2/3 assent 
in two votes and a further 2/3 assent from the electorate of the Cook Islands; Ariki are paramount chiefs. 
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acts and ordinances since 1974. The Niue Act 1966, enacted by the New Zealand’s parliament, 
created the base for the island’s statutes, including general legislation not included in the 
Constitution. New bills must go through three separate readings. Delegation of regulatory 
powers is based on statutes. Most regulations are made by the cabinet. The Village Councils 
have a right to make bylaws. All regulations and bylaws must be submitted to the Assembly’s 
confirmation within 28 days after the promulgation.26
The sources of law in Tokelau are expressed in the Tokelau Act 1948. There are acts and 
regulations of the New Zealand Parliament, which are specifically made for Tokelau and 
those, which are extended to the islands, and are not inconsistent with other acts of New 
Zealand. Since 1969 the laws of England as in force in New Zealand in 1840 became in force 
in Tokelau. General Fono (chiefs’ meeting) has legislative power in Tokelau since 1996 in 
questions dealing with tolls, rates, dues, fines, taxes and public holidays. It can also prescribe 
criminal offences and penalties. Both General Fono and Governor General in Council can 
make regulations necessary for peace, order and good government of Tokelau. General Fono’s 
regulations must be published both in Tokelauan and English. The Village Councils have 
been able  since 1986 to make their own village rules.27 
3.2.2.	 Tikanga	Māori
The Māori customary law (tikanga Māori) is based on a continuing review of fundamental 
principles in a dialogue between the past and the present. It has the capacity adapt to new 
circumstances while maintaining conformity with basic beliefs. There are variations between 
the iwi but common is that more than one distinct cultural group can be acknowledged and 
accommodated within a society. The values inform the whole range of law and provide the 
primary guide of behaviour.28
The first charter of the colony (1840) established courts with jurisdiction over all 
inhabitants of the country. At the same time, the principle of continuity in English common 
law recognised certain degree of validity for pre-colonial laws. The Māori customary laws 
were well-established in their territories and even extended to Pākehā. George Clarke, the 
head of New Zealand’s Protectorate Department, recommended a separate Māori system of 
law and the recognition of their customs and laws. Also the colonial secretary in London 
asked the governor of New Zealand to uphold Māori customary law and to incorporate 
some Māori institutions as tapu to the legal system. In some regions with a strong Māori 
presence, the British authorities showed pragmatism with Maori customary law, using two 
legal systems side by side. The Colonial Office in London allowed the custom to prevail in 
26   Niue Act 1966, ss. 51, 672, 706; Constitution of Niue (1974), art. 28, 35-36; Ntumy (1993), pp. 159, 163; 
Townend (2003). The Niue Act included also provisions on the High Court and references to over 30 of 
New Zealand’s statutes, which have an equal status with later statutes (s. 677). 
27   Tokelau Act 1948, ss. 3A, 3D, 4, 6; Tokelau Amendment Act 1969, s. 3; Tokelau Amendment Act 1996, ss. 
8-9; Tokelau Village Incorporation Regulation 1986, s. 18. 
28   NZCA, Hineiti Rirerire Arani v. Public Trustee of New Zealand (1920); Māori Custom and Values in New 
Zealand Law (2001), pp. 3-5, 17. Tikanga comes from tika, right, correct, just, fair.
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dealings which involved only Māori. In criminal law the legislation met to some extent the 
indigenous reality.29 
In 1844 Governor FitzRoy issued the Native Exemption Ordinance which applied to 
Māori offences outside the town limits and was intended to be a transitional measure. A 
Māori could only be punished according to the muru (forgiveness) principle and they were 
generally exempted from the imprisonment which was against their customary practice. 
Governor Gray repealed both the protectorate department and Native Exemption Ordinance 
in 1846, but the Māori customary law was used in Resident Magistrate Court until 1893 and 
was even otherwise dominant until the 1860s. The Clarke’s and Swanson’s idea about separate 
pockets of customary law was included to the s. 71 of the Constitution Act 1852, which 
offered a possibility to create native districts with customary law jurisdiction. The promise 
remained a dead letter and was finally repealed with the enactment of the Constitution Act 
1986. In more isolated parts of King Country the customary law prevailed until World War 
II. Elsewhere, the increasing Pākehā population had less need to respect the Māori customary 
law but even despite the war, confiscations and new legislation New Zealand’s legislation 
preserved the sui generis status of Māori customary law in registration of births and deaths, 
education, qualification as electors, jury service, matrimony and property assessment. As a 
throwback to legal plurality, judges’ oath demanded that they do right to all people after the 
law and usages of New Zealand. A similar wording is included in the Supreme Court Act 
2003.30  
Despite the parallel existence of two legal systems in early New Zealand, the colonial 
society expected that to be only a transitional stage. Governor Fitzgerald hoped that the 
customary law would be abandoned in time. The collective security would be obtained by 
a common legal system. In 1845 Martin CJ published Ko Nga Tikanga A Te Pākehā, which 
was aimed at the Māori as an introduction to the basic principles of the English law. Due 
to the ideology of gradual civilisation was established a council to advise the governor on 
indigenous policy (1863).31 
The establishment of Waitangi Tribunal (1975) has increased the importance of Māori 
customary law as the secondary source of treaty. The treaty itself promises to protect the 
Māori custom and cultural values. The case law of Waitangi Tribunal, Maori Land Court 
and Maori Appellate Court shows that the customary law is alive and well in the Māori 
communities. The Waitangi Tribunal proceeds in marae oral hearings and recognises the 
expertise of elders and learned tribe members and the Waikato University Law School has 
29   McHugh (1991), pp. 90-91; Karsten (2002), p. 83; Joseph (2009), p. 75.
30   Native Exemption Ordinance (1844), ss. 2, 6; Constitution Act (1852), s. 71; Native Council Act (1863), 
s. 12(2); Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s. 18; Supreme Court Act 2003, s. 3; Karsten (2002), pp. 83-84; 
McHugh (1991), p. 274; Elias (2005), p. 6; Joseph (2009), p. 77. Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand 
Law, pp. 19-20. The presumption of continuity can be found from early English case law. In Case of Tanistry 
(1608) the indigenous laws survived British sovereignty as long as they met the requirements of reasonable-
ness, certainty, immemorial usage and compatibility with the prerogative of the Crown. In Campbell v. Hall 
(1774), Lord Mansfield held, among other options, that the laws of the newly-acquired territories remain in 
force until altered by the Crown. On the other hand, Mansfield also said that articles of a treaty or capitula-
tion of cession are sacred and inviolable; The early settlers were in many regions more dependent on the 
Māori customary law than their own common law.
31   Elias (2005), p. 6; Joseph (2009), p. 79.
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created several projects on tikanga Māori. In 1988-1990 the Māori activists campaigned for 
a separate Māori legal system, including a separate criminal justice system. They did not 
recognise the cession of sovereignty in the legal sense: for them the indigenous sovereignty 
existed in a separate jurisdictional realm.32 
In 1986 the High Court recognised in the Te Weehi case the existence of customary law 
in customary fishing. The decision brought legal pluralism to local courts when they had to 
investigate and enforce the customary law. The local laws and property rights of peoples had 
continued after the establishment of British sovereignty. One year later the Court of Appeal 
confirmed that the customs and practices which include spiritual elements are cognisable 
in a court of law provided they are properly extinquished by evidence. The court has also 
stressed that the existing indigenous rights can only be extinguished by the free consent of 
their occupiers.33
In the associated states and territories custom is defined narrowly. The Cook Islands Act 
1915 defined custom as “the ancient custom and usages of the Natives of the Cook Islands”. 
This precluded the courts from recognising new or changed custom. The scope of customary 
law covers interests in customary land and the conferring of chiefly titles. The local Island 
Councils have power to make, alter or revoke bylaws, which reflect the island’s customary 
law. They must be approved by the territory’s cabinet. The offences against bylaws are resolved 
by local justices of peace or by the High Court.34 In Niue juridical notice is to be taken of 
Niuean custom so far as it has the force of law under the Niue Act. Much of everyday life is 
governed by the custom but very little of it is formally recognised by law. When a custom 
contradicts with statute or common law, the latter prevails. Since 1968 the customary rules 
and governance of land system have been included in the legislation.There is no explicit 
mention about custom as a source of law for Tokelau, but the islands’ daily life is based largely 
on custom, especially in family relations, landholding, public order and village organisation. 
These areas are referred in regulations. The village elders make rules for their respective 
villages based on Tokelau Village Incorporation Regulation.35  
3.2.3. Waitangi Tribunal and the Indigenous Courts
In early New Zealand, the Māori retained their own tribal rūnanga courts, which were chief-
led dispute settlement forums. They used utu (retaliatory measures) to solve disputes, often 
related to land. In 1846 were established the Resident Magistrate Courts with summary 
jurisdiction over disputes between Māori and Pākehā. In cases involving only Māori, the 
Resident Magistrate was assisted by two rangatira (chief) who acted as Native Assessors. The 
assessors had an equal position in decision-making with the Resident Magistrate: the cases 
32   Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (2001), p. 69; McHugh (2004), p. 505.
33   NZHC, Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer (1986), s. 121; NZCA, Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato 
Valley Authority (1987), s. 215;  Te Runanganui o te Ika Whenua Inc Society v. Attorney- General (1994), s. 
24; McHugh (1991), p. 125.
34   Cook Islands Act (1915), s. 422; Outer Islands Local Government Act (Cook Islands, 1988); Ntumy (1993), 
p. 5.
35   Niue Act (1966), s. 672; Tokelau Village Incorporation Regulation 1986; Ntumy (1993), pp. 162, 299. 
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had to to be determined unanimously, according to equity and good conscience, and taking 
into consideration Māori customs, norms and institutions. Rangatira controlled their own 
people and decided whether they could be given up to British courts in the case of more 
serious crimes dealing with the Pākehā settlement. The Native Circuit Courts Act 1858 created 
20 Circuit Courts with respective judges. These courts used similarly Māori Assessors and 
Indigenous juries. The courts enforced the bylaws made by the village rūnanga. The Māori 
officials had a limited right to hear cases, whose compensation was at maximum worth £5. 
These systems were later abolished by the Magistrates Court Act 1893 and replaced by the 
Stipendiary Magistrate exluding the Māori customary law.36  
During the Māori wars, the Native Land Act 1862 contained provisions to establish a 
Native Land Court (NLC) to create a proper forum for Māori title cases. The court, created 
in 1865, was modelled on the conventions of British Courts of Law and Compensation Court 
whose judge Francis Fenton became the new court’s chief judge. The North Island was divided 
into five court districts. In 1865-1909 its main judicial tasks were to determine ownership of 
land and to facilitate individualisation of title, which de facto prepared the transfer of land 
to court and generated considerable litigation in the superior courts in succeeding years. On 
the other hand, the court also showed independence in relation to the Native Department 
and other courts. Any Māori with a claim could initiate investigation of title before the court. 
More than ten persons could be issued a certificate of title and the registration of names 
became possible two years later. A tribe could only receive a certificate to a block of more than 
5,000 acres. The Governor in Council had the power to order a rehearing. This was modified 
in 1880 to include all Māori. A rehearing court could change the former decision, to limit 
its scope (since 1886), and its ruling was final. The Supreme Court could refer questions of 
custom to NLC for determination. In 1868 the judges received wide powers to correct both 
written and unwritten defects and errors. From 1873 the court could send any question of law 
to be sent to the Supreme Court for binding determination.37 
Later the Supreme Court was also allowed to send the determination back to NLC (from 
1880). Superior courts were first reluctant to review the decisions of the land courts but when 
the twentieth century approached, they began to hear submissions in the form of applications 
for writs of certiorari or prohibition. The basic structure of NLC remained in subsequent 
legislation. The Native Land Court Act 1894 created the Native Appellate Court, constituted 
of two judges of the NLC, in order to hear appeals from the NLC and make binding decisions. 
An appeal was to be submitted to a district registrar. Like NLC it could ask for the Supreme 
Court’s decision. The Native Land Act 1909 excluded the NLC from the process of investigation 
of title. The most Māori customary land had already been investigated and the function of 
the court moved in a more protective direction by exercising a quasi-parental jurisdiction 
and taking part in the Crown’s duties. The court developed a system of land title registry 
and from the late 1920s its duties were increased by the legislation. Judges and registrars ran 
Maori Land Boards and were, therefore, able to promote economic development projects. 
This active period ended with the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 which attempted to 
36   Resident Magistrates Courts Ordinance 1846, ss. 7-10, 13, 19-20; Native Circuit Courts Act 1858, s. 2; 
Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law, p. 20; Karsten (2002), pp. 83-84; Cox (1993), p. 80; Joseph 
(2009), p. 78.
37   Spiller (2001), pp. 148, 157; McHugh (2004), pp. 186-187; Young & Belgrave & Bennion (2005), pp. 12-13. 
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abolish the Māori land question and reduced the land court to a formal court of record. In 
1953 the courts were renamed as the the Maori Land Court (MLC) and Maori Appellate 
Court (MAC).38 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the the Māori had in several 
petitions demanded the court’s reform or abolishment. The real reform took place, however, 
only from the 1970s. The court began to improvise Māori custom in some areas and promoted 
mana with the “1840 rule”, according to which a Māori customary title was to be ascertained 
from the date of Crown sovereignty. E.T.J. Durie CJ reformed during the late 1970s the 
MLC’s role: it became an active agent in tenurial reform, which used its statutory jurisdiction 
creatively and at the extremity of allowance. The court began to use s. 438 of the Maori Affairs 
Act 1953, originally intended as a device to alienate land, to constitute special trusts to prevent 
the alienation and to maintain Māori ownership. Although a royal commission report (1980) 
suggested the repeal of the land courts, their role was recognised and reformed in Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act 1993. According to the law, a process in MLC ensures that the affected 
individual has an opportunity to appeal. The court does the following: it investigates titles to 
customary land and transfer of land to Māori freehold land by issue of Māori freehold orders; 
makes orders for convention of general land and Māori freehold land; makes partition of 
Māori freehold land for owners in common; changes status of Māori land to general land; 
sanctions exchange of Māori land; grants succession orders; appoints trustees to Māori land 
if they are minors; confirms land alienations; enforces or administers trust of Māori land; and 
vests Māori land in trustees. The Chief Judge has the power to consider written applications 
from aggrieved individuals if he/she believes that it is counteraffected by an order erroneous 
in fact, mistaken in law, or an omission has taken place by the court. He/she can state the case 
to the judicial review of the High Court, counsel or add an order of the court.39  
The Minister of Maori Affairs, the Chief Executive of Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Maori 
Affairs) or the Chief Judge of the court may refer any matter for inquiry to the court. Lay 
members may be appointed to the MLC and MAC in cases relating to tikanga Māori. Since 
1975 it has had a right to resolve questions of fact relating to customary law principles of take 
(land). MLC has constituted, based on the present legislation, tailor-made trust instruments. 
It may, by request of the chief executive of Te Pune Kōkiri or the chief justice to determine the 
Māori bodies’ representation. The court used this mandate in the early years very carefully as 
it saw it as a remedy to previous, unsuccessful attempts. Later most of the judges have been 
Māori and they refer widely to tikanga Māori. The court’s success in tenurial reform brought 
to it mana (here: respect) in the eyes of the Māori public.40  
The Maori Appellate Court (MAC), consisting of the MLC’s judges and additional experts 
of tikanga Māori, may rehear and determine applications from all final orders of MLC. MAC 
38   Native Lands Act 1865, ss. 23, 40, 81; Native Lands Act 1867, s. 17; Native Lands Act Amendment Act 1868, 
s. 3;  Native Land Act 1873, s. 103; Native Land Court Act 1880, ss. 47, 67;  Native Land Court Act 1886, 
s. 76; Native Land Act 1894, ss. 79, 86, 88, 92-93, 99; Native Land Act 1909, s. 84; Maori Affairs Act 1953; 
Young & Belgrave & Bennion  (2005), p. 24. NLC used its right to ask the opinion of superior courts actively 
since the 1890s. One reason was the criticism against its past actions in land ownership cases. 
39   Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, ss. 6, 18, 29-30, 32, 44, 49, 61, 132-133, 135, 222, 310-312, IV-V, XII, XIV; 
The Maori Land Courts (1980), pp. 127-128; McGuire (1993), pp. 125-127; O’Malley (1998), pp. 213, 246. 
40   The Maori Land Courts (1980), pp. 127-128; McGuire (1993), pp. 125-127.   
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has the power to determine provisional or preliminary decisions of the MLC, and sanction 
them, if needed. It has also equal discreditionary powers. It may revise or set aside an act 
of MLC which has usurped, exceeded or abused powers, failed to apply with public duties, 
failed to account or give due weight to relevant matters. Since 1988 the the MAC has received 
applications from the Waitangi Tribunal on tikanga Māori, take and determination of rohe. 
Also the High Court may state a case to MAC on tikanga. An order made by the Chief Judge 
may be submitted to the MAC when the decision is final. Also the Waitangi Tribunal may 
state a case to the MAC when it is related to Māori custom or usage, right of Māori ownership, 
occupation of portioned lands and determination of tribal boundaries. The decision of the 
MAC is binding on the tribunal. A party may appeal to the Court of Appeal against the 
determination of the MAC, unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that there are exceptional 
circumstances that justify taking the appeal directly to the Supreme Court.41
The Waitangi Tribunal (WT) was established by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. The 
early cases related to local land administration, environmental pollution and to use of 
natural resources. The tribunal was largely neglected until 1983, when Eddie Durie, its first 
Māori Chief Judge, supported by the Trials Division of the Department of Justice, started a 
procedural reform with Motanui Report. The appeal was heard in marae and tribunal used 
oral evidence of kaumatua (elder) in Māori. It used for the first time Māori legal terminology, 
focused the spirit of the treaty and began to develop Māori kawa (procedure) to interpret the 
concepts of justice, fairness and ownership from Māori perspectives. An important change 
took place in 1985, when the Treaty of Waitangi Act was amended to extend the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to all grievances dating retrospectively to 1840. As result, the number of claims 
and subsequent reports exploded. The claimants could initiate claims in their natural 
environment - marae. The fundamental principle is that the cession of Māori sovereignty to 
the Crown in exchange for the protection of tino rangatiratanga (paramount authority). WT 
recognises the central importance of negotiated settlement as an expression of mana. The 
WT has been able to conceptualise Māori positions in terms of Western law and history and 
has contributed to New Zealand’s understanding of its heritage.Unlike other courts, it does 
not pay much attention to precedents. Principles are used as living and dynamic instrument 
and interpretative tools to see the past actions in a contemporary light.42 
Also the influence of international law and politics has been important in its case law. Until 
1988 it appeared mostly in rules of treaty status and interpretation and territorial boundary 
delimitation. In the Muriwhenua Fishing Report (1988) the WT broadened the scope by 
discussing on the emerging rights in international and comparative law, and used them to 
support its findings in respect of the development of fishing rights. The WT returned to 
same theme in the Ngāi Tahu Sea Fisheries Resource Report in 1992. The government hurried 
up the settlement process so that it could be resolved before 2020. The problem is that the 
41   Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s. 6A; Te Ture Whenua Act 1993, ss. 50-51, 55-56, 58-61; Supreme Court Act 
2003, s. 46; McGuire (1993), pp. 128-131.
42   Havemann (1999), p. 280; Hayward (2003), p. 59; McHugh (2004), pp. 572-573, 576.
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process has become slow due to the large number of claims and the limited resources of the 
tribunal.43 
The WT is uniquely bicultural in its composition and modus operandi. Its hearings can 
be classified as historical, contemporary or conceptual: the historic claims relate to the 
actions of the Crown in the past, mostly about the way in which land was acquired from 
the Māori owners; to the contemporary claims that cover social and cultural issues and the 
processes used by the government; and to conceptual claims concerning Māori interest in use 
and development of rivers, lakes, foreshores, minerals and geothermal resources or outputs 
from the development of those resources. The important treaty principles are protection and 
preservation of Māori property and taonga; protection of Māori custom and cultural values; 
partnership; recognition of Māori worldview, value system, law and politics; active protection 
of treaty interests; Māori autonomy; development; good faith; and economic protection. On 
the basis of its decisions the tribunal can propose redress when the Crown is found in default 
of its duties and obligations.44 
The WT operates as a commission of inquiry in search of information to help resolve specific 
claims that are likely to be prejudicially affected by a government act or omission alleged to be 
inconsistent with the principles of the treaty and to issue reports and recommendations to the 
Crown. Its reports are also admissible as evidence in High Court proceedings. The tribunal 
has established the Ranganui Whānui project in 15 districts which enables equal weighting to 
all historic claims, reduces dublication, foster national overview and inform the tribunal about 
the relative impacts of specific claims. In the evalution has been used the criteria of Crown 
acts of commission, omission, demography and the quantity and value of the resource lost. 
A full hearing is given to claims against the Crown for redress from loss of language, culture, 
land or resources as articulated in article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi. The restorative approach 
aims at the rehabilitation of mana. The WT’s recommendations are generally non-binding, 
although it has authority since 1988 to make binding recommendations in relation to the 
return of specified lands to Māori ownership. The tribunal has used this option only in 1998, 
when it ordered the government to return land and pay compensation at Tūrangi Township. 
The WT can examine proposed legislation referred to it by the House of Representatives 
or a minister of the Crown for its opinion on whether the legislation would conform to the 
principles of the treaty. The WT has also power to refer parties to mediation at any time. The 
hearings have two stages: it investigates first the validity of the Maori claim. If valid, The WT 
holds a hearing and issues recommendations on appropriate remedies for the claim. WT 
aims to group and investigate claims on a systematic basis, often reviewing similar claims 
together and grouping claims geographically. Current government policy is that all claims 
must be registered initially with the WT before direct negotiations with the Crown can begin. 
43   Treaty of Waitangi Act 1988, ss. 4-6; WT, Muriwhenua Fishing Report (1988), s. 9; Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries 
Resource Report (1992), s. 11; Palmer (2008), p. 113; Anaya (2011), pp. 24-28. Government’s announcement 
led in 2008 to 1,834 new claims (cf. 1,579 in previous 32 years. In 2010 there were laid altogether 3,490 
claims.  
44   Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss. 6(1), 6AA; Durie (1998), pp. 184-185; Māori Customary Law and the Treaty 
of Waitangi (2001), pp. 75-76, 79-82. In 1975-1986 there were only 36 enquiries, but in a single year 1987 
already 88. 
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Negotiated claims go first through a tribunal hearing and report, serving as the background 
for negotiations with the Crown.45 
Among the WT’s outcomes are allocation of a significant portion of New Zealand’s 
commercial fisheries quota, recognition of Māori as an official language, return of tribal lands, 
recognition of continuing Maori resource management rights and payment of compensation 
for historical land losses and Crown apologies for past conduct. A major problem of the 
tribunal is, however, its large workload and limited resources. A major part of all claims are 
still to be cleared. There is also a tendency from the governments’ side to pass the tribunal in 
negotiations with distinct iwi.46 
 On the Cook Islands there existed during the protectorate (1888-1901) a district judge 
system. The British resident established a Supreme Court in 1888, which was reorganised in 
1898 as a Federal High Court.The criminal cases were removed to the High Community Court. 
Since 1915 the Supreme Court of New Zealand became the Court of Appeal, which was soon 
annexed to New Zealand’s legal system. The Ariki Court was established to hear cases dealing 
with violation of island or district laws passed before 1898, and the Rarotonga Land Court 
land questions (since 1902 Land Titles Court). Resident Gudgeon became its Chief Justice. 
The Ariki Court was abolished only after six years. After World War II the Native Appellate 
Court was established. The judicial system was reconstructed in 1965 by the Constitution and 
was closely connected to New Zealand’s system. All judges are appointed and removed by 
the Queen’s Representative. They must be former New Zealand or Commonwealth judges or 
barristers. The lower courts are chaired by Justices of Peace. The High Court has jurisdiction 
over all civil, criminal and land matters and appellate jurisdiction over lesser courts. The 
Court of Appeal was recreated in 1981. At least one of its judges must be a former New 
Zealand’s judge. It is the final court except in certain matters which may be appealed to the 
Privy Council. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal have the power to interpret 
the Constitution and to determine the application and effect of its provisions. They have – 
unlike in New Zealand – the power to strike down legislation that fails to comply with the 
Constitution. For land questions there are the Land Court of the Cook Islands and the Land 
Appellate Court. The court of last instance is the Privy Council. The courts apply the rules 
of common law and equity and have relied mostly on the case law of New Zealand, Australia 
and England. In the cases of conflict between the common law and equity, equity prevails.47  
The High Court, divided into civil, criminal and land divisions, is the court of general 
jurisdiction for Niue. The commissioners of the High Court are local lay judges. Justices of 
peace work at the local level. In a decision two of them are equal to one commissioner of 
the High Court. The Court of Appeal was established in 2009. The judges are appointed and 
removed (in accordance with the assembly) by the governor general of New Zealand. The 
45   Treaty  of Waitangi Act 1975, ss. 5, 8, 9A-D; State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s. 27B; Crown Forest As-
sets Act 1989, s. 36; Durie (1998), p. 185; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 386, 393; Mutu (2011), 
p. 83. The courts have been reluctant to rule settlement disputes which are not reported by the tribunal; the 
government threatened several times to limit the tribunal’s powers, if it uses binding recommendation, as 
happened in 1998. 
46   Havemann (1999), p. 211.
47   Constitution of the Cook Islands (1965), art. 47, 56, 59-60; Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, ss. 47, 52, 
55, 61; Cook Islands Act 1915, ss. 153, 155; Cook Islands Amendment Act 1946, s. 19; Gilson (1991), pp. 
90, 105, 113, 120, 131; Ntumy (1993), p. 4; Sissons (1999), p. 13; Judicial Committee of the Pricy Council.
116
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
Land Court of Niue has exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to Niuean land. There 
exists also the Land Appellate Court of Niue which is formed of the judges of the Land Court 
and the MLC (New Zealand). Like on the Cook Islands, the court of last instant for Niue is 
still the Privy Council in London.48 
In Tokelau the basic level of justice are the Village Courts presided normally by faipule 
(village council’s chairman). The punishments are ordered by the commissioner. The Village 
Courts represent the practical and customary level justice with petty crimes and land dispute 
cases. The cases concerning matrimony, adoption and divorce are dealt with either by the 
commissioner or the elders. More serious crimes and more difficult cases were applied to the 
High Court of Niue (1970-1986) and thereafter to the High Court of New Zealand. The court 
of final appeal is the New Zealand Court of Appeal.49
3.2.4. Customary Dispute Resolution
The judging of minor disputes according to Māori custom began with the Maori Social and 
Economic Advancement Act 1945, and was developed in the Maori Welfare Act 1962 and 
the Maori Community Development Act 1977. The “marae courts” have been used from 
1962. The Waitangi Tribunal developed further this procedure by incorporating Māori 
practices. The hearings are held on Māori territory - often in marae -, the Māori language is 
partly used in proceedings and Māori protocols are followed. Even elsewhere new concepts 
have been created that are familiar to Māori. The traditional whanau involved motions of 
shame and reconciliation, wanting to heal a rift between offenders, victims, individuals and 
collective. The rohe of family is an important element. It is based on the model of a Māori 
extended family. This kind of decision-making recognises New Zealand’s cultural plurality. 
New legislation has answered this challenge by providing services to culturally sensitive and 
appropriate processes.50 
The Criminal Justice Act 1985 allowed the imposing of a penalty without conviction. 
The Māori customary approach of utu could be used in dispute resolution. It is an ongoing 
process of restoring balance. This kind of process is open to all first-time minor offenders. 
The process begins with the offender’s arrest. The police officer inquires if the offender 
identifies himself as a Māori because the process is mandatory to such a person. A Māori 
representative is called to join the first negotiations where the offender becomes part of the 
program. The community is addressed during the process which integrates all participants. 
The offender is evaluated in a local marae forum. It is basically a kanohi ki te kanohi (“face-
to-face”) session. Relying on the basic philosophy of a first intervention step, some major 
ideas in these Māori dispute resolution programs are direct intervention, administration of 
tikanga Māori and care-taking of a Māori by another Māori. The process is tailor-made for 
the offender. The programs allow involvement of whanau and they make it possible for a 
judge to use an early treatment or intervention model which can prevent further crimes by 
48   Constitution of Niue (1974), art. 37-43, 46, 51-53; Niue Amendment Act (No. 2) (1968), ss. 47-48; Ntumy 
(1993), pp. 160, 164-165; Niue Government; Judicial Committee of the Pricy Council. 
49   Tokelau Amendment Act 1970, s. 4-5; Tokelau Amendment Act 1986, s. 4; Ntumy (1993), p. 301.
50   Sheleff (2000), p. 315; Elias (2005), p. 5; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2006), p. 333.
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using the possibilities offered by tikanga Māori. An offender can alternatively be sentenced to 
house detention. Also the Law Commission has supported that there should be paid closer 
attention to alternative dispute resolution in treaty settlements. The same kind of process is 
used in juvenile cases. Te Whanau Awhina Program utilises an existing youth program. The 
Maori Congress established in the early 1990s an unofficial body te whare ahupiri, the justice 
arm of, and established by the Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes of Ko Huiarau 
but it had a limited support among the iwi. It represented a source of authority, using Māori 
concepts of justice and tikanga.51
In Tokelau the major form of judicial procedure is still customary procedure following 
the oral tradition. There is no court documentation, the offender appears on request and pays 
a penalty without proper execution. Since 1985 New Zealand has introduced to the islands 
gradually the crime procedure with an inquisitorial form of court procedure.52
3.2.5.	 Māori	Wardens
In the 1840s the Māori had their own police force (karere) which existed the longest in King 
Country. On the Cook Islands the British missionaries introduced a similar police, appointed 
by local ariki.A local police force was re-established in 1888. In the reform of 1898 it was 
submitted to the control of the federal government and was later incorporated into the New 
Zealand Police. In New Zealand the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 
created the Māori wardens as officers with authority over Māori individuals. The wardens’ 
duty is to prevent unruly and riotous behaviour and drunkenness. A warden can enter licenced 
premises, hotels and Māori gatherings and order an intoxicated, violent, quarrelsome or 
disorderly Māori to leave the premises. He can seize and remove liquour and forbid a Māori 
to drive, require the keys and render a motor vehicle immobile and remove it to a place of 
safety. The local Maori Council has a right to fine a Māori for $20. The associated states have 
their own police services and penitentiaries, while they maintain close operation with the 
mother country’s enforcement authorities.53
Canada3.3. 
3.3.1. Application of General Legislation
In 1541 King Francis I of France gave his representatives a right to “exercise [in the lands of 
Canada] the powers to make laws, edicts, statutes and political ordinances.” During the New 
France period the French criminal law was expressly declared applicable to Indigenous people 
but the Crown had difficulties in implementing it and the application of French civil law 
51   Criminal Justice Act 1985, ss. 16, 19; Durie (1998), p. 197; Havemann (1999), p. 311; McHugh (2004), p. 
524; Toki (2005), pp. 177, 185-186.
52   Ntumy (1993), p. 307.
53   Cook Islands Act 1915, ss. 44-50; Maori Social And Economic Advencement Act 1945, s. 11; Maori Com-
munity Development Act 1962, ss. 30-36; Niue Act 1966, ss. 26-29; Gilson (1991), p. 91; McHugh (2004), p. 
273; Cook Islands Government.
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could be based only on the implicit principle of general and absolute territorial application 
of French law.54
The Indians have been  since 1867 - and the Inuit in 1939-1950 and partly afterwards - 
under the federal legislation. The constitutional protection has to reconcile with the affirmation 
of the Crown sovereignty. The Crown can develop the territories under its control and apply 
there its laws if they respect the rights of the indigenous peoples. The Crown must follow the 
Supreme Court’s Sparrow and Van der Peet justification tests (cf. section 6.3.2) which apply 
both to ancestral and treaty rights, and both the federal and provincial laws.55 
Since 1922 the provincial laws of general application have been in force on reserves. This 
was confirmed in the revision of Indian Act in 1951. Section 88 of the Indian Act, 1985, defines 
that all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable 
to and in respect of Indians in the province. The Supreme Court has confirmed that all laws 
of general application in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in provinces, 
except when the law is inconsistent with the Indian Act: “Section is a referential incorporation 
of provincial legislation which takes effect under the section as federal legislation.” The 
provincial laws may take into consideration indigenous rights also in a more particular 
manner. When this happens, they can be integrated to provincial legislation. The federal and 
provincial governments have also the right to restrict those rights which are not expressly 
mentioned in the Constitution. For instance, the Québec Court of Appeal has interpreted 
that the adoption of special clauses for the indigenous peoples in provincial law could be 
justified both in the context of s. 35 of the Constitution Act and s. 88 of the Indian Act. In 
conflict situations the federal legislation has always prevalence over provincial legislation. 
A provincial law is inapplicable where it is inconsistent with the Indian Act or any order, 
rule, regulation or bylaw made thereunder. Outside is also left the essence of indianness: the 
provinces cannot impair the Indigenous people in what makes them Indigenous.56
In 1964 the British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled in R. v. White and Bob that the 
provincial laws only applied by virtue of section 88 of the Indian Act. The other provinces 
followed the example with exception of Québec, which has historically been outside the 
treaties. In Sioui (1990) the Supreme Court ruled that the original treaty takes precedence 
over post-1982 laws by the virtue of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Together 
with Sparrow it dealt with First Nations’ self-government. According to Wilson J the self-
government deals with a question about the Indians’ historic occupation and possession of 
their tribal lands.57
54   Örücü (1996), p. 4; Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), p. 367.
55   SCC, Sparrow (1990); Van der Peet (1996), s. 43.
56   Indian Act (1951), s. 87; Indian Act, 1985, s, 88; SCC, Cardinal v. Attorney-General of Alberta (1974); Kruger 
et al. v. the Queen (1978), s. 116; Derrickson v. Derrickson (1986), ss. 51-59; Côté (1996), s. 83; CAQ, Québec 
(Procureur général) c. Savard (2002), ss. 28-41; Tobias (1976), p. 21; Hogg (1985), p. 561; Otis (2005), pp. 
107-109, 113. 
57   SCC, Sioui (1990); BCCA, R. v. White and Bob (1964); Dickason (1994), p. 354; McHugh (2004), p. 348
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3.3.2.  Indigenous Legislation
After the colonial wars the Indian tribes realised that their status had changed. The Six Nations 
demanded in 1839 and 1942 that they want to be governed according to their own laws but 
the Canadian officials refused to consider the pleas. When the Indian Act was revised in 1951, 
they protested the reform by claiming that it was dictatorial and would retard their progress 
as a nation.58 
The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (1975) began the process of negotiated 
self-government powers. This policy has been later followed in different parts of Canada. Major 
examples are the Sechelt First Nation’s Constitution (1986)59; Nisga’a Lisims Government and 
village governments, Tsawassen government and Maa’nulth First Nations in British Columbia, 
who have made separate agreements, including own constitutions and legislation60; and the 
Umbrella Agreement (UFA, 1993) of the Yukon First Nations, each having a constitution.61
Several other First Nations have today legislative powers in their inner affairs.  Generally 
they have also jurisdiction to enact laws affecting all people on settlement lands. In most 
cases their laws prevail, except when they touch the doctrine of federal paramountcy. Also 
the Bill C-7 (2002) would have extended the Indian bands legislative powers in local and 
58   Dickason (1994), p. 356.
59 The Sechelt First Nation’s Constitution has provisions on the composition of band council and its procedu-
res and legislative powers; system of financial accountability; membership code; referendum; and the rights 
and interests in land. The council may legislate on zoning and land use planning; expropriation of interests 
in Sechelt land; infrastructure; taxation; property; education; social and welfare services; health services; 
preservation and management of natural resources; preservation, protection and management of fur-bea-
ring animals, fish and game; public order and safety; business, professions and trade; intoxicants; fines and 
imprisonment; succession; financial administration; elections and referenda; administrative bodies; and 
good government. Cf. Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, 1986, ss. 10, 14.
60 Nisga’a can legislate beyond local boundaries on all Nisga’a lands. The criminal law is however, excluded 
from all agreements in British Columbia, as it belongs to federal and provincial core area. The First Nations’ 
Constitutions include provisions on democratic government; traditional elements of government; mem-
bership; elections; role of administrative bodies; removals from office; law-making powers and process to 
enact and check them; amend the constition; financial administration; conflict of interest regulations; and 
protection of rights. They may legislate on administration; finance; management and operation of local 
government; assets (Maanulth); elections; membership/citizenship; rights, duties and obligations; business; 
land use and management and forest resources; infrastructure; public works; traffic and transportation; 
public order, peace and safety, including enforcement officers; health and social services; liquour; marriage; 
succession; child services; family development services; adoption; Aboriginal healers; kindergarten, school 
and higher education; education of culture and Indigenous language; First Nation’s  and village lands; ass-
ets; designation of harvest; hunting and fishing;  intoxicants; and arctic plants and their distribution. Cf. 
Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 5, 8- 9, 11; Maa’nulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (Bri-
tish Columbia), ss. 10, 13; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), ss. 9, 
12, 16.
61 The Yukon First Nations’ constitutions include provisions on citizenship code; governing bodies; system of 
reporting; rights and freedoms; check of laws; amending of constitution; legislation on land; resource ma-
nagement; fishing and hunting; planning; environmental quality; health; and the administration of justice. 
The laws of general application are in force.Cf. Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act, 1994 (Yukon), ss. 
8, 16-20.
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band purposes and governance. The ministerial approval would have been closed. Instead, a 
contrary provincial or federal statute would have overridden a band law.62
In the interim period, before the federal authorities were able to consolidate their power, 
the Métis twice created legislative authority of their own - in 1869-1870 and 1873-1877. In St. 
Laurent’s settlement the governing body enacted 28 basic laws on buffalo hunting and taxation. 
There were also regulations on the work and employment conditions. Some modern Métis 
groups have created their own, unofficial legislation. In Saskatchewan the provincial Métis 
organisation has created a Constitution which defines the provincial Métis organisations, 
including the Legislative Assembly, which enacts Métis legislation and regulations.63
In Nunavut there are no sepatate Inuit laws, although majority of legislators are Inuit. 
The Inuvialuit Agreement-in-Principle (2003) would give the Inuvialuit Council the powers 
to make laws on internal matters, including the culture and language. The will prevail in 
the event of conflict with federal or territorial laws. Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement 
(LILCA) has created to Nunatsiavut an assembly, with law-making powers. The Labrador Inuit 
Constitution includes provisions on political structures; civil service; taxation and revenues; 
justice system; legislation and customary rules; law enforcement; local administration and 
a unique Labrador Inuit Charter of Rights and Principles, including  language, culture, 
relationship to environment, equality and democracy.64
3.3.3.   Bylaws
Bylaws for reserves were introduced for the first time in 1869. This authority was largely 
reduced in the years to come. Only in 1951 was the Indian Act was amended to allow the 
band councils anew to pass bylaws. At first the councils were slow to take advantage of this 
possibility. Still in 1966 the Hawthorne Report found that only 23% of all bands in Canada 
had passed a bylaw. The fact that the Governor in Council could use veto over each decision 
made by a band discouraged the bylaw-making. They are still rather rearly used for the same 
reasons. After been passed a majority vote by the band council, they have to be mailed to 
the minister within four days. He/she can disallow it within 40 days, otherwise it is effective. 
The Indian Act, 1985, defines as the scope of bylaws in the First Nations’ reserves.65 There 
are also band council resolutions. The Indian Band Council Procedure Regulations apply to 
determine procedures for council meetings.66
62   McHugh (2004), p. 476.
63   Dickason (1994), p. 294; Wilson & Mullet (2008), p. 347. 
64   Nunavut Act, 1993, ss. 23-28; Labrador Inuit Constitution (2002), ss. 2-7, 9-12; IFA (2003), s. 18; LILCA 
(2005), ss. 17, 21; Borrows (2010), p. 53.
65 Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, s. 12; Indian Act, 1985, ss. 81, 83, 85.1. The bylaws are related to 
health; traffic; law and order; trespass; infrastructure; zoning; construction; surveying and allotting reserve 
lands to individuals; control of noxious weeds; bee-keeping and poultry raising; alcohol; public games and 
amusements; regulation of salesmen; game and fishing; residence; citizenship and membership codes; and 
taxation. 
66   Indian Act, 1985, s. 85.1; Dickason (1994), p. 333.
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Some First Nations which are by agreement are excluded from the Indian Act, like 
Tåîchô67 and the Cree and Naskapi of Northern Québec68 have preserved their right to make 
bylaws. Similarly, the Metis Settlement Act, 1990, permits the Métis Settlement Councils in 
Alberta to make bylaws.69 The last-mentioned must be given three separate readings at the 
meeting of Settlement Council and after the second reading must be presented at a public 
meeting and approved by a majority vote of the settlement members present at the meeting. 
All Métis bylaws and regulation must be consistent with provincial legislation, except those 
relating to hunting, trapping and gathering, which are approved by the Lieutenant Governor 
in Council.70 
3.3.4. Indigenous Courts
The First Nations were submitted during the late nineteenth century to the Indian Department’s 
jurisdiction. The Indian agents became justices of peace in 1881 and three years later their 
powers were extended significantly as they conducted legal proceedings on reserves. They 
could handle all cases breaching the peace and prohibit Indigenous ceremonies. From 1936 
they had also the administrative control over the Band Council meetings. In 1867 the British 
Columbia Indians were granted a right to give unsworn testimony in civil court actions, 
inquests and official inquiries. This was extended with a federal act (1876) to all Indians in 
criminal cases. These provisions were later dropped from the Indian Act, when the right to 
testify by affirmation became general.71
The James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (1975, JBNQA) made it first possible to 
administrate the local justice, but the real change in the First Nations’ jurisprudence began 
with the Constitution Act, 1982. UFA and the Nisga’a Final Agreement include a possibility 
to create a parallel justice system. The governments have sponsored a national Native 
Courtworker Program, which has been administered through Friendship Centres. The Native 
courtworkers are available in the courts to help the Indigenous defendants. Some jurisdictions 
have also established community legal clinics, which provide services to Indigenous peoples. 
The lawyers develop their expertise in Indigenous law. The Native Law Centre in Saskatoon 
and many law schools have attempted to address the shortage of indigenous lawyers in 
67 Tåîchô Council may make bylaws on inner procedural rules; employees; work conditions; infrastructure 
and payments. Cf. Tåîchô Community Government Act, 2004 (NWT), ss. 28, 82.
68 The Cree and Naskapi can make bylaws on administration; regulation of buildings; health and hygiene; 
public order and safety; protection of environment; prevention of pollution; nuisances; taxation; roads, 
traffic and transportation; business; and parks and recreation. Cf. Cree-Naskapi (of Québec) Act, 1984, s. 
45(1).
69 The bylaws are related to internal management; health, safety; welfare; public order; safety; fire protection; 
nuisance; pests; animals; airports; advertising; refuse disposal; parks; recreation; control of business; instal-
lation of water; sewage connections; sewage fees; development levies; land use planning; and development. 
The Settlement Councils may also make decisions on membership and land allocation. All bylaws and deci-
sions must conform to provincial legislation and General Council policy. The General Council has right to 
make regulations on membership; land development; finance; and hunting, fishing and trapping. Cf. Metis 
Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 51-52, Schedule 1, ss. 1-18.
70   Metis Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 51-52, Schedule 1, ss. 1-18; Bell (1994), p. 16.
71   Dickason (1994), pp. 261-262; McHugh (2004), p. 260.
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Canada. The First Nations Land Management Act and other statutes allow the First Nations 
a power to appoint justices of peace in accordance with federal agreements. Ontario created 
in 1984 a Native Justices of the Peace Program to promote indigenous participation in the 
administration of justice by recruiting and appointing indigenous people as Justices of the 
Peace.72
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) suggested in 1996 that the 
indigenous peoples’ justice systems should be given recognition and that the different levels 
of government should begin to collaborate with the First Nations to achieve this end. It 
estimated that there are no legislative barriers to establish separate justice systems. The federal 
Criminal Code was amended in 1996 to offer an alternative to incarceration for all offenders. 
This policy’s practical consequence was the 1999 Supreme Court’s Gladue case, where the 
court stressed a need to reduce the country’s overreliance on incarceration for Indigenous 
peoples. Consequently, in Toronto was established in 2000 the Gladue (Aboriginal Persons) 
Court whose objective is to establish the criminal trial court’s response to Gladue case and the 
sentencing amendments of the Criminal Code and the consideration of the circumstances of 
indigenous accused and offenders.  The model has been followed elsewhere in Canada. The 
Commission on First Nations and Métis Peoples and Justice Reform of Saskatchewan have 
made a large number of recommendations on remedies, including training programs for 
offenders. Some indigenous communities have started to manage their own justice systems. 
The Mohawk Nation has established the Akwesasne Department of Justice.73
UFA allows the Yukon First Nations to negotiate an agreement on the administration of 
justice. The territorial courts have jurisdiction in respect to the First Nations laws and the 
court of appeal is the Supreme Court of Yukon. The first indigenous court in Canada was, 
however, established in 2004 for Tsuu T’ina First Nation in British Columbia. Also Nisga’a 
Lisims government may create a Nisga’a Court with civil and some criminal jurisdiction. 
It will resemble the Provincial Court of British Columbia and be appointed by the Nisga’a 
government.74
Negotiations on the control of Métis justice system in Alberta started in the late 1980s. 
The Métis Settlement Accord (1989) established the Metis Settlements Appeal Tribunal to 
hear appeals and references on local matters. The tribunal follows an informal and flexible 
procedure suited to the need of particular parties and the broad scope of the tribunal’s fact 
finding and remedial powers. Most of the cases have dealt with land ownership, but also 
questions on forest resources, subsurface access and disposition, membership, marriage and 
divorce, property and other Métis rights. Its first order was issued in 1991. The tribunal is 
72   First Nations Land Management Act, 1999, s. 35; Décret concernant la publication de l’entente concernant 
une nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, 2007 (Québec), Préambule, 
s. 2.8; JBNQA (1975), ss. 18-20; McHugh (2004), p. 482; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 599-600; 
Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 36. 
73   Kanesatake Interim Land Base Governance Act, 2001, s. 16; RCAP (1996); SCC, R. v. Gladue [1999]; Report 
of Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2004), pp. 55, 58; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 600-601.
74   Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act, 1994 (Yukon), s. 14; Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 11.17; 
Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), ss. 13.37; Tsuwassen First Nation 
Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), ss. 16.8, 16.147; UFA (1993), s. 26; Elliott (2005), p. 174. 
Most First Nations’ matters are dealt with by the ordinary courts and are appealed in the ordinary manner 
to the various courts with appellate jurisdiction. 
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a quasi-judicial body established to settle disputes on membership, land dealings, surface 
rights and other matters that the parties agree to submit to its jurisdiction. To the tribunal’s 
remedial powers belong the power to amend or repeal settlement bylaws, refer decisions 
back to the settlement council to be reconsidered, direct the Registrar of the Metis Settlement 
Land Registry to correct errors and omission, confirm the substance of an agreement under 
an order of the Tribunal and other remedies. Decisions of the tribunal may be enforced as in 
regular court. As an appellate court functions the Alberta Court of Appeal. The tribunal has 
a Chairperson appointed by the Minister, three members appointed each by the Minister and 
the General Council each, and the remainder by agreement. The Chairperson can establish 
panels of three or more members of the Tribunal. The majority of panel must be appointed 
by the minister, except when there is a question about land allocation. The four established 
panels are the the Land Access Panel (LAP), the Existing Leases Land Access Panel (ELLAP), 
the Membership Panel and the Land Panel. The ELLAP deals exclusively with companies 
which held mineral leases before 1 November 1991. The LAP has jurisdiction to review and 
amend all right of entry and compensation orders, review rates of compensation. The office 
of the Métis Settlement Ombudsman was created in 2003. The ombudsman is accountable 
to the Minister of Aboriginal and Northern Affairs of Alberta and has heard complaints on 
housing, employment, professional conduct, nepotism, administrative fairness and conflict 
of interests.75 
Nunavut has no proper indigenous courts. The administration of justice was first given to 
Magistrates as Justices of Peace (1873). In 1955 was created the Superior Court of Record to 
Yellowknife (since 1972 The Supreme Court of NWT) and the Nunavut Court of Justice (NCJ) 
and the Nunavut Court of Appeal (NCA) were created in 1999. NCJ is a single level court 
with powers of superior court and territorial court. Its judges, appointed by the Governor 
in Council, have the status of superior court judges. There are yet very few Inuit judges but 
the deficiency is compensated by Inuit lay justices of the peace (nunalingni iqqaqtuijit). In 
2003 the first lay judge was appointed to the NCJ. The NCJ functions also as a circuit fly-
in court delivering justice at the local level. The NCA as an appellate court is composed of 
justices from other territories and provinces. Nunatsiavut has a Judicial Council and own 
court, which may apply both written and customary law.76
3.3.5.  Customary Law 
The Indigenous people were not without law before the arrival of the European settlers. 
The most sophisticated example of law in North America was the Great Law of Peace 
(Gayanashagowa) of the Iroquois Confederacy, which the Peacemaker brought according to 
the Iroquois legend to Hiawatha during the sixteenth century. It is the first North American 
75   Metis Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 118, 175, 180-187; Metis Settlements Ombudsman Regulation, 
2007, ss. 3-5, 13; Bell (1994), pp. 22-24, 67-68; Bell (1999), pp. 59-87. Also in Yukon the ombudsman system 
can be used in similar way by the First Nations.
76   Nunavut Act, 1993, ss. 31, 35-36; Labrador Inuit Constitution, 2002, s. 9; Loukacheva (2007), pp. 89-90, 
93.
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constitution, which has influenced also the United States’ early constitutional law.77 As early 
as 1839 the Iroquois chiefs had asked to be governed according to their own laws, but it was 
rejected. In 1890 they renewed their effort in asking an exemption from the Indian Act. In 
1942 the Reserve of Lac des Deux Montagnes in Québec applied to the Federal Government 
asking that their customary law would replace the Indian Act. Even these attempts were 
without any success.78  
Another example of developped customary law is from British Columbia. The Gitxsan 
people’s Kungax (own spiritual power) regulated the behaviour and outlining remedies 
for breaches of social order; adaawk regulated the territorial and property rights, potlatch 
the gift-giving and ayuukhl the social, economic and political relations by line of memory. 
Many Indigenous peoples have preserved in their customary law a close relation with the 
spiritual and ecological aspects of life. In the Mi’kmaq’s sukumowati the law is formulated 
by experiencing and empirically identifying in relation to the surrounding ecosystem. The 
customary law also includes a sacred vision on the past and the world. The spoken version 
has, unlike in Western understanding, the primary authority.79
In the mid-nineteenth century large areas of present Canada were still under customary 
law. As late as 1867 Monk J of Québec Superior Court held that the Indigenous law was 
continued in tribes’ domestic affairs. Unlike the US Supreme Court, he based his judgement 
on factual integrity of customary law after the ascendancy of Crown sovereignty. About the 
same time in the mixture of cultures of the early nineteenth century Manitoba, there existed 
both the common law and customary legal systems.80
The co-existence was followed by a period of long neglect. As late as 1984, Steele J estimated 
in Bear Island Foundation that due to the primitive level of Indian social organisation they 
have no true law. The only law is a statutory law, legislated by an organised state. He held 
that the band’s understanding of history was influenced by a small, dedicated and well-
meaning group of white people who pieced together limited pieces of oral tradition. But 
the change was under way. Since the 1970s various initiatives began of Aboriginal justice 
by the Ministry of Solicitor General, and later by the Aboriginal Justice Directorate of the 
Department of Justice and its Aboriginal Justice Strategy. The new Constitution Act, 1982 
recognises the continuity of Indigenous society. The relevance of customary law has been 
recognised variously in marriage, adoption and the legal capacity of bands. In Toronto has 
77 The Great Law of Peace is divided in three parts: the story of Peacemaker and conversion of Thadodaho; 
conversion of nations and their coming together as the League of the Iroquois; and a recitation of the prin-
ciples or laws of the League.  The 171 articles of Gayanashagowa include provisions on rights and duties of 
chiefs; clans and consanguinity; symbols, adoption, emigration; rights of foreign nations; rights and powers 
of war; treason; secession of a nation; rights of the people of the Six Nations; protected religious ceremonies; 
installation songs; protection of the longhouse; and funeral addresses. 
78   Constitution of the Five Nations (1916); Dickason (1994), pp. 241-242, 356-359; Horn (1994), pp. 102-103; 
Snow (1994), pp. 60, 158-162, 187. In 1900 the Iroquois traditional chiefs accepted the official version of the 
Great Law of Peace; Gayanashagowa influenced the framers of the United States’ Constitution, especially 
Benjamin Franklin and James Madison. The influence of the Great Law of Peace to the US Constitution 
and Bill of Rights was recognised in 1988 by the Concurrent Resolution 331 of the United States’ Congress; 
Thadodaho was in the legend a malevolent Onondaga shaman with snakes in his hair.
79   Borrows (2010), pp. 61-63, 92-98.
80   CSQ, Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), ss. 79-81. Only 14 years later the same Québec court came to exactly op-
posite conclusion in Fraser v. Pouliot: there was no valid customary law or marriage. 
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been established an Aboriginal legal services unit. Some First Nations have proclaimed that 
their own laws are in effect. Their general recognition depends much on the claims’ legal 
basis and the political willingness of the federal and provincial governments. Generally, they 
live their own life – non-recognised by the government, but inside the community having a 
force of law. In some modern agreements the customary law and oral history have been given 
a visible role. The Tlicho Agreement recognises the customary law in some precise matters. 
It deals with the following: personal status of the Tlicho people; family law; culture; and 
offences. But as in Nisga’a legal system, where the customary law is not a formal source of law, 
the custom has a supportive role for courts.81 
The Inuit had before the integration into Canadian society a complex and holistic system 
of law and justice based on oral traditions, which did not make a clear distinction between 
the law and custom. The spiritual beliefs and rituals formed the basis of their moral code. 
There were no equivalents to Western words like crime, justice and law. The animism held 
the human beings and animals as equal creatures and there were taboos which were to be 
respected. Piqujaq as law signified “what is asked to be done” and recognised the role of 
elders and leaders in maintaining order in the communy. Tirigiisuusiit were prohibitions and 
obligations. There was however little formal mechanisms to sanction them. Akitsiraqvik were 
places where the great councils delivered justice until 1924. They relied flexibly on customary 
precedents and had to find consensus. There was a remarkable degree of forgiveness, but the 
death sentence was possible. It was important to preserve the social harmony. Angakkuq’s 
(shaman) functions were a combination of a law officer, priest, doctor and inquisitor. The 
family disputes were settled by the family, group disputes by umialik. A special form of remedy 
was the song duel which functioned as a kind of communal psychotherapy. The Christianity 
replaced the traditional beliefs, but to some extent the oral traditions have preserved alive 
some elements of Shamanism. The customary features are better served at the local level 
where the justices of peace are mostly Inuit. The establishment of the Akitsiraq Law School 
program gives promise that Inuit qaujimajatuqangit will be better taken into consideration. 
The law school’s program is based on legal pluralism.The expertise of Inuit elders is used 
outside the official legal system in minor criminal law resolution.82   
Although the Canadian authorities tried since the early nineteenth century to assimilate 
the Inuit into the Western legal system, the indigenous people relied on Inuit customary 
law on property, territory and family matters. Jack Sissons, the judge of the Supreme Court 
of NWT was the first to use Inuit concepts of right and justice in the Canadian system in 
the 1960s. He tried to integrate the two systems of law. The problem of modern Nunavut 
courts is the language barrier and lack of information on Inuit customary law. The only 
lasting result has been the recognition of Inuit customary adoptions. He registered them 
81   Amendment of Champaigne and Aishihik First Nations Final Agreement, 2006 (Yukon), s. 1.1; ONCA, 
Attorney-General of Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, (1984), ss. 353, 370-372; Indigenous Legal Tradi-
tions (2007), p. 14; Otis (2009), p. 243. Borrows (2010), p. 39. 
82   Loukacheva (2007), pp. 80-96, 101-102; Groarke (2009), pp. 788, 790, 792-793; Borrows (2010), pp. 103, 
145. In the first Inuit murder trial (1917) the judge said: “These remote savages, really cannibals... have got 
to be taught to recognize the authority of the British Crown... for the first time in history... people who are 
as nearly as possibly living to-day in the Stone Age, will be brought in contact with and will be taught what 
is the white-man’s justice.” 
126
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
systematically them without any precedent or legal theory in court circuits. Later the Court 
of Appeal stressed that custom had always been regarded as a source of law in the British 
common law tradition. Gradually the child welfare authorities of the NWT accepted the 
practice. Nunatsiavut the customary law is the underlying Inuit law, which is applied besides 
the statutory law and common law. The Inuit legal principles are referred widely in Nunavut’s 
legislation. The Legislative Assembly and Executive Council may take into consideration 
the Inuit qaujimajatuqangit in their work. Nunatsiavut in Labrador forms an exception:  the 
Labrador Inuit Constitution recognises to customary law precedence, if there is a conflict 
with the written law.The Constitution also makes it possible to cofidy the customary law. The 
Nunatsiavut Assembly and the local court may also apply the customary law but there must 
be proof of the existence of customary practice. 83 
The Supreme Court has been more understanding than the legislator towards indigenous 
law. In Sparrow Dickson CJ held that it is crucial to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective 
on the meaning of the rights at stake. In Van der Peet the court warned about undervaluing 
and narrowing the Indigenous oral history’s reach. McLachlin J said in her dissenting 
view that the golden thread of British legal history was the recognition by common law 
of the ancestral laws and customs of the Aboriginal peoples who occupied the land prior 
to European settlement. In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ took stand to hearsay rules which are 
difficult to test directly in courts. Their exceptions and relaxation are subject to the guiding 
principles of necessity and reliability. He held that the courts must come to terms with the 
oral histories of Indigenous societies by placing them on an equal footing with the types of 
historical evidence that courts are familiar with.  He said that requiring general knowledge 
of Indigenous oral histories ignores their local nature. The oral personal and family histories 
are admissible as proof of Aboriginal rights claims. The approach was necessary because the 
treatment of evidence in aboriginal rights cases must accord due weight to the perspective of 
Indigenous peoples and due to special evidentiary difficulties involved in proving rights that 
pre-date written records. 84 
Despite this turn, all Supreme Court cases have not supported the significance of oral 
evidence. In Marshall/Bernard McLachlin CJ held that the use of oral traditions could not 
be properly trusted because of feedback affect from the ideas generated outside one’s own 
culture and a product of one’s own literacy. LeBel J (dissent), however, defended the sui generis 
characterisation of Aboriginal rights. It should be understood as a concept that enables and 
requires Canadian law to recognise rights that are not grounded in Euro-derived law. Similarly, 
in Mitchell v. MNR the court estimated Chief Mitchell’s oral evidence as sparce, doubtful and 
equivocal, and without much weight. Binnie J (dissent) argued that Aboriginal rights derive 
and are limited by Canadian sovereignty. The Constitution Act, 1982, is the exclusive source 
of s. 35 rights. However, in the majority decision McLachlin CJ defined an absorption model, 
according to which the Aboriginal interests and customary laws survived the assertion of 
sovereignty, but were absorbed into the common law rights, unless incompatible with the 
83   Legislative Assembly and Executive Council Act, 2002 (Nunavut), s. 2(3); Labrador Inuit Constitution 
(2005), s. 9; NWTTC, Katie (1961); NWRCA, Re Deborah (1972); Otis (2009), p. 245; Borrows (2010), p. 
53. 
84   SCC, Sparrow (1990); Van der Peet (1996), ss. 68, 263; Delgamuukw (1997), ss. 82-87.
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Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, surrendered voluntarily by treaty process, or extinguished 
by the government. Otherwise they continued as part of the law of Canada.85 
3.3.6.  Alternative Dispute Resolution
In the the 1970s in the United States started a number of Indigenous peoples’ alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) projects which offered a more flexible and selective process, 
appropriate to individual sitruations. The indigenous peoples began to demand similar 
projects in Canada. An ADR process based on traditional concepts was used for the first 
time in Canada in 1986, where a judge of first instance court invited a council of elders to 
give evidence on the traditional treatment of offenders. The judge took into account common 
sentiment as expressed by the elders. This indicated willingness to return the offenders back 
to the community in the spirit of forgiveness. To the hearing of 12 hours there participated 
plenty of community members. There was an idea of seeking payment of restitution in a 
process of effecting reconciliation. In 1988 the Province of Manitoba established the Public 
Enquiry to the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People. The inquiry process took 
into consideration indigenous and cultural views. Consultations were also held in indigenous 
communities. The RCAP stressed the legitimation of an Indigenous alternative criminal 
justice system. The federal Department of Justice has similarly considered a restorative 
approach to juvenile offending after New Zealand’s example. The Arbitration Act allows the 
ADR being set up in family and civil law cases. A challenge in these processes is to prevent 
them coming to simplified images of traditional culture and society.86 Ontario has offered 
advocates for children and youth to give them an independent voice.87 In New Brunswick the 
authorities have to take into consideration when dealing with young offenders their gender, 
ethnicity, culture, language, difference and Aboriginal status. The Aboriginal communities 
must be included in the hearing and planning.88 
The Yukon Territorial Court allowed in 1992 the use of sentencing circles when it was 
necessary to deal with the surrounding factors. Later the territory has entered into agreements 
with individual bands. A precondition is common preparation and willingness of all parties 
in  the process. In the sentencing circle the accused sits in a circle with the victim, relatives, 
the judge, the Crown attorney, the defence lawyer and other community members. The circle 
will make a recommendation to the Crown about the appropriate sentence. The model is a 
limited accommodation strategy which reserves all effective power to the Canadian justice 
system.89 A collective sentencing circle, the community holistic circle healing, has been also 
practiced in the Hollow Water First Nation. A group of residents developed an approach 
where, after the offender had acknowledged his responsibility and was accepted by the group, 
85   SCC, Marshall/Bernard (2005), ss. 62-65; Mitchell v. MNR (2001), s. 51. 
86   NWTCA, R. v. Naqitarvik (1986); RCAP (1996), Vol. 2, Part 1; Miller (2000), pp. 12, 15, 29; Sheleff (2000), 
pp. 313-315; Havemann (1999), pp. 307-311.
87   Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth Act, 2007 (Ontario), s. 1.
88   Custody and Delection of Young Persons Act, 2011 (New Brunswick), ss. 2, 4. 
89   Victims of Crime Act, 2010 (Yukon), s. 13; YTC, R. v. Moses (1992).
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he was allowed to stay in the community but was subject to a 13-step process that takes five 
years. Similar circles have been used e.g. in Nunavut and Saskatchewan.90 
The Coast Salish people live in both sides of the US-Canadian border. In 1974, in the state 
of Washington, was established the Upper Skagit Tribal Court as a part of the nationwide 
ADR programs. One of the aims was to restore the community order. In British Columbia, 
the Stó:lō Nation was included in the South Island Justice Project, which was a pilot project 
for the federal Department of Justice on Vancouver Island. In the 1980s the mainstream legal 
personel was educated in Coast Salish practices and concepts. and the provincial courts were 
allowed to delegate minor cases to the Coast Salish people. The Stó:lō First Nation’s House 
of Justice (Lálém Te Stó:lō Sí:yá:m) was created in British Columbia in 1993. It included two 
leaders, two chiefs and one elder. The house was empowered with the mandate to develop and 
implement alternative justice programs to help the nation to re-establish healthy communities 
and achieve full potential of all of its citizens. In the late 1990s the nation began to develop 
and implement an alternative justice program. It first tried New Zealand’s family councelling 
model, but then developed instead its own system. They decided to involve in the training for 
peacemaking circles, based on a Yukon model. The process of rediscovery was based on Stó:lō 
culture, customs and traditions and the support of indigenous communities. The aim was to 
be self-determining and responsible, and to bring the justice back to people by giving them 
an opportunity to play meaningful roles in problem solution.91  
The language has central importance in this process. The nation’s elders were asked to 
create an Indigenous expression to Stó:lō justice. The program is called Qwi:qwelstóm kwelam 
t’ey (“They are teaching you, moving you towards the good”). It incorporates balance and 
harmony to help one another to survive and to care all people. It focuses relationship and 
interconnectedness of all life. The justice is centered on family. The key elements are the 
role of family, family ties, community connections, teachings and spirituality. The process of 
qwi:qwelstóm aims to resolve the conflicts “in a good way” and respectfully, focusing on the 
person, and to reconnect the extended family members and to increase the reporting rates 
of family violence and sexual assaults within the communities by providing an alternative to 
the punitive and adversarial criminal justice system. The system encourages families to begin 
a healing process to end the cycle of abuse. The circles create space and place for meaningful 
discussion, profound interaction and better understanding. All participants are required 
to share all sacred parts of being (physical, mental, emotional and spiritual) and to come 
physically and mentally prepared. The process is verbal and open: each participant is equally 
vulnerable. In criminal justice a circle can be arranged to replace the trial process, make a 
sentencing recommendation, assist in reintegration to community, and to develop a healing 
plan. Most of circles are healing circles. Peace circles are used to assist with family disputes, 
community relationships, custody concerns and divorce settlements. Their object is to restore 
balance in family and community. At least one elder must be present in a circle. They have 
natural authority and knowledge to re-establish broken connections.92 
The tribal members are tied in many ways to families and ancestors. A special feature 
in circles is the use of traditional teaching and spirituality. A Stó:lō circle ends with an 
90   RCAP, Vol. 3, pp. 159-169; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2006), p. 333.
91   Miller (2000), pp. 4-10.
92   Miller (2000), pp. 126-127; Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), pp. 18-26. 
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elder’s prayer and is enclosed by a shared meal. The program is accountable to the House 
of Justice and the Elders Council. The latter has a supervisory role. The referrals to House 
of Justice come from the RCMP, Crown counsel, probation officers, community members, 
self referrals and Crown departments. Smómíyelhtel (justice assistants) have been trained in 
monthly meetings.They inform the sentencing circle on the process. The Stó:lō officials have 
protocol agreements with the RCMP and police representatives. Upon receiving a referral to 
qwi:qwelstóm, a justice worker must ensure that the wrongdoer takes responsibility for his/
her behaviour, and all persons concerned are fully informed of the process and offered an 
opportunity to participate. Crown representatives consider on case-by-case basis what type 
of cases they will send to Stó:lō justice.93
Since 2003 the federal Ministry of Justice started 12 ADR pilot projects based on the 
Residential School remedy process. The program was based on a tort-law model in conjuction 
with health support program administered through Health Canada and a commemoration 
program. The reconciliation, including relationship- and trustbuilding, authenticity, humility 
and community engagement, has all been an essential element in these processes. The 
cultural loss is connected to powerful reclaiming of culture, family, community and nation. 
The federal Criminal Code encourages the judges to use different methods of analysis in 
determining a fit sentence for Indigenous offenders. The code and the later case law also 
stress the amelioration of imprisoned Indigenous persons’ services. The disparity between 
sanctions to different offenders needs to be justified. The judges have a duty to consider 
unique circles of Indigenous offenders. The application of this Gladue principle is required in 
all cases involving an Indigenous offender. A failure to meet it constitutes an error justifying 
an applied intervention.94 
The Nisga’a Lisims government may establish a Nisga’a Court for better administration of 
Nisga’a laws. It can review administrative decisions of Nisga’a Public Institutions, adjudicate 
prosecutions, adjudicate disputes on Nisga’a lands, and to impose penalties and other 
remedies according to Nisga’a laws. The court will apply traditional Nisga’a methods and 
values, including the use of elders in adjudication and sentencing and emphasis on restitution. 
The Agreement introduces a three-stage dispute resolution mechanism: the collaborative 
negotiation, mediation, a technical advisory panel, neutral evaluation and the Elders Advisory 
Council, binding arbitration or judicial proceedings. The First Nations Governance Act would 
have offered an appointment of an impartial person to deal with internal band disputes, but 
would have placed the third party disputes to court. There has also been a Nisga’a Youth 
Justice Initiative to replace as an alternative to federal system.95
In 1873-1877 the St. Laurent’ Métis settlement had an early arbitration system. The 
governing body convened once a month to settle failures to meet obligations or follow 
regulations. All contracts made on Sundays were estimated as null and void. Also the Metis 
Settlements Appeal Tribunal had wanted to provide a nonadversarial alternative. It can act 
as an arbitrator, to appoint an arbitrator or to refer the dispute to a mediator.96 In Nunavut, 
93   Miller (2000), pp. 126-127; Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), pp. 26-34.  
94   Criminal Code, 1985, s. 718.2; SCC, Gladue (1999), ss. 93-98; R. v. Ipeelee (2012), ss. 80-87; Indigenous 
Legal Traditions (2007), pp. 41-43, 62, 64.
95   Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 12.33-48; McHugh (2004), p. 438.
96   Bell (1994), p. 22.
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the victims of crime can seek justice from the elders. The elders make collaboration with 
professional mediators in the Iqaluit Restorative Justice Society to resolve lesser crimes as 
vandalism and minor theft or assaults. The elders ask the perpetraitors questions about the 
crime committed and give them advice. The mediation sessions help the victim and the 
offender agree on some form of conflict resolution. In 2007 the Qikiqtani Truth Commission 
was established to investigate injustices that took place in the 1950s and 1960s.97 
3.3.7.  Enforcement of Law
The colonial legislation gave the chiefs in reserves some powers to arrange law enforcement 
in the reserves. Also Treaties 2-3 mentioned the enforcement and guaranteed the later the 
Ontario First Nations a police force. The Indian Advancement Act, 1884 granted to the tribal 
councils a power to punish transgressions by by-laws. Otherwise, the RCMP took the main 
tasks on policing the Indigenous communities.98
According to the Indian Act the observance of law and order, and prevention of disorderly 
conduct and nuisances belongs to band councils. The federal First Nations Policing Policy 
gives the First Nations communities an opportunity to participate with provincial and federal 
governments in the development of police services in their communities. There are two 
options: the communities may develop and administer their own police service or choose 
a police service with First Nations officers working withing an existing structure. The First 
Nations police services may also patrol for road control outside the reserves. The RCMP’s 
role is governed by federal and provincial tripartite agreements. The Bill C-7 (2002) would 
have strengthened the enforcement powers of bands, enabling them to enforce directly and 
to appoint band enforcement officers with powers of search and seizure. In Nunavut, the 
federal government has established Inuit ranger patrols to each Inuit community. They make 
co-operation with the military in reporting. Nunatsiavut and Nunavik have their respective 
police services.99
The federal state and provinces have agreed since the 1990s about the geographically 
limited First Nations Police Services in reserves. The First Nations’ constables have in 
reserves the powers of a police officer. They are usually based on tripartite agreements and 
directed by boards. In Manitoba, the provincial police services must recognise the plural and 
multicultural character of the Manitoban society.100 The provincial police of Alberta takes, 
however, care of the Métis settlement’s police services.101 In British Columbia the settlement 
First Nations may create community correction services and declare s state of local emergency 
and have a limited jurisdiction over public order, peace or safety, power to impose fines, 
restitution, imprisonment or other penalties for violation of indigenous laws. The Nisga’a 
97   Loukacheva (2007), pp. 101-102; IWGIA (2010), p. 52. 
98   Treaty 2 (1871); Treaty 3 (1873); Indian Advancement Act, 1884, s. 13; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend 
(2008), 602. 
99   Indian Act , 1985, s. 81(3)(c)-(d); Labrador Inuit Constitution, 2002, s. 9.4; SCC, R. v. Decorte (2005), s.28; 
McHugh (2004), p. 477; Loukacheva (2007), p. 139; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 601-602.
100 Police Act, 1990 (Saskatchewan), s. 16(1); Police Services Act, 1990 (Ontario), s. 54; Police Services Act, 
2012 (Manitoba), ss. 9, 45-46; Police Act, 2004 (Nova Scotia), s. 87.
101  Police Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 4(1). 
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Police Service officers have powers, duties, privileges, liabilities and responsibilities of a peace 
officer.Nisga’a Nation has won community correction service. The services are directed by 
the Nisga’a Police Board.102 The transfer to Indigenous enforcement of law has been generally 
successful. However, there have been also grave challenges. The deteriorating relationship 
of the Iroquois with the Québec government led to the establishment of their proper police 
force called the Peacekeepers which became a recognised enforcement agency on the reserve. 
It has been, however, challenged by unrecognised, paramilitary enforcement group called the 
Warrior Movement.103
Conclusions3.4. 
Legal pluralism exists and is more or less recognised in all compared countries. The 
geographical separateness and historical continuity have been in this a significant factor. In 
the beginning it was an expression of imported, Western legal systems’ incapability to absorb 
the customary communities to dominant order of the society. When the settler societies 
strengthened, they believed until the 1970s that the custom would give way to the norms of 
Western law. 
There were, however, certain differences between the compared countries. In France 
the principle of spécialité législative has signified since the seventeenth century a different 
treatment for the  overseas areas, recognised recently also in EU law. A significant change 
took place in 1946, when the overseas areas were divided into overseas departments, which 
were integrated into the French legal system, but preserved a right to limited differences, 
based on historical, geographical and economic special conditions. In the overseas territories 
continued the principle, according to which the statutes of Metropolitan France would be in 
force only when expressly extended there.The laws of sovereignty, general principles of law 
and general laws form an exception to this rule as they apply in all the republic’s territory. 
In New Zealand the legal pluralism was recognised from the 1840s as a fact and there has 
existed also parallel, non-recognised Māori law since the 1860s, which was an expression 
of the relative strength of the Māori population. Māori never completely disappeared from 
legislation as an “exception”, but has returned as being more widely accepted since the 1970s. 
In Canada the legal pluralism has been part of the recognised legal system through the 
country’s legal hybridity. However, the inclusion of the Indigenous peoples to this definition 
has taken place only since the 1980s, while the Indigenous law has developped strongly in the 
last few decades.
 In France there is officially a unitary legal system. In Canada the legislative power has 
been constitutionally divided between the provinces since 1867. Since 1986 also several First 
102 Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, 1986, s. 14(2); Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1999, s. 12; Maanulth 
First Nations Final Agreement, 2007, ss. 13.26, 13.34; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement, 2007, s. 
16.
103 Dickason (1994), pp. 358-359. In 1988 the first armed conflict in modern times took place between the Ca-
nadian authorities and the Iroquois, when the Royal Mounted Police raided the Kahnawaké reserve’s stores. 
The armed Warriors blocked the bridge to Montréal for 27 hours. Two years later the Warriors supported 
the uprising in Oka. 
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Nations have obtained a right to legislate in geographically and by content limited frames. 
In France the republican principles prohibited the division or delegation of this power. 
The Accord of Nouméa signified, however, in this sense a radical change. Since 1998 New 
Caledonia and since 2004 French Polynesia had a geographically and by content limited 
right to legislate equally with the French Parliament. In New Zealand the legal unity changed 
in 1965, when the Cook Islands (followed by Niue in 1974) was granted an indepent legal 
system, which was only loosely connected to the mother country. Similarly the legislatures in 
associated states and territories are separate, independent bodies. In all three countries the 
development has gone towards more plural, disintegrated and asymmetric legislative power, 
although only in New Zealand has this development led to a model of three parallel legal 
systems, which are loosely connected to each other.
The customary law was dominant in France until the Civil Code of 1804, and even thereafter 
it did not completely vanish. In New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna the geographically 
restricted legal duality was an early recognised fact. The Accord of Nouméa and changes 
in legislation reinforced the status of customary law as recognised personal law and the 
construction of new customary institutions has been a unique phenomenon. While Wallis 
and Futuna has been characterised by continued customary dominance, French Polynesia has 
developped in the opposite direction. The royal house of Tahiti and the Protestant missionaries 
paved the way for the codification of law and later the pushing aside of customary law to 
family circles. Also the Indigenous legal institions have faded out together with the decline of 
recognised customary law. The British missionaries’ influence on legal change was similarly 
visible in the Cook Islands as part of the “civilisation process”, while on Wallis and Futuna 
the Catholic policy was more protective. In New Zealand and Canada the customary law 
was first recognised, but the strengthening of settler society gradually restricted its scope. 
Unlike in France, the customary family law lost ground both in New Zealand and Canada.
The partial recognition of customary law began only in the 1960s in Canada and the 1970s 
in New Zealand. In both countries the developed case law, in New Zealand also the existence 
of a growingly Indigenous tribunal/court system which has been essential to change, which 
has has been followed by the legislature and (in Canada) by the creation of new indigenous 
legal bodies. In all countries the active period concentrates in the 1980s and 1990s, when the 
global attitude to Indigenous peoples changed remarkably.
The participation of the Indigenous people in the enforcement of law and alternative dispute 
resolution has been strongest in Canada. In New Zealand the Māori Wardens have similar – 
although more patronising features. The customary dispute resolution has developed in the 
same direction as Canada, reflecting change towards increased responsibility of Indigenious 
peoples in arrangements of law and order. Here France forms a different model. Its’ legislator 
has created less opportunities for differential arrangements in this sector, with the exception 
of New Caledonia, where the customary assessors and officials have strengthened the 
Indigenous role. Elsewhere the recognition of customary law keeping and mediation is more 
indirect.
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France4.1. 
4.1.1. New Caledonia: Sui Generis Collectivity
4.1.1.1.  Heavy Burden of the Past 
New Caledonia was discovered and named by James Cook in 1774. The Protestant 
missionaries arrived on the islands in 1840, followed only three years later by the French 
Catholic missionaries. In 1844 Admiral La Ferrière made 14 official treaties with the local 
chiefs in New Caledonia, which recognised the French protection. The formal annexation 
took place nine years later (on Loyalty Islands in 1862), and there was no more need for further 
negotiations, except in Isle of Pines, where was obtained the formal consent of the local chief. 
The islands were until 1860 under the general supervision of the French Naval Governor in 
Tahiti, and thereafter part of the French Establishments of Oceania (Établissements Français 
d’Océanie, EFO).  Its governor, assisted by a Consultative Council, had until 1885 wide 
powers. Outside the European settlements were created Municipal Commissions. In 1868 the 
governor created the concept of tribu (tribe): 254 tribes replaced the 39 traditional clans as 
basic units. The tribes became legal persons to practice internal discipline and since 1868 the 
Indigenous people were relocated to reserves. The colonial administration created a variant 
of traditional chiefdom. The Great Chiefs (grand-chef) were appointed to manage local tribes, 
and since 1877 also to keep order in districts including several tribes. Those who did not obey 
the colonial authority were dismissed or deported to Tahiti. The small chiefs (petit-chef) were 
responsible for local communities. The governor was alone able to decide on reserves’ and 
chiefs’ fate.1 
In 1887 the French Government introduced Code de l’Indigénat, which submitted 
Indigenous people to forced labour, nighttime curfews, requisition and taxation. The code 
created two classes: the French citizens and the French subjects. The latter preserved only 
their religious and customary personal status. The Kanak revolted several times but were 
suppressed by the army. In 1903-1942 the territory suffered from economic crisis, inactivity 
and isolation. The World War II changed this state of affairs:  the opening of the French 
Pacific colonies began in 1942, when the American troops arrived on the islands. Despite 
1   Arrêté du 22 janvier 1868 (EFO); Ntumy (1993), pp. 596-597; Vigne (2000), pp. 2-3. 
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the Treaty of Geneva (1938) the forced labour continued until 1946, when the code and its 
restrictions were repealed.2  
The transportation of prisoners into forced labour began in 1854. Ten years later Emperor 
Napoléon III decided to create a penal colony in New Caledonia. It existed for 23 years, and 
more than 20,000 prisoners were brought to the islands. Many of them were persuaded to 
stay in New Caledonia even after their release. The discovery of gold (1863) and nickel (1875) 
hastened the transformation of the islands into a civil colony. The active colonisation policy 
started massive immigration and transformed the islands into a multicultural society. The 
Melanesian population dropped from 100,000 (1853) to 20,000 (1921) but began again to 
recover later. The active intervention of the state with a policy of industrial expansion from 
1945 brought to the main island a great number of new immigrants. The French settlers were 
joined by pieds-noirs of Algeria and immigrants from other overseas territories. Together with 
the nickel boom of 1969-1972 the Kanak became a minority. As late as 1972 Prime Minister 
Mesmer expressed the need to arrange massive immigration from Metropolitan France and 
overseas departments to prevent the nationalist claims of the Indigenous population. As a 
consequence, about 20,000 new immigrants arrived on the island.3 For these reasons the 
1970s and 1980s became decades of deepening ethnic polarisation. 
The legal status of New Caledonia has been exceptionally turbulent. Between 1946 and 
1998 it had seven different administrative statutes. The first statute (1946) created the overseas 
territory. The Representative Territorial Assembly included 20 members and was in charge 
of the proper interests of the territory. Outside the sessions a Permanent Commission took 
care on the administration, while the Governor preserved his central position as executive. 
In 1956 the French Government checked its stand on overseas territories in Defferre law, 
which “associated the populations more closely to the management of their proper interests”. 
It suggested reorganisation of General Governments, the creation of the Councils of the 
Government and the extention of the competencies of the local Elected Assemblies. In 1957 
the Council of the Government was established, having 6-8 members elected by the Territorial 
Assembly. A setback came only one year later with the Fifth Republic’s new policy. When the 
other territories gained independence and New Zealand promoted the self-government of its 
remaining possessions, France tightened its grip on the Pacific territories. Possible reasons 
for this policy were that the decree of 1957 was originally designed for the large TOMs of 
Africa, the threat of indigenous movements to unitary state, and the need to centralise the 
administration for strategic reasons.4 
2   Loi no. 69-5 du 3 janvier 1969; Aldrich (1993), pp. 17-18, 35; Ntumy (1993), p. 597; Pastorel (2011), p. 610. 
It has been estimated that 5% of Caledonians died in Kanak insurrections and their subjugation; the strug-
gle between Vichy and Free France governments in Pacific and the new influences brought by the American 
troops weakened the French influence in the area. The pro-Vichy administration proclaimed New Caledo-
nia autonomous in 1940 and individual American officers tried in 1942 to annex Wallis and Futuna under 
their own flag.
3   Loi du 30 mai 1854, s. 1; Roberts (1963), pp. 518-524; Aubry (1992), p. 139; Aldrich (1993), p. xi, xviii, 127; 
Ntumy (1993), p. 597; New Caledonia, pp. 258-277; Nouvelle-Calédonie. Especially smallpox and measles 
were destructive to the Melanesian population.
4   Aldrich (1993), pp. 63-64, 67.
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 New Caledonia’s powers were reduced several times (1958, 1963, 1965 and 1969) and the 
Council became a mere advisor of the Governor. On the other hand, the Territorial Assembly 
was given powers to expel the councillors and to the territory was created the Office of the 
General Secretary and the municipalities. The restoration of territorial status began in the 
1970s in the aftermath of the independence of the Comores. The Governor was replaced by 
a High Commissioner in 1976 and the post of Vice-President of the Council was recreated. 
To the Council were returned its collegial competences in charge of the administration of 
territorial interests. The Territorial Assembly was given the general competence on the affairs 
of the territory. New Caledonia was the first overseas territory to obtained a new form of 
territorial competency. The period ended in the independence of New Hebrides (Vanuatu), 
which had deep psychological effects on New Caledonia.5 
4.1.1.2.  Turbulent Period of Transformation
The electoral programme of François Mitterrand promised change to the status of the 
Overseas Territories. In the beginning of the new decentralisation were passed several statutes 
to reform the planning, media and taxation. In 1982-1983 a pro-independence party formed 
for the first time a majority in the government of New Caledonia and the Kanak politicians 
proclaimed the territory independent (without real effect). The overseas Minister introduced 
after negotiations the draft Lemoine law (1984), which offered internal autonomy for New 
Caledonia. In the National Assembly it was supported only by the Socialists and Communists. 
It would have transferred the executive power to the Territorial Government and there was 
a promise to arrange a referendum on the future in five years’ time. Due to raising tensions 
the bill was not ratified and in January 1985 New Caledonia was proclaimed as being in a 
state of alert. In the meanwhile, President Mitterrand had appointed Edgard Pisani as high 
commissioner to resolve the crisis. Based on his plan, Fabius-Pisani law (1985) sought in the 
violent situation new solutions. It took into use article 88 of the Constutition, which had been 
until then a dead letter. The law opened up the possibility for independence in association 
with France. This was challenged by several parliamentarians who saw it possible only 
between two independent states and being against the UN Resolution 1514 which prohibited 
all conditions or reservations to independence. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Council held 
it merely as a declaration of intention without normative content.6
The law of 17 July 1986 ordered an arrangement of consultation within 12 months’ time. 
The alternatives were independence or autonomy within France. The consultation was 
boycotted by the Kanak, whose politicians drafted a Constitution for “the Republic of Kanaky” 
with a bicameral parliament and classical division of power. Nevertheless, the consultation 
5   Loi du 28 décembre 1976, art. 48; Loi-cadre du 23 juin 1956, art. 1; Décret du 21 juillet 1957; Aubry (1992), 
pp. 138-139; New Hebrides was an Anglo-French condominium. The population is Melanesian and related 
to Kanak. 
6   Constitution (1958), art. 88; Loi du 6 septembre 1984; Loi no. 85-872 du 23 août 1985, art. 1; CC, Décision 
no. 85-196 DC du 8 août 1985; New Caledonia, pp. 299, 315, 335-340. “La République peut conclure des 
accords avec des États qui désirent s’associer à elle pour developer leurs civilisations” (art. 88); The question 
in referendum on Algeria (1962) suggested a similar arrangement; In state of alert the government used the 
law of 7 August 1955, originally created for Algeria.
136
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
was arranged. In September 1987   98% of voters supported the pro-France alternative. The 
Territorial Assembly was replaced by the Congress with 54 elected members, based on a 
regional quota. The autonomy was expressed though a 10-member Executive Council, 
including four regional presidents and five members elected by the Congress. The President 
of the Council was the President of the Congress with a purely consultative role, while the 
High Commissioner regained his position as the executive. The islands were divided into four 
territorial collectivities, creating within France a unique federal structure. The Territorial 
Government was able to delegate by ordinance competences to Regional Councils.7
The United Nations urged France to take positive steps in relation to the self-determination 
of New Caledonia. After the demand by the the heads of government of the South Pacific 
Forum and the Conference of Non-Alied Countries, the UN General Assembly decided on 2 
December 1986 that New Caledonia is in the meaning of the UN Charter a non-independent 
territory. According to the resolution, the people of New Caledonia has an inalienable right 
to self-determination and independence in conformity with the dispositions of the resolution 
1514(XV).8
The subsequent changes in legislation indicated that the French politicians were willing to 
resolve fundamentally the prolonged crisis. In 1988 the Parliament passed three new laws on 
New Caledonia: on the status of the territory, administration and referendum. The first law (22 
January) gave to the territory extended autonomy, but the second (12 July) reconcentrated the 
powers to the High Commissioner and Consultative Committee as an interim arrangement. 
The law of 9 November 1988 was the first statute based on political agreement and not 
granted directly from Paris which pacified the situation. It allowed a referendum on self-
determination which would take place after ten years. The electorate for 1998 referendum was 
limited. However, the law did not promise a referendum to the Kanak but to the populations 
of interest, including also the long-established French population. The state preserved its 
competence in the following: external affairs; defence; justice; maintenance of order; customs; 
money; nationality; civil status; and penal procedure. The territory obtained powers in 
external commerce; regulation and exploitation of mining resources; access of foreigners to 
work markets; principles of work and formation; and a majority in electrical company. The 
territorial competences were later extended with the organic laws of 1995 and 1999. The law did 
not create an elected executive to New Caledonia but recognised the Congress and Provincial 
Assemblies (former Regional Councils) joint participation with the state in the exercise of 
external relations. They could propose to the national government opening of negotiations 
in order to conclude agreements with one or several states or territories in Pacific region. 
A representant of the Congress or Provincial Assembly could take part in the negotiations. 
The French Government could also allow the bodies’ presidents to participate in the work of 
international organisations in the region. The Congress was granted consultative competence 
to the bills which authorised the ratification of international conventions dealing with the 
7   Loi du 17 juillet 1986. Regnault (2003), pp. 289-298. The Congress has 32 members from South Province, 
15 from the North and seven from the islands; The unofficial Constitution of Kanaky was based on French 
model, including the idea that “national sovereignty belongs to the people”.
8   UN, Resolution 41/41A (1986). France had not reported on its overseas territories to UN after 1946; Since 
the Accord of Nouméa the relationship between France and the region’s countries has normalised. Australia 
has entered into a strategic partnership with France.
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competences of the territory or the provinces. It was assisted by the consultative Permanent 
Commission, which was elected on an annual basis by the Congress to work in the meantime 
of congressional sessions. The law created also an Economic and Social Council which had 39 
members with a five-year mandate representing the provincies and the Customary Senate. It 
is consulted on all bills of loi du pays and decisions of the Congress dealing with economic or 
social affairs. It has also an important consultation role in its own sphere.9
The bill of 1984 had suggested for the first time the division of New Caledonia into six 
provinces with Provincial Councils, elected from a customary base and having a consultative 
role. In the background were the geographical and ethnic differences between different parts 
of the territory. Based on the plan of the Prime Minister Fabius and being a modified version 
of the earlier drafts, the law of 1985 created four regions with Regional Councils, having 
modest competences in regional affairs. The French population feared that its position would 
weaken and the law of 1988 checked again the system. New Caledonia had on two occasions 
rejected the departementalisation. Instead, the new accords and legislation confirmed a 
federal structure of four levels: state, territory, three provinces and 33 municipalities. This 
structure was made possible by article 72 al. 1 of the Constitution, according to which 
all other territorial collectivities are created by law. There were created three provinces: 
the South Province was predominantly French, while the North and Islands Provinces 
were overwhelmingly Melanesian. The regional councils were also renamed as Provincial 
Assemblies, having respectively 7, 15 and 32 members, being also members of the Congress. 
They are elected by universal suffrage for five years with proportional majority representation. 
The provinces are competent in all matters not reserved by the law to the state, territory or 
municipalities. The provinces have also direct access to economic and cultural exchange with 
the states and territories of the Pacific region.10  
The first municipality was created to Nouméa in 1879. In 1947, there were created 
Regional Commissions elsewhere under territorial supervision. The new structure did 
not cope well with Kanak traditional structures. The differences between municipal 
9   Accord de Nouméa (1998), s. 2.1.4.b, art. 2.1.4.b; Loi no. 84-820 du 6 septembre 1984; Loi référendaire no. 
88-1028 du 9 novembre 1988, art. 2, 57-2, 85-8, 88; Hamon & Troper (2007), p. 498; Rouault (2007), p. 153; 
The French Pacific territories were able to join the Council of the South Pacific in 1983. The South Pacific 
Forum is closed for them because it allows only the independent states to be members.
10 Accord de Nouméa (1998), s. 2.1.1; art. 2.1; Loi no. 85-872 du 23 août 1985; Loi référendaire du 9 novembre 
1988, art. 7; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 1, 40, 46, 50, 157, 161, 173,197; New Caledonia, 
pp. 349-351; Payé (2001), p. 201; Rouault (2007), p. 247. The departementalisation was offered in 1958 and 
again in the 1970s, when Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon changed its status; the predominantly French South 
Province has a majority in the Congress, based on population; Legislator has created several new collectivi-
ties based on art. 72 al. 1: the City of Paris (1964), Mayotte (1976, 2010), Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon (1985), 
Corsica (1991) and the monodepartemental regions; The French politicians in New Caledonia presented in 
1985 an alternative “Swiss solution” – a federation of two regions, with respective assemblies responsible for 
economic development, environmental management and social welfare; To provincial competence belong 
the cultural and linguistic programs in elementary schools; maintaining of certain secondary schools and 
their residential homes; provincial boards for social and health affairs; establishments of care and training 
and recruiting of their personnel; provincial road network; provincial airports and ports; tourism; sport 
and culture; economic development; authorisation of minor foreign investments; town planning; land 
rights; vocational training; agriculture, hunting and fishing; exploitation of economic sea zone’s resources; 
regulation of internal commerce; and customary law.
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structures were repealed in 1961 and eight years later was a system established, consisting 
of 33 municipalities, covering  all the territory. They were integrated in 1977 to the general 
French legislation with some local particularities dealing with the funds of intermunicipal 
fiscal compensation and the lack of the mayors’ right to keep public order (since 1884). The 
municipalities were a forgotten part of the administrative reforms in New Caledonia while 
no statute before 1990 expressly mentioned them. In 1990 the municipal powers were limited 
to economic and social policy and town planning. The mayors lost the right to grant building 
licencies. This reduction of powers was corrected in 1995, when the municipalities’ rights in 
town planning, taxation and distribution of electricity were again increased. The Code of the 
Municipalities of New Caledonia was created by the law of 19 March 1999. It is a modified 
version of the provisions in the General Code of Territorial Collectivities. The municipalities 
are created by the Congress which decides on the following: their public function; local taxes; 
and the delegation of regulative powers. In addition, the provincial assemblies may delegate 
them competences in instruction and licenced premises. The municipalities are represented 
in the Consultative Committee of Mines and Special Administrative Commission; they may 
form public collectivities or establishments; and their representatives can ask corrections 
to territorial, provincial and municipal provisions. They can make development contracts 
compatible with the territorial development schemes. The French legislation is applicable to 
town planning and delivery of electricity only when approved by a Provincial Assembly. In 
defining the limits of municipalities there should be taken into consideration the customary 
areas.11     
After a violent drama in Ouvéa and the threat of full civil war, President Mitterrand and 
Prime Minister Rocard sought an urgent compromise with the conflicting parties. On 26 June 
1988 the parties signed the Accords of Matignon (Accords de Matignon), which was submitted 
to national referendum. It described the necessity to re-establish the social peace and to 
create conditions in which people could choose their destiny. The document emphasised the 
importance of coexistence and dialogue. The administration and development of the federal 
territory of New Caledonia was organised within the three provinces of Loyalty Islands, 
South and North, which became legal persons. Some 400 young Kanak would be educated 
to leading positions, including the resource sector. Conseil d’Etat gave several rulings where 
it restricted the application of territorial and provincial powers: the secondary education’s 
supervision belonged to the state; the state had a right to intervene in rural development 
in the provinces; the external communication belonged to the state; there could be parallel 
state services in the domain of the territory; and the provinces had no competence on public 
sea resources. Neither could the provinces take measures which would affect the essential 
11   Accord der Nouméa (1998), art. 1.2.2.; Code des communes de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (1999), art. L-111-1; 
Loi organique du 20 février 1995, art. 41, 47, 54, 86, 189, 211; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, 
art. 4, 52; Loi no. 77-44 du 8 juillet 1977; Loi no. 69-5 du 3 janvier 1969; Loi no 90-1247 du 29 décembre 
1990, art. 7; Décret no. 76-1301 du 28 décembre 1976; Arrêté no.1288 du 18 octobre 1947; Arrêté 61/036 
CG du 31 janvier 1961; Luchaire (2000), pp. 18-20; Payé (2001), p. 217;  Pastorel (2011), p. 615. In New 
Caledonia the maintenance of public order belongs to High Commissioner.  
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conditions in the exercise of fundamental principles recognised by the laws of the republic 
and reaffirmed by the preambule of the Constitution.12 
4.1.1.3.  Accord of Nouméa and the Process of Reconciliation
In the subsequent decade the different parties of New Caledonia and the state of France 
recognised the need to have a period of transition, now extending 15-20 years ahead. The 
Accord of Nouméa (Accord de Nouméa), signed on 5 May 1998, created a new relationship 
between France and New Caledonia.  Based on the agreement, the Parliament enacted the 
organic law of 19 March 1999 which established a sui generis collectivity. The Constitution 
had to be amended due to the New Caledonian process by the constitutional law of 20 
July 1998. The new title XIII includes the articles 77-78 of the Constitution, which give the 
agreement a constitutional status. It opens to territory an option to access full sovereignty 
after a transitory period. The consultations will be arranged in the period 2014-2018. If there 
will be a negative answer, there will be arranged a second consultation if 1/3 of the Congress 
members request it in writing. There is no statutory guidance about possible third round but 
the Constitutional Council has held it possible. If no solution is found, a political reunion 
must be arranged to solve the deadlock. The Congress has in its recent Declaration of General 
Policy stressed the need to engage in the process and to renew the political, economic, social, 
industrial and provincial balancing.13 
The Accord of Nouméa is an epoch-making document in unitary France. It has rendered 
the purely social, cultural and administrative autonomy to the political process of gradually 
extending self-determination. Its four major principles are the: recognition of the Kanak 
identity; recognition of the merits of other people; community of common destiny and 
citizenship; and the principle of progressiveness through dialogue. The Accord recognises 
both the past grievances and need for remedy, and the worth of scientific and technical 
advancement brought by the settlers. The purpose of the Accord is to support the two major 
ethnic groups to live together and to develop a common destiny. The common past and will 
to live together are the touchstones of the community. Therefore, the Accord recognises 
constitutionally the existence of multicultural society in New Caledonia. It includes a local 
social contract between all ethnic communities of the islands. The local citizenship is an 
important expression of it. The open dialogue is a living condition to the progress of New 
Caledonia’s political and legal status. The accord’s innovations are the divided sovereignty 
12   Accords de Matignon (1988), Préambule, Texte no. 1; CE, Bouquillard, 31 juillet 1992; Province Sud de 
Nouvelle-Calédonie, 31 juillet 1992; Territoire de la Nouvelle-Calédonie, 11 décembre 1992; Syndicat des 
fonctionnaires, agents et ouvriers de la meteorologie et de l’aviation civile, 11 mars 1994; Haut-Commissaire 
de la République en Nouvelle-Calédonie, 18 novembre 1994; Auby (1992), p. 143. In Ouvéa, a number of 
gendarme were killed or kidnapped by the Kanak Liberation Front. In the release of hostages the French 
troops killed a large number of Kanak guerrillas. 
13  Constitution (1958), art. 77; Accord de Nouméa (1998), art. 216-221; Loi du 19 mars 1999, art. 217; Décla-
ration politique générale (2011);  Luchaire (2000), pp. 8-10; Bechtel (2002), p. 39.
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(souveraineté partagée), which is an irreversible process; the division of legislative powers for 
the first time in French history; and the creation of double citizenship.14  
The competences are divided to the state’s core competences and transferable competences. 
As territorial collectivity, New Caledonia has representation in the French Parliament and 
national Economic and Social Council. The territory, provinces, and municipalities are 
territorial collectivities of New Caledonia. The institutions of the two first-mentioned are 
under the High Commissioners’ supervision. He/she is no longer the head of the territory but 
has, nevertheless, an important role in the process as the director of the administration of the 
state. He/she does to following: executes the national laws and decrees; guarantees the public 
order; may call public forces in the case of necessity; guarantees the proper functioning of the 
New Caledonian institutions and supervises their functioning through the territorial organs; 
exercices the control of legality on the regulations of the territorial authorities; is associated 
with the functioning of institutions; and is informed on the reunions of the government. The 
projects of decisions are transmitted to the High Commissioner before their publication and 
he/she can demand their second deliberation. The mines are administered by the Council of 
Mines, which is headed by the High Commissioner.15 
The structure of the 54-member Congress has been preserved but the mandate of the 
Congress and Provincial Assemblies has been reduced to five years. The President of the 
Congress has replaced the High Commissioner as the head of the territorial administration. 
An important change is also that the Congress has become besides its control function a 
legislature. Article 99 of the organic law defines the scope of lois du pays (laws of the country). 
They are submitted to the control of Conseil d’Etat. All high officials and 18 members of 
the Congress can also apply to the Constitutional Council. The Customary Senate must be 
consulted about the bills, when they deal with the Kanak identity.16
The collegial Government, having 5-11 members, is elected by the Congress and is 
responsible to it. The Government is, based on the ideology of the accord, a coalition 
government, representing both population groups. A consultative committee includes 
representatives both from the state and local government. The Government has an important 
preparatory and executive role concerning lois du pays. The High Commissioner must 
inform the government and its president on the questions belonging to the state competence, 
including education and monetary questions.17  
The Accord has significantly increased the competences of the territory. The competences 
can be divided as follows: to those transferred to territory in stages; belonging jointly to the state 
14   Accords de Nouméa (1998), Préambule, ss. 1-2; Bechtel (2002), pp. 40-43. The accord mentions several 
times the Kanak people. The Constitutional Council repealed only three years earlier a provision mention-
ing “the people of Corsica within the French people”.
15   Constitution (1958), art. 72; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 2-5; Rouault (2007), p. 246.
16   Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 34-38, 42, 62-63, 99-100, 104, 108, 127; Accords de Nouméa, 
art. 1.2., 2.1.4.a; Luchaire (2000), pp. 52-53. 
17 Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art.26, 127-128, 132-133, 135, 181; Accords de Nouméa (1998). 
The Government  decides on tariffs and prices; organisation of public employment; organisation of services; 
tariffs and rental charges of post and telecommunications; tariffs of public services; nomination of public 
officers; management of territorial property; nominations; the gifts to territory; administrative constraints 
on published works; loans; placing of free funds; and gambling.
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and the territory; and the central Government’s competences, which cannot be transferred. 
The transfers of competences are in theory irreversible, based on the moral engagement of 
the state to Accord. The Accord includes a plan about the transfer of competences to New 
Caledonia in two stages, which has been followed. New Caledonia has the right to represent 
and be a member of  international organisations. The Congress has a right to authorise the 
president of the government to negotiate and sign international agreements in the name of 
the republic. The state authorities must be informed. 18
4.1.2. French Polynesia: Overseas Country  
Captain Samuel Wallis discovered Tahiti in 1767 and English Protestant missionaries gained 
ground in the islands from 1796. The Pomare family used the European aid to gain political 
control over Society Islands. Pomare II also converted to Christianity to advance his personal 
political aims and to consolidate his power. While the British missionaries did not support 
all the royal house’s claims, the French representatives (since 1831) offered an alternatice 
choice. After loosing the competition on New Zealand, France offered support to the close 
circles of Queen Pomare IV. The Frenchmen were finally able to take control of Polynesia 
by gunboat diplomacy (military presence).  In 1842 the chiefs asked in the queen’s name for 
French protection. In other islands the French authorities took from chiefs formal signatures. 
In return to protection France promised to guarantee the royal house, customary lands 
and religious freedom. In 1843 was created the French Establishments of Oceania with de 
facto military occupation. All Tahitian resistance was suppressed. Otherwise the Franch 
authorities were generous: they paid life annuity to the queen and her court, and supported 
her land policy. In the territory prevailed for decades a double administration of royal house, 
Tahitian Assembly with a Western form of procedure, two separate treasuries and a French 
Governor with his council.The third remarkable power was the Protestant Church although 
its connections to Britain were cut off.The Governor relied on customary district chiefs at the 
local level. Gradually the French authorities tightened up their control. In 1865 the French 
civil law extended to all spheres except land law and the next year the Tahitian Assembly was 
18 Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 21-22, 29; Accord de Nouméa (1998), art.; 2.3, 2.8, 3.1-3.3; 
Payé (1993), p. 343. The Declaration of 1789 gives, however, the people (sovereign) a right to review, reform 
and to change its constitution, which has took place several times; First have been transferred the emplo-
yment questions, foreign trade, postal services, navigation, air traffic, natural resources, the principles of 
formation, customary penalties, the rules of provincial administration, the programs of primary education, 
the formation of teachers and the control of instruction. In the second stage have been transferred the regu-
lations of police and security, the financial establishments, civil and commercial law, real estate, communal 
administration, public establishments, secondary education, children’s protection and private education. 
The joint competences are international and regional relations, immigrants, media, order, mines, interna-
tional aviation, higher education and scientific research. The public sectors, which in New Caledonia still 
belong to the competence of the metropolitan state, are the judicial system; public order; nationality; gua-
rantees of public liberties, civic rights and elections; defence and war materials; monetary system; external 
transport; public functions of state; public markets; delegation of state’s services; rules on the administra-
tion of provinces and municipalities and budgetary control over them; resources of exclusive economic 
zone; and foreign policy. The other divided competences are immigration, audiovisual communications, 
the maintenance of order, the mining, the international aviation and the higher education and research.
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no longer convened. The Tahitian treasury was absorbed into its French counterpart in 1876. 
The following year the Tahitian Assembly – now a mere rubber stamp - was convened to 
discharge the old queen. The road was open for full annexation to France.19 
In 1880 King Pomare V declared that he would cede the sovereignty of his kingdom and 
its dependencies to France. The French Parliament ratified the annexation in January 1881.
The Kingdom of Tahiti became a French colony and all its inhabitants became French citizens. 
In 1891, after the death of the nominal king, the Tahitian royal house was abolished. France 
obtained a series of agreements with the local chiefs who were not dependent on the kingdom 
and the different Polynesian archipelagos were annexed by 1900 to EFO. All Tahitian political 
institutions except District Councils, with diminished powers, were abolished. The colonial 
administration was first under the charge of the naval governor, and later under the civilian 
governors.  The true center of decision was, however, in the French colonial ministry, and EFO 
had 34 governors in a 44 years period. The governor was assisted by the purely consultative 
General Council (1885-1903), including 18 members who discussed on transactions, charities, 
pensions, taxation and budget.  After conflict with the Catholic Church, Governor Gallet 
reduced the number of seats to 11 and abolished the council’s budgetary powers in 1899. 
Governor Petit replaced it with the Council of Administration (1903-1932), having only two 
elected members, while the rest were administrators. This body was in turn replaced by the 
Economic and Financial Delegations (1932-1945). Despite the growing demands the last-
mentioned body was only slightly modified and represented the French minority. The only 
sector where indigenous people had some possibility of participation was the five District 
Councils, having a president and 7-11 members. The chairman (tavana) was a traditional 
chief. These councils were later replaced by more centralised municipal commissions.20
Unlike in New Caledonia or Wallis and Futuna, the Free France took an early hold on 
Polynesia and American troops arrived in 1943. In 1944, The French Provisional National 
Committee gave promises that the powers would be decentralised to local government, and 
created local elected assemblies. Tahitians were recruited to administrative posts. In 1946 
was established the overseas territory of French Polynesia (Pōrīnetia Farāni). The reform was 
similar to New Caledonia with a Territorial Assembly and strong governor. The indigenous 
movement for autonomy began in 1946 and the first indigenous political party was created, 
which was led by Pouvana’a Opa’a, who was elected to the French parliament in 1951. In 1957 
the powers of the Territorial Assembly (now 30 members) were extended in economic and 
fiscal matters. The assembly chose 6-8 ministers to the Council of Government where one of 
them functioned as vice-chairman. Although the governor remained sole representative of 
the state, the chief of administration and the chairman of the council, the statute created a 
political dimension to the decentralisation.21 
19   Siikala (1982), pp. 228-234.
20   Décret du 28 décembre 1885, art. 130-131; Cadoux (1989), pp. 351-355; Newbury (2000), p. 1, 26-27, 60-61, 
92; 103-107, 111, 115-122, 129, 179, 182, 188, 208; Aldrich (1993), p. xxi; Pastorel (2011), p. 610.
21   Décret no. 46-2397 du 25 octobre 1946, art. 34; Décret 57-812 du 22 juillet 1957; Cadoux (1989), pp. 357-
361; Newbury (1980), p. 310; Aldrich (1993), p. 37; Sem, pp. 102-103; The party was Rassemblement Dé-
mocratique des Populations Tahitiennes (1947-1963).
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Like in New Caledonia, the Fifth Republic reduced considerably the local powers of 
deliberation. The ministers lost their independent position and became mere advisors. The 
office of vice-chairman was abolished and the governor was able to discharge independently 
the council. The new concentration of powers led to explotion of political activitity among the 
indigenous population. Finally in 1967 the autonomists gained a majority in the Territorial 
Assembly. They demanded a return to the degree of 1957 and formed a coalition to obtain 
inner autonomy. The growing demands inside Polynesia, the international pressure and 
changes in political climate in Paris finally led to the reform of legislation in 1977, which gave 
French Polynesia administrative and financial autonomy. It was the first negotiated statute. 
The governor was replaced by the high commissioner of the republic. The local institutions 
were reinforced: the Territorial Assembly received regulatory powers; the Council of 
Government was recreated and amended with a vice-chairman as the chief executive; and 
there was the consultative Economic and Social Committee and a procedure for financial 
conventions between the state and the territory. All these reforms signified return to the 1957 
situation with some new innovations. A major problem was, however, the total exclusion of 
local politicians from external and internal matters. The High Commissioner was still the 
chairman of the council and the chief of the territorial administration who decided on the 
territorial budget.22
In the late 1970s the local politicians strived to further develop the autonomy. In 1984, 
the socialist government introduced a new law on internal autonomy of French Polynesia 
which created a distinction between the competences of state and territory. The state’s role 
became complementary and the territory gained an internal autonomy with a particular and 
developing organisation. A limited delegation of the state’s powers became also possible. The 
High Commissioner’s powers were reduced. He/she did not lead anymore the council or 
administration, but was the delegate of the French government, in charge of national interests 
in the territory. He/she took care of the following: promulgated the applicable statutes in 
the local Journal Officiel; controled the use of state subsidies and finance; national defence; 
public order; and liberties and rights. The high commissioner could also proclaim a state of 
alert. The internal organisation and functioning of the Territorial Assembly were reformed. 
The number of seats was increased to 41, better representing the weight of different electoral 
districts. It had competence for internal financial and social affairs and it had to be consulted 
on the ratification of international agreements dealing with the competence of the territory. 
The council was renamed as the Territorial Council of Ministers. Its president was elected 
by the Territorial Assembly. He/she had a number of roles: to direct the government and 
territorial administration; to coordinate with the high commissioner; and to represent with 
the Government of the republic.23 
The President of the Territorial Government could propose to the French government the 
opening of negotiations on international regional agreements.  He could also represent the 
republic in regional organisation with the high commissar when delegated by the national 
Government. The President chose 6-10 ministers either from the Territorial Assembly or 
22   Loi no. 77-772 du 12 juillet 1977; Ordonnance no. 58-1337 du 23 décembre 1958; Cadoux (1989), pp. 362-
363, 365-366; Sem (1996), p. 104. The major strategic reason in French Polynesia was the nuclear testing 
site; the elections of 1967 were participated by 59 different political groupings. 
23   Cadoux (1989), pp. 367-370, 376-377; Regnault (2003), p. 23.
144
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
outside of it. The ministerial list was submitted for the assembly’s acceptance. A minister 
had to be a minimum of 23 years old and a resident of Polynesia for at least five years. 
The Government worked collegially either in the form of the project of deliberation or 
reglementary domain. It directed collegially all territorial administrative services and all 
foreign investments. In fiscal questions it was assisted by the Consultative Credit Committee 
and the minister of DOM/TOM had an obligation to consult the Territorial Government on 
certain questions. All the government’s initiatives were submitted to the High Commissioner 
who could take them to examination. The rules for the Economic and Social Committee 
were specified and the Administrative Court was given financial control of the territory. The 
national Cour de Comptes was represented by its delegated magistrates.24
The precidency of Jacques Chirac led in 1996 to the enactment of a new statute on French 
Polynesia. In the background was the close co-operation between Gaston Flosse, the head of 
the Polynesian Government and the President. Flosse was a pro-French politician and the 
aim was with strengthened autonomy to prevent the advance of independence movement. 
The new statute dropped the notion territory from the legislation. The republic guaranteed 
Polynesia’s autonomy by favouring economic, social and cultural development, and respecting 
its proper interests, geographical specificity and identity. Nevertheless, the autonomy was 
administrative, economic, social and cultural – not political or legislative. In external affairs 
the President of the Government was given powers to negotiate and sign administrative 
agreements with states and regional organisations and the territory to participate in 
international negotiations. Another minor reform was that the law did not anymore limit the 
number of ministers in Government. The Constitutional Council corrected the new statute 
concerning the guarantees of public liberties, which belong to the indivisible comptetence of 
the state.25
The Accord of Nouméa had direct consequences to Polynesia. Like in New Caledonia, there 
is a strong pro-independence opposition. French Government, supported by the Territorial 
Government, considered in 1999-2000 giving French Polynesia a special constitutional 
status with legislative powers similar to New Caledonia, a limited citizenship and extended 
participation in international stage, included to a new title XIV in the Constitution. The 
process, however, halted to constitutional conference which did not warm to a constitutional 
revision. The territory remained in article 74 of the Constitution. As a response to the 
frustration, the autonomists hurried to suggest a statute-based, extended self-government 
for the territory.  Based on the Accord of Tahiti Nui, the Parliament enacted the organic law 
of 27 February 2004 which recognised for Polynesia, now an Overseas Country within the 
Republic (pays d’outre-mer au sein de la République, POM), wide normative powers in all 
matters which are not specifically the state’s domain. The republic guaranties its autonomy 
24   Loi no 84-821 du 6 septembre 1984, art. 1-3, 5, 8-9, 24, 27-31, 35, 37-40, 42-43, 62, 68, 82-83, 91-97, 103-
104; 
25   Loi organique no. 96-312 du 12 avril 1996, art. 1, 40-41; CC, Décision no. 96-373 DC du 9 avril 1996.
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and favours economic, social and cultural development by considering its geographical 
specificity and the population’s identity.26
The institutions and high officials of French Polynesia are the High Commissioner, 
President of French Polynesia, Government of French Polynesia, Polynesian Assembly and 
the Economic, Social and Cultural Council. The president of French Polynesia is elected by 
the Polynesian Assembly among its members. He/she undertakes the following: leads the 
work of local government and administration; represents the collectivity; promulgates the 
loi du pays and takes care of their execution; directs the preparation of annual budget; and 
appoints the government, which prepares the ordinances and defines the rules not belonging 
to the state.27 
The High Commissioner who presides overthe High Council of Polynesia (Haut conseil 
de la Polynésie) has numerous duties, He or she: guarantees public order; respects public 
liberties; guarantees individual and collective rights in Polynesia; directs the services of the 
state, excluding the judiciary; assures on behalf of the state the control of public or private 
organisms or persons who benefit on subventions or attributions of the state; gives regulations 
belonging to his/her competence; acts as the supervisor of incomes and expenditures; has 
responsibilities for territorial defence;  can proclaim  a state of alert; represents the state 
before different levels of administration in French Polynesia; signs on behalf of the state 
the agreements between the state and Polynesia; supervises the functioning of municipal 
authorities; coordinates internal security and prevention of criminality; and directs the 
national police and the units of the gendarmerie in matters of public order and administrative 
policy.28
The President of French Polynesia, who is elected by the assembly from the ranks of 
its members in a secret ballot for the electoral period, represents the territory and leads its 
government and administration. He/she appoints the most public employee; signs the local 
regulations and contracts; organises the territorial budget; executes lois du pays; and exercises 
reglementary powers. The President is informed by the High Commissioner on matters 
related to order and inner security.29 
The Government is the executive of Polynesia, which leads the politics and arranges the 
administration.  It is collegially responsible before the assembly. The Government is composed 
of Vice President and Ministers, appointed by the President who chairs its meetings. The 
electors can make a petition to convene the assembly on all matters belonging to its competence. 
The government is consulted by the Minister of Overseas or High Commissioner on matters 
listed in art. 97. The Government can also make initiatives on the questions belonging to the 
competence of the state. It informed about international projects, questions of immigration 
and monetary questions and has to be consulted on draft regulations and treaties on French 
26   Loi organique du 27 février 2004, art. 1; CC, Décision no. 2004-490 DC du 12 février 2004, 13; Faberon 
(2001), pp. 382-388;  Faberon (2006b), pp. 693-694; AlWardi (2008), pp. 187-237. Regnault & Fayaud 
(2008), p. 155; The Constitutional Council answered on 12 February 2004 that the overseas land is an ac-
ceptable notion when it has no legal effects: “s’il désigne cette dernière comme << pays d’outre-mer >>, cette 
denomination n’emporte aucun effet de droit; que, dans ces conditions, l’article 1er n’est pas contraire à la 
Constitution.”
27   Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 64, 69, 73, 89-90.
28   Rouault (2007), pp. 245-246.
29   Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 64, 69.
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Polynesia, which it can modify or suppress before their implementation. The budget is sent 
from each municipality to the territorial government to be approved. It may delegate to 
the president or minister in 11 domains listed in article 92. The government may submit 
after the assembly’s authorisation for a local referendum all draft regulations relevant to its 
attributions.30 
The Assembly of French Polynesia has 57 members elected for five years. The reform of 
2004 has given it a stronger role. It decides on the territorial budget and counts and controls 
the actions of the president and government. It is consulted by the national parliament on 
bills, draft regulations and international engagements concerning the territory. It can also 
modify or reject provisions. Since 2004 the assembly has had a limited power to make 
regulations called lois du pays. They are submitted to Conseil d’Etat and the High Council 
of French Polynesia, which has an advisory role besides the territorial government. The 
assembly has its own president of as chairman. The assembly may submit to local referendum 
all projects or propositions of loi du pays or deliberations to regulate matters belonging to its 
competence.31
French Polynesia may participate in the competence of the state related to civic rights; 
research; penal law; arrival and sojourn of foreigners; audiovisual communication; and postal 
services.These joint competences are submitted to the control of the high commissioner. 
The authorities of the republic may delegate to the President of French Polynesia a right 
to negotiate international engagements. He/she may also be allowed to undersign the 
agreements in the name of the republic. The territory may participate together with the 
state to the work of international organisations. These competences are not independent: 
they mean participation in the state’s competence and are submitted to the conditions of the 
Constitution. The competences of the state are in French Polynesia nationality; guarantees 
of public liberties; foreign policy; defence; immigration; security; money; international 
transport; municipal administration; military; audio-visual communication; and the higher 
education. The respective laws are directly applicable in French Polynesia.32
The Economic, Cultural and Social Council is an advisory body composed of the 
representatives of professional groups, syndicats, organisms and associations which work in 
30   Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 10, 15-30, 90-91, 159; Rouault (2007), pp. 242-243. The 
Government may introduce lois du pays; set rules on creation and organisation of services; public establish-
ments and groupings of public interest; instruction in schools under territorial competence; instruction of 
local languages in all schools; grants, subventions, allowances and prices; assistances and allowances of edu-
cation; general organisation of fairs and markets; internal prices, tariffs and commerce; tariffs and rules of 
assessment; collection of licence fees for services; quantitive restrictions of import; conditions of approval 
for private airports; assistance programmes for access to public works; modalities of application to remu-
nerate the personnel of public sector and ministries; security of traffic and navigation inside the territorial 
water zone;  vessels and their registration and conduct; timezone; road traffic; codification of Polynesian 
regulations; ceiling of remunerations submitted to contribution and financing of the regimes of social pro-
tection; allocations of social protection; and other competencies listed in articles 93-94.
31 Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 9, 102-104, 140; Loi organique no. 2011-918 du 1 août 
2011, s. 104; Rouault (2007), p. 245. 
32   Constitution (1958), art. 52-53; Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 7, 14, 31-42; CC, Déci-
sion no. 96-373 DC du 9 avril 1996.
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the respective sectors of  Polynesian society. It is consulted on the projects and bills of loi du 
pays of an economic or social character.33 
At the local level the territory was divided by the Tahitian Assembly into five districts 
in 1855. The District Councils included the chiefs, district judges, senior mutoi and two 
ra’atira elected by local landowners. Their role was to oversee the district’s property; supervise 
feasts; and act as the preliminary court in minor political matters and land questions. 
Since 1877 gendarmerie replaced the district chiefs in administration except in questions 
of land registration, agriculture and public works. Ten years later there were established 
rural municipal communities with 4-member councils. However, in 1890-1965 only four 
municipalities were created. The governor was able to approve or suspend all district chiefs. 
The system was reformed in 1971, when 44 new municipalies became under the chiefs of 
subdivision (later mayors). In 1984 the state’s role at the local level was limited to the proper 
competences of the state and the next year the Territorial Assembly decided to create the 
Service of Administration of the Archipelagos in French Polynesia and four districts, directed 
by territorial administrators. In 1990 the Council of Archipelago was created, which includes 
the assembly members and mayors from more isolated communities. The council has a 
consultative function in local affairs. 
The municipalities of French Polynesia are territorial collectivities of the republic but 
they have only minor competences related to municipal police; municipal roads; cemeteries; 
municipal transportation; construction; elementary schools; drinking water; household 
refuse and biodegrable waste; and sewage. The French provisions on municipal councils 
are not applicable in the territory. The municipalities can participate in their competence in 
economic and social aid and intervention, town planning, culture and local heritage. To the 
mayors can be delegated competences to apply lois du pays and regulations. Also competences 
in economic aid and intervention, social aid, town planning, culture, local heritage and local 
production and distribution of electricity may be delegated to municipalities. In 2007 parts 
1-2 and 5 of the General Code of Territorial Collectivities were extended to apply in the 
municipalities of French Polynesia, which has stringed their juridical regime together with 
the municipalities of Metropolitan France.34
4.1.3.  Wallis and Futuna: the Republican Kingdoms
The island of Futuna was first visited by Jacques Le Maire and Wilhelm Schouten in 1616 
and Wallis by Samuel Wallis in 1767. The islands became a Catholic mission of the French 
Marist Fathers in 1837 and only five years later the lavelua of Uvéa, under the influence of 
Monseigneur Bataillon, the head of the Marist mission, requested French protection which 
was granted in principle. The request was renewed by Queen Amélia in 1886. Based on the 
following treaty (1887), France appointed a resident (in the beginning a Catholic priest) to 
33   Rouault (2007), p. 243.
34   Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 43; Loi du 24 décembre 1971; Loi du 12 juillet 1990; 
Décret no 72-408 du 17 mai 1972; Ordonnance no. 2007-1434 du 5 octobre 2007; Délibération du 23 mai 
1985; Aubry (1992), p. 132; Cadoux (1989), pp. 379-381; Newbury (1980), pp. 183-184, 213-214; Rouault 
(2007), pp. 244-245; Magnon (2008), p. 300; Pastorel (2011), pp. 611, 615. 
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the islands to take charge of external affairs and the European population, while the Queen 
would preserve all her independence and authority over her subjects. A similar treaty was 
made with the two kingdoms of Futuna in 1888. In 1910 French administration was formally 
established on the islands and the original treaty was revised (1911) so that only the French 
Government could appoint a General Commissioner, who had to be a civil servant. In 1913 
the King of Uvéa requested again that his kingdom be attached to France. It took, however, 46 
years before France arranged a referendum on the status of the remote islands which became 
an overseas territory (1961).35
The law of 1961, which is still in force, defines the status of the territory, which has only 
lately been redefined as an overseas collectivity. The islanders have the same rights and 
obligations as all French citizens. Unlike in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, the status 
of Wallis and Futuna has remained very stable, avoiding the high surges of decentralisation 
elsewhere. The territory is ethnically homogenous and it has little mineral or strategic worth 
to France, while the Wallisian and Futunians have seen more advantages in belonging to 
France. The state administration of the islands is direct, but leaves most internal affairs intact. 
The state has in principle the competence to intervene. It has a double representation through 
the High Commissioner of the Republic in Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia) and the supreme 
administrator of the territory (kovana; today also prefect). Their joint responsibility is to 
take care of national interests, administrative control and the respect of laws. In practice, 
the supreme administrator takes care of these functions locally, assisted by a delegate in 
Futuna. To his/her competences belong: citizenship; foreigners’ stay in the territory; control 
of institutions; general organisation of defence; transfer of property; measures of health 
and protection; state of alarm; and promulgation of all statutes dealing with the territory. 
He/she has also customary ceremonial duties which rank him/her in a hierarchy between 
the king and the bishop. The High Commissioners’ position is more nominal, having few 
defined regulatory responsibilities: the French armed forces are submitted to him/her in New 
Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna.36
The competences of the state are as follows: defence; maintenance of public security; 
respect of statutes and court decisions; external relations and communications;  education; 
administrative and financial control; customs; economic development; and the administration 
of justice. Since 1971 the state has been also in charge of health and medical services. The 
state’s services are partially common with New Caledonia. Due to the Accord of Nouméa, 
New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna made in 2003 a separate accord to redefine their 
relationship. The state guarantees the economic, social and cultural development of Wallis and 
Futuna while New Caledonia’s role is central in employment and in creation of harmonious 
economic development to help Wallis and Futuna in access to work, social coverage and 
health care.37
Despite thestate’s central statutory responsibilities, the public life on the islands is based 
on coexistence between the republic, the three royal houses and the Catholic Church. The 
35   Ntumy (1993), pp. 622-623; Rohm (2006), pp. 7-8; L’histoire des institutions à Wallis et Futuna.
36   Constitution (1958), art. 72; Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 1, 4, 7-8; Payé (2001), pp. 221-228; 
L’histoire des institutions à Wallis et Futuna. 
37   Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 7; Loi no. 71-1061 du 29 décembre 1971; Accord particulier Nouvelle-
Calédonie/Wallis et Futuna (2003), art. 3-5; Payé (2001), pp. 229-231.
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Supreme Administrator functions as the chief of the territory. He/she chairs the Territorial 
Council and has the decisive vote, while the three kings/queens act as Vice Presidents. 
This formalises the last-mentioned’s visible authority on the islands. To the Council belong 
also three French citizens appointed by the Supreme Administrator. The council examines 
all the documents and projects, which are related to territorial interest, administration of 
patrimonial interests and territorial public works. It then transfer them for the decision of 
the Territorial Assembly; and decides independently on the regulation of domestic markets, 
rents, organisation of chiefsdoms, and fairs. The Supreme Administrator has also the right 
to introduce to the council directly applicable regulations, which change fiscal rules on 
production, circulation and consumption. They are promulgated by the Territorial Assembly. 
In practice, the Council’s role has been weak and it has met seldom.38  
The transformation to an Overseas Territory made the islands formally under the influence 
of French constitutional law. This led to the establishment of Territorial Assembly, which 
has 20 members from five electoral districts. The custom is strongly present in elections: an 
unwritten rule is that the members of assembly belong to aliki, noble families. Therefore, the 
pedigree is more important in the elections than the political programme. The French state 
pays life annuity to the kings and chiefs according to their rank. The assembly is assisted 
by the Permanent Commission, whose membership criteria are fluency in reading, writing 
and speaking French. The commission prepares the topics which are returned from the 
assembly. In a case of urgency it may give opinions on the competence of the assembly, which 
is temporarily submitted to it by the supreme administrator. The legislation does not list the 
competences of the Territorial Assembly but the administrative practice is to relay to a degree 
from 1957, made for New Caledonia and which is limited by nature. The competence of 
Territorial Assembly is therefore limited to the status of the state’s civil servants; regulation 
of customary status; territorial property; development of land property and rights; social 
security; agriculture; breeding; fishing and forests; territorial transportation; town planning; 
living; tourism; public markets; taxation; creation and suppression of public services; and the 
granting of minor mineral rights.39
Wallis and Futuna have no municipalities. The local division is based on the three 
customary kingdoms of Uvéa, Sigavé and Alo. They are legal persons - although not territorial 
collectivities - led and represented by kings or queens, who are elected by the local noble 
families with great local influence. The kingdoms local administration is customary. Each 
kingdom has a fono, consisting of kivalu (prime minister) and 5-6 ministers, all aliki. The 
Kingdom of Uvéa is further divided into three districts, led by matapule, whom lavelua 
appoints on the proposition of the people. Each district has a number of villages with a chief, 
chosen by the people. In two smaller kingdoms a minister of fono acts also as a village chief. 
38   Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 10; Décret no. 62-288 du 19 février 1962, art. 5, 7, 9; Payé (2001), p. 
237.
39   Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 11-12; Décret no 57-812 du 22 juillet 1957; Décret no. 96-1007 du 22 
novembre 1996, art. 2; Payé (2001), pp. 237-238.
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They organise farming and fishing, and are in charge of rural police, medical services and 
roads, and inform the ruler on maintenance of order, security and health situation.40
4.1.3.  French Guiana: Long Time Forgotten
French Guiana in South America is one of the most sparcely populated territories of France. 
It was discovered by Christopher Columbus in 1498, but only the expedition of Sieur de 
Revardière led to the establishment of the Colony of French Guiana. When Cardinal 
Richelieu authorised the territory’s colonisation there was established the town of Cayenne 
in 1637. In 1673-1798 French Guiana was an important destination for the  slave trade and 
later, in 1852-1945, was a penitentiary colony with an archipelago of prison camps. As one 
of the old colonies it became in the constitutional reform of 1946 an overseas department, 
and therefore, an integral part of France. French law was extended there with full force and 
the governor was replaced by a prefect and General Council. In the administrative reform 
of 1972 its status was promoted to one of a monodepartemental region and the system of 
parallel councils was abolished ten years later. Following the aspirations in the Pacific region 
and Corsica, the presidents of the Regional Councils in Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique 
delivered in 1999 the Declaration of Basse-Terre, which suggested increased autonomy and 
also integration between the three territorial collectivities. In January 2010 a referendum 
was arranged on the status of French Guiana which offered it a status of overseas collectivity, 
loosing its ties with Metropolitan France, and giving it increased autonomy. However, 70% 
of voters rejected the offer and French Guiana remains an overseas region.41 The economic 
dependence and the advantage in belonging to the EU influenced the outcome.
Athough French Guiana is divided into municipalities, the well-organised society is 
limited to the coastal strip. The communities of the interior are difficult to reach and due to 
their poverty they are dependant on the subsidies of state and region.The Indian minority 
living in the sparcely populated interior of the territory and close to Surinam’s border 
together with other ethnic minorities has been totally neglected for a long time.  Following 
the constitutional principle of indivisibility they were completely non-existent “free people” 
and forgotten even in administrational law. The French Governor had occasional contacts 
with their chiefs, but otherwise they were left in peace. In 1930, however, the Territory of 
Inini was established in the interior as a response to the administrators’ demands for a more 
organised society. The territory and its Indigenous people were under the protection of the 
Governor and his Administrative Council. There were no municipalities and the grass-root 
administration was carried out by gendarmerie while the villages continued to be under the 
hereditary chiefs. The situation changed only in 1951, when the territory was transformed 
into a unique structure called a district outside the municipality (arrondissement hors du 
40   Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 9; Paye (2001), pp. 235, 243; Bechtel (2002), p. 59; Aimot & Tamole 
(2007), s. 56; Pastorel (2011), p. 612. The rulers’ position is not always secure: in 2005 lavelua Tomaki 
Kulimoetoke II was deposed after having protected his relative over murder charges. The island divided as 
consequence to two clans: the “Royalists” and “Renovators”.
41   Loi no. 72-619 du 5 juillet 1972; Loi du 2 mars 1982; Aubry (1992), pp. 71, 77, 83; Peyrat & Gougis & Chine 
(1998), pp. 55, 60, 64; Bechtel (2002), p. 25; Guyane Française: composition ethnolinquistique. 
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commun). The district became a legal person with its own budget and a civil servant assisted 
by the District Council. The district was divided into municipal centers that were created by 
Conseil d’Etat after the advice of the District Council and General Council, and administered 
by Municipal Assemblies and Municipal Circles. They were established by the prefect’s 
regulations but lacking proper organs. The civil servant acted as the mayor of the district. 
Finally there were only nine Municipal Circles that were administered by local commandants 
of gendarmerie. In reality, the representatives of the republic had to divide their power with 
customary chiefs.42
After the efficient integration process of 1965-1969 the district was abolished and the 
period of special Indian Territory ended. DOM of French Guiana was divided in two districts 
of Cayenne and Saint-Laurent-du-Maroni and 20 municipalities. Only in the Municipality 
of Camopi were the residents exclusively Indians.  Since 1970 access to the southern part of 
region has been submitted to the authorisation by the prefect to protect the Indians’ health and 
culture. There have been also some attempts to pass protective legislation on the Indigenous 
people of Guiana (1972, 1984) but they have not proceeded to the stage of a bill. The Indian’s 
organisations have been active in demands for recognition and self-government since the 
1990s: in 1996 an international conference of Indigenous peoples delivered a message to the 
French Government but the changes have been modest. In response, the Consultive Council 
of Indian and Bushinenge People has been established, and its 20 members are nominated for 
six-year terms. Of these, 16 represent Indian or Bushinenge organisations and associations. It 
gives opinions on the Regional Council’s projects which are related to the environment and 
the life and culture of Indians or Bushinenge. The council can also have a reunion with the 
regional Economic, Social and Environmental Council on common questions.43
In 1979 the General Council tried to abolish the system of hereditary chiefs. Instead, 
they have since then been formally appointed by the council’s president and their role has 
remained important. They act as mediators between the organised and customary world; 
agents of police in their communities in cooperation with gendarmerie; administrators who 
register their people; guarantors of ethnic culture; and as organisers of ritual and spiritual 
ceremonies. They receive a monthly compensation from the region. The traditional structures 
coexist with the municipal administration. 44 While the municipal structure has remained 
weak, they have a primary role in community.
 
42   Loi no. 51-1098 du 14 séptembre 1951; Loi no. 69-1263 du 31 décembre 1969; Décret du 6 juin 1930; Aubry 
(1992), p. 82; Arnoux (1996), pp. 1620-1625; Peyrat & Gougis & Chine (1998), pp. 65-66; Émeri (2000); 
Bechtel (2002), pp. 25-26, 28.
43   Code général des collectivités territoriales, art. L 4436-1-6, D 4436-1-2; Décret du 17 mars 1969; Arrêté du 
14 septembre 1970 (French Guiana); Arnoux (1996), pp. 1624-1625, 1629-1630; Miévilly (2002), pp. 284-
286. The Indian’s have supported the prefect’s limitation policy but many municipal councillors have been 
against it, because it reduces the number of tourists and income; Bushinenge are descendants of escaped 
slaves. 
44   Arnoux (1996), pp. 1625-1628.
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4.1.5.  The Caledonian Citizenship and Electoral Rights
Common citizenship has been one of the means by which to integrate with the unitary state. 
In the French colonial system there was in use a two-level system of citizens and subjects. 
People in the old colonies obtained citizenship during the revolution. The same rights 
were granted to Tahitians by agreement in 1880, but the Kanak were submitted to Code de 
l’Indigénat and became citizens only in 1945. In the same year was created also the shortlived 
citizenship of the French Union (1946-1958; of the French Community in 1958-1960). 
Further, the electoral rights were in New Caledonia first limited to war veterans, customary 
chiefs, farmers and teachers. The Constitution of 1946 gave an opportunity to continue this 
restriction. The category of Kanak voters was extended in 1951 and only in 1957 did all New 
Caledonians have electoral rights. The Indians of French Guiana had the worst situation. They 
had to - despite the legislation - apply for the French citizenship, which very few actually did 
before 1965-1969 when they were actively encouraged to become “French”. Only the isolated 
Wayampi and Palikur peoples, who have a strong connection to their kin in Brazil, rejected 
for a long time the offer.45
The electoral rights were planned to be restricted again in New Caledonia from the 1980s, 
this time to meet the Kanak’s demands. The Pisani Plan (1984) included restriction of electoral 
rights to those people who had lived on the islands for at least three years. The Accord of 
Matignon limited the electorate in the elections of the Congress and the Assemblies of the 
Provinces. Consequently, the law of 9 November 1988 limited the electorate for the 1998 
referendum.  Accoring to UN practice the subject group to self-determination is the colonised 
population. Therefore, the recent immigrants were excluded from decision-making related 
to self-determination. France guaranteed a minimum solution to which both parties were 
able to agree. The Accord of Nouméa created the parallel citizenship of New Caledonia. It 
connects this citizenship as one of the principles of political agreement to the construction of 
the community of common destiny. The citizenship creates a Caledonian identity and confers 
to its people particular rights. The organic law of 1999 defines that the French nationals, 
who fulfil the conditions in article 188, may benefit from New Caledonian citizenship. 
The electorate is based on the electoral list of 8 November 1998. It follows the conditions 
expressed in the law of 9 November 1988, i.e. people who have lived in the territory since 6 
November 1988. There are added those children born after the date whose parents satisfied 
the conditions. As consequence,  all persons are accepted as electors if they have lived in the 
territory at least 10 years before 31 December 2014; were born in the territory and are living 
there permanently; or have a customary status. According to the Constitution, New Caledonia 
may take measures of positive discrimination in favour of its population. This means in New 
Caledonia a guarantee of protection for its indigenous population. It is specially connected 
to the vote in local elections and to protect the local work force. Conseil Constitutionnel has 
ruled that exemptions to the principle of equality acquire explicit constitutional mention. 
45   Constitution (1946), Préambule, art. 80; Loi du 30 décembre 1880; Loi du 7 mai 1946; Loi du 23 mai 1951; 
Loi du 26 juillet 1957; Ordonnance du 24 mars 1945; Ordonnance du 22 août 1945; Arnoux (1996), pp. 
1624-1625, 1629, 1631-1632; Payé (2001),  p. 433; Bechtel (2002), pp. 72-75; Pastorel (2011), p. 606.
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In this light the positive discrimination in favour of permanently settled persons is not 
inconstitutional. In municipal elections there are no restrictions to vote.46  
Several individuals have applied to domestic and international courts against New 
Caledonia’s electoral rules which have excluded them from voting due to living in the territory 
for not enough time. The courts have ruled that the specific voting right is related to the 
process of New Caledonia’s self-determination, and only those individuals with a substantial 
connection to the territory should be allowed to vote. The restrictions are justified when there 
are compelling local requirements. They are more important to the long-term residents of 
New Caledonia, who are a minority in relation to the population of France and entitled to a 
special means of protection. The contracting states of international conventions have a large 
margin of appreciation.47 
The demographic changes in French Polynesia have led to reform of electoral districts. In 
2002, 87% of Polynesians lived in the central Society Islands. The electoral law was reformed 
in 2007. Accordingly, French Polynesia became a unique electoral district with eight sections. 
In all, 37 MPs are elected from the Society Islands and 20 from the other islands. To be elected 
in the first round, a candidate has to obtain more than 50% of the votes in the constituency 
and at least 12.5% to be able to participate in the second round. There has been also an 
attempt to create a parallel citizenship, similar to New Caledonia, which would have been 
based on identity and to attribution of positive discrimination in rights and liberties, giving 
specific rights to the work force and land owning. A constitutional congress (2000), however, 
buried the initiative to an unseen future.48 
4.1.6.		 Pacific	Tax	Haven?		
The Declaration of 1789 demands equal treatment of all citizens in relation to taxation. 
Nevertheless, this has been interpreted broadly, based on the legal particularism of overseas 
collectivities. Sénatus-consulte of 4 July 1866 granted the colonies’ local assemblies a limited 
right to define their own tariffs. In New Caledonia the taxation of the Melanesian population 
was in charge of the chiefs who collected head tax from their tribal members. The Constitution 
46   Constitution (1958), art. 74 al. 3; Accord de Matignon (1988), Texte no. 2; Accord de Nouméa, s. 2.2.1; 
Loi référendaire no. 88-1028 du 9 novembre 1988; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 2, 5, 24; 
CC, Décision no 99-410 DC du 15 mars 1999; Luchaire (2000), pp. 8-9, 25;  Payé (2001), p. 434; New Cal-
edonia, p. 338. France accepted for the first time the principle to restrict the electorate after World War II 
in its litigation with Italy on Alpine valleys; In 1985 the Constitutional Council ruled that the law cannot 
give preferential treatment to the Kanak section of the population. Nevertheless, the council later partly 
reversed its opinion while accepting the protection of indigenous population. The citizenship is not specifi-
cally for Kanak only but for all New Caledonians who fulfil the conditions. The Congress of New Caledonia 
proposed in 2011 the passing of the Code of Citizenship.
47   UNHRC, Gillot v. France (2002); CAA, Mme. Demaret, 8 octobre 2003; ECtHR, Py v. France (2005), ss. 26, 
46.
48   Loi no. 2007-1774 du 17 décembre 2007, art. 3; Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 102; 
Payé (2001), p. 448; Bechtel (2002), p. 73; Guiselin (2004); Sage (2008), pp. 384-385. Relations between the 
parties are often based more on personal relations than political programmes. The parties led by Oscar Te-
maru (for larger autonomy/independence) and Gaston Flosse (autonomist) have been in coalition against 
other autonomists.
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of 1958 describes the taxation as one of the basic attributions of the state and the rules of 
taxation must be based on law. In 1965 the Constitutional Council admitted the legislator 
a right to transfer competences to overseas territories in constitutional matters. Further, 
the state cannot raise taxes or customs from overseas collectivities: they belong fully to the 
competence of the Congress/territorial assemblies.49
In the Pacific region there are several statute-based exceptions to the taxation of 
Metropolitan France: Wallis and Futuna has no income tax and in New Caledonia it was 
introduced for the first time in 1982 as part of the decentralisation legislation. The value-
added tax was similarly introduced to French Polynesia only in the 1990s, but does not exist 
in New Caledonia or Wallis and Futuna. In high taxation France the three collectivities are 
like tax havens. Before 1969 the Indians of French Guiana payed no taxes to the French state 
or DOM but the intensification of administration has changed the situation. The Indians have 
no more fiscal advantage, as the territory forms an integral part of Metropolitan France. The 
residents of the Pacific territories are treated similarly to taxpayers living abroad, even if they 
had a residence in Metropolitan France and Pacific collectivites are treated in fiscal means 
like foreign coutries. Therefore, the General Tax Code is not fully applicable in the overseas 
collectivities. Nevertheless, all the state’s fiscal agreements with the territorial collectivities 
have the quality of domestic law. Based on the Constitution, all fiscal particularism is based 
on the state’s legal delegation.  The delegation of powers creates, however, a fiscal quasi-
sovereignty. It gives a territorial collectivity full fiscal power within the limits of the national 
legislation (in New Caledonia also under territorial legislation). The principle of exclusivity 
means that the deligated legislation excludes the Metropolitan fiscal legislation belonging to 
the scope of territorial competence. And finally, the principle of autonomy stresses the triple 
power to tax, control and sanction. In New Caledonia, the territorial authorities have used 
their fiscal powers to redirect the allowances to favour the Indigenous provinces.50
4.1.7.  European Dimension
French Guiana belongs as an overseas region to the European Union. It means that the EU 
legislation is there in full force. The Treaty of Rome (TEEC; integrated as the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, TFEU) included as a political compromise a special 
provision for DOM. The European Court of Justice ruled in 1978 that they are an integral part 
of the European Communities, but that there may be applied particular provisions which take 
into consideration the particular geographical, economic and social conditions. Their status 
in the EU is primarily defined by reference to the Constitution. The article was reformed 
in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty which mentions as the criteria of particular status the 
isolation, insularity, topography, small area, difficult climate and economic dependency. In 
49   DDHC (1789), art. 13; Constitution (1958), art. 34; Sénatus-consulte du 4 juillet 1866; CC, Décision no. 
65-34 L du 2 juillet 1965; Aldrich (1993), p. 73; Payé (2001), p. 282. 
50   Loi no. 82-1152 du 30 décembre 1982; Loi référendaire no. 88-1028 du 9 novembre 1988, art. 33, 35; CC, 
Décision no. 83-161 DC du 19 juillet 1983; Cour administrative d’appel de Nancy, Bonnard, 26 juin 1991; 
Aubry (1992), p. 140; Arnoux (1996), p. 1624; Payé (2001), pp. 278-285. 
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The Court of the European Communities ruled in 1991 that according to article 169 of the 
Maastricht Treaty the state is alone responsible vis-á-vis the community law.51 
Those territories which do not belong to the EU are called Overseas Territories. They 
include all French Pacific territories. According to the EU’s new rules their status can be 
changed more easily. The European Council can on the initiative of a member state change the 
status of overseas territories to the outermost region, or vice versa. According to the French 
Constitution the overseas countries and territories are subject to a regime of special association. 
In article 198 of TFEU is defined the overseas territories position: they are invited to form 
association agreements with the EU. According to other provisions they can opt for the EU’s 
freedoms, but can claim customs on goods imported by the EU on non-discriminative basis. 
The EU legislation applies to Overseas Territories only in so far as included to the association 
agreements. The aim of association is to develop the regions economically, socially and 
culturally and to favour the interests of their residents. The decisions on association are made 
by the EU commission. First they were made every five years (1964-1991), but since 1991 the 
interval has been lengthened to 10 years. The association decisions include cooperation in 
varying sectors. In the treaty the comptetent authorities of the overseas establish and submit 
to the EU a project of indicative programme, which is a common agreement between the 
union and those authorities. The French Overseas Countries and Territories (PTOM) have 
an associated, mostly economic bond with the European Union. They are members in ACP 
agreements. PTOM have the advantage of European common markets with some quantitive 
restrictions. These tariff restrictions protect the local production from international 
competition. 
The three Polynesian entities are also outside the monetary union. They have since 1946 
used the Pacific Franc, which is tied to the value of the euro. The territories also take advantage 
of European stabilising mechanisms. They may limit the free circulation of persons. They may 
adopt specific systems of education, which are mutually recognised in the EU. The principle 
of non-discrimination means prohibition against the discrimination based on services and 
trade. An exception is the citizenship of New Caledonia, which belongs to the domestic law 
of France. As French citizens the New Caledonians, Polynesians and Wallisians/Futunians 
have also the European citizenship. Therefore, the majority of New Caledonians have in 
fact a triple citizenship. The residents of the Pacific territories have also right to vote in EU 
countries’ municipal elections.52
51   TEEC (1957), art. 131-136, 227 § 2; Treaty of Maastricht (1992), art. 169; EEC Council, Decision 91/482/
EEC, 25 July 1991, Annex 1; ECJ, Hansen, 10 October 1978; Commission v. Italian Republic, 13 December 
1991; Bechtel (2002), pp. 116-117, 121-122.
52   TFEU (2007), art. 113, 198-199, 200, 202; Treaty of Maastricht (1992), art. 8-8E, 182-188; Treaty of Amster-
dam, art. 299-2, Annex II; Constitution (1958), art. 72; Sem (1996), pp. 250-282; Bernardi (1998), pp. 165; 
Bechtel (2002), pp. 131-135; André (2004).
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New Zealand4.2. 
4.2.1. Treaty of Waitangi
The Māori see themselves as tangata whenua (people of land). The Treaty of Waitangi defines 
in two different versions their rights and relation to the British Crown. According to Waitangi 
ideology, in 1840 a new nation was created of two elements - Pākehā and Māori - the New 
Zealanders. Much of British policy in acquiring sovereignty over New Zealand was based on 
the Māori’s nature as a sedentary agricultural and self-governing people. Before Waitangi, the 
Pākehā were loosely governed from New South Wales and the first Protestant missionaries 
arrived on the islands in 1814. The British authorities were first reluctant to take responsibility 
for the territory, but the attitude chamged from the 1830s due to the competition in the South 
Pacific . In 1838 New Zealand had already a French colony with a Catholic bishop. Also the 
American whalers’ activity increased. The British representatives and missioners encouraged 
the Māori chiefs to proclaim New Zealand independent under British protection (1835). This 
act united for the first time the rival Māori groups together. The British Crown recognised 
the Māori sovereignty and prepared mechanism to justify imposing its own will on the Māori 
and assuming governance. Since 1839 the Colonial Office saw that the time had come to 
instigate the British rule and rationalise the land purchases. The Treaty of Waitangi had three 
objectices: protection of Māori interests, promotion of settler interests, and securing of the 
strategic advantages for the Crown. Captain Hobson was given the task to implement the 
Colonial Office’s plans for formal arrangement with Māori, which took place in haste.53  
The missionaries drafted two different versions of the treaty in English and Māori which 
are today equally authoritative. They have some vital differences: in the English version 
the Māori cede their sovereignty to the Crown in exchange for a guarantee of continued 
enjoyment of property, land, fishing and hunting rights, and sale of property exclusively to 
the Crown. The Māori are promised equal citizenship rights as British subjects. However, in 
the Māori version the chiefs cede kāwanatanga (governance) to make laws for the good order 
and security of the land, but retain tino rangatiratanga, or authority over their lands, homes, 
estates, taonga (valued possessions) and institutions. Both versions guarantee the Māori 
property rights. The Māori participants hardly understood the true significance of the treaty.
They later regarded it as an instrument of sacred proportions, and since the Kohimarama 
Conference (1860) they have recognised it as their source of rights. They argue that the treaty 
affirmed tino rangatiratanga. For them it established a unique relationship between the Māori 
53   Orange (1993), pp. 1-36; Durie (1998), p. 176.
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and Crown, where the sovereignty was exchanged for protection of rangatiratanga over the 
full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of properties.54 
According to Sian Elias CJ the treaty contained four promises for the Māori: a guarantee 
of existing rights of property; the promise of authority; the promise of equal treatment 
and the acknowledgement of relativity. Despite the solemn promises, the treaty was 
widely disregarded in New Zealand between the 1840 and the 1970s. A long-term policy 
of the Crown was to amalgamate the Māori to the settlers’ framework and governmental 
institutions. New Zealand’s Government never recognised the Maori self-determination 
along the lines of the Marshall doctrine, and the worst setback took place in 1877, when 
James Prendergast CJ of the Supreme Court ruled that the Treaty of Waitangi was a simple 
nullity. Following a minority ideology that denied all legal status of Māori forms of collective 
political organisation, he reinforced the Crown’s sovereignty over the islands. Even the rights 
vested by the Native rights legislation were illusory. The Māori were only individuals, British 
subjects. However, when speaking about Crown-Māori relations as acts of state and therefore 
not examinable by the courts, he was controversial: the nineteenth century practice was that 
the state could not act by the Crown against its own subjects. The consequence of the decision 
was that it established the absolute sovereignty of the Crown, where the Treaty of Waitangi 
showed incapacity to act as qualification to sovereignty. The decision defined New Zealand’s 
official policy for almost 100 years. In 1941 the Privy Council specified the status of the treaty 
by rejecting the Prendergast CJ’s judgment about the treaty as simple nullity. On the contrary, 
it was a valid treaty of cession but as such it had no enforceable status in municipal law until 
recognised in statute. 55
In 1971 the Ministers of Justice and Māori Affairs prepared and sybmitted to the 
National Government a paper with the purpose of clarifying the status of the treaty. The 
paper recommended instead of ratification or the incorporation of treaty to the municipal 
54   Treaty of Waitangi (1840); Havemann (1999), p. 207; Anaya (2004), p. 188; Palmer (2008), pp. 62-63. “Her 
Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the 
respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Land and 
Estates Forest Fisheries and other Properties which they may collectively or individually possess so land as 
it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession... Her Majesty the Queen of England extends 
to the Natives of New Zealand Her Royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of 
British subjects. / Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu ki nga tangata 
katoa o Nu Tireni te tino rangatiratanga o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o taonga katoa.... Ka tiakina e te 
Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana 
mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani. Cf. Treaty of Waitangi, art. 2-3. In Māori kāwanatanga, a biblical word, has 
lesser meaning than in English equivalent being a mere vehicle of sovereign authority. In 1840 the Māori 
had no experience about the meaning of central government. Mana, used in the Declaration of Independ-
ence (1835), would have opened better to Māori experience. Mana can be divided to mana atua (sacred 
power of gods), mana tūpuna (power handed down through chiefly lineage) and mana whenua (power as-
sociated with the possession of lands). Also rangatiratanga is borrowed from the Bible, originally used in 
the Lord’s Prayer in the meaning “thy kingdom come”; Significant in defining the treaty policy was also the 
Orakei Māori Conference (1879), which stressed the treaty as a covenant of peace and unity.
55   NZSC, Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington (1877), p. 78; JCPC, Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v. Aotea District 
Maori Land Board (1941), p. 338; Havemann (1999), pp. 450-451, 456; Sharp & McHugh (2001), p. 209. 
Paul McHugh describes the Wi Parata case as a precarious aftermath of the Māori wars. A similar discus-
sion on indigenous rights was actively debated in North America at the same time. He estimates that Pren-
dergast took a deliberately different direction than the United States Supreme Court.
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law consultation with the Māori Council and promotion of special Waitangi Day. This was 
not enough for the Māori. Matiu Rata, the Minister of Māori affairs (1972-1975) was a 
driving force in the Labour government to give the treaty a statutory basis. The Government 
established in 1975 the Waitangi Tribunal (WT), deligated the treaty’s interpretation to it 
and incorporated the treaty into law. Despite this, New Zealand’s courts have been unwilling 
to enforce the treaty as a freestanding source of rights. It is only enforceable in the courts 
when incorporated by statute. A real change took place in 1985 when WT’s jurisdiction was 
retrospectively extended. Thereafter most of the Māori litigation in New Zealand has been 
based on treaty rights.  The first statute to uphold the treaty was the Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975. During the last quarter of the twentieth century a reference to the treaty was included 
in 14 statutes.56
In 1985, the governmental White Paper proposed, following Canadian legal development, 
to render the Treaty of Waitangi part of the country’s supreme law and to incorporate the treaty 
as a schedule to the new Bill of Rights. This would have made the treaty rights enforceable by 
the courts with a promoted significance among the human rights. The Māori felt, however, 
that if the treaty was included to general law it would loose its mana and finally the suggestion 
was dropped from the final version of the Human Rights Act.57
A remarkable breakthrough took place in case law from 1986 when the High Court in 
Te Weehi recognised the Native title. The treaty was even interpreted to be generally relevant 
to the exercise of statutory discretions. In Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley 
Authority (1987), the Court of Appeal held that the consistent recognition of treaty by 
parliament has made it part of the fabric against which public officials make decisions and 
exercise their discretion. The principles are part of law and it is the courts’ task to determine 
the scope of a particular law.  In the Maori Council trilogy (1987-1990) the court admitted the 
continued reality of Māori tribalism and overturned part of Wi Parata – doctrine. The court 
ruled that the treaty is founded upon the Crown’s protection of rangatiratanga in exchange 
for the acquisition of sovereignty over their territory. The most important treaty principle 
is partnership which requires both parties to act reasonably and on the basis of good faith 
and ongoing negotiation. The parties have mutual duty on reasonable co-operation. Other 
principles are active protection of taonga and redress of grievances. There is a profound moral 
obligation to protect Māori rights and to preserve their culture which flows from the treaty. 
These responsibilities are analogous to fiduciary duties.58 
The Labour Government answered in 1989 to the challenge of case law by  releasing its 
treaty principles: 1) kāwanatanga principle: the Government has the right to govern and 
to make laws; 2) rangatiratanga principle: iwi should have the right to organise as iwi and 
the control under the law their own resources; 3) principle of equality: all New Zealanders 
56   Healing the Past, Building a Future (2002), s. 56; Havemann (1999), pp. 259-261; Spiller (2001), p. 181; 
Palmer (2008), p. 179; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 288. There has been also criticism against the 
inclusion of the treaty in legislation. In 2006 a single MP introduced the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
Deletion Bill.
57   Havemann (1999), p. 259. The White Paper was influenced by the constitutional reforms of Canada three 
years earlier.
58   NZCA, Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority (1987); New Zealand Maori Council v. At-
torney General (1987). Partnership replaces in court’s language sovereignty and respective notions. 
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are equal before the law; 4) principle of reasonable cooperation: the government and iwi 
are obliged to accord each other cooperation on major issues of common concern; and 5) 
principle of redress: government is responsible for providing effective processes for the 
resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation could occur. In 1990 the 
National government amended the kāwatanga principle to indicate that the Government 
should govern for the common good. The principle of rangatiratanga was extended to reflect 
self-management within the scope of law. In 1993 the same Government published a strategic 
objectives document Path to 2010, which promised to continue working towards an agreed 
understanding of the place of the treaty in New Zealand society.59    
Although the Court of Appeal preserved the doctrine of Crown sovereignty, its new case 
law gave impetus to governments. The golden age of Māori legislation was in 1985-1993, and 
was initiated by both the Labour and National governments in response to the changes in WT 
and in society in general. The Crown recognised in legislation the significance of treaty to 
public life. Statutory schemes have been expressly subjected to the principles of the treaty. The 
treaty considerations have, therefore, influenced both the legislative process and the content 
of statutes. The subsequent case law has shaped executive and administrative authority. Māori 
consultation and the element of consent have been woven into the fabric of public decision-
making. Also the passing of Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 made a 
number of human rights observable even with direct reference to the treaty. The acts are 
enforceable in the courts against actions by the government. Even later the status of the treaty 
has been in focus. In 2004 Prime Minister Clark appointed a Royal Commission on the New 
Zealand Constitution which included in its items the status of the Treaty of Waitangi.60
The courts have developed common law principles that synthetise the treaty and 
Indigenous rights elements. In the decision of R. v. Symonds (1847), the Court of Appeal 
ruled that the treaty is binding on the Crown. In Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato 
Valley Authority (1987) the same court used the treaty as an aid to interpret the law. Also 
the Waitangi Tribunal’s definition of treaty principles has been of major importance. Its 
recommendation in the State-Owned Enterprises case (1986) led the parliament to amend the 
State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 to include the ss. 9 and 27. According to s. 9 the Crown 
has to act in a manner consistent with the treaty principles. Section 27 guarantees the land 
rights under transfers to SOE. The Maori Council made application to the High Court by 
saying that the SOE Act needed clarification: the ss. 9 and 27 were contradictory and the 
breach of provisions was still evident. Later the Court of Appeal gave a direction that within 
21 days the Crown was to prepare a scheme of safeguards that pre- or post-Act Māori claims 
to the tribunal would not be prejudiced. The scheme was to be submitted to the New Zealand 
Māori Council for agreement or comment within a further 21 days. The conclusion of the 
court was that the principles of the treaty were to override everything else in the SOE Act and 
the treaty partners were to act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith. 
The consequent negotiations led to the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988 with 
safeguards and new arrangements. 
59   Durie (1998), pp. 204-206; Havemann (1999), p. 209.
60   Spiller (2001), p. 180; McHugh (2004), pp. 417-422, 508.
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In Ngai Tahu Reports (1991-1992) WT has stressed the overarching principle of exchange 
with inherent reciprocity to have paramount importance. The principles of active protection, 
right of redress for past breaches and duty to consult are subordinate within it. The Napier 
Hospital Report (2001) has identified the relevant principles of active protection, partnership, 
equity and options, and the duties of good faith and consultation. The courts have adopted a 
view according to which the treaty’s history, form and place in social order require its broad, 
unquibbling and practical interpretation. The treaty has created an obligation for the Crown: 
the relationship should be founded on mutual and reasonable cooperation in the utmost good 
faith and trust. The wording of detailed and specific provisions of acts must be interpreted, 
applied and enforced in the light of what they have determined the treaty means generally. In 
cases of ambiguity the courts may consider the application of general meaning of the treaty to 
the case before choosing the meaning consistent with the legislator’s purpose.61 
Paul McHugh has named three areas of common law rules by which the treaty may 
receive recognition. Common law principles of aborinal rights affect the status of tribal 
societies upon the Crown’s acquisition of the sovereignty of their territory. The Crown claims 
sovereign title and exercises a constituent power in a given territory. The statutes have an 
ultimate and overriding effect. This approach gives the treaty an incidental value. A treaty-
driven approach aims to find ways in which treaty rights are incorporated into the legal fabric 
of the country. It gives more central weight to treaty mana and wants to promote its legal 
status. The conventions and jus cogens of the international law have also influenced New 
Zealand’s legislator. Especially the solutions in other common law countries have been taken 
into account.62 
The treaty establishes a quasi-legal framework whose political frame of reference is invoked 
to challenge existing practices, encourage Māori perspectives in policy and administration, 
facilitate expression of tino rangatiratanga and the Māori share of national resources, and 
foster the principle of bilateral input for post-colonial Aotearoa identity formation. The Crown 
acknowledges that it is formally bound by the Treaty’s partnership principle to acknowledge 
the collective and inherent rights of the Māori for self-determining control over taonga. 
Reference to tino rangatiratanga defines what rightfully belongs to the Māori as the original 
occupants and treaty signatories. With tino rangatiratanga as a legitimating principle, the 
different iwi are seeking control over the decision-making process in conjunction with the 
power and resources to implement decisions in a way that fosters positive outcomes. There are, 
however, different readings of the notion focusing on the empowerment, self-determination, 
territorial and cultural aspects. Mason Durie has stressed it as the development of Māori 
policy by the Māori as part of the special covenant with the Crown and the responsibility 
of the Māori over their own affairs at iwi and national levels. The scope of rangatiratanga is 
61   State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, ss. 9, 27; JCPC, Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land 
Board (1941), p. 322; NZCA, R. v. Symonds (1847);  Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Author-
ity (1987); WT, State Owned Enterprises Report (1986); Ngai Tahu Report (1991); Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries 
Resource Report (1992); Napier Hospital Report (2001); Durie (1998), p. 183-184;  Alves (1999), pp. 75-76; 
Palmer (2008), pp. 127-128, 182. 
62   McHugh (1991), pp. 69-71. The Canadian and Australian case law has been referred several times during 
the last few decades in indigenous questions, but the reasoning in New Zealand’s courts has a strong do-
mestic flavour.
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expansive. It prevails at the level of mana whenua with implication of iwi control of resources 
and rights to negotiate directly with the Crown for grievance resolution. It must also prevail 
at the mana tangata level with recognition of Māori rights to organise according to a range of 
social and political groupings.63
4.2.2.  Tino Rangatiratanga
Tino Rangatiratanga, which means exercise of paramount authority, power, sovereignty and 
autonomy, is an important expression for Māori self-esteem. Nevertheless, the Māori as a 
collective group is a relatively young definition, born out of  encounter with the Pākeha. In 
legislation Māori was defined in the Electoral Act 1893 as follows: “an aboriginal inhabitant 
of New Zealand, and includes half-castes and their descendants by Natives”.64 In the Maori 
Housing Act 1935 the definition was “a person belonging to the Aboriginal race of New 
Zealand, and includes a person descended from Native”.65 In legislation the blood and lifestyle 
were usually set as the basis for status. In New Zealand a “half-caste Māori” was included in 
the statutory definition of a Native. They were able to hold the status if living as members of 
some Māori tribe or community. The Native Land Act 1909 eliminated the lifestyle definition 
and introduced a 50% blood quantum. The quota limited the Māori status in law but did 
not influence the freehold ownership to land. The Native Land Court was given powers to 
determine whether a person was a Māori. The Native Land Amendment Act 1912 allowed 
a Māori to be declared European by the Order in Council. The quantum was still included 
in Birth and Deaths Regulation Act 1951 and Electoral Act 1956 which included three 
categories: more than 50% Māori required enrollment to the Māori electorate, under 50% 
Māori to the European electorate and half-castes who were able to choose their category. The 
Hunn Report (1960) recommended theretaining of the quantum, possibly raised to 75% to 
limit the government’s responsibility to the Māori. It was ultimately believed that the Māori 
would assimilate with the  ethnic majority but the times were changing and the quamtum was 
finally abolished from the legislation in 1993.66
After the Treaty of Waitangi the British authorities extended some legal recognition to the 
pre-existing Māori system of government and law, i.e. there was presumption of continuity. 
Attorney General Swainson argued in the 1840s that the tribes, which had not signed the 
treaty, were independent vis-à-vis the Crown. He wanted to define the limits where sovereign 
power and authority could be justly and effectively exercised, and suggested as a transitional 
measure Native Districts where Māori custom would prevail. The idea was transferred to 
British legislation in s. 71 of the Constitution Act 1852.It was born in a situation where the 
Māori were still dominant in society. Nevertheless, the prevailing feature of Māori policy was 
from the late 1840s assimilation. Settlers believed that Māori would soon disappear as their 
63   Havemann (1999), pp. 207-208. The major courts have recognised the treaty’s constitutional value: the 
Court of Appeal in 1987, the Waitangi Tribunal in 1991 and the Privy Council in 1993.
64   Electoral Act 1893, s. 148.
65   Maori Housing Act 1935, s. 2.
66   Native Land Act 1909, s. 24(2); Havemann (1999), p. 204; McHugh (2004), pp. 217, 275-276. In 1912-1931 
only 76 Māori changed their status; in 1961, 51.5 % of Māori declared themselves as full-blooded.
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numbers diminished and the Native Districts were never realised. In 1861 Governor Gray 
tried to slow down the advance of the Māori King Movement through several measures. The 
Native Affairs Department was established to displace the independent Māori management 
of their own affairs. At the local level village rūnanga (council) under resident magistrates 
and district rūnanga under civil commissioners were created with limited powers to make 
bylaws. Their funding and administrative support was increased. In some districts they were 
used as a means to connect the local tribes to the official administration and to advance the 
sale and lease of Māori lands.The experiment did not last long: the councils were neglected in 
the midst of Māori wars when it became obvious that the Māori were not willing to abandon 
their traditional structures.67 The Native Territorial Rights Act 1858 recognised for a while 
the existence of tribes but the Native Land Acts of 1865 and 1873 following the war had 
already strong de-tribalising features.68 
In a meeting at Waitangi in 1881 the government expressed a demographic message: 
the Māori were too few to obtain separate rights. The Native Department was temporarily 
abolished in 1892. Despite this, the Māori recognised the queen’s authority but wanted more 
self-determination. They sent several petitions that the Native districts would be established, 
and visited in Britain in 1882-1883 and 1913 to meet Queen Victoria and King George V. 
The Imperial Government, however, returned the petitions to the dominion’s government as 
internal matters. Despite the neglecting reception the Rātana Church sent in 1924 a petition 
to King George V asking that the Treaty of Waitangi should be ratified as a constitutional 
document. In 1883 total of 12 hapū-level Māori committees were created to answer the 
Māori demands but they had little meaningful powers. The situation improved at the turn 
of the century during James Carroll’s ministry in the reestablished Native Department. New 
legislation (1900) gave more local authority to tribes in questions of land, health, sanitation 
and the consumption of alcohol. The beginning was promising. Even kingitanga (Māori 
king movement) accepted the local councils when King Mahuta was granted a seat in the 
national Parliament. Pākeha were still annoyed by the slow development of land sales and 
soon the Maori Land Councils were striped of their powers, the Māori were left outside the 
councils, and in 1905 they became Maori Land Boards with powers in questions of health 
and sanitation.69 
From the 1920s the Native Department adopted a more social role. In the same decade 
Maori Trust Boards were created, based on specific land and resource issues to administer 
the money which was awarded in settlement of raupatu (confiscation) claims. The Maori 
Trusts Board Act (1955) unified their governing pattern. The trust boards became subject to 
ministerial oversight and audit, and existed alongside the customary political structures.70
67   Constitution Act 1852 (UK), s. 71; Native Circuit Court Act 1858, s. 1; Native Districts Regulation Act 1858. 
s. 1; Native Council Act 1860, ss. 2-3; Orange (1993), pp. 110-111, 162; O’Malley (1998), p. 22-25; Have-
mann (1999), pp. 383-385.
68   Native Territorial Rights Act 1858, s. 1; Native Lands Act 1865, ss. 21-54, 67-71; Native Land Act 1873, ss. 
21-33. 
69   Native Committees Act 1883, ss. 3-4; Maori Councils Act 1900, ss. 6-15; Maori Lands Administration Act 
1900, Preamble, ss. 4-7; Orange (1993), pp. 199-202, 205-206, 212, 228; Havemann (1999), pp. 390-391; Hill 
(2004), pp. 32-33, 38; Williams (2006), p. 123; James Carroll was himself half-Māori. 
70   Armitage (1995), p. 158; McHugh (2004), pp. 272, 347, 423, 516. 
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World War II gave the Māori a more prominent role in public life. Sir Apirana Ngata 
suggested establishing a Māori military unit and in 1939 the 28th Maori Battalion was created 
on a tribal base. Two years later Parere Paikea initiated the organising of the Maori War Effort 
Organisation which offered a unique opportunity to show the Māori capacity in leadership 
and planning. Its committees were in Māori hands and applied Māori values. Although they 
were not financed by the government, they gave the indigenous community an important 
public role and showed their capability to arrange local administration.71 
The reforms did not completely disappear with the end of the war. Prime Minister Fraser 
supported moderate Māori aspirations to prevent the raise of a more large-scale Māori 
nationalism. The Native Department was central to his plans. It was renamed in 1945 as 
the Department of Maori Affairs. Under the government’s control were established elective 
local committees and executive committees as part of the Department’s organisation, taking 
advantage of wartime experience of tribal structures. The executive committees were given 
powers to promote self-dependence, thrift, pride of race and conduct conducive to their well-
being. The Māori villages, registered in the Maori Land Court were designated as basic units. 
Within three years 85% of Māori organisation were under the system which was based on 
rural population.72
The changing environment and urbanisation challenged, however, the existing system.
The Hunn Report (1960) showed that there was no return to the old. It suggested instead 
an integration policy which would combine Māori and Pākeha elements to form one nation 
with distinct cultures. The differentiation in statutory law should be gradually eliminated. 
The Department’s role should be in the future in the field of interdepartemental policy and 
new structures would facilitate Māori contributions to this policy. The National government 
introduced in 1962 a nationwide New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC), to advice the 
government on Māori policy. Under its control is a hierarchy of regional and local Māori 
committees: the Maori District Committees, Maori Executive Committees and Maori 
Committees with respective geographical areas. They do not follow the tribal rohe but activate 
Māori participation as a formal network of representation. NZMC was intended to operate 
in the extra-parliamentary sphere “to consider and discuss measures which shall consult and 
promote harmonious and friendly relationship between the Maori race and the other members 
of community”, but it became an active force in national Māori policy in defending their 
rights in settlements and litigation. It has been able to influence the appointments of Māoris 
on government-appointed committees and the Waitangi Tribunal and the modification of 
the legislation to consider Indigenous aspects. In 1979 the government allowed it to prepare a 
draft of the Maori Affairs Bill and four years later the council published a programme, which 
based all land and cultural legislation on Māori philosophy.73 
In the early 1970s the Labour government included the Māori self-government to its official 
policy, based on tino rangatiratanga. The Department of Maori Affairs was restructured in 
71   Havemann (1999), p. 392; Crawford (2008), pp. 4, 238. During the wartime the Maori War Effort Organisa-
tion had 315 tribal committees in 21 zones and 41 tribal executive committees.
72   Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945, s. 12 (a)(ii); McHugh (2004), pp. 272-273; Crawford 
(2008), p. 244.
73   Maori Community Development Act 1962, ss. 8-18; Walker (1984), p. 9; Armitage (1995), pp. 145-146; 
McHugh (2004), pp. 347-349.
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1975: it no longer governed the Māori but became a Māori-run unit to assert Indigenous 
presence within New Zealand’s Government. In the late 1970s Kara Puketapu, the Secratary 
for Maori Affairs, developed tū tangata – policy, a community based philosophy to encourage 
the planning and implementation of policy and programmes for Māori at the local level. This 
policy of Māori autonomy was part of the state’s devolution policy. The Labour Government’s 
policy statement Te Urapare Rangapū prescribed the role of iwi in policy advice and the 
delivery of Government programmes. The Government agencies were required to consult 
with iwi, to form partnership with them and devolve them resources. There were established 
different kōkiri units or building blocks. The Department’s top-down policy was shifted 
to a bottom-up philosophy. The assimilation policy had ended and had been replaced by 
recognition of diversity in society.74
In 1984 the Labour Party started a free market economy and privatisation programme 
which signified to the Māori a growing tribal responsibility in heath, education, welfare, 
economic progress and greater autonomy. This was for them both a challenge and possibility. 
The country was moving beyond multiculturalism while the government cautiously 
recognised the Māori quest for political and cultural self-determination. In 1988 the Minister 
of Maori Affairs released a policy document, He Tirohanga Rangapū which contained a 
vision and strategy to guide Māori towards greater independence at the tribal level with 
reduced dependency on the state. The Ministry of Maori Affairs was restructured and the 
Iwi Transition Authority was set up to oversee the formation of rūnanga iwi, which were 
established in 1990.75
The Waitangi Tribunal had showed that tino rangatiratanga refers to tribal self-
management as local government. The question of iwi authorities was vital when dealing 
with the distribution of the pre-settlement fisheries assets and the settlements. The tribes had 
to show that they had an appropriate infrastructure to manage settlement packages. Three 
first settlements were negotiated by tribal trust boards but more was needed. The Runanga 
Iwi Act 1990 was a short-lived child of the Government’s privatisation policy which wanted to 
strenthen the rūnanga as legal person to work as an authoritative voice of iwi in their dealings 
vis-à-vis the Crown.The act included objection procedures and resolution mechanisms and 
the Maori Land Court was given a facilitative and interpretative role. The act was unpopular 
among the Māori as an attempt to force a customary structure to statute form and as failure 
to recognise the hapū and whānau levels of traditional Māori governance. The Act survived 
for only one year as the new parliament repealed it. The Resource Management Act 1991 
inherited a number of tangata whenua provisions from the repealed statute, including 
references to iwi authorities and rūnanga. Several iwi have returned the rūnanga structure in 
another form, as trust boards or instead of them. They represent iwi in its dealings with the 
Crown and local government.76
74   Armitage (1995), pp. 147-148, 158; Havemann (1999), p. 394.
75   He Tirohanga Rangapū (1988), p. 13; O’Sullivan (2007), pp. 2-3.
76   WT, Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (1988), p. 187; Durie (1998), pp. 225-226; McHugh (1991), pp. 52-
53. Cf. Te Runanga o Ngati Porou Act 1987, ss. 3-4; Te Runanga o Ngati Whatua Act 1988, s. 4; Te Runanga 
o Ngai Tahu Act 1996, Preamble, ss. 6-7, 19, 29; Ngati Awa Claims Settlement Act 2005, Preamble, (6); Te 
Runanga o Ngati Awa Act 2005, ss.5-6. Ngāi Tahu and Ngati Awa have abolished their trust boards and have 
statute based rūnanga structure. 
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The Labour government established a Māori Economic Development Commission 
to create a research and policy unit, an Economic development programme and transfer 
responsibilities to tribal groups. Later the commission suggested loans and training for Māori 
small businesses. The subsequent Mana Enterprises Scheme (1985) was the first real test of a 
delivery system for government programmes. It was created to facilitate the entry of Māori 
into business and to reduce their unemployment. Loans were distributed to potential business 
through iwi, urban Māori organisations, the Māori Women’s Welfare League and the Rātana 
Church. Funds were allocated to various Māori projects by the Department, which encouraged 
the Māori to enter the commercial world. Another similar governmental initiative was the 
Maori Development Corporation (1987), which offered support also to medium size Māori 
businesses. At the national hui (meeting) of Taumata were defined six major themes for the 
decade. They were the Treaty of Waitangi; tino rangatiratanga; iwi development; economic 
self-reliance; social equity; and cultural advancement. The Labour Government raised the iwi 
development as the preferred focus for Māori development. Several Government functions 
were devolved to tribal authorities.77 
In 1991 the National Government published its own programme Ka Awatea, which 
redirected the strategy for Māori development. The new document turned the direction again 
back towards governmental responsibility, stressing education, training, health and economic 
resource development. It stressed a greater enhancement to meet Māori aspirations, reduced 
substantive programme delivery and a stronger policy and monitoring role of the Ministry. 
The iwi principle was maintained. The most visible result of Ka Awatea was that both the 
Ministry of Maori Affairs and Iwi Transition Agency were abolished in 1992 and replaced 
in 1994 by Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development) whose core areas are education, 
training and employment, health and economic resource development. Since restructuring 
its prime task is to function as a policy advisor to the government. It monitors mainstream 
departments’ provision of services to Māori and develops ethnicity data. It has regional offices 
with knowledge of local communities which strengthen the Crown relationship at the iwi and 
hapū level.78 
Based on treaty policy, Mason Durie has divided the modern goals of Māori self-
determination into a commitment to strengthen economic standing, social well-being and 
cultural identity; enhance dimensions of power and control in better self-management of 
natural resources, encourage greater productivity of Māori land, promote of good health, 
promote sound education, promote the use of Māori language and decision-making that 
reflect Māori realities and aspirations; and promote change. To the wider context belong the 
aspects of Māori history, demography, the national economic reform, state restructuring and 
indigenous development in general.79 
At the local level the Local Government Act 1974 compelled the Regional Councils to 
acknowledge the Māori values. The Māori Local Government Reference Consultation Group 
was established to promote Māori perspectives. The Local Government Act 2002 includes a 
reference to the Treaty of Waitangi and conceives its principles in more specific terms and 
77   Ritchie (1995), pp. 125-126; Durie (1998), pp. 10-12. 
78   Ministry of Maori Development Act 1991, ss. 5, 8; Ka Awatea (1991); Durie (1998), p. 9, 11; Alves (1999), 
p. 80.
79   Durie (1998), pp. 5, 13.
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Māori participation in decision-making processes and fosters the development of Māori 
capacities to make contributions. The Māori participation is, however, left to the consideration 
of local authorities. The Auckland (1986-1992) and Bay of Plenty (2001-) regions have proved 
the Māori mandates in City/Regional Councils, but only the latter experiment has been 
lasting. To Auckland was instead, after the Royal Commission’s recommendation, established 
the Maori Advisory Board, which has a non-binding consultative role before the city council. 
It promotes cultural, economic, environmental and social issues of significance for mana 
whenua. The Local Government Act 2002 recognises the urban Māori groups as it refers 
to both kaupapa (purpose-based) and whakapapa (genealogical) groups. The governmental 
reports on local government issues recognised many challenges with local governance of 
Māori affairs, including a lack of information and uncertainty. A major part of this process 
was the implementation of the reforms brought by the Resource Management Act 1991.80  
The New Zealand Law Commission has in its report (2006) defined hapū and iwi as the 
main Māori polical units. A challenge are the urban Māori who do not identify with any 
particular iwi. Different Maori collectivities like corporations and trusts do not always fit 
well into the mainstream legal system. The Commission recommended creating a special 
corporate vehicle waka umanga with some characteristics of a corporation but leaving most 
of the internal arrangements to a charter developed by the Maori collectivity. Waka umanga’s 
basic unit would be hapū. It was designed to meet the organisational needs of tribes and 
other Māori groups who manage community-held assets. A viable group should have had 
at least 50 members. Fifteen people were neeed to propose or oppose the creation of waka 
umanga and the disputes would be brought to the Maori Land Court. Besides the minimum 
size of hapu there are no other imposed criteria. The proposal allowed the tribes to form 
their own waka umanga by developing a model which best suits their own culture, tradition 
and requirements. The critics of the plan were, however, afraid that it would restrict mana 
motuhake (self-determination) with criteria which are a prerequisite to settlement of claims. 
One idea behind waka umanga was to speed up the resolution of treaty claims. In 2008, 
the process to the law of the Waka Umanga Bill 2007 was stopped due to the Conservative 
opposition’s and the iwi and hapū organisations’ will to preserve the self-determination of 
traditional structures and make essential changes to the draft. 81 
4.2.3.  Settlement Policy
There are three ways by which to make treaty claims: through litigation, by formal inquire 
of the Waitangi Tribunal and its mediation or by direct negotiation with the government. 
The litigation has been a costly and limited way to lay pressure on the Crown. The courts 
follow the reasoning of the Privy Council in Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino (1941), according to 
which they can only make findings on the treaty if expressly mentioned in legislation.The 
governments have preferred an iwi-based negotiation process with larger units. This has been 
80   Local Government Act 1974; Local Government Act 2002, ss. 7, 40, 67, 108; Local Government (Auckland 
Council) Act 2009, s. 81; Hayward (2003), pp. 5-6, 104-110; McHugh (2004), p. 507; Anaya (2011), pp. 16-
18.
81   Waka Umanga (2006), pp. 150-152; Aho (2006), pp. 117-118; McKay (2011), pp. 68-69, 71, 91, 94. 
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also the basis for the advisory work of Te Puni Kōkiri’s regional offices. The Labour government 
published in 1989 the Principles for Crown Action which defined the settlement principles: 
the Crown acknowledges explicitly historical grievance; the resolution of outstanding claims 
should not create further injustices; the Crown has a duty to act in the best interest of all 
New Zealanders; the settlements must be durable, fair, sustainable and remove the sence of 
grievance; the resolution process is consistent and equitable between the parties; nothing in 
the settlements will remove, restrict or replace Māori rights under the article 3 of the treaty; 
and the settlements will take into account fiscal and economic constraints and the ability of 
the Crown to pay compensation.82
The following National Government established in 1989 a Crown task force and the 
Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit (since 1995 the Office of Treaty Settlements, OTS) under the 
Ministry of Justice to oversee and manage negotiations, implementation and the acquisition 
and disposition of Crown-owned property for settlements. Its requirements ask the claimants 
to produce a deed of mandate identifying those authorised to negotiate. Direct negotiations 
include negotiations with groups representing all Māori (comprehensive negotiation), with 
tribes for tribal interests (tribal negotiation) and with particular Māori leaders (leadership 
summits). The form of governance entity is left to the Māori with the condition of adequate 
representation, full accountability, transparent decision-making and dispute-resolution 
procedure. In OTS policy the settlements have three aspects of redress: the settlement 
addresses the claimants’ mana by giving an agreed historical account of injustice and 
apology; financial and commercial redress so that claimants could build an economic base; 
and cultural redress to protect wāhi tapu and wāhi whakahirahira (sacred and significant 
sites) through ownership or kaitiatanga (guardianship). The special relationship of Māori in 
rohe is recognised. A governance entity is in charge of settlement assets. It must be approved 
by the claimant group and to represent them.83
In 2000 the settlement policies and processes were reviewed. The Crown was to be guided 
following the key principles: good faith; restoring and strengthening the treaty relationship; 
redress relating to treaty breaches; fair and consistent treatment of claims; transparent 
information for claimants; the promotion of greater understanding of treaty settlements for 
the public; and the principle that settlements can be negotiated only between the claimants 
and government. In 2002 the Law Commission recommended a new statute-based model 
settlement entity to be created by which a settlement group could receive and administer 
the transferred assets and to handle also wider matters. It would be founded on stewardship, 
transparency, accountability to membership and internal dispute resolution.84 
Before the beginning of the negotiation the claimants have to identify their interests in a 
negotiation brief which clarify the grievances, identify the affected area, included commercial 
Crown assets, culturally important sites and interests. An agreement in principle, earlier also 
heads of agreement, are steps leading to a deed of settlement. They are formal documents 
which state the nature of a settlement in detail. An agreement in principle is outlined in a 
82   JCPC, Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino (1941), p. 322; Principles for Crown Action (1989); A Guide for Depart-
ments on Consultating with Iwi (2003), pp. 6, 19.
83   Durie (1998), pp. 188-189; Healing the Past (2002), p. 84; Treaty Negotiations (2003), p. 17; McHugh 
(2004), p. 515; The OTS’ role has  increased  with the growth of direct negotiations.
84   Treaty Negotiations (2003), p. 7; McHugh (2004), p. 517.
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letter from the responsible minister to the claimant representatives, covering the main parts 
of the proposed settlement. The next step is a draft deed of settlement which as a detailed 
document states the terms of the comprehensive and final settlement between the Crown 
and the claimant group, the Crown’s acknowledgement and apologies, and final and cultural 
redress. If a clear majority of iwi members support the deed of settlement by a postal ballot, 
the parties may sign it. A deed of settlement demands a final stage which is a statute enacted 
by the parliament and confirmed by governor general’s royal assent.85
The process has taken place in a twin-track claims-settlement process of direct negotiation 
and WT hearing. The SOE property, the mineral, geothermal and hydroelectric resources are 
usually excluded from the settlement packages. The Government has reached 22 historical 
settlements between the Crown and different Māori groups, providing for compensation 
payments totaling about $ 1 billion. The New Zealand Government has set as a goal the end 
of the treaty claims before 2020. Each settlement has been different: they have demanded 
plenty of groundwork of definition, hearing and negotiation. Particularly difficult have been 
the negotiations on conservation estates of common interests to all.86
The first modern claims settlement was made by the National Government in 1992, 
concerning the sea fisheries settlement. The treaty-based settlement policy with iwi started 
in 1994. At the end of the same year the Government introduced a fiscal envelope which 
intended to provide a durable, full and final settlement for historic claims, based on direct 
negotiations on an iwi-by-iwi basis. The intention was to limit as non-negotiable the total 
value of all claims to $ 1 billion which was to be distributed over a ten years period and 
covering all costs of the settlement policy. The government’s idea was to return all property 
rights which the compromise in negotiations would indicate as being fair. In the absence of 
sufficient property rights there would be offered cash and assets. Category A included land 
of special cultural, historical or spiritual significance, and category B other sites of special 
significance: lakes, river beds and mountains. In Category C areas conservation values would 
be maintained. Where the changes to common heritage were involved, the maintenance of 
provisions for public access and quality of stewardship would be part of the settlement. Sir 
Hepi Te Heu Heu gathered three nationwide hui at Hirangi where Māori rejection of the 
plan - inconsistent with the principles of honour and good faith - was unanimous. The Bolger 
government did not include treaty principles among the settlement principles but promised 
to acknowledge the historical injustices and to act in the best interests of all New Zealanders. 
The durable settlements had to be fair, sustainable and remove the sense of grievance; make 
sure that the resolution process was consistent and equitable between the claimant groups; 
exclude article 3 rights in the treaty on royal protection and citizenship; and make sure the 
settlements take into account fiscal and economic constraints. The Māori representatives 
answered that the claims should be primarily guided by the principles of natural justice. 
Among interests of natural resources they listed the ownership, use, value and regulatory 
85   Treaty Negotiations (2003), pp. 25-27; Office of Treaty Settlements.
86   Alves (1999), pp. 78-79; Treaty Negotiations (2003), p. 34; McHugh (2004), p. 536; Richardson & Imai & 
McNeil (2009), pp. 387, 395, 418.
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interests. The new coalition government finally ended the financial cap as a political promise 
to the Māori and focused on the final settlements as being benchmarks.87 
The settlements are based on guiding treaty principles. They do the following: recognise 
the tribal rohe; include acknowledgement, apology, and cultural and commercial redress; bind 
to the Crown; and are as historical settlements always final. The financial compensation has 
already passed the $1 billion level.88 Two early claims, Tainui and Ngāi Tahu, are good examples 
of settlements due to their large quantity of loss and breach. The National Government used 
on them an amount from all the settlement funding that was comparable to their quantum 
in relation to the fiscal cap.  The Tainui Confederation, the dominant element of the Māori 
Kingdom, had the largest raupatu claim on lands confiscated in 1863 by the New Zealand 
Settlement Act 1863 (4,865 sq km). The claim process had a long background: Based on 
the recommendations of the Sim Commission (1927) the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori Claims 
Settlement Act 1946 was enacted which established the Tainui Maori Trust Board. The 
government offered £ 6,000 for 50 years and then £ 5,000 each year, which was increased 
further in 1955. In 1979 an advance payment allowed farming land to be purchased. Together 
with the Nga Marae Toopu representing 120 marae, the board participated in the negotiations 
with the Crown. The final Tainui Settlement (1995) included the return of 158 sq km of land, 
an apology from the Queen and monetary compensation of $170 million. The tenants received 
guarantees and the tribe withdrew its claims over coal mines and conservation estates. The 
Tainui Maori Trust Board was replaced by Te Kauhanganui O Waikato, an incorporated society 
87   Durie (1998), pp. 190-194; Alves (1999), pp. 76-77, 81; Mutu (2011), p. 57. The modern iwi settlements 
reached were the following: Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Settlement (1992); Ngāti Rangiteaorere Settlement 
(1993); Ngāti Whakaue Settlement (1994); Hauai Settlement (1995);Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement 
(1995), Waimakuku Settlement (1995); Rotoma Settlement (1996); Te Maunga Settlement (1996); Ngāi Ta-
hu Claims Settlement (1997); Ngāti Tūrangitukua Claims Settlement (1998); Pouakani Claims Settlement 
(1999); Te Uri o Hau Claims Settlement (2000); Ngāti Ruanui Claims Settlement (2001); Ngāti Tama Claims 
Settlement (2001); Ngaa Rauru Kitahi Claims Settlement (2003); Ngāti Awa Claims Settlement (2003); 
Ngāti Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement (2003); Maori Commercial Aquaculture Settlement 
(2004); Te Arawa Lakes Settlement (2004); Ngāti Mutunga Claims Settlement Act (2005); Te Roroa Claims 
Settlement (2005); Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu Claims Settlement (2008); Central North Island For-
ests Land Collective Settlement (2008); Port Nicholson Block Claims Settlement (2008); Waikato-Tainui 
Raupatu Claims Waikato River Settlement (2010); Ngāti Apa (North Island) Claims Settlement (2010); 
Ngati Tuwharetoa, Rauhawa and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Settlement (2010); Whanganui Iwi 
On-account Settlement (2011); Ngāti Manawa Claims Settlement (2012); Ngāti Whare Claims Settlement 
(2012); Ngāti Pāhauwera Treaty Claims Settlement (2012); Ngati Porou Claims Settlement (2012); Mara-
eria A and B Blocks Claims Settlement (2012); Ngāti Mākino Claims Settlement (2012); Rongowhakaata 
Claims Settlement (2012); Ngai Tāmanuhiri Claims Settlement (2012); Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Claims Settle-
ment (2012); Ngāti Whātua o Kaipara Settlement (2013) and Waitahu Claims Settlement (2013). Cf. Ngati 
Turangitukua Claims Settlement Act 1999, Preamble (n)-(o); Pouakani Claims Settlement Act 2000, ss. 12, 
34; Te Uri o Hau Claims Settlement Act 2002, s. 39; Ngati Ruanui Claims Settlement Act 2003, ss. 3, 15, 26; 
Ngati Tama Claims Settlement Act 2003, ss. 3, 12, 20; Maori Commercial Aquaculture Settlement Act 2004, 
s. 6(1); Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi Claims Settlement Act 2005, Preamble,(15), s. 15; Ngati Awa Claims Settlement 
Act 2005, Preamble, (1), (16); ss. 3, 15, 161; Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement Act 2005, 
Preamble, (4), (45), ss. 3, 15, 21, 116; Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu Claims Settlement Act 2005, s. 4; 
Ngati Matunga Claims Settlement Act 2006, ss. 3, 29; Te Roroa Claims Settlement Act 2008, ss. 27, 87; Ngati 
Apa (North Island) Claims Settlement Act 2010, ss. 4, 7-8, 13; Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato 
River) Settlement Act 2010, s. 5.
88   Office of Treaty Settlements. 
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of 61 marae, which held all shares in the trust companies set up under the settlement. There 
were also critics: some Māori wished that the settlement should have been made with each of 
the 33 hapū individually. This was a symptom of Māori inner tensions which shadowed the 
settlement negotiations generally.89
Ngāi Tahu, located on South Island, is one of the largest tribes. Unlike most tribes, 75% of 
its members live in their traditional areas. Besides the land questions the tribe was provided 
with health, education and welfare options. The Ngai Tahu had sold for a low price or lost 
their lands (over 100,000 sq km) and their mahinga kai (food resources) between 1844-1864. 
The claim involved the complete South Island, which made negotiations challenging. The 
environmentalist and recreation organisations were also concerned about the effects of the 
settlement. WT’s three-volume Ngāi Tahu Report (1992) includes important principles for 
remedial action: the statutes must ensure that Māori values are made part of the criteria 
of assessment before the tribunal or authority involved; there must be proper and affective 
consultation with the Māori in advance; there must be representation of the Māori in territorial 
authorities and national bodies; and representation before tribunals and authorities making 
planning and environmental changes. Ngāi Tahu established a trust board (later rūnanga) to 
administer compensatory payments. The reached settlement (1996) differed from the Tainui 
claim:  it had no raupatu claims but the focus was besides the land in sea fisheries, mahinga 
kai and cultural redress. The final settlement granted the Ngāi Tahu the following: a formal 
Crown apology; $ 170 million in cash; 13,800 sq km of land; the possibility to purchase Crown 
properties at market prices from an agreed list for maximum $200 million; the  right of first 
refusal over surplus Crown land in a number of categories with a relativity clause; and title 
to historically important locations as nature reserves which were leased to the Conservation 
Minister in perpetuity. Mahinga kai rights included management rights to reefs, title and use 
of customary fishing areas and first right of refusal for harvest rights of shellfish species. The 
settlement also restored original Māori names.90
The Taranaki tribes made altogether 21 claims to the WT. In its Taranaki Report (1996) 
the tribunal criticised with exceptionally strong wording the government’s policy and held 
the Crown’s purchases of Taranaki lands as invalid. The Māori wars started in the 1860s in 
their territory and they lost 8,000 sq km of territory through confiscation, and later an equal 
amount by illegal purchases and land reforms. No land was returned. The WT deemed their 
losses as the most severe in the country. It estimated that full reparation based on usual legal 
principles is unavailable to the Māori. To require that Māori leaders would sign a  full and final 
89   Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, ss. 10-24, 38, Schedule 4; Durie (1998), pp. 196-198; Alves 
(1999), pp. 124-127; Treaty Negotiations (2003), p. 32; McHugh (2004), pp. 515-516, 522. Kauhanganui’s 
position as legal person is based on the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 and has met structural problems 
with traditional forms of government; The judiciary has been reluctant to intervene in the Māori communi-
ties’ inner conflicts, which has echos Wi Parata - doctrine. 
90   Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, Preamble, ss. 202-236, 287-314; WT, Ngāi Tahu Report (1992); 
Durie (1998), pp. 198-202; Alves (1999), pp. 134-135. Only 6.3 sq km of conservation estate, totalling 
50,000 sq km, was returned.
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agreement would only serve to destabilise their authority. Instead, signicant compensation 
was payed.91 
The settlements have offered new economic opportunities to the tribes. In 1985 
several Māori incorporations and other organisations established the Federation of Maori 
Authorities (FOMA), which is a business network of Māori resource-based businesses 
whose main objectives are to encourage active and economic business development and to 
provide professional and commercial services to members. FOMA has strongly lobbied for 
the drafting of new legislation.Since 1995 it has had co-operation with the ministry-based 
Maori Land Investment Group (MLIG), which has promoted the effective utilisation and 
development of collectively owned Māori land.92 
4.2.4.  Mana Motuhake
Mana Motuhake means self-determination but is often connected to the parallel Māori 
political and legal structures. Already the Declaration of Independence (1835) included an 
idea of Māori nation state which would gather together the separate tribes. The Declaration, 
recognised by the British Government and King William IV, proposed a Māori legislature, a 
parlament consisting of chiefs and having full legislative powers. The kaumatua would hold 
annual rūnanga where laws for the islands might be laid down by the chiefs. The impetus 
to a confederation of tribes came probably both from the British agents and the Māori 
themselves. Nu Tireni (New Zealand) would have been ruled by Māori values, practices and 
aspirations.93
The Treaty of Waitangi changed the course: there was no more talk about a Māori 
state; the Māori believed, instead in a Hobbesian indivisible state of settlers, in a divided 
sovereignty. The disappointment to settler policy and the will to stop the loss of land led the 
Māori to search for an alternative to the kāwanatanga model or cession of governmental 
power to the British Crown. The alternative was called mana motuhake - creation of parallel 
structures of politics and legislation. From 1853 a northern movement developed which 
stressed the Māori sovereignty. In 1857 two chiefs from Otaki began to promote a separate 
Māori parliament and king. In the background discontent was growing among the Māori to 
Pākeha forms of government. The movement was an attempt to reconstitute tribalism into 
a confederate form and counterbalancing the mana of the Crown. Several meetings were 
arranged in the Waikato and Auckland regions. In all, 23 North Island tribes supported 
the idea which resulted in kīngitanga (kingdom), an association of independent tribes. The 
movement wanted equality, a parallel mana with the Queen with both owing allegiance to 
God. They trusted in the promises of rangatiratanga in the treaty. Based in  Waikato in central 
North Island the movement chose Te Wherowhero as their first king in 1858. The kingdom 
91   Taranaki Report (1996), pp. 1-14, 307-315; Mutu (2011), pp. 33-34. “If war is the absence of peace, the war 
has never ended in Taranaki, because that essential prerequisite for peace among peoples, that each should 
be able to live with dignity on their own lands, is still absent and the protest over land rights continues to 
be made.”  Cf. Taranaki Report (1996), s. 6.
92   Durie (1998), pp. 144-145. 
93   Te wakaputanga o te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tireni (1835); Orange, p. 195; Durie (1998), pp. 3, 220.
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operated in Waikato and Parihaka as an autonomous Māori polity beyond the control of the 
colonial state. Those iwi, which did not place themselves under the king, developed rūnanga 
or tribal assemblies. Both asserted tribal control over their land.94  
The majority of settlers were hostile to the movement. Governor Browne gathered 200 
Māori chiefs in Kohimarama in 1860 to strengthen the treaty bonds between the Pākeha and 
Māori. The meeting was more important to the Māori as it highlighted to them the significance 
of the treaty as a guarantee of their rights. After the meeting Browne continued the pressure 
against the King Movement by demanding its submission without reserve for the Queen’s 
sovereignty and the authority of law. Even after the outbreak of war the moderate Kingites 
kept the discussion open with the government. Nevertheless, the war spread to Waikato and 
the Māori fought on both sides of the front.95
The war and confiscations embittered many Māori and their applications to get the lands 
back went unanswered. Rūnanga and komiti were adopted to answer the local needs. They 
formed parallel structures to retain tribal influence against the changes around. Rūnanganui 
became a tribal council to retain mana in the face of growing settler challenge. They 
served to reform, consolidate or re-affirm tribal associations, and to determine hapū and 
iwi relationships with the Government. Difficulties with the Government led to expansion 
of rūnanga in the 1870s. In Hawke’s Bay region a repudiation movement arose to obtain 
compensation for fraudulent land dealings. Soon its aims, however, broadened. Wiremu 
Tamihana had called in 1856 for establishment of a national rūnanga. In 1879, Paora Tūhaere, 
the principal chief of the Ngāti Whatua, convened to Orakei marae a meeting of chiefs. They 
felt that a separate parliament would enable them to better work together. A Māori parliament, 
Kotahitanga, was first convened by Ngapuhi in 1879-1890s in Kohimarama and Ngapuhi. Its 
aim was to discuss treaty issues and to unify the scattered tribes in New Zealand under the 
same organisation. In 1891 convened a new, broader Kotahitanga at Kaikohe. A nationwide 
meeting of Te Kotahitanga o te Tiriti o Waitangi opened in Waipatu in 1892 to supplement the 
New Zealand’s parliament. The Māori Parliament retained the traditional rūnanga principle 
of consultation and deliberation, but also European procedures. The parliament had two 
houses: the upper house of 50 chiefs and the lower house of 96 younger men. For elections 
there were tribal electoral districts. Kotahitanga demanded the New Zealand’s Government 
to abolish the Native Land Court and to establish the promised Native districts. In all, 22,000 
peoples supported the Māori Parliament’s petition. The Maori Councils Act 1900 watered 
down the old Kotahitanga but a parallel Kotahitanga o Te Aute convened in 1897-1902.96
King Tawhiao appealed to the government for the establishment of a Māori chiefly council 
to administer the indigenous rights under the treaty. While rejected, he established his own 
kauhanganui (Great Council), referring to s. 71 of the Constitution Act 1852. Tawhiao 
94   Orange (1993), pp. 142-143; Sharp (1998), pp. 252-253. Kingitanga is the missioners’ biblical translation 
from English, used in the Declaration of Independence 1835 with the meaning “sovereign power”; Mana 
motuhake refers to power and control. It was adopted as a motto by the kingitanga movement and has been 
later used to stress Māori autonomy and separate development. Mana motuhake emphasises, more than 
tino rangatiratanga,  independence from state and Crown.
95   Orange (1993), pp. 145, 148-150, 157, 164.
96   Walker (1984), p. 7; Orange (1993), pp. 190-191, 199-202, 215, 224-227; Barlow (1993), pp. 57-58; O’Malley, 
p. 212. The last kotahitanga was established by young Māori educated at the Anglican Te Aute College, 
Hawkes Bay. One of them, Sir Apirana Ngata, was later influencial in New Zealand’s politics.
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proclaimed his royal mana in 1891 and a Māori Constitution was enacted three years later. 
It outlined the governmental and administrative structure of the King Country. The King’s 
Parliament, bicameral kauhanganui, was located in Maungawa. The Kingites still recognised 
the covenant with the Queen, but the King had ko te mana motuhake – a separate and 
independent power. Both existing Māori Parliaments legislated on land questions, and also 
discussed on hunting and fishing rights, self-determination and the constitutional relationship 
to Pākeha institutions. In 1894 MP Hone Heke tried to render the Kingite institutions and 
legislation legitimate by introducing to New Zealand Parliament the Native Rights Bill, which 
included propositions to create a separate Māori constitution, and own legislature to enact 
laws on Māori personal rights, lands and other property. As a result, the non-Māori members 
of parliament walked out of the chamber, and the bill was finally defeated in 1896. In 1897 
Premier Seddon proposed a national Māori Council, consisting of 50 members, of which 
half were to be elected and another half were to be appointed by the Māori king. When King 
Mahuta demanded also resolution of raupatu claims, the initiative did not come about.97
At one time in the 1890s there were three parallel Māori parliamentary systems. Only 
the Māori kingdom has survived until today. The other independent tribes preserved their 
rangatira. A difficulty to meet tribal unity was due to competition in rohe and influence. 
Besides the supra-tribal systems of kingitanga and Rātana Church, the northern tribes of 
Takitimu have federated as waka, consisting of six whenua.98
Mason Durie has described the constitutional elements of the Māori self-determination 
as mana wairua (spiritual and cultural values, beliefs and practices); mana whenua (iwi and 
hapū ownership and control over tribal resources); mana ariki (authority of paramount 
leaders within their own tribes and as nationwide leaders); and mana tangata (rights of 
individuals to organise as Māori and to assert citizenship rights). In Taranaki Report the 
Waitangi Tribunal described the autonomy or self-government as a right to constitutional 
status as first peoples and as a right to manage their own policy, resources and affairs within 
the minimum parameters necessary for the proper operation of the state.99
The renewed policy of the courts since the mid-1980s activated several Māori groups to 
demand recognition of their sovereignty. Ngati Whatua stated in 1993 that its sovereignty 
had remained under the Declaration of Independence of 1835. It and all similar demands 
have been rejected in the courts. A new model of Māori aspirations has been tikanga rua 
which has aimed to establish a separate second house to the parliament to legislate on the 
questions of tikanga Māori (Māori law). This upper house, Te Rūnanganui o the Tiriti (The 
Treaty Council), would check the compatibility of the lower house bills related to treaty before 
giving assent.100 
In the early 1990s when the influence of the Maori Council diminished, the Māori Queen 
Te Arikinui, Sir Hepi Te Heuheu and Te Reo Hura, the head of Rātana Church, made efforts to 
97   Walker (1984), p. 5; Ritchie (1995), p. 122; Spiller (2001), p. 162. The Kingites did not reject completely 
the settler state’s structures. King Mahuta was elected in 1903 as member of New Zealand’s parliament and 
minister.   
98   Ritchie (1995), pp. 124-125.
99   WT, Tarakanaki Report (1996), s. 1.6; Durie (1998), p. 229. 
100 NZHC, Re Manukau (1993); Havemann (1999), p. 119; McHugh (2004), p. 506. This model has been pro-
posed for instance by the Anglican Church of Aotearoa, itself including Māori structures.
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re-establish kotahitanga and mana motuhake. The outcome was the National Māori Congress 
(Te Whakakohitanga o Nga Iwi o Aotearoa me te Waiponaumu), established in 1991. In the 
early 1990s  was constituted a national forum for 47 tribal and urban authorities who had 
assigned their residual rights to a national body to undertake the following: provide a national 
forum to address economic, social, cultural, environmental and political issues; promote iwi-
based tino rangatiratanga, constitutional and legislative arrangements of development and 
self-determination; to carry out administrative, economic, social and cultural functions to 
monitor government policy;  to lobby the law making-process; and  to advance, co-ordinate 
and promote a unified national iwi position in foreign politics. The Congress was guided 
by the principles of whatakotahi (shared traditions and aspirations), mana motuhake, tino 
rangatiratanga and paihere tangata (joining together in the pursuit of common goals). The 
structure included an executive and annual congress. Nine committees took responsibility 
for the development of the Congress. 101 The Congress was related to changes caused by the 
government’s privatisation policy and the Māori’s will to lobby for a constitutional change, 
which still waits its time.
At the local level, marae are the most enduring and authentic forum for debate and 
decision making. Most of them centre on whānau or hapū and reflect the culture and history 
of its members, ancestors, common journeys and joint fates. Decisions made in marae carry 
often special authority as they relate directly to the affairs of a group. Most hui are arranged 
there to reach binding decisions. Marae are governed by trustees, representing whānau as key 
stakeholders and appointed by tacit approval or election. The autonomy of marae is restricted 
by legislation and local bylaws. The trustees are appointed by the Maori Land Court. At the 
same time the marae are expected to conform to the customs of their respective tribes. This 
makes of marae an interesting mixture of a traditional and statute-based structure. Their 
structures can also vary. Besides independent marae they may be part of an institution with a 
supportive role. There are marae in schools, universities, polytechnics, hospital, churches and 
in the New Zealand Army to observe the appropriate customs. The Tainui Maori Trust Board 
has returned to the rūnanga model, which has transferred the tribal accountability back to 
iwi. In all, 60 rangatahi were trained to take their place in local marae and in rūnanga. Many 
other tribes are more related to their traditional forms of government, but often parts of the 
statute based systems, like incorporations or land trusts.102 
4.2.5.		 Outside	the	Iwi	and	Hapū:	Urban	Māori
The moving of Māori from rural to urban communities between 1950 and 1970 was rapid. 
In the 1960s the government’s plan was to disperse Māori families among Pākeha to progress 
the integration policy but the great influx of Māori created poor suburban Māori enclaves. 
Over 85 % of Māori live today in urban centres. In the largest cities of New Zealand live also 
a significant number of people from the associated states and territories. This fact challenges 
101 Ritchie (1995), pp. 186-188; Durie (1998), p. 230; Havemann (1999), p. 212. The policy traces back to the 
objectives of the 1835 Declaration of Independence. 
102 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, ss. 211-284; Resource Management Act 1993, s. 354; Durie (1998), pp. 
221-222, 230-231; McHugh (2004), 423. 
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the traditional Indigenous structures. The New Zealand Maori Council has recognised this 
in its policy which serves both the traditional tribal and urban structures. The urban Māori 
have established on a voluntary basis a number of associations and trusts, called Urban 
Maori Authorities, which are often pantribal units that do not follow any of the traditional 
structures.103
The urban Māori have claims that are centred on politics of recognition and responsiveness 
and the redistribution of resources. The Māori Department’s tū tangata – philosophy 
provided from 1978 a new dynamic for the Māori to reorganise themselves including the 
spirit of devolution, community empowerment and community-based programmes. They 
began to manage programmes for employment, welfare and economic development and to 
support Māori culture and practices, and to help the Māori to find their roots. Their political 
lobby groups actively promoted the political, social, economic and cultural concerns of urban 
Māori. In 1984 the tribal committees was changed to Māori committees. Despite this the 
Government’s policy paper Te Urapare Rangapū (1988) stressed still iwi as the sole structure 
to negotiate in treaty relations.104   
In 1996 the Court of Appeal recommended for urban Māori separate provision akin to 
distribution of the benefits. The urban quest culminated in 1998 in the question of whether 
the purpose-based urban Māori trusts could as treaty partners, exercising rangatiratanga, be 
beneficiaries of the 1992 fisheries settlement. The iwi saw themselves as the sole benifiaries due 
to their whakapapa, and the urban claims as based on welfarism. They offered as a solution 
extraterritorial membership based on whakapapa. But there are also some iwi located inside 
urban areas who have offered service delivery to all Māori living within their takiwa. The iwi 
resistance has limited the urban structures to purpose-based service delivery.105 
In 1998 the Waitangi Tribunal held that the exercise of rangatiratanga could take place 
also in modern settings. The policy of devolution was designed to empower and create 
partnership with Māori communities as they were. All Māori were entitled to the benefit of 
the treaty. In regard to the social welfare question the tribunal has indicated that urban Māori 
trusts running from kaupapa are a manifestation of rangatiratanga in the sphere of service-
delivery. As a consequence, the amended family legislation enables the urban trusts and other 
similar structures to apply money to deliver large-scale social services.106 
4.2.6.  Associated States and Territories
To the realm of New Zealand belong two associated states, the Cook Islands and Niue, and 
an associated territory, Tokelau. West Samoa gained its independence in 1962, but on the 
other island territories there has been no strong support for independence. British rule 
103 Community Development Act 1962, s. 2; Meredith (2004), pp. 164-166, 171. A census from 1996 indicated 
that 25% of Māori did not identify their iwi.
104 Meredith (2004), pp. 163, 167, 170.
105 NZCA, Te Runanga o Muriwhenua v. Te Runanganui o te Upoko o te Ika (1996); McHugh (2004), pp. 518-
520.
106 Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, ss. 139-140, 400-402; WT, Te Whānau o Waipareira 
Report (2002), s. 8; Meredith (2004), p. 171. 
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was first extended to Tokelau in 1877 and each of its three islands became a protectorate 
of Britain in 1889. The Cook Islands were first under the influence of London Missionary 
Society (1823-1888). The rumours of a French invasion awoke the Colonial Office in London, 
which appointed in 1881, based on a petition of European residents - a consul to the island. 
In 1885 New Zealand promised to pay, and was granted the nomination of consul, who 
became a Resident. Only three years later some ariki asked for British protection and the 
Colonial Office established a protectorate. Resident Moss collaborated with Queen Makea 
Takau to develop a local government, free of missionary influence. In 1890 he persuaded 
ariki to establish a General Council as legislature for all islands. It included three ariki, three 
district judges, one mata’iapo and one European resident. Moss adviced ariki in drafting and 
administrating the laws. He signed all local acts in the name of the New Zealand Government 
and was able to reject all bills. He also introduced a European administration, customs, postal 
services, Supreme Court, and a division of districts (tapere). Arikis were, however, frustrated 
with the loss of their mana and wanted more direct British protection – instead of that from 
New Zealand. Despite of this Moss continued his fundamental reforms. In  1891 a Federal 
Parliament was created  with  an upper house including five Rarotongan ariki and the General 
Council was replaced by an Executive Council of three district ariki. The Queen became the 
formal head of the Federal Government.  In the reform of 1893 the Parliament moved to 
majority rule with universal suffrage and direct European representation was abolished.107  
Prime Minister Seddon wanted to extend the dominion’s influence in the Pacific region as 
a buffer against “Asian invasion”.  In the meanwhile, Resident Moss had fallen in disfavour due 
to his independent policy. The Government instructed Chief Judge Prendergast to visit the 
islands and raise corruption charges against Moss. This took place in 1897 and the following 
year Moss was replaced by Colonel Gudgeon. He reformed the islands’ administration but 
prepared simultaneously its annexation to New Zealand which took place in 1901 when 
the Executive Council formally asked it. New Zealand’s Government accepted the offer 
and promised that a Council of Ariki would replace the Federal Parliament, the Queen 
would remain as head of Government, and the land rights would not be changed and New 
Zealand’s legislation would be in force only if approved by the council, which would make 
all appointments and dismissals of civil servants.  The promises were kept only partly: to the 
council was left the local governance but the real ruler was Gudgeon, who was appointed in 
1909 as Resident Commissioner and the Council’s advisor, but under responsible Minister’s 
supervision. New Zealand’s government introduced also Island Councils which in 1904 
replaced the old district structures. Queen Makea remained still as the nominal head of the 
Ariki Council. The self-government was limited to advisory Island Councils.108  
World War II was a culmination point in policy with growing demands for  self-
determination. New Zealand took steps to increase the territory’s political authority. It 
enacted the Cook Islands Amendment Act 1946 which established a 20-member Legislative 
Council. It was able to make ordinances besides the Resident Commissioner. It was renamed 
in 1958 as the Legislative Assembly. It included five officials, 14 elected members, seven 
107 Gilson (1991), pp. 1, 61-65; Sissons (1999), pp. 11-14; Cook Islands Government.
108 Cook Islands and Other Islands Governance Act 1901, ss. 2, 4-5, 7-8; Cook Islands Act 1915, s. 59; Gilson 
(1991), pp. 88-89, 101, 110-112, 121, 129-130.
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members appointed by Island Councils and one member elected by the non-indigenous 
community.109
The king of Niue petitioned British protection in the 1870s. Britain concluded a formal 
treaty with the Savage Island (Niue) in 1900 and the island was annexed to the protectorate 
of the Cook Islands in 1900. Niue was granted a separate administration three years later. By 
the Cook Islands Amendment Act 1957 the Island Council of Niue was replaced by the Niue 
Council, where the Resident Commissioner served as chairman.110 
The three atolls of Tokelau were annexed after 27 years of protectorate to the British colony 
of Gilbert and Ellice Islands (present Kiribati) in 1916. In 1925 the status changed again, 
when New Zealand acquired the administrative control of the islands. The next year New 
Zealand delegated the power to legislate for Tokelau to the administrator of Western Samoa, 
which was then also under New Zealand. After World War II (1946) Tokelau was placed on 
the United Nations’ list of non-self-governing territories as a dependent territory of New 
Zealand. New Zealand checked its relation to islands and in 1948 New Zealand’s Parliament 
enacted the Tokelau Act, which made the territory an integral part of New Zealand whose 
status may be changed by the act of parliament. The aims to replicate Gilbert and Ellis Islands’ 
administration failed due to the islands’ isolation.111
Due to the decolonisation process and the UN Resolution 1514 (1960) New Zealand 
offered to the Cook Islands and Niue four possible options: independence, integration to New 
Zealand, independent federation of Polynesian countries, or internal autonomy in association 
with New Zealand. Both chose the last-mentioned option. Tokelau was offered transfer toWest 
Samoa or the Cook Islands but the islanders wanted to continue the status quo. For the Cook 
Islands a constitution was enacted in 1965 which created a self-governing territory in free 
association with New Zealand, leaving to the mother country the responsibility for external 
affairs and defence. Despite this, the Cook Islands were able to enter into international 
arrangements and independently make agreements with independent states. It has diplomatic 
relations with 19 countries and is a member of e.g. Cotonou Partnership Agreement, South 
Pacific Forum, Asian Development Bank, South Pacific Commission, International Civil 
Aviation Organisation, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, and is an associated member of the British 
Commonwealth.112 
The administration follows the model of New Zealand. The Parliament (until the 1981 
Legislative Assembly) has 24 elected members from single-member constituencies for 5-year 
terms (one for overseas islanders) and a Cabinet with a Premier. All members may introduce a 
bill. For territorial administration the Cook Islands have 31 different ministries and agencies. 
The Queen’s Representative represents the Queen who is the head of state with executive 
authority. He/she works in three-year terms on the advice of the Prime Minister and the 
109 Cook Islands Amendment Act 1946, ss. 2-3, 12; Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s. 27-29; Ntumy 
(1993), p. 297; Angelo (1995), p. 413. Seddon made in May 1900 a tour in South Pacific to invite several 
Crown colonies to join the realm of New Zealand, among them Tonga and Fizhi. The German West Samoa 
was occupied by the New Zealand Army 11 days before the outbreak of World War I. 
110 Ntumy (1993), p. 158. The Treaty of Niue was the only formal treaty in the region by the British authorities 
besides the Treaty of Waitangi.
111 Tokelau Act (1948), ss. 3-4; Huntsman & Hooper (1996), pp. 265-266, 269; Angelo (1995), p. 413.  
112 Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, s. 5; Ntumy (1993), pp. 4, 13, 158; Huntsman & Hooper (1996), p. 317; 
Cook Islands Government.
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Cabinet which has 3-6 members. He/she appoints all Ministers and gives royal consent to 
statutes. The islands have a similar Executive Council as in the mother country. The Executive 
Council may amend the Cabinet’s decisions when the Queen’s Representative has not given 
to them a royal consent. The High Commissioner has a more nominal role as the mother 
country’s official representative. As recognition of Native royal heritage, the House of Ariki 
was established in 1967, which was a consultative body of 24 hereditary chiefs serving one-
year terms, and appointed by the Queen’s Representative. The Parliament may submit to 
the house bills on welfare, customs, tradition, and land tenure for opinion. The House of 
Ariki has been active since the beginning and has been able to change land legislation and to 
strengthen the customary rules. The government soon wanted to limit the powerful nobility’s 
powers to which the House of Ariki answered in 1970 by demanding more power in matters 
concerning the land title and local government, using as their arms ara korero (meetings) 
and ara tiroa (customary duty to work for ariki). The legislature complemented the House of 
Ariki in 1972 with Koutu Nui, the council of lower chiefs – again to restrict arikis’ power. 113 
The local government is vested in the Island Councils, where usually belong the local ariki, 
a representative of aronga mana (Council of Chiefs), local MPs and elected members. The 
last-mentioned have a right to vote. The Council is chaired by a mayor, who has a deliberative 
vote. To the Island Councils’ regulatory powers belong the right to execute and administrer 
local ordinances and bylaws, assist in the coordination of economic and social development 
activities, assist the territorial government in the good rule and government of the islands. 
The Rarotonga Local Government Bill 1988 suggested District Councils should be based 
on the vaka system, which took place 11 years later. The first mayors were elected in 2000. 
The three vaka councils had 13 (Te Au o Tonga), 8 (Puiakura) and 9 (Tikitumu) members 
respectively. As part of the islands’ unsteady political life the experiment did not succeed and 
the system was, despite local protests, repealed in 2008.114 
The development was more limited and delayed in Niue. The island was ruled by the 
old Cook Islands Act until 1966, when New Zealand’s parliament enacted the Niue Act. 
It delegated some of the resident commissioner’s powers to the Niue Assembly. Later the 
Resident Commissioner became responsible to the Niue Executive Committee. In the first 
eight years the Assembly was able to make statutes only on limited matters, but in 1974 New 
Zealand granted the island a self-governing status and its own Constitution The island’s status 
could no more be changed unilaterally by New Zealand. New Zealand has retained powers 
related to citizenship, external affairs, defense and care of economic and administrative 
113 Cook Island Act 1915, ss. 59, 70; Constitution of the Cook Islands 1965, art. 2-5, 8, 12-13, 18-19, 25, 27, 42, 
46;  Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, Schedule 1, ss. 2-9, 11A, 12-13, 24; House of Arikis Act 1966 (Cook 
Islands); Reforming the Political System of the Cook Islands (1998), pp. 15, 32, 35, 62; Sissons (1999), pp. 
61, 64-67, 72; Cook Islands Government. The power struggle is far from over: in 2008 the House of Ariki at-
tempted a coup by dismissing the Queen’s representative and government. They tried to regain prestige and 
mana, but failed; There has been some discussion about the consequences if New Zealand were to become 
a republic. The Queen is head of state in relation to her realm of New Zealand; The Cook Islands’ political 
life has been turbulent: most of the legal reforms proposed in the 1990s have not been realised. In 2006 the 
Queen’s representative dissolved the parliament, based on lack of confidence.
114 Outer Islands Local Government Act 1987 (Cook Islands), ss. 4-7; Rarotonga Local Government Act 1997 
(Cook Islands); Rarotonga Local Government (Repeal) Act 2008 (Cook Islands), s. 2; Reforeming the Po-
litical System of the Cook Islands (1998), pp. 56-57; Cook Islands Government.
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assistance and facilities for courts and public services. The Niue Assembly can in theory repeal 
these provisions but it is not probable due to the island’s weak economic and demographic 
situation.115 
The head of state for Niue is the sovereign of New Zealand, who has the executive authority. 
She is represented by the Governor General of New Zealand. The formal representative 
of the New Zealand government is the High Commissioner. The executive authority is 
practiced on behalf of the Queen by the Cabinet of Niue. The right of the monarch to advice 
and information is provided by the ministers of New Zealand and Niue. The Cabinet has a 
Premier and three other members who are collectively responsible to the Assembly. They steer 
the general direction and control of the executive government of Niue. The Niue Assembly 
has 20 members elected from village constituencies and six from a general constituency for 
three years. All members of the Assembly can introduce bills. Like on the Cook Islands, New 
Zealand’s laws are applicable only after implimentation by the Assembly of Niue and there 
are very few laws of New Zealand in force. For territorial administration there are a number 
of specialised Government agencies. For local government there are elected Village Councils 
with bylaw-making powers. Like the Cook Islands, Niue has the possibility to create direct 
international connections. Eight countries have their consulates in Niue, and the territory is 
a member or associated member in several international organizations.116 
New Zealand’s representative for Tokelau is the Administrator, who has the ultimate 
decision-making power on administration. His office is in Wellington. Many daily 
administrative affairs are delegated to the official secretary who was located together with 
Tokelau Public Service in Apia, Western Samoa in 1955-1993, but who was later moved to 
Tokelau. New Zealand began to develop Tokelau’s administration since 1963 and held several 
meetings in the islands. A temporary halt to development was a cyclone, which led New 
Zealand’s Government to draft the Tokelau Resettlement Scheme. In 1966 a large of number 
of Tokelauans were relocated to the mother country. In the early 1970s the tide changed 
again. General Fono, a meeting of three atolls, was promoted from 1972 as the central body. 
Its membership has been reduced from an original 60 members to a more efficient 27 and it 
has gradually acquired concrete decision power. Each atoll sends nine representatives to the 
meetings arranged few times annually. General Fono has an increasing role in political and 
executive questions and budgetary allocations, and no statute on Tokelau can be approved 
without its consent. Also the chief minister’s (ulu) role has strengthened. New Zealand’s 
government has committed to the development of Tokelau’s gradual self-determination. In 
1994 it established the Constitutional Special Issues Commission and to Tokelau has been 
arranged several UN visiting missions. Since 2004 New Zealand has taken steps to create the 
associate state of Tokelau – similar to the Cook Islands and Niue. The local support has not 
been, however, unanimous: in two referenda (2006 and 2007) the change of status did not 
reach the demanded 2/3 majority.117   
115 Niue Constitution Act 1974, ss. 3, 6, 8; Niue Act 1966, ss. 5, 9, 31, Ntumy (1993), pp. 158-160, 167.
116 Constitution of Niue 1974, art. 1-4, 16, 36; Niue Act 1966, ss. 4, 50; Niue Constitution Act 1974, Schedule 
2, ss. 1-5, 16; Ntumy (1993), pp. 162-163; Niue Government.
117 Tokelau Amendment  Act 1967, ss. 2, 4; Ntumy (1993), pp. 297; Angelo (1995), pp. 414-415, 421; Huntsman 
& Hooper (1996), pp. 318-320; Angelo (1999); Tokelau Leaders Confident of Stronger Backing for Next 
Referendum on Self-Determination (2007).
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The decision power in Tokelau was concentrated to three Village Councils in 1916-1975, 
when New Zealand’s Government repealed their powers. The local powers were returned in 
1986. The three Village Councils on each atoll are independent of each other.  The Chairman 
of the Council is called faipule, who acts also as the judicial officer of the island. Pulenuku is 
the Village Mayor who takes care of the infrastructure and daily life of the village. Both are 
elected for three years. A third official is failautuhi, the Village Clerk and Treasurer. Each 
extended family, or kaiga, has its own representative in the Council. In the island of Fakaofo 
the Council is more limited: it consists of a small group of senior leaders. The will of Village 
Councils is executed by the able-bodied men of each village.118
4.2.7.		 Māori	Constituencies
A unique feature in New Zealand is the guaranteed parliamentary seats for Māori. From the 
1840s there were discussions on the enfranchisement of Māori to better assimilate them into 
British society. Earl Grey, the Secretary of the State for Colonies, suggested that the Māori 
franchise should be dependent on their ability to read and write English. The assimilation 
policy to civilise the Māori began in around 1847 as the construction of responsible 
government started. Despite many settlers’ resistance the Constitution Act 1852 created a 
male franchise system based on property and without distinction to race. Only seven years 
later the Māori were, however, disenfranchised by Crown law officers who saw that the 
Māori were ineligible to vote due to their collective ownership of land. When, however, the 
rapid population increase on South Island due to the gold rush threatened North Island’s 
parliamentary dominance, a Māori parliamentary representation was introduced as a 
temporary political expedient to retain the balance of power in parliament. It was also a 
measure to reward loyal natives and a countermeasure to criticism in Britain against the 
war confiscations. Four electoral Māori districts were designed as a temporary measure for 
five years but became from 1876 a permanent arrangement. The Māori voters were able to 
doublevote both in Māori and general electorates in 1879-1893 on the basis of a £ 25 freehold 
estate. Some of them were even chosen to the Upper House and to the cabinet.119
The Rātana Church, an Indigenous religious movement, began to gain remarkable ground 
in Māori politics from 1928 when it established the Rātana Polical Party. It made an alliance 
with the Labour Party and dominated the Māori seats in parliament from 1937 until the 
1980s. There have always been doubts about the extent to which the sitting members directly 
represent Maori interests. The sitting members have often owed their first loyalty to their 
parties. The old British first-past-the-post electoral system also profited the local electorate’s 
majority. A fundamental electoral reform was made in 1993, when the mixed member 
proportional system (MMP) was brought into use. The rules determining the number of 
parliamentary seats for Māori were altered. The number of Māori electorates – including the 
Chatham Islands - has been increased (five in 1996, six in 1999 and seven in 2005). The total 
118 Tokelau Village Incorporation Regulation 1986, ss. 5, 8, 14, 18; Ntumy (1993), p. 302; Angelo (1995), p. 422; 
270
119 The Maori Representation Act 1867, ss. 4-5; Walker (1984), p. 3; Havemann (1999), pp. 386-387; Hayward 
(2003), pp. 58, 137. 
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number of Māori in parliament is due to a double-system and proportional representation 
much higher, representing their average share of total population. A new Māori Party was 
established in 2004 and the following year it won a majority of Māori seats.120  
At the local level the devolution process brought forth experiments to give the Māori 
electorate better voice. The Auckland Regional Council had in 1986-1992 Māori constituencies 
based on parliamentary districts before the National Government repealed the empowering 
statute. After the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Auckland’s Governance 
a Maori Advisory Board was established, which has a non-binding consultive role. A 
new, more lasting arrangement took place when the Local Electoral Act 2001 opened up 
the possibility for the local authority to switch the system to a single transferable vote to 
increase the representation of minorities. The Trapski Report (1998) suggested fundamental 
reforms. Consequently, to the Bay of Plenty Regional Council was introduced in 2001 wards 
for electors on the Māori parliamentary roll. There are three Māori seats (25%, based on 
a mathematical equation). The number of Māori seats can be checked when the share of 
indigenous population changes. At the local level the reform has transferred the system 
from economic and geographical representation to ward or singular at-large electorate. It 
is designed to better reflect the contemporary environment. The Bay of Plenty has stayed an 
exception in New Zealand and only a few local authorities have chosen the single transfer 
vote polling system, which favours the Māori.121
The Federation of Cook Islands had from 1893 a universal suffrage (also women) for 
two elected members of the federation’s Parliament. The Cook Island’s Constitution (1965) 
connects the electoral rights to residency. The Legislative Assembly limited from the beginning 
the demanded time of residency to three months. A specialial constituency is for Indigenous 
overseas Cook Islanders representing the large communities in New Zealand and Australia, 
although there has been from time-to-time also voices to repeal the arrangement.122
120 Electoral Act 1993, ss. 45-46, 78, 112; Armitage (1995), p. 145; Hayward (2003), pp. 134-138; Richardson 
& Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 304-305. In 1991, about 45% of Māori were registered to general rolls, 30% to 
Māori rolls and 25% had not registered. In 1996 fifteen Māori were elected to Parliament and three of them 
to cabinet, including the deputy prime minister. Six years later the total number rose to 20, but only two of 
them were chosen to cabinet; The Rātana Church was established in 1918 by the faith-healer Tahupotiki 
Wiremu Rātana. 
121 Local Government Amendment Act (No 2) 1986, s. 3; Bay of Plenty Regional Council (Maori Constituency 
Empowering) Act 2001, ss. 5-6; Local Electoral Act 2001, s. 19Z-19ZH; Maori Seats And Constituencies 
and Local Authorities (2004), pp. 9, 12, 16; Hayward (2003), p. 136; Anaya (2011), p. 17; Mutu (2011), p. 
129. Before the reform an estimated 3% of local councillors were Māori; In the Bay of Plenty Region 28% of 
the population are Māori. Before the electoral reform no Māori was elected to the regional council.
122 Gilson (1991), p. 67; Sissons (1999), pp. 15-16. In Maurangi v. High Commissioner of the Cook Islands the 
Court of Appeal did not want to take a stand on the political question of whether Cook Islanders living 
abroad should be allowed to vote in the islands’ general elections. Cf. NZCA, Maurangi v. High Commis-
sioner of the Cook Islands (1975). 
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4.2.8.  Taxation and Financial Autonomy
Those iwi, which have reached a final settlement and have created rūnanga structure, have 
limited taxation rights. All Māori authorities are, however, under New Zealand’s tax system 
and legislation. They must give a complete statement each year of their taxable income for 
the preceding year. The Audit Office of New Zealand supervises all public funds on the Cook 
Islands and Niue. The Island Councils can order local payments as fees, services, charges, 
fines, contributions, subscriptions and rents. The government of New Zealand provides 
annually fiscal resources to Niue and Tokelau because both depend heavily on imports which 
come mainly from New Zealand.123
4.2.9.  Citizenship
The Māori are New Zealand citizens, enjoying all the benefits, rights and privileges that go 
with it. This is derived from the right to tino rangatiratanga under article 3 of the Treaty 
of Waitangi. Also the residents of associated states and territories are British nationals 
(Commonwealth citizens) and New Zealand citizen. The Cook Islanders have a status of 
permanent resident of the Cook Islands which defines the electoral and social rights. The 
status includes all persons born on the islands, having a parent who was a permanent resident 
at the date of the person’s birth; having a father, who was a permanent resident at the date of 
the father’s death; and those adopted by a person who was a permanent resident at the date of 
the adoption. A person may apply the status and the Constitution permits the parliament to 
prescribe the qualifications for applicants. The status may be also revoked if a person is absent 
from the Cook Islands for more than three years, indicating that he/she has ceased to make 
a home on the islands. There are no equivalent provisions for Niue or Tokelau. The Tokelau 
Immigration Regulations 1991 require a permit for other New Zealanders to reside or work 
in Tokelau. 124
Canada4.3. 
4.3.1. The Constitutional Status of the Indigenous Peoples
The indigenous peoples came formally under British/Canadian Authority between 1713 and 
1905. The basis for the constitutional status of indigeneous peoples are the two Constitution 
Acts, 1867 and 1982, the latter forms the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The 
Constitution Act, 1867, recognises the existence of Indians in s. 91. The subsection 24 follows 
the policy of protection, expressed in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Indians form in 
123 Tax Administration Act 1994, s. 69B; 70B; Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996, s. 30; Taxation (Maori Or-
ganisations, Taxpayer Compliance and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2003, ss. 97-98; Ntumy (1993), pp. 
10-11, 159, 166, 298, 300. 
124 Treaty of Waitangi (1840), art. 3, Constitution of the Cook Islands 1965, art. 46, 76A; Cook Islands Consti-
tution Act 1964, s. 6; Constitution of Niue 1974, art. 36; Niue Constitution Act, 1974, s. 5; Citizenship Act 
1977, ss. 29, 684A; Wilson (1997), p. 6.
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this provision a distinct legal category of people for which the Crown has reserved lands. 
There is no definition of an Indian title to land or pre-existing sovereignty as the fathers of the 
Canadian Constitution expected the Indians to assimilate.125 The subsection 91(24) has been 
untouched since the birth of the confederation.
Despite the mention of Indians in the Constitution Act, 1867 and the treaty making 
process, there was “a period of erosion” in aboriginal and treaty rights. A first sign of change 
was the reform of Indian Act in 1951. The post-war atmosphere forced the federal legislator 
to check its stand on discriminative Indian legislation. During the repatriation process of 
the Canadian Constitution, the first draft of the new Constitution Act (1980) included only 
a negative non-derogation provision on indigenous rights. After wide protests they were, 
however, included in the final version. The Constitution Act, 1982 and its Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms transferred the indigenous rights from common law’s pre-existing legal doctrine 
to constitutional law. The Inuit were recognised in SCC’s Re Eskimos decision (1939), and the 
Métis in the NRTA process of the 1930s. This recognition of all three indigenous categories 
was finally included to the s. 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Van der Peet (1996) 
the Supreme Court defines as the purpose of s. 35 “the reconciliation of the pre-existence 
of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.” Sections 25 and 35 recognise 
the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the First Nations, Métis and Inuit. Section 25 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, refers to the protection of a specified minority group. That 
means a constitutional recognition of pre-contact rights of indigenous peoples. Section 35 is 
outside the rights part of the Constitution Act, 1982, which protects it from the s. 1 limitation 
(“justified in a free and democratic society”) and s. 33 override provisions. The nonderogation 
clause of s. 25 ensures that new legislation does not infringe the Aboriginal rights recognised 
in s. 35. There are, however, different interpretations as to whether s.25 gives the Indigenous 
communities also absolute or internal immunity. The French wording of the section supports 
more this interpretation. The other interpretations support relative protection of indigenous 
difference.126   
The Aboriginal rights are based on Indigenous peoples’ inherent occupation of North 
America as sovereign nations before the arrival of settlers. The rights are held communally 
by the members of an Indigenous group and include everything necessary for their survival 
as Indigenous peoples. The iIndigenous rights are sui generis and they must be interpreted 
according to a different set of rules. Treaty rights refer to solemn promises made when 
the treaties were signed with the First Nations. The Constitution recognises only existing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights as existent on 17 April 1982. The Indigenous peoples have the 
onus to prove the existence of Aboriginal rights through integral to the distinctive culture test. 
The proof is validated either in court or throught the recognition of the federal Government. 
The Crown may override Aboriginal and treaty rights by federal legislation, but there must 
125 Royal Proclamation (1763); Constitution Act (1867), s. 91(24); Dickason (1994), p. 257. 
126 Constitution Act (1982), ss. 25, 35; SCC, Re Eskimos (1939); Van der Peet (1996), s. 31; Hogg (1985), p. 564; 
Elliott (2005), p. 76; Otis (2005), pp. 160-165; Hutchinson (2007), p. 184. The French version says: “Le fait 
que la présente Charte garantit certain droits et libertés ne porte pas atteinte aux droits et libertés – ances-
triaux, issus de traits ou autres – des peuples autochtones du Canada.”; Some, like Patrick Macklem, are 
worried that the Charter poses a risk to the continued vitality of indigenous difference when it authorises 
judicial reorganisation of indigenous societies according to non-Aboriginal values. Macklem 2001, p. 195.
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be a clear and plain intention to extinguish them. Since 1982 it has been also difficult to 
extinguish the rights without the Indigenous group’s consent.127 
The Constitution Act, 1982, defines that a constitutional amendment concerning the 
Indigenous rights can be made only after a constitutional conference between the Prime 
Minister and the provincial First Ministers. The Prime Minister has also an obligation to 
invite the representatives of Indigenous peoples to participate in the conference. Section 
35.1(b) can be read as a commitment to the recognition of Indigenous peoples in Canada 
as legitimate constitutional actors.  There is, however, a question whether the right to self-
government is included in the scope of s. 35(1). According to the Supreme Court the task 
for the courts applying s. 35 is to reconcile Indigenous rights with the sovereignty of the 
Crown. The House of Commons Special Committee on Indian Self-Government (Penner) 
Report (1983) and later Cooligan Report (1985) recommended the extension of the self-
government concept: all range of law-making, politics, progressive delivery, law enforcement 
and adjudication powers would be available to the First Nations governments within their 
territories. Based on s. 37, there were arranged four constitutional conferences. The first 
conference (1983) guaranteed Aboriginal and treaty rights equally to both sexes and provided 
indigenous participation in future constitutional change. The three latter conferences (1984-
1987) turned their attention towards the recognition of self-government. The 1985 conference 
stressed the following: recognition of right of self-government for Aboriginal peoples within 
the Canadian federation; requirement for negotiated tripartite agreements; constitutional 
protection of Aboriginal peoples’ rights in negotiated agreements; and the non-derogation 
of Aboriginal or treaty rights.The first ministers accepted the concept of self-government, 
but did not find agreement for constitutional amendment. As a means to find a way out, the 
federal government introduced Bill C-52 (An Act Relating to Self-Government for Indian 
Nations), which died out when the federal Parliament was dissolved.128
The draft Meech Lake Accord (1987) was a disappointment to First Nations, as it 
concentrated on Québec as a distinct society and did not address the Indigenous rights. Eliah 
Harper, a Cree MP of Manitoba Legislature, was in a key position to invalidate the accord by 
his delay tactics. The Charlottetown Accord five years later was an unsuccessful attempt to 
reform the Indigenous peoples’ status in Canada. It was based on a thorough consultation with 
Indigenous groups. The Accord would have recognised the Indigenous peoples right as first 
peoples to govern their land; representation in the Senate with double majority guarantees 
in matters affecting them; given candidacy to Supreme Court of Canada; given the right to 
participate in the First Ministers’ Conferences; made the general non-derogation clause as 
protection; given the inherent right of indigenous peoples to self-government as one of the 
three orders of government in Canada; given broad powers and autonomy to control their 
inner affairs; and allowed a Métis self-government. The Charlottetown Accord (1992) would 
have changed the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) by creating a Métis Nation Accord, or 
127 Elliott (2001), pp. 10-12, 34.  
128 Constitution Act (1982), ss. 35, 35.1, s. 35(2); SCC, R. v. Van der Peet (1996); Delgamuukw v. British Co-
lumbia (1997); Cassidy (1991), p. 43; Armitage (1995), p. 79; Cairns (2000), p. 84; Olthuis & Kleer & Town-
shend (2008), p. 16; Otis (2005), pp. 71-72; Baudoin and Mendes (2007), pp. 16-17. A similar process of 
meetings has recently been arranged in Yukon. 
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Métis Constitution, which would have been nationwide binding. Also the legislative authority 
of the province of Alberta would have been preserved vis-à-vis Métis. 129 
These ideas were not completely abandoned. The work was continued by the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), which first released in 1993 a discussion paper 
entitled Partners in Confederation. When the commission’s work was still in progress, the 
federal Government recognised the right to self-government as a constitutional Indigenous 
right. It announced a willingness to enter into self-government negotiations and agreements 
with Indigenous nations. All self-government agreements should be subject to the Charter. 
In the 1996 the RCAP published its massive 4,000-page report which supported the 
modernisation of aboriginality. It proposed restoration of the Indigenous-driven sovereignty 
through the revitalisation of selected Indigenous customs and institutions. Besides the 
procurement of cultural sovereignty and territorial groundedness as a basis for the healing 
process and realignment of the political agenda to accommodate Indigenous authority 
alongside federal and provincial jurisdictions, they included control over the process and 
power of self-governance as a third order of the Canadian Government. The commission’s 
design  was a pan-Canadian First Nations government and a third chamber of Parliament 
called the House of First Peoples, which would have full responsibility within its own 
jurisdiction. It would have initiated legislation and provided advice to the House of Commons 
and the Senate on legislation and constitutional matters relating to Indigenous peoples. The 
federal Government would speak with it on a nation-to-nation basis. This has instead taken 
place in discussion with indivual First Nations. RCAP estimated that there could be 50-80 
units for self-determination. They would have an inherent right to self-government and their 
laws could override the federal and provincial laws in inner matters. All of them should have 
their individual constitutional  frameworks from which to exercise the right. The commission 
suggested that a group of bands would hold a referendum to determine whether to proceed 
towards self-government and could then develop constitution and membership criteria. A 
Recognition Panel would take care of wider consultation with a larger membership. Two 
alternative models to indigenous self-government are according to RCAP a public government 
model and community of interest model - a non-territorial model to provide various services 
delegated through federal or provincial legislation.130 
In the meantime (1995), the federal government announced its policy to implement the 
right of self-government.131 In its policy paper Gathering the Strength (1998) the government 
reassured its commitment to First Nations self-governance.132 While the political way to 
129 Charlottetown  Accord (1992), ss. 2, 9, 20, 23, 40-41, 53, 55-56; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 
16-17.
130 RCAP, Vol. 2, pp. 181, 314-320; Thibault (1998), ss. 159-249; Cairns (2000), p. 102; Elliott (2001), p. 163. 
131 The possible areas of negotiation were: 1) full Indigenous responsibility: governing structures, membership, 
marriage, adoption, child welfare, aboriginal language, culture and religion, education, health, social ser-
vices, enforcement of aboriginal laws, policing, property rights, land and natural resources management, 
agriculture, hunting, fishing, trapping, taxation, housing, local transportation, licencing and regulation of 
businesses; and 2) federal responsibility with limited indigenous powers: divorce, labour and training, ad-
ministration of justice, penitentiaries, parole, environmental measures, fisheries, co-management, migra-
tory birds co-management, gaming and emergency preparedness. Cf. Federal Policy Guide (1995).
132 Gathering Strength (1998), p. 8. The RCAP was influenced by the Harvard Project on Indian Economic 
Development (1992) which emphasises the legal factors. 
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amend the Constitution did not come to realisation, the Supreme Court showed remarkable 
judicial activism and took the leading role. It has characterised the indigenous societies since 
Guerin (1985) as sui generis. The court distinguishes the sui generis law from the international 
law and British colonial law in stressing the continuity of indigenous interests in land. Sui 
generis is a unifying principle underlying the different dimensions of title arising from the 
possession before the assertion of British sovereignty.133
The courts have evolved three main approaches to Aboriginal rights, the first based on 
the royal prerogative and the other two on common law. The dominant theory was until the 
1980s the Royal Proclamation approach. It assumes that Aboriginal rights derive from the 
governmental recognition of 1763 and the rights must depend on legislative or executive 
government recognition to have legal status. In the 1980s and 1990s to the forefront came 
the occupancy and use approach that Aboriginal rights derive from common law recognition 
of traditional Indigenous occupation and use of land before the assertion of European 
sovereignty. A more advanced form of theory is the land and societies approach, promoted 
in the Supreme Court’s Sparrow decision (1990), which means common law recognition 
of Indigenous peoples’ prior occupation and use of land in North America in distinctive 
societies.134 
A significant impulse to the Supreme Court’s development on the doctrine on Aboriginal 
rights in the 1990s was the unsettled land question of First Nations in British Columbia. 
In 1990 the Supreme Court created the so-called Sparrow test to clarify the Aboriginal 
and Treaty rights. It helped to define whether or not the government regulations would be 
justified based on the s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In the Sparrow test the meaning 
of s. 35(1) was derived from the general principles of constitutional interpretation, principles 
related to Aboriginal rights, and the purpose behind constitutional provisions. The nature of 
35(1) suggests that it is construed in a purposive way and demands a generous and liberal 
interpretation of words. The Government has responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity 
in respect to Indigenous peoples. Their relationship is trust-like. The existing Aboriginal 
rights must be interpreted flexibly to permit their evolution over time. The contemporary 
recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights must be defined in the light of historical 
relationship. Legislation that affects the exercise of Aboriginal rights will be valid, if it meets 
the test for justifying the interference with the rights recognised and affirmed under s. 35(1). 
Federal power must be reconciled with federal duty and the best way to achieve this is to 
demand the justification of government regulations that infringes upon or deny Aboriginal 
rights. The way in which the legislative objective well be attained must uphold the honour of 
the Crown and must be in keeping with the unique contemporary relationship, grounded in 
history and policy, between the Crown and the Indigenous peoples. The extent of legislative or 
regulatory impact on the existed Aboriginal rights may be scrutinised to ensure recognition 
and affirmation.135
In 1996-1997 the Supreme Court gave several new definitions on the indigenous rights. 
Van der Peet’s (1996) significance is in establishing a cultural test, which will be returned to 
133 SCC, Guerin (1985), ss. 382, 387; Simon v. The Queen (1985), s. 404; Sparrow (1990); Sioui (1990); R. v. Côté 
(1996), ss. 42-54; Delgamuukw (1997), ss. 113-114; Cook & Lindau (2000), pp. 107-108. 
134 Elliott (2005), p. 33.
135 SCC, Sparrow (1990). 
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later. In Van der Peet Lamer CJ also referred to distinctive societies which existed there before 
the colonial encounter. In her dissenting view L’Heureux-Dubé J stressed that the Indigenous 
peoples were before the contact independent nations, occupying and controlling their own 
territories with distinct culture, own practices, traditions and customs. In Badger (1996) the 
court held that a treaty represents an exchange of solemn promises between the Crown and 
Indian nation. It acknowledged that sui generis First Nations jurisprudence and order are 
inherent to First Nations societies. The honour of the Crown is at stake and it is assumed to 
fulfil its promises. Ambiguities and doubtful expressions must be resolved in favour of the 
Indians and any limitations restricting the Indian rights under the treaties must be narrowly 
construed.136 
The Supreme Court has been generally cautious in discussing self-government as a 
general judicial concept. In Adams and Côté (both 1996) it dissociated the ancestrial rights 
and Aboriginal title. In Delgamuukw (1997) Lamer CJ said that before the contact the First 
Nations already lived in communities and participated in distinctive cultures. It separated 
them from all other minority groups in Canadian society and mandates their special legal 
and constitutional status. The constitutional force given to Aboriginal rights protects them 
against provincial legislative power,  precludes a unilateral extinguishment of their rights, 
provides them a basis for recognition of Aboriginal rights, negotiations and settlements of 
claims, and assists them in reconciling the rights and interests that arise from distinctive 
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown. The legal rights of the Indian people will have 
to be in accordance with wider society through political compromises and accommodations 
based on negotiations and agreement and ultimately in accordance with the sovereign will of 
the community as a whole.137
In Westbank (1999) the court has stressed flexibility when interpreting the Constitution. 
The different orders of government are not separated from each other. Corbiere’s (1999) most 
important outcome was Bill C-7 which presented an interim, more facilitative regime to 
supersede the Indian Act, pending each Nation’s own self-government agreement and based 
on the idea of implementing constitutional values into the Indigenous system of governance. 
Bill C-7, or First Nations’ Governance Act (2002), was controversial as a boilerplate over 
Indian governance. The First Nations protested the lack of consultation and incompatibility 
with the right of self-government. The reform of Indian policy had to be done one group at 
a time.138 
Following Calder the federal government adopted a comprehensive claims policy and 
regional initiatives, aimed at the settlement of land disputes and self-government agreement. 
The federal policy was known as the Kelowna Accord. It was meant to intensify the action by 
recognising the inherent right of self-government and setting out what areas of jurisdiction 
are negotiable, with whom the government will negotiate, and how negotiated agreements 
are to be ratified. A major objective was to harmonise laws by developing co-operative 
arrangements that would ensure the harmonious relationship of laws, indispensable to 
136 SCC, Van der Peet (1996), ss. 30, 35, 106; R. v. Badger (1996), ss. 76-82.
137 SCC, Adams (1996), ss. 25-30; Côté (1996), ss. 84-88; Delgamuukw (1997), ss. 180-181, 186, 207.
138 SCC, Westbank First Nation v. British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (1999), s. 18; McHugh (2004), 
pp. 337, 433. 
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the proper functioning of Canada.139 The Kelowna Accord was rejected by the following 
Conservative government.
4.3.2.		 Indigenous	Definition
In the Canadian context an Indian was defined for the first time in the Act for Lower Canada, 
1851. The definition was based on tribal membership, marriage, residence and adoption 
by Indian parents. The law created also separation between status and non-status Indian 
categories. Soon the law was revised to exclude the whites living among the Indians and 
non-Indians married to Indian women. After 1867 the male bloodline became the major 
definition of an Indian. The Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869 specified the definition with 
blood quantum: a status Indian had to have at least 25 % Indian blood. Also the distinction 
between men and women was specified: if a registered Indian man married a non-Indian 
woman, she acquired her husband’s status, which was passed on to their children. In contrast, 
the Indian wife of a non-Indian lost her right to annuity payments, to be a member of a band, 
or even to be an Indian within the meaning of the act. According to a double mother rule a 
one-quarter Indian wife could be included, but her children could not claim Indian status. 
This definition of Indian status was retained until 1985.140
The first Indian Act (1876) defined an Indian “a person who pursuant of this Act is 
registered as an Indian, or is entitled to be registered as an Indian”. Indian blood continued 
to be another important ground for definition. It indicated belonging to a band and entitled 
use of its lands. The act narrowed federal recognition of indianness in eastern Canada to 
those indigenous people who already lived on recognised reserves or belonged to recognised 
Indian bands. The act defined also two other categories of Indian: a non-treaty Indian was 
“any person of Indian blood who reputed belong to an irregular band or who follow the 
Indian mode of life”. An enfranchised Indian had, subsequent to the grant of letters patent, 
ceased to be an Indian.141 
The revision of Indian Act in 1951 changed the definition in a more technical and 
complicated direction. The Indian status relied on registration or entitlement to register on 
a roll maintained by the department. The half-breeds and women married to a non-Indian 
were still excluded. The definition has been modified in the Indian Act, 1985: the register with 
band lists has been preserved and maintained in the department, but the blood quantum has 
been replaced by a two-generation cut-off clause which demands that a person must have 
two status Indian grandparents. It has become possible to transfer the control of membership 
to local bands, who must create their own membership rules. Change in the status of many 
women, who had regained their status after 1985, but who had not been accepted back to the 
reserves, has led the department to redefine Indians into two categories: federally registered 
and those accepted as band members. Persons who had relinguished their Indian status in the 
enfranchise process have been able to resume it through an application process. Before 1985, 
139 Aboriginal Roundtable to Kelowna Accord (2005), First Ministers Meeting on Aboriginal Issues.
140 Act for Lower Canada, 1851, s. 2; Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, ss. 1, 6; Indian Act, 1876, s. 3; Dicka-
son (1994), pp. 250-251.
141 Indian Act, 1876, s. 2; Lawrence (2004), p. 84.
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the category of non-status Indians had importance. They were individuals, excluded from 
recognition either by a band or by the department. With the new Indian Act many of them 
gained or regained the recognition, which ended the concept as a significant category. The 
federal administration prefers to speak about Indians living off the reserves.142
A first attempt to define the Métis was made in 1845, when some of them asked the Red 
River Governor Christie to define their special status. The governor held that they had the 
same rights as all other British subjects. When the federation of Canada was born, a general 
definition on the Métis was not made. In several documents they were referred as half-breeds. 
Some of them identified as Indians to receive the benefits and membership of Indian reserves. 
After Bill C-31 they have no legal means to return to being a Métis. The Ewing Commission 
(Alberta, 1934-1936) defined the Métis as anyone with any degree of Indian ancestry who 
lives the life ordinary associated with the Métis. The Métis Association of Alberta extended 
later the definition to include anyone who considered himself/herself a Métis and who was 
accepted by the community as such. The Métis Population Betterment Act, 1938, defined 
a Métis as “a person of mixed white and Indian ancestry having not less than one-quarter 
Indian blood. In Metis Settlements Act, 1990, a Métis is a person of Aboriginal ancestry, who 
identifies with Métis history and culture. Persons registered as an Indian under the Indian 
Act and as Inuit for the purposes of a land claim are expressly excluded. The Métis Nation 
defines for its citizenship criteria self-identification, historical ancestry, distinctiveness and 
acceptance by the community.143
The Métis cannot be defined like the First Nations or Inuits by using as a criterion pre-
contact existence. Instead, in R. v. Powley (2003) the Supreme Court has created, based on 
the Van der Peet case, a pre-control test focusing on the period between a particular Métis 
community’s appearance and its entering to Canadian society. The court used a purposive 
reading of s. 35: the inclusion of Métis is based on a commitment to recognise the Métis 
and enhance their survival as distinctive communities. The first criterion is belongs to an 
identiable community, a group of Métis with a distinctive collective identity, living together in 
the same geographic area and sharing a common way of life. The Supreme Court found three 
broad factors to identify a Métis, reminding of the Métis Nation’s criteria: self-identification 
as a member of the Métis community; evidence of ancestral connection to a historic Métis 
community; and demonstrated acceptance by a modern Métis community. Later, lower 
courts have several times stressed as important aspects of evidence of the recognition of 
the community, genealogical evidence, contextuality, site spefic community and a common 
purpose based on historical realities.144 
The Inuit have faced similar difficulties over official definition as the Métis. They were 
likewise a challenge to Canadian officials, living in a federal territory without provincial 
supervision. According to the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24) only the Indians and their 
142 Indian Act (1951), s. 12; Indian Act, 1985, ss. 5-6, 8-10, 12(1); Dickason (1994), p. 332; Armitage (1995), p. 
84; Beaudoin & Mendes (1996), p. 17.21.
143 Métis Population Betterment Act, 1938 (Alberta), s. 2; Bell (1994), p. 8;  Dickason (1994), p. 264; Weber 
(2004), s. ; Isaac (2008), pp. 3-4. 
144 SCC, R. v. Powley (2003), ss. 12-13, 31-33; Isaak (2008), pp. 13-14. Cf. BCPC, R. v. Willison; NBPC, R. v. 
Castonguay; R. v. Daigle; ONCJ, Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources) v. Beaudry (2006); SPC, R. v. Lavio-
lette (2005); R. v. Norton (2005).
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lands were under federal jurisdiction. In 1939 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled, based on 
narrow historical evidence, that “the Esquimaux.... are included among the Indian races”. They 
have since been under federal authority, but are excluded from the ndian Act. The Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement (1993) defines them as indigenous people who since traditional 
times used and occupied the lands and waters of the Nunavut Settlement Area. They are Inuit 
as defined by Inuk custom and associated with the community. In defining the Nunavik, 
Inuvialuit and Nunatsiavut membership, the ancestry and adoption to the community are 
decisive factors. In Nunatsiavut a 25% blood quota is still in use.145 
4.3.3.  The Treaties and Agreements
4.3.3.1. Allies Become Wards
Today there are more than 500 treaties in force between the federal/provincial Crown and the 
Indigenous peoples, which vary from tiny lots to Nunavut Agreement, creating an ongoing 
relationship while the self-government models vary to a great extent. The first treaty-making 
period was in 1763-1923. These historical treaties were negotiated in the context of superior 
bargaining power on the part of the non-Indian parties and there was increasing imbalance 
over time. The era of modern agreements started in 1973. The First Nations have continued 
to look to treaties as acts of constitutive self-determination and critical points of reference for 
determining their specific ongoing rights and place in the larger world.146
 The First European power in present Canada was France. With the consolidation of 
royal power it built up relations with the indigenous peoples, based on formal declarations. 
Only treaties in written form were peace treaties with the Indian tribes and confederations. 
The most important of them was Paix des braves (1701) between France and its enemy, the 
Iroquois Confederation. The French king was proclaimed as the Sovereign of all territory and 
the protector of Indian tribes. The Christian indigenous villages (réduction) and the schools 
for Native children were showcases of the superior French culture. They had a cultural and 
religious mission with a strong flavour of assimilation. Governor de Champlain saw as an 
outcome the merger to one French people. On the other hand - due to their weak position 
- the Frenchmen needed local tribes as their allies. Therefore, they were ambiguous when 
dealing with the idea of indigenous sovereignty.147
The oldest British treaty including the territories of present Canada was the Portsmouth 
Treaty (1713), including the Maliseet people. The early treaties were treaties of peace and 
friendship: no land was ceded by them. The Treaties of Boston and Drummer (both in 1725) 
145 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA, 1975), s. 1; Western Arctic Claim Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement (IFA, 1984), s. 2; Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA,1993), s. 1; Labrador Inuit Land 
Claims Agreement (LILCA, 2005), s.1; SCC, Re Eskimos (1939), p. 141; Elliott (2005), p. 20. Inuit means “a 
man”. Eskimo is a Cree word, which means “he eats it raw”; The Indian Act, 1951, said: “This Act does not 
apply to the race of aborigines commonly referred to as Eskimos”; Inuk is the singular form of Inuit. 
146 Anaya (2004), p. 188.
147 Grand Paix de Montréal (1701); Dickason (1994), p.167; Örücü (1996), p. 3. According to de Champlain, 
“Our young men will marry your daughters, and we shall be one people”. In Côté and Adams, the Supreme 
Court held that France was unequivocally opposed to the existence of Aboriginal rights. 
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were similar, including the Mi’kmaq, Maliseet and Abenaki. Through treaties the British 
Crown became the rightful possessor of the present-day Maritime Provinces but not all tribes 
accepted the terms. Annuities and guarantees of traditional economy were included for the 
first time to the Halifax Treaty (1752). The Nova Scotia County Court held in 1928 that it 
was a mere agreement made by the Governor and his Council with a handful of Indians: 
“The savages’ right of sovereignty, even of ownership, were never recognized”. The territory 
had passed to the United Kingdom by a treaty with France, who had acquired it by priority 
of discovery and ancient possession. An agreement with Indians could be terminated by 
provincial or federal Government. As Indian sovereignty had never been recognised, the 
1752 agreement could not be classed as an international treaty. This view was upheld until 
1985 when the Supreme Court reversed in Simon the interpretation. Dickson CJ held that the 
Indian treaties must be given a fair, large and liberal construction in favour of the Indians, 
and that they should be construed in a sense naturally understandable by the Indians.148 
The Indian status began to form in the mid-eighteenth century. In 1755, during the war 
against France, the British government established the Indian Department and appointed 
a superintendent of Indian affairs who was responsible for political relations with Indian 
people, boundary negotiations, enlistment in wartime, and protected them from traders. The 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognised the importance of First Nations as allies. It unified the 
Indian policy and secured their rights under the auspices of British justice and the principle 
of negotiated treaty over unextinguished title. The Royal Proclamation has a constitutional 
status, as cited in s. 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982.149
Treaties following the Royal Proclamation permitted the use of land in return for a trade 
agreement. The Indians were to keep peace with the British and give them military assistance 
and material benefits. Between 1764-1825 a total of 12 treaties were negotiated. These early 
treaties of peace and friendship were often imprecise, but as the number of settlers increased, 
the agreements became essentially land transfers. Already the agreement of 1784 with the 
chiefs of Lower Canada ceded over 12,000 square kilometres of land to the Crown. In 1790-
1793 the Ojibwa, Odawa and Potawomi ceded 20,000 square kilometres more. The annuities 
substituted cash payments for land from 1818.150
The war of 1812 with the United States was a turning point. The Indians were no more 
considered as allies but as subjects of the Crown. This change was visible in the case law 
of Upper Canada.  Governor Haldimand had granted the Grand River reserve to Britain’s 
Iroquois allies in 1784. The early nineteenth century leases raised a question on indigenous 
legal status. The Upper Canada’s Court of King’s Bench ruled in 1835 that the Six Nations’ 
Indians were mere tenants at the will of the Crown. Later Robinson CJ held that although the 
Indians were “distinct tribes as respect of their race, yet that gave them no corporate powers 
or existence”...“The common law is not part savage and part civilized”. Also Darling Report 
(1828) expressed the Crown’s goal: to assimilate the Indians as members of civilised society. 
Governor Head negotiated in 1836 a Treaty with the Ojibway and Ottawa, which established 
148 Treaty of Portsmouth (1713), art. 1; Treaty of Boston (1725), art. 1; Treaty No. 239 (1725), art. 1; Halifax 
Treaty (1752), art. 4; NSCC, R. v. Syliboy (1929), s. 313; Simon v. The Queen (1985), s. 399; Dickason (1994), 
pp. 346, 348; Karsten (2002), p. 57.
149 Armitage (1995), p. 73.
150 Dickason (1994), pp. 189-191; McHugh (2004), pp. 152-143.
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Manitoulin Island as a place of refuge for indigenous people. The Crown recognised the 
Aboriginal title to the island. In return, the Indian nations agreed to relinquish or modify 
their rights of exclusive use and enjoyment in favour of non-exclusive rights in order to 
enable other indigenous people to relocate there in the future. 151
In 1844 the management of Indian affairs in the Canadas was transferred from the military 
authorities to the governor’s civil secretary.  The imperial administration was not coping 
well with the local administrative problems, and the responsibility was entrusted in 1860 
to provincial Governments. Herman Merivale, permanent undersecretary of the Colonial 
Office, developed the concept of regional approaches. There were as many policies as there 
were colonies: in the Maritimes insulation and in the Canadas amalgamation. The common 
theme was, however, the civilisation of Indians.152
The period since 1850 was a beginning of huge land-cession treaties. Two important 
treaties in Upper Canada were the Robinson Treaties (1850). They created a standard pattern 
for public and open negotiations, based on the Royal Proclamation of 1763. According to 
them: the lands were to be surrendered to the Crown; each treaty had an annex of schedule of 
reserves to be held in common; annuities were paid to each member of a signing band; and 
the hunting and fishing rights on unoccupied lands were guaranteed. The Enfranchisement 
Act’s (1869) goal was with time to abolish the Indians’s special status, but it did not affect the 
enfranchised Indians treaty rights, except for the treaty payments. They still had a right to live 
on reserves. This opened a right to business licence, to buy liquor and send children to public 
schools. Despite these attractions, only 102 Indians gave up their special status in 1858-1921. 
Later the vote and land requirements were eased and more Indians enfranchised. The Indian 
Department’s purpose was the extinction of Indians as Indians. 153  
4.3.3.2.  Numbered Treaties: the Era of Extinguishment
Also the founding fathers of the Canadian Confederation supported assimilation. The treaty 
making was seen as a moral obligation, as a means of avoiding conflict. When the Canadian 
government acquired the Rupert’s land in 1870, which did not belong to the lands covered 
by the Royal Proclamation, it promised to negotiate with Indians for the extinguishment of 
their title and the setting aside of reserves for their exclusive use. Canada’s promise to Britain 
to honour the provisions of the Royal Proclamation led to eleven numbered treaties between 
the Crown and the Indians and some Métis in 1871-1922, covering parts of Ontario, the three 
Prairie Provinces, northeastern British Columbia and the southern Northwest Territories. 
Outside the numbered treaties were left most of British Columbia, the Northwest Territories, 
151 UCKB/UCQB, Doe ex D. Jackson v. Wilkes (1835); Doe ex d. Sheldon v. Ramsay (1852), p. 123; Macklem 
(2001), p. 133; McHugh (2004), pp. 155-156. From Québec can be later found one exception in case law. In 
1867 Monk J (Québec Superior Court) held that the Indians’ laws and usages were in full force. He followed 
the reasoning of Marshall court in Worcester v. Georgia.
152 Dickason (1994), p. 248; McHugh (2004), p. 182.
153 Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, ss. 16-17; Crown Treaty 60 (1850); Crown Treaty 61 (1850); Tobias 
(1976), pp. 22-23; Dickason (1994), 327. Superintendent Scott promised to “continue until there is not a 
single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question, 
and no Indian department.”
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Québec and the Maritime Provinces. Newfoundland did not belong to Canada before 1949. 
Three treaties had their areas extended and several were modified by later adhesions, the 
last time in 1956. The numbered treaties are similar in form and contents. They define the 
relationship between the federal state and the different bands in different geographical regions 
of Canada, thus guaranteeing the protection of Indigenous rights in return for extinguishment 
of Aboriginal title over the remaining lands. The federal Government regarded the treaties 
as the final means of opening up Indian lands for settlement and development. The Indians, 
on the other hand, believed that they could adapt to the demands of the contemporary world 
within the framework of their own traditions.154
In Treaties 1-2 (both in 1871) the Saulteaux and Cree were offered a present, an annuity 
and 160 acres of land for a family of five. In 1875 the treaty terms were annexed with Treaty 
3 (1873, Saulteaux), which raised the annuities. Further, there was given a gratuity.155 Treaty 3 
gave for a family of five 640 acres of land. Treaties 1-3 promised to Indians buggies, livestock, 
seeds, farming equipments and supplies.156 Treaties 3-11 included general hunting and fishing 
rights, ammunition and fishing nets. The chiefs and headmen were given distinctive suits of 
clothing for chiefs with flags, medals and annual gratuities.All treaties established schools 
on reserves and prohibited the sale of liquor.157 Treaty 6 (1876),covering central Alberta and 
Saskatchewan, includes a provisions on medicine chests, kept at the home of the Indian Agent 
for use by the people, and assistance against famine, and pestilence relief.158 Treaty 7 (1877) 
in southern Alberta promised 1 sq mile land for a family of five, cattle for raising stock, 
a Winchester rifle, medal, flag and salary for theachers.159 Treaties 8-11 (1899-1921) were 
northern resource development treaties. In the background was the arrival of American gold 
seekers on the banks of the Mackenzie River in 1898, the need for mining development and 
infrastructure, and later also the discovery of oil. The numbered treaties area was extended to 
northeast British Columbia, northern Alberta, northwest Saskatchewan, western and southern 
NWT and eastern Yukon, which included mineral rich areas and farming opportunities and 
controlled the roads to goldfields. The treaty areas covered huge territories: Treaties 8 and 
11 covered 841,000 sq km and 963,000 sq km respectively. The Indians of the north wanted 
assistance during famine periods, social care and education, and even a railway. They had 
learned the conditions of former treaties and had two main concerns: free fishing and hunting 
rights and the fear to be located to reserves. They were assured that selection of reserve lands 
would be left for the future. They were offered free ammunition and fishing nets. The Métis in 
the treaty area were offered either 240 acres of land or $ 240 in cash. The treaties were amended 
several times but many vocal promises were not realised: absolute ownership of lands and 
the health and social care were left outside the written documents. The northernmost areas 
154 Brown & Maguire (1979), p. 32; Dickason (1994), pp. 273-277; Eisenberg & Spiller-Halev (2005), p. 286. 
Prime Minister MacDonald said that “the great aim of our civilization has been to do away with the tribal 
system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the inhabitants of the Dominion, as speedily as 
they are fit for the change.”
155 Treaty 1 (1871); Treaty 2 (1871).
156 Treaty 3 (1873).
157 Treaties 3-11 (1873-1921).
158 Treaty 6 (1876).
159 Treaty 7 (1877).
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offered more hardships and less advantage to the Canadian Government to prepare a treaty. 
There were also less politically active Métis.160 
The difference in languages and concepts caused misunderstanding. The federal 
Government saw that the treaty offered the Indians usufructuary rights, subject to 
governmental regulation and excluded rights in the areas required for settlement, mining, 
lumbering and trading. The Indians had a different view though: they understood they had 
been guaranteed free rights to hunt, fish, and trap. The northern Indians did not know the 
concepts of finite boundaries. The Indians saw the Treaty 8 as a peace and friendship treaty. 
Later, when the government began to survey the area in 1913-1915, they understood that the 
white man interpreted the treaty in a different way. The Dogribs demanded a written special 
recognition of their rights in 1920. The Dene Nation litigated in 1973 in Alberta againt the 
Treaties 8 and 11 by claiming that they were fraudulent. They lost the case.161
The first numbered treaties excluded the Métis, but Lieutenant Simpson, who negotiated 
the treaties, allowed individuals to make a choice to identify as either Indian or half-breed. 
Most chose the first option. In Treaty 3 the Ojibway chief Mawedopenais succeeded to 
include the half-breeds to the treaty and they are the only Métis who have been able to access 
numbered treaties as such. In 1879 the Indian Act was amended to enable “really half-breed” 
individuals to withdraw from a treaty and in 1880 the federal government excluded them by 
amending again the Indian Act, after the intervention of missionaries and NWMP. Scrip was 
made available since 1885: the Métis were offered either 240 dollars of money or 240 acres 
of land per family, but in the negotiations of Treaty 11 only money. The scrip was tempting: 
in two first years more than 1,000 people discharged their treaty rights and three Treaty 6 
First Nations in Alberta ceased to exist. In Yukon, where the Indian tribes were left outside 
the numbered treaties, there was less distinction between the Indians and half-breeds and 
the scope of federal jurisdiction was left open. The indigenous people were offered small 
parcels of land as residential reserves. While not protected by the treaties, they were easy to 
relocate.162 The Supreme Court approached the questions in the Ross River case (2002), where 
it gave the federal government a broad discretion on the question.163
The federal government made in the treaty area a separate decision concerning Sioux 
refugees in 1874. They were former British allies, who were given 12,000 acres of land 
per family. Their reserves have never been included in any treaty, but they are registered 
and entitled to Indian status except for annuities. Also the Lubicon Lake Indian Nation in 
Northern Alberta was left outside a numbered treaty. Since 1933 it has litigated on decision 
right and profits over oil and mineral resources in their territory. The Nation was promised 
160 Treaty 8 (1899); Treaty 9 (1905); Treaty 10 (1906); Treaty 11 (1921); Champagne (1994), p. 519.
161 Treaty 8 (1899); Treaty 9 (1905); Treaty 10 (1906); Fumoleau (1973), pp. 58-59; Dickason (1994), pp. 373-
378. British Columbia did not resist the late treaties because it esteemed their territory worthless; The first 
Treaty Eight reserve was established only in 1961 in Fort Nelson, British Columbia.
162 Indian Act (1879), s. 3; Dickason (1994), pp. 306-310, 316-317-373; Lawrence (2004), pp. 89-90, 93-94. 
Often the line between an Indian and half-breed was more or less artificial. In Treaty 3 the scrips were 
awailable only in NWT. In Ontario the same people were defined as Indians. The Supreme Court has held 
this historical division recently in Alberta v. Cunningham (2011), where the Métis classified as Indians are 
excluded from Métis settlements in Alberta.
163 SCC, Council of Ross River Dene Band v. Canada (2002), ss. 67-68; One of theYukon tribes was relocated 
four times in eight years’. 
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a reserve in 1939, but a dispute on band lists prevented it. In 1952 began the mining and 
oil explorations. In 1990 Chief Ominyak submitted to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee a communication claiming that the federal government denied their right to 
self-determination and free disposal of natural resources. The federal government held the 
communication as inadmissible since all domestic remedies had not been exhausted. The 
committee confirmed that Ominyak as an individual could not under the First Optional 
Protocol claim to be a victim of a violation of the right of self-determination, but it also held 
that in the light of art. 27 certain recent developments threatened the way of life and culture 
of the Lubicon Lake Band and constituted a violation of the article as long as they continue. 
The Canadian government attempted to subsequently force a settlement on terms rejected by 
the Lubicon Cree and matters were left at an impasse. Another similar, longlasting conflict 
took place in Ipperwash, Ontario, where the Chippewas tried to obtain back former reserve 
land, taken over by the army in 1942. After confrontations the federal government agreed to 
clean the area up and to support research on issues related to nearby Provincial Park, also 
former reserve land. The area was returned to the Chippewas in 2009.164
Some northernmost Indian tribes asked a treaty to protect their hunting, fishing and 
trapping rights and to protect them from famine, but the federal government held a treaty there 
as unnecessary due to poor prospects of settlement and costly administration. The Dominion 
Lands Act did not apply to non-extinguished areas. The Indian department opened in 1911 
as an agency in Fort Simpson to distribute relief and to carry out experiments in farming, 
followed by HBC, which opened a trading post north of the polar circle and introduced the 
currency in the fur trade. A turning point in the north was collapse of the fur trade and 
the start of oil production in the 1930s. The Ministry of Interior established temporarily a 
northern branch. To keep the process in order, the federal Government restricted access to 
the Mackenzie District in NWT to those “mentally and physically able, and properly equipped 
and outfitted”. 165  
British Columbia has been another exception in treaty policy. To block the American 
advance to the north, British Crown established the Vancouver Island (1849) and British 
Columbia (1858) colonies. HBC and Governor Douglas managed first together the Vancouver 
Island. Unlike the company, Governor wanted to sign treaties with the Indians. He treated the 
tribes as British subjects and saw his own role based on the Crown trusteeship as a mediator. 
In 1850-1854 he concluded 14 treaties with Salish bands on Vancouver Island. In exchange for 
extinguishment of lands the tribes were confirmed possession of their villages and cultivated 
lands, and a liberty to hunt and fish on unoccupied land. The treaty formula was copied from 
New Zealand Company’s land purchase. The colony’s treaty-making ended in 1854 to the 
lack of funds and frustration of meagre results. Douglas’ follower, Joseph Trutch, turned to a 
more aggressive policy and denied the existence of aboriginal title. When British Columbia 
joined the Confederation, only s. 13 in the British Columbia Terms of Union reminded 
about dominion’s constitutional responsibility towards the Indians. It took yet another 67 
164 UNHCR, Bernard Ominayak, Chief of  the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990), s. 32; Dickason (1994), 
pp. 282-283; Anaya (2004), p. 257; Elliott (2005), p. 180; IWGIA (2010), p. 62. Since 1989 two groups have 
broken away from the Lubicon Lake band and have been recognised by the federal government as separate 
bands. Treaty 8 chiefs have not recognised the decisions’ legitimacy.
165 Dickason (1994), pp. 371, 377-378.  
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years before British Columbia fulfilled its obligation to transfer Indian reserve lands to 
federal authority (1938). The reluctance to acknowledge Aboriginal rights has continued 
long in British Columbia. Still in 1991 McEachern CJ from the British Columbia Supreme 
Court ruled that Aboriginal plaintiffs’ ancestors lacked the “badges of civilization” and were 
“primitive people”. Their life was at best “nasty, brutish and short”.166  
By 1912 the Crown had made 483 treaties but soon the making of new treaties halted. The 
ideology of enfranchisement gained new speed in 1917, when the Indian Act was amended 
to grant a vote without property to Indians living off reserves. Within two years almost 500 
Indians gave up their Indian status. The federal government encouraged also the treaty Métis 
and Indian women married to non-Indian men to give up their Indian status. Between 1920-
1922 the Indian Act included a provision, where the superintendent was empowered to 
enfranchise Indians whom he considered qualified, even without their own will. For instance, 
obtaining a university degree could lead to loosing the Indian status. A modified version 
of that provision was in force from 1933-1951 and the compulsory enfranchisement was 
dropped only from the revised version of the Indian Act in 1951.167
4.3.3.3.  Renewed Treaty Policy
In the 1960s the Conservative Diefenbaker and Pierson governments supported the idea 
of an Indian Claims Commission, based on the US model. Also the Indian administration 
implemented a number of programmes to answer the continuing treaty and aboriginal title 
claims. After Pierre Trudeau’s Government had failed to introduce in 1969 the so-called 
White Paper, which would have abolished the Indian Act and dismantled the established 
legal relations between the Aboriginal peoples and the state of Canada in favour of equality, 
and the Supreme Court’s Calder decision, acknowledging for the first time that the Aboriginal 
title to land existed before colonial encounter, the federal Government established in 1973 the 
Office of Claims Negotiations. The following year the Government developed a policy paper 
named Indian-Federal Government Relationships. Its principles were based on the concept 
of a partnership between the federal government and First Nations. As a consequence, the 
Office of Native Claims was established to negotiate settlements. The federal policy developed 
further with the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Royal Commission (1977), which could be 
regarded as a milestone. The Commission’s report brought the self-determination to the 
official vocabulary. The federal Government developed two formal negotiation policies. The 
Comprehensive Claims Policy (since 1981) authorised the federal government to negotiate 
claims of undefined Aboriginal rights. The policy was renewed in 1986. The main points 
in the new policy were a stress on exchange of rights, self-government, resource revenue-
sharing, environmental management, offshore areas, interim measures and implementation 
166 British Columbia Terms of Union (1871), s. 13; BCCA, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1970), ss. 11, 21, 
26; Tennant (1990), pp. 30-38; Remwick (1991), pp. 52-54; Dickason (1994), p. 242, 325; McHugh (2004), 
pp. 174-175. The Douglas treaties covered only 3% of Vancouver Island; (1991), The pace of negotiations 
has been slow even elsewhere. The Manitoulin Island Treaty (1862) was signed in 1990, granting the Ojibwa 
364 sq km of reserve land. 
167 Indian Act (1920, 1933); Dickason (1994), pp. 189, 331. 
4. Administration and Self-Determination
197
plans. The alternative is the specific claims process. As an answer to growing criticism the 
federal Government established in 1991 the Indian Specific Claims Commission to negotiate 
claims where the government had breached a treaty promise relating to land, mismanaged 
First Nations land or assets, or violated a statutory obligation to a First Nation. The process 
was speed up, restrictions to pre-Confederation claims were revoked and there was created a 
joint working group. The Commission was replaced in 2003 by the Canadian Centre for the 
Independent Resolution of First Nations Specific Claims to deal with compensation claims 
arising as a result of the government’s treaty, legislative, or administrative obligations and help 
the First Nations in research and dispute resolution efforts. Both policies call for the federal 
government to negotiate claims if the claim demonstrates an unfulfilled legal obligation on 
the part of the government. Due to Canada’s federal structure, the provinces and territories 
have often participated in the negotiations. The federal Government has negotiated altogether 
23 Comprehensive Claims. 168  
In 2007 the federal Government made a commitment to resolve the outstanding specific 
claims quickly. A Specific Claims Action Plan proposed four key initiatives: to create a 
new tribunal staffed with impartial judges who would make final decisions on claims 
when negotiations fail; make arrangements for financial compensation more transparent 
through dedicated funding for settlements; speed up processing of small claims and improve 
flexibility in the handling of large claims; and to refocus the existing Indian Specific Claims 
Commission to concentrate on dispute resolution. The specific claims include Treaty Land 
Entitlement (TLE) claims, dealing with the Crown’s failure to provide First Nations with 
sufficient reserve lands. The Prairie Provinces have negotiated separate TLE agreements, 
based on the Constitution Act, 1930, which has a legal requirement to make land available. 
In Saskatchewan the TLE Framework Agreement Agreement (1992) covers 28 and a similar 
agreement in Manitoba (1997) 21 First Nations, who have not received full land entitlement 
under treaties. The federal and provincial governments granted in Saskatchewan $516 million 
and in Manitoba $76 million to settle the land debts. The First Nations were able to purchase 
federal, provincial or private land anywhere in Saskatchewan. In Manitoba 3,990 sq km of 
Crown land was offered and further 464 sq km to be purchased. Later similar agreements 
have been made across Canada.169
The modern agreements have excluded the Indian Act, but it still directs the daily life 
of those First Nations bands which have not made a comprehensive agreement with the 
federal and provincial governments. In 1999 the federal parliament enacted the First Nations 
Management Act which gave the First Nations the possibility to exit the Indian Act in favour 
of more extended regime. The band councils have become legal entities having the capacity, 
rights, powers and privileges of natural person. The agreements are not statutorily under the 
s. 35 protection. Further, not all First Nations have been willing to change their system: some 
of them wanted to protect their specificity or had doubts about the federal government’s 
motives. In 2002 a more comprehensive reform was initiated, the Bill C-7 (The First Nations 
168 Baudoin and Mendes (2007),  p. 17-9; Remwick (1991), p. 64; Mc Hugh (2004), pp. 332-334; Elliott (2005), 
pp. 165-166, 385-387; Belanger (2008), p. 58; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 383-384, 394-395. 
In 1973-2008 1,279 specific land claims were made, of which 489 were concluded. Together all agreements 
were worth of over $2 billion. Over 800 claims were still unsolved. 
169 Belanger (2008), p. 59; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 111-112; Land Entitlement Fact Sheet.
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Governance Act). The First Nations, however, were against its rigid governmental format, 
which did not take into consideration enough the Indigenous needs. The bill would have 
demanded of each band a code for leadership selection with an amending procedure and 
an appeal process; modern standards of financial and operational accountability through 
principles of transparency, disclosure and redress; and a governance code containing rules for 
council and band meetings, standards for frequency, notice, access to information, privacy 
and conflicts of interest. Bill C-7 would have recognised the bands’ legal capacity and extended 
its law-making powers in internal affairs. The bands governance would have become subject 
to the Human Rights Act, but the bill lapsed in 2003.170
As a consequence of various critiques on the slow pace of the process, the federal Parliament 
has enacted the Specific Claims Tribunal Act, 2008 which includes three separate timelines 
for assessing and negotiating specific claims. If the timelines are not met, the First Nations can 
take their claims to the tribunal for binding decision. It must determine if the Crown has an 
outstanding lawful obligation and how much compensation is owed. The tribunal has a $150 
million cap on compensation. Fifteen First Nations or groupings have made a self-government 
agreement with the federal Government: eleven Yukon First Nations in 1993, 1997-1998, 
2002-2003 and 2005; Nisga’a (1999) and Westbank (2003) First Nations in British Columbia, 
Tåîchô in NWT (2003); and the Labrador Inuit in 2005. The Yukon agreements were made 
in addition to comprehensive land claims agreements. Nisga’a, Tlicho and Labrador Inuit 
agreements are the only comprehensive agreements which include detailed self-government 
regimes within the same document as the land claims. The Anishnaabe draft agreement, 
rejected in 2004 by the four First Nations affected by it, would have replaced most of the 
Indian Act and recognised a regional group as a Government outside of the comprehensive 
land claims process. In most above-mentioned agreements the self-government is based on 
the municipal model, with the exception of Nisga’a and Labrador Inuit agreements.171
Similarly, the provincial governments have participated to tripartite negotiation processes 
because the federal government has no plenary authority in the provinces. There are provincial 
agreements, which relate to ancestral rights, hunting, trapping or indigenous culture. For 
instance, Québec has adopted a number of laws concerning the James Bay and Northern 
Québec agreements and recognised a right to autonomy and the promotion of economic, 
social and cultural conditions of nine First Nations and the Inuit. It has also reserved and 
allotted lands for the benefit of Indian bands usufruct of lands, which are gratuitously 
transferred to the government of Canada to be administered in trust for Indian bands. 
Ontario has established the Indian Commission of Ontario and Saskatchewan the Office of 
Treaty Commission. The most active treaty process, however, has been in British Columbia, 
where the treaty process started later, due to the province’s stand. In 1993 there was finally 
established the British Columbia Treaty Commission, which was influenced by the Waitangi 
Tribunal in New Zealand. It assesses the readiness of the parties to negotiate, allocates 
negotiation funding to First Nations, monitors and reports on the progress of negotiations 
and may facilitate the meetings or assist in resolving disputes. The negotiation process has 
170 First Nations Land Management Act 1999, s. 18; McHugh (2004), pp. 476-477. The Indian Act is exempted 
from the Human Rights Act (s. 67).
171 Tåîchô Community Government Act, 2004 (NWT), s. 8; Specific Claims Tribunal Act, 2008, ss. 15-16, 20; 
Belanger (2008), p. 61; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 110.
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six stages: statement of intent, preparation for negotiations, negotiations of a framework 
agreement, agreement in principle and final treaty, and implementation of the treaty. In 2008, 
58 First Nations were participating in the process.172
DIAND has supported with various programmes Indigenous business life, and there are 
today more than 20,000 businesses owned by indigenous people. The Manitoba Councils 
Investment Group is a good example of these results. A special form of modern provincial 
agreements, after the American model, deals with gaming, which has become a major 
income for many First Nations. The federal Criminal Code generally prohibits gaming 
in Canada but in 1985 the code was amended to allow it subject to provincial regulation 
and certain conditions. In the 1990s several First Nations tried to create their own gaming 
operation following the American model, which led to criminal charges and court battles. 
The Pamajewon case (1996) went to the Supreme Court, which narrowed the claims to the 
regulation of high-stakes gambling and connection to pre-colonial society. After Pamajewon 
the Province of Ontario made an agreement with the Rama Mnjikaning First Nation to 
establish Casino Rama. The Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation distribute a portion of 
the corporations’ revenues to the First Nations of Ontario. Also other provinces have created 
their own gaming regulations. In Saskatchewan there has been established a provincial Indian 
Gaming Authority with indigenous representation, which delivers profits to First Nations 
and Métis through the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, Saskatchewan Indian 
Gaming Authority and  The Clarence Campeau Development Fund (Métis). The First Nations 
have their own (unofficial) First Nations Gaming Act. Manitoba and Alberta have Gaming 
Commissions and a Gaming Association, respectively. All provinces are not as willing to 
co-operation: either they limit the operations to lottery, or - like in Québec - the provincial 
authorities and the courts have tried to restrict the activities.173 
4.3.3.4.  Modern Treaties 
The Sechelt Indian Band in British Columbia was the first band to be excluded from the 
Indian Act’s provisions in 1981. The province wanted to demonstrate that Indian goals could 
be achieved outside the contexts of constitutional change and land claims. The band became 
in 1986 a legal entity with the capacity, rights, powers and privileges of a natural person. 
It was granted the capacity to contract, acquire and hold property, and expend, invest and 
borrow monies and litigate. The Sechelt Indian Government District has jurisdiction over all 
Sechelt lands. The band council has broad management and legislative powers. An Advisory 
Council aids in planning and recommends servicing programmes. Due to their semiurban 
location the Sechelt received only 933 hectares of new land, but $42 million in cash. The land 
172 Loi sur l’exercise des droits fondamentaux et des prérogatives du peuple Québecois et de l’Etat du Québec, 
2001 (Québec), Préambule, ss. 11-12; Loi sur les terres du domaine de l’Etat, 2010 (Québec), ss. 51-52; 
Coyle (2006), p. 811; Elliott (2005), pp. 133, 193.
173 Lotteries Act, 1976 (New Brunswick). s. 1; Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation Act, 1994 (Saskatchewan), 
ss. 6, 25; Lottery and Gaming Corporation Act, 1999 (Ontario), s. 14(1); SCC, Pamajewon (1996), ss. 25-30; 
Report of Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2004), p. 77; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 397-403. The Mo-
hawk of Kahnawake passed their own gaming law and established the first on-line gaming-server in North 
America.
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was vested in band with full powers of disposition. A comprehensive land claim agreement in 
principle was agreed in 1999. An interesting feature in the Sechelt municipal self-government 
model is its jurisdiction over the non-Indigenous residents. The self-government is also 
protected by limiting the voting right and the right to hold office to Indigenous peoples.174
Nisga’a Final Agreement (1999), including 1,992 sq km in fee simple and $190 million in 
cash, has been an important precedent. The federal government included for the first time 
the governmental autonomy to treaty and the jurisdiction has an evolving character. The 
agreement attempted to provide certainty without extinguishing Aboriginal rights and title. 
By replacing the municipal structures of former treaties and the Indian Act, it has powers 
belonging normally to provinces. Benefiting the constitutional protection of ss. 25 and 35 
rights, the nation is recognised as a definite entity in terms of its membership, territory and 
political and legal institutions. The governmental powers are divided between the Nisga’a 
Lisims and Village Governments. The agreement covers a full set of property and other rights 
enjoyed by the Nisga’a, including surface, subsurface and fishing rights.  Non-Nisga’a citizens 
living permanently on Nisga’a lands may vote and be elected as members to public bodies. The 
Nisga’a Nation has proper control of its budget. The provincial or federal government laws 
are paramount in health services and intoxicants and are exclusive concerning the criminal 
law.175    
In British Columbia, altogether 116 First Nations began negotiations on agreement with 
the treaty commission on 47 different negotiating tables. Of these, 39 achieved agreement-
in-principle. Gwaii Haanas (1993) and Westbank First Nation (2003) were the first to reach 
a final agreement after Nisga’a. In 2006 three new final agreements were achieved, with the 
Lheidli T’enneh, Tsawwassen and Maa-nulth First Nations. Gwaii Haanas, encompassing the 
Queen Charlotte Islands archipelago, had in the background a long controversy on logging 
on the islands which threatened the traditional habitat. The Haida Nation designated the 
area as a tribal heritage site. The logging continued until Canada and British Columbia 
signed an understanding in 1987, which led to designation of terrestrial and marine national 
park (1988). The agreement (1993) created a Management Board with equal representation 
to make recommendations to both governments. The board members became responsible 
for their respective government agencies to ensure that legislation, policies and agreements 
were adhered to. The Supreme Court held that the Crown must consult with indigenous 
groups when it proposes to take an action that may interfere with existing indigenous or 
treaty rights. This led both the federal and provincial/territorial level to develop a third form 
of negotiations besides the two forms of claims policies - the ad hoc consultation policy to 
174 Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act, 1986, ss. 6, 17-18, 26; Sechelt Indian Government District Ena-
bling Act , 1996, s. 4(1); Sechelt Indian  Government District Enabling Act Advisory Council Regulation, 
1988, ss. 1, 4; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, p. 17.23. The Nisga’a were the first Indians in Brit-
ish Columbia to be able to raise a common front for claims. They were followed by the others.
175 Nisga’a Final Agreement (2000), ss. 9, 19-21, 34, 36, 39, 41, 44-45, 47, 89, 100-103, 115; Otis (2005), p. 91; 
White & Maxim & Spence (2004), p. 127. The Nisga’a authority is paramount in the Nisga’a Constitution 
and Government, citizenship, culture and language, property, health services, faith healers, use of lands, 
child and family services, adoption, education and cultural property. The four Village Governments have a 
similar paramountcy in local administration and regulation of village lands. The federal and provincial laws 
of general application prevail in regard to public order, peace and safety, buildings and public works, traffic 
and transportation, marriage, social services, health services, gambling and gaming, and intoxicants. 
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meet the decision’s requirements. In 2010 the federal Government has made Kunst’aa guu 
– Kunst’aagah Reconciliation Protocol with Haida Gwaii to further refine and elevate the 
procedure. There is established the Haida Gwaii Management Council to direct the use and 
management of land and resources.176
The Westbank First Nation have specific powers to land and resource management, 
landlord and tenant relations, health services, culture, language, education, public works 
and community services. The federal legistalation has supremacy on peace, order and good 
government. The lands stay as reserves and the First Nation had a tax immunity based on 
the Indian Act. The agreement is not a section 35 treaty. The Tsawassen and Maa-nulth Final 
Agreements follow the structure of Nisga’a Agreement with some basic differences. They are 
binding to the Crown but First Nations have relieved all their claims. There are no more 
reserves, but the Charter rights and federal/provincial laws are applied to them. First Nations 
have well-defined law-making powers. The federal laws regulate the criminal law; official 
languages; peace, order and good government, protection of health, safety of all Canadians 
and human rights (Tsawassen);  and intellectual property, aeronautics, shipping, navigation, 
labour relations and working conditions (Maanulth). In the case of conflict, the federal and 
provincial laws prevail. The First Nations’ citizens preserve all rights and benefits of Canadian 
citizens. Unlike Nisga’a and Tsawassen, Maanulth is a confederation, where each member 
forms a separate and distinct legal person with equal rights.177 
In Ontario, the legislation allows agreements on the municipal system in the limits of 
reserves occupied by the First Nations. The Missauga First Nation reached in 1995 a final 
agreement on reserve lands, whose northern border had been surveyed incorrectedly in the 
1850s. Three years later the federal Government signed a framework agreement on fiscal 
relations, elections and government structures with the Anishinabek Nation, covering over 
30 Ontario First Nations.178
In 1993 the Yukon First Nations, left outside of the Treaty 11, were included in the treaty 
system in the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA), where they ceded, released and surrendered 
all their Aboriginal claims rights and titles to the Crown. The interpretative provisions establish 
the principle of equality between the parties. The self-government process is included to 
separate self-government agreements. The first four agreements (Vuntut Gwich’in, Champagne 
and Aishihik, Teslin Tlingit and Nacho Nyak Dun) covered altogether 41,000 sq km and a 
financial settlement of $ 242 million. Each First Nation received legislative power in specific 
fields. Similar self-government agreements were signed also with the Little Salmon/Carmacks 
and Selkirk (1997), Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in (1998), Ta’an Kwach’an (2002), Kluane (2003), Kwanlin 
Dun (2005) and Carcross/Tagish (2005) First Nations. All First Nations are legal persons. The 
settlement lands are divided to two classes – 1) category A: rights equivalent to fee simple title 
to the surface and full fee simple title to the subsurface, and 2) category B: rights equivalent 
176 Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act, Preamble, ss. 3-4; Haida Agreement (1993); Belanger (2008), p. 57; Ri-
chardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 384. The model was copied in ten years’ time to 11 other national 
parks.
177 Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007, ss. 1, 13, 43; Tsawassen First Nation Final Agreement 
Act, 2007, ss. 2.9, 2.11-12, 2.15, 2.19, 2.22-24, 2.33; Westbank Indian Self-Government Agreement (2003); 
Elliott (2005), p. 196.
178 Municipal Act, 2001 (Ontario), s. 21(1); Elliott (2005), pp. 178, 200.
202
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
to fee simple surface title. The single First Nations have their separate self-governments. They 
have established their own constitution, citizenship, governing body and legislative powers. 
They may manage, establish and keep land records and manage, administer, allocate and 
regulate their harvesting rights. They can compel the territorial government to negotiate the 
transfer of the administration of programmes or services. The governments may delegate any 
of its powers to any legal entity in Canada.179
A specific problem in many modern agreements is that their self-government is negotiated 
as a side agreement which has no direct constitutional effect. This formula was used for the 
first time in UFA and was later copied in British Columbia and other provinces.According 
to the Campbell Government’s so-called Principle Six an “Aboriginal self-government has 
characteristics of local government, with powers delegated by Canada and British Columbia”.180 
That is, at least in theory the agreements could be repealed by Legislature. 
Dene Indians were signatories to Treaty 11 but there were established no reserves. They 
lifestyle became threated in the early 1970s when the federal government decided to begin 
the planning of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline to carry oil from NWT to American markets. 
The Dene formed Indian Brotherhood (later Dene Nation). In 1974 the federal Government 
appointed Thomas Berger J to inquire about the effects of the pipeline. After large inquiry 
he proposed that the pipeline should be delayed for ten years to allow the Dene to settle 
land claims and to prepare for the project. In 1976-1977 started negotiations with the Dene 
Nation and the Métis Association of NWT on Mackenzie Valley and western NWT. Later the 
negotiations split. The reached settlements are Gwich’in Final Agreement (1991), Sahtu Dene 
and Métis Agreement (1993) and the Tlicho Agreement (2003). The Agreements include 
rights to large land mass: for Gwitch’in 16,000 sq km of land in fee simple with a right to 
exploit specified stone and soil substances, and 6,000 sq km with various mining and mineral 
rights and all pre-existing rights, titles or interest to land burden the Gwich’in title to land; for 
Sahtu Dene and Métis 41,000 sq km; and for Tlicho 39,000 sq km, including the mines and 
mineral rights, but excluding water in or under lands or on the boundary to their lands. The 
payments vary from $75-90 million paid in 15 years time. 
The agreements include a share of resource royalties for hunting, fishing and trapping 
rights, exclusive commercial wildlife activities and some subsurface rights. The agreements 
have economic development programmes in the settlement area and a commitment for 
the territorial government to make preferential contracts and policies to maximise local 
and regional employment. They have also involvement in forestry, national parks, land use 
planning and subsurface resources. All laws of general application continue to apply to Tlicho 
citizens. The Tlicho government may grant leases and licenses to use and occupy Tlicho lands 
but it has an obligation to continue administering the rights and interests of parties with pre-
existing rights to land. It can make discretionary decisions respecting the pre-existing right, 
interest or resource management policy. 181  
179 Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act, 1994 (Yukon), s. 8; Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA, 1993), s. 
2; White & Maxim & Spence (2004), p. 154.
180 UFA (1993), ss. 2.1-2.2.
181 Gwitchin Comprehensive Land Claims Agreement (1991), ss. 18.1-18.2; Tlicho Agreement (2005), ss. 2.8-
2.9, 18.1, 18.6; Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 119-121; White & Maxim & Spence (2003), pp. 186-
187.
4. Administration and Self-Determination
203
Canada has established the office of the federal interlocutor for Métis and son-status 
Indians, which has a portfolio in the Executive Cabinet, transferred to DIAND in 2004. This 
has significance, because the federal government has traditionally taken the position that the 
Métis have primarily provincial responsibility. The federal interlocutor engages with Métis 
through tripartite negotiation processes and bilateral relationships. The bilateral process has 
led to Métis Nation Framework Agreement (2005). It aims to: engage in a new partnership; 
build the capacity of Métis National Council and its governing members to represent the 
interests of the Métis Nation; develop the negotiation and discussion processes; identify 
options to resolve the outstanding issues; and to identify initiatives. The framework agreement 
also addresses the implementation of the Powley decision.182
At the provincial level, the Métis are included besides the Sahtu Dene and Métis 
Agreement in the NWT Métis Nation Framework Agreement (1996) and Dehcho Framework 
Agreement (2001). The Legislature of Newfoundland and Labrador recognised the Labrador 
Métis Association in 1985. Saskatchewan has passed the Métis Act (2001) which recognises 
their contribution to Canada, establishes a bilateral process to work on land, harvesting, 
governance and capacity building, and establishes the Metis Nation – Saskatchewan 
Secretariat Incorporated as the administrative body of the Métis Nation of Saskatchewan. 
The secretariat has responsibility for the implementation of the policies and programmes 
of the Métis Nation. British Columbia has made a Relationship Accord with Métis (2005), 
stressing health, housing, education, economic opportunities, collective renewal and 
Métis identification. A more modest, tripartite temporary draft (2002-2007), called the 
Memorandum of Understanding, was made in Manitoba between the parties. Its focus was 
on self-government questions.183 
4.3.3.5.  Nunavut: a Public Government 
The Canadian administration reached the Arctic relatively late. First there were only 
missionaries and fur traders present. From 1907 Canada used a sectoral theory to gradually 
annex the Arctic symbolically. The Northwest Mounted Police reached the eastern Arctic 
permanently only in 1922. In 1927 the Inuit affairs were transferred to the Northwest 
Territories. Despite the definition as Indians (1939-1950) the Inuit were treated separately. 
The post-war Robinson Report, which raised questions on the Inuit’s poor living conditions, 
led the department to take in 1950 over their administration. Due to strategic reasons and 
to strengthen the Canadian sovereignty the federal government saw it as important that the 
Inuit would remain in the north despite many hardships. In 1953 a large number of Québec 
Inuit were forced to relocate to strengthen the Canadian presence in the north, although 
it broke their traditional community patterns. From 1947, in the north were built weather 
stations and the Distant Early Warning radar line. Ten years later Diefenbaker’s government 
started the New North Programme, which was based on improved infrastructure to facilitate 
the bringing of industrial know-how to exploit northern resources. The Iqaluit Council 
182 Isaac (2008), pp. 49-50.
183 Métis Act, 2001 (Saskatchewan), ss. 2, 5; Métis Nation Relationship Accord (British Columbia, 2005); Isaac 
(2008), pp. 58, 62.
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was established in 1962 and the municipal administration one year later. In 1967 the seat 
of territorial government, including the commissioner and council, was transferred to 
Yellowknife. The territorial government took the task of developing local administration in the 
Arctic. It established Settlement Councils with delegated limited responsibility. Their modest 
function was to advise the government on existing and proposed policies for the running of 
the settlements. The local councils were part of the larger programme of assimilation into 
general Canadian culture.184 
The Inuit awakening began in the 1960s. The first educated generation began to defend 
the Inuit rights in changing conditions shadowed by economic exploitation. The Inuit started 
in the 1960s negotiations to obtain own territory and in 1971 was established the Inuit 
Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) which did not recognise the surrender of indigenous rights. Two 
years later it presented to Trudeau’s government a draft agreement on settlement of Inuit 
land claims. The strong emphasis on nationhood was abandoned by the ITC from 1977. The 
original Northwest Territories had covered all Arctic Canada east of Yukon and north of the 
provinces and Ungava Peninsula (present Québec and Newfoundland-Labrador). It was an 
artificial construction with different geographical elements administered from Yellowknife, 
the southwestern end of the vast territory. In the western half the indigenous people lived as 
minority, divided in several First Nations, Métis and Inuit groups. In Eastern Arctic the Inuit 
formed a clear majority of more than 80 % of the total population. The negotiations showed 
to be difficult. The Public Commission of Inquiry on Northern Territories (1966) was against 
the idea. Nevertheless, only ten years later the ITC started with the federal Government 
negotiations to create a territory of self-government. Later these negotiations concentrated 
on the Eastern Arctic, when the Inuit in the western part of the territory negotiated their own 
agreement. Nunavut Tungavik Corporated was established by ITC as the legal representative 
of the Inuit of Nunavut for the treaty rights and treaty negotiations. Due to the Inuit’s strong 
territorial position, the negotiators chose a public government model instead of an ethnical 
one.185
There was a question on the application of Inuit territorial rights. The Inuit had before 
the Canadian arrival an effective and exclusive control of their areas. In Inuit customary law 
the possession meant peaceful and collective utilisation and occupation of ancestral lands. 
In April 1982 the majority of people in NWT voted for the division of the territory. The land 
dispute between the Inuit and Dene Nation was bitter. John Parker, the arbitrator, suggested 
in 1991 another referendum on a land claims agreement which 85 % of Inuit supported. The 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement and Nunavut Acts, ratified in 1993, created the new territory 
of Nunavut, one of the 12 administrative units in Canada. The transitional period ended in 
1999. Nunavut is the most far-reaching agreement with the Indigenous peoples in Canada. It 
uniquely combines the public territorial government with the Indigenous self-government. 
With the agreement the Inuit agreed to cede, release and surrender all Aboriginal claims, 
rights, titles and interests in and to lands and waters within Canada and adjacent offshore 
184 Goldstein (1990), pp. 40-41; Dickason (1994), pp. 380-381, 396-401; Duffy (1988), pp. 11, 16, 47; Minority 
Rights Group (1994), pp. 112-114. The theory of sectors means a zoning of territories as a pretext to annex 
them symbolically; One part of Grise Fiord’s have later returned to their old homes and received compensa-
tion from the federal government.
185 Dickason (1994), pp. 414-415; Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 114-115.
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areas within the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Canada. They further agreed on behalf of 
their heirs, descendants and successors not to assert any cause of action, claim or demand of 
any nature based on any Aboriginal claims, rights or interests in and to lands and waters.186
 NLCA and the Nunavut Act (1993) define the scope of package. The Inuit agreed to cede, 
release and surrender to the Crown all claims, rights, title and interests to lands and waters 
anywhere within Canada. The agreement has constitutional protection as it is a land claims 
agreement in the meaning of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The territory comprises 2.1 
million sq km, or 20 % of Canadian territory while the population is only 31,000. The Inuit 
title is recognised to 35,257 sq km, including the mineral rights. A $1.148 billion capital 
transfer payment was payed to Inuit between 1993-2007. Further the Land Claims Agreement 
included $13 million Training Trust Funds and a share of federal government royalties from 
oil, gas and mineral development on Crown lands. The Inuit have a right to harvest wildlife 
on lands and water and a right to use water. They have right of first refusal on sport and 
commercial development of renewable resources in the Nunavut Settlement Area, a right to 
carving stones and involvement in the planning and management of three federally funded 
national parks.187 
The territory is made up of three regions and 28 communities. The Commissioner of 
Nunavut is appointed by the Governor in Council. The cabinet is called the Executive Council 
of Nunavut. Its departments are set up in communities, which makes the government highly 
decentralised. The territorial legislature is called the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut.  All 
residents have the right to elect its 19 members. The Governor in Council can disallow a 
statute up to one year after its enactment. The statutes of NWT can apply to Nunavut after the 
Assembly’s implementation. The Assembly sits a minimum one time per year and is elected 
for five years. Nunavut has a territorial judiciary and its own penitentiary. The result is a 
publicly elected, largely Inuit territorial government that preserves the rights of all residents 
with special attention to the Inuit. Inuit employment is increased and maintained at a 
representative level.188
4.3.3.6.  Other Arctic Agreements
The other Inuit groups live in northern Québec (Ungava), in coastal Labrador and in 
northwestern NWT. Their status was for a long time under dispute. The district of Ungava was 
removed to the province of Québec in 1912. In 1939 Québec wanted to place the responsibility 
for the Inuit into federal hands. They claimed that the Inuit were Indians, which were under 
the federal responsibility according to s. 92(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The federal 
government tried to prove the contrary. The Supreme Court ruled, based on vague evidence, 
186 Nunavut Act, 1993, s. 1; Bernier (1986), pp. 320, 327; Curry (2004), p. 165.
187 Nunavut Act, 1993, s. 3, 5, 11-12, 23, 28-29, 31, 49; NLCA (1993), ss. 3-4.
188 Nunavut Act, 1993, ss. 5, 12, 18, 23; NLCA (1993), s. 23; Elliott (2001), p. 138; Richardson & Imai & Mc-
Neil (2009), p. 305. The Legislative Assembly may legislate on territorial elections; offices; administration 
of justice; prisons; municipal and local institutions; hospitals and charities; land; direct taxation; territorial 
revenues; the Inuit languages; property; civil rights; education; marriage; territorial companies;  game; ag-
riculture; local agreements; and money for territorial purposes. 
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that the Inuit were Indians and they were since then under federal responsibility since then. 
In 1950 the authority over them was vested to the Minister of Resources and Development. 
With the growth of nationalism Québec changed its attitude. After the recommendation of 
the Bracle commission (1962) the province took over the administration of northern Québec. 
The recent Bouchard-Taylor Commission’s Report (2008) has stressed a plural, democratic 
and equal society, to whose values also the Indigenous people may be included.189
The first treaty including the Inuit was the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, 
concluded between the governments of Canada and Québec and the Cree and Inuit of 
Northern Québec in 1975. The province of Québec started in 1973 a massive project to take 
advantage of waterpower resources. As a response, the Indigenous peoples started litigation. 
Their first victory was the decision of the Québec Superior Court (1973), which halted the 
project until an agreement with the Indigenous people could be negotiated. The final accord 
was ratified two years later. It prevented the province to take unilateral action and today 
its rights are constitutionally protected. The Crees and Inuit ceded all their claims, rights, 
titles and interests in and to land and other rights in Québec and Canada. The pact gave to 
indigenous peoples a cash settlement of $232.5 million over 21 years and substantial control 
over their political, economic and social affairs.190 
The territory was divided in three categories: 1) 1,348 sq km of land under the complete 
and exclusive indigenous control and exclusive use with mining and forest resources; 2) 15,706 
sq km for exclusive right of hunting, fishing and trapping under provincial jurisdiction; 3) 
special type of public lands with specific development rights. Québec has established for 
Category II lands a cooperational body called the James Bay Regional Zone Council, which 
serves both the indigenous and non-indigenous communities. JBNQA created the Québec 
Cree and Kativik Regional Governments. Later the Naskapi Development Corporation was 
established.They receive payments from the federal state (25%) and Québec (50%) through 
the Cree Board of Compensation, the Makivik Corporation (Makivik Kuapuriisat) and the 
Naskapi Development Corporation, which administrate the lands and funds. The Inuit 
villages – Québec north of the 55th latitude, have been called Nunavik (“Place to live”) since 
1983. In 1991 the Inuit and non-Inuit in northern Québec voted in a referendum for the 
establishment of a Regional Assembly and a Constitution. In 2006 the Nunavik Inuit Land 
Claims Agreement was made and the following year an Agreement-in-Principle was signed 
for the creation of the Nunavik Regional Government which had an estimated implementation 
time of 2013. It amalgamates three JBNQA institutions: the Kativik Regional Government, 
the Kativik School Board and the Nunavik Regional Board of Health and Social Services. The 
Inuit communities of Nunavik are incorporated in municipalities under provincial laws.191 
There was almost endless litigation on the agreement in the first decades. JBNQA was 
amended in 1978 by the Northeast Québec Agreement including the Naskapi. They were 
189 SCC, R. v. Eskimo (1939); Dickason (1994), p. 381; Minority Rights Group (1994), p. 111; Scott (2001), p. 
52; Weller (2010), p. 649.
190 Minority Rights Group (1994), p. 116-118; Aikio & Scheinin (2005), p. 24. The price was a flooded territory 
of 15,500 sq km.
191 JBNQA (1975), ss. 5-7, 11-13; Loi sur le Conseil régional de zone de la Baie James, 2001 (Québec), ss. 2, 6; 
Loi sur la Société du développement des Naskapis, 2007 (Québec), ss. 7-14; Loi sur la Société Makivik, 2007 
(Québec), ss. 7-14; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 140; IWGIA (2010), p. 52. 
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further added in 1984 by the Cree-Naskapi Act which replaced the Indian Act in northern 
Québec and was the first Indigenous self-government model in Canada. Its central features 
are unique title, administration of band affairs, internal management, public order, taxation 
for local purpose, and local service-structure. The RCAP report estimated that the effort of 
agreement bodies had been sincere but their success limited. In all, there had been a very 
significant improvement over the situation preceding their creation. The Cree complained 
that the structures were unsympathetic in their form and operation and Québec had treated 
the Category III land without regard for the First Nations. It had allowed without advisory 
procedures increased logging and road-building and planned large-scale hydro-projects and 
policy changes independently.192 
Based on the RCAP’s recommendations, the National Assembly of Québec enacted in 
2002 La paix des braves, where the Cree abandoned the litigation as a means of enforcing their 
rights although it allowed the parties to maintain their legal positions regarding the original 
agreement and its interpretation. In 2007 the nation to nation Agreement Concerning a 
New Relationship was agreed between the Government of Canada and Eeyou Istchee (Grand 
Council of the Crees). The agreement strengthenes the political, economic and social relations 
between the provincial and First Nation governments based on cooperation and partnership. 
The Indigenous villages are municipal structures.  The Cree Regional Authority takes care of 
the administration, general welfare, education, culture, youth training, recreational centres 
and preservation of way of life, values and traditions of the James Bay Cree. The Naskapi 
and Inuit have respective regional authorities acting as municipalities. The Kativik Regional 
Government, the Makivik Corporation and the province have concluded the Partnership 
Agreement on Economic and Community Development in Nunavik (Sanarrutik Agreement, 
2002). It includes provisions on electric transmission, hydroelectric potential, provincial 
parks, community and economic development projects and wildlife management.193
Six Inuit settlements in western NWT broke away from common negotiations with the 
eastern Inuit in 1977 and seven years later reached the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA). 
They gave up all their claims to land in exchange for legal title to selected lands, financial 
compensation and other rights. They were provided with 91,000 sq km of land, including 
13,000 sq km in fee simple absolute with subsurface rights. The financial compensation was 
$45 million paid in 13 years time, a $10 million Economic Enhancement Fund and a $7.5 
million Social Development Fund. IFA has no provisions on self-government. The lands are 
vested in the Inuvialuit Land Corporation. Each local community has its own non-profit 
organisation to manage the compensation and benefits. They control together the Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation. The Inuvialuit has reached a separate Agreement-in-Principle on self-
government in 2003. It would create an Inuvialuit Government and Council. The government 
192 Loi sur les Cris et les Naskapis du Québec (1984), s. 2.1; JBNQA (1975), ss. 11-13; White & Maxim & Spence 
(2003), p. 231.
193 Loi sur les villages Cris et le village Naskapi, 2009, s. 2; Loi sur d’administration  régionale Crie, 2009 
(Québec), s. 6; Loi sur les villages Nordiques et l’administration régionale Kativik, 2012 (Québec), s. 244; 
Décret concernant la publication  de l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du 
Québec et les Cris du Québec (2007), Préambule; Research Report for Land, Resources and Environment 
Regimes Project (1995), pp. 3-5; Partnership Agreement on Economic and Community Development in 
Nunavik (2002); Belanger (2008), p. 11. Paix des Braves (“The Peace of the Brave”) refers to the early peace 
treaty between the French Crown and the Iroquois (1701).  
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will have the power to make laws on internal matters. Negotiations on joint Beaufort-Delta 
regional public self-government with the Gwich’in ended without results in 2006.194
The Labrador Inuit have cohabited with the European settlers from the nineteenth century 
onwards. Both maintained distinct hunting and trapping areas with minimal overlapping. 
Later the province of Newfoundland had little opportunities to support the communities and 
most financial aid came from the federal government. The province refused for a long time 
to grant special rights to Indigenous peoples. The Labrador Inuit Association submitted in 
1978 a proposal for the settlement of claims to the federal government, demanding rights to 
land, compensation and management powers over resources and the regional government. 
Finally, in 2005, was signed the tripartite Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement (LILCA) 
which established to coastal Labrador the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area called Nunatsiavut. 
It consists of five Inuit communities, administed by Inuit Community Councils – municipal 
structures - with 6,200 sq km in Inuit ownership. They have also specific rights to 74,000 sq km 
of land and 44,000 sq km of tidal waters extending 12 miles off the coast. Within the settlement 
area, 16,000 sq km are defined as Labrador Inuit Lands, excluding subsurface resources. 
The package included $130 million as compensation for the relocation of communities in 
the 1950s. The land use planning is developed jointly by the province and the Nunatsiavut 
Government in the Regional Planning Authority. The Inuit have exclusive right to carving 
stones in Inuit lands. All residents have personal water use rights. The industrial use of water 
must obtain a permit from the province. Marine management plans and development of 
non-renewable resources in ocean areas requires prior consultation with the Nunantsiavut 
Government and require Inuit Impacts and Benefits Agreements. The Inuit will receive 25% 
of provincial revenues from subsurface developments in Labrador Inuit Lands, 50% of the first 
$2 million and 5% of any additional provincial revenues from subsurface resources in other 
settlement area. The revenues are capped when they will exceed the average per capita income 
of all Canadians. Further, the Nunatsiavut Government will receive 5% of provincial revenues 
from subsurface resources from the Volsey’s Bay project and payments from Volsey’s Bay 
Nickel Company Ltd. and Vale Inco. Some 3,700 sq km are separated for Thorngat Mountains 
National Park.195
Nunatsiavut has a Constitution, Executive Council, Assembly, local governments, First 
Minister and a President with a 4-year term of office. The administration’s special character is 
that it also represents all the Inuit of Labrador nationwide. As compromise the Nunatsiavut 
Assembly and administrative are in separate locations. The legislative powers include 
health services, education, management of rights and benefits, citizenship, justice, culture 
and language. Nunatsiavut has also received from the provincial Government 130 million 
dollars as compensation for the forced relocation of communities during the 1950s. The 
Indigenous leaders in the north have proposed a 3-10 years residency requirement for non-
indigenous people before voting or holding a public office and a guaranteed 30 % Indigenous 
representation in the regional governments with a veto over legislation affecting crucial 
194 IFA (1984), s. 7(1); Jurisdictional Response to Land Resources, Land Use and Inuvialuit Settlement Regula-
tion (1997); Hamilton (1994), p.; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 144.
195 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, 2004 (Newfoundland and Labrador), s. 8.2; LILCA (2005), ss. 
1, 4-9, 19; White & Maxim & Spence (2004), pp. 101-103.
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Indigenous interests to protect the indigenous communities from uncontrolled migration 
and economic exploitation.196
4.3.4. Reserves and Settlements
4.3.4.1. From Reductions to Reserves: Isolation and Assimilation
Canada has over 600 Indian bands living on 2,800 reserves and eight Métis settlements. The 
Indian reserves cover a land space of 32,000 sq km. The Inuit are not included in the reserve/
settlement system due to late contact and geography. Historically the Canadian governments 
have sought to integrate indigenous people under general legal regimes, although this goal 
has been often contradicted and undermined by continued discrimination and segregation. 
The segregation has been also viewed as a defence of highly valued cultural heritage. The 
First Nations have generally supported autonomous control of lands, although they have 
opposed its limitation to only a small remnant of their traditional lands. They have generally 
resisted the integration of reserve lands into the general land regimes and have argued for an 
expansion of lands controlled by the First Nations as part of the land settlements. The reserve 
system is a special phenomenon of southern Canada where the population density is higher 
and the land more wanted.197
The reserve system developed in several stages. In the background were réductions, 
supervised by the Jesuit and Sulpician orders. They had the idea to reduce the Indians 
as settled farmers, who would be easier to convert and assimilate. The first of these early 
reserves was Sillery (1637) for Montagnais. Its title rested with the Jesuits until 1651. It was a 
residential mission for introducing agriculture to Indians whose lands had been overhunted 
and overtrapped. Many setbacks led, however, to the closing of réduction in the 1650s.198
An agreement with the chiefs of Upper Canada (1784) created a reserve for the Six 
Nations, including many Iroquois refugees from the colony of New York. The original area 
of the reserve was 11,500 sq km. Superintendent Darling advocated in his report (1828) that 
establishing of model farms and villages were the best means of civilising the Indians. Such 
a village was formed along the Credit River. Around 1830 Sir James Kempt, the governor of 
Lower Canada, supported the idea of model villages, where the Indians would become self-
supporting citizens. The early villages were located in Canada West (Ontario) and were for 
Christian Indians. They followed the model of earlier French experiments. Also the Moravian 
Church had established its own model villages since 1792, followed by several other Christian 
denominations. This policy lasted until the early twentieth century. 199 
196 Labrador Inuit Constitution (2002), ss. 3-5, LILCA (2005), s. 17; Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 123-
124; Kymlicka (1989), pp. 146-147; Nunatsiavut Government.
197 Kymlicka (1989), pp. 145-146; Report of Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2004), p. 3.
198 Stanley (1950), pp. 178, 185. The model for réductions were the Jesuit missions (reducción) in South Amer-
ica.
199 Dickason (1994), pp. 190, 228, 234-236; 320. File Hills Colony (since 1901) aimed at assimilation and indi-
vidual farming in 80 acres lots. The life of colonists was highly controlled and even marriage partners were 
selected for them.
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Sir Francis Bond Head, the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, however, saw the model 
villages as a waste of time. Instead, he took advantage of a gift distribution on Manitoulin 
Island in 1836 and arranged there an Ojibwa Indian territory with a promise of the Crown’s 
protection. Another territory concerned the Bruce Peninsula. William McDougal negotiated 
in 1862 a surrender agreement with the Indians for $700. Almost 2,500 sq km of land was 
extinguished. Each family was promised 100 acres of land.200
In Britain, the Select Committee on Aborigines (1836-1837) developed a new set of 
policies based on the empire’s civilising role. The former allies were becoming wards. One 
of the first signs in Canada was Upper Canada’s Crown Lands Protection Act, 1839. The 
Crown became the guardian of Indians which were excluded from political rights, based on 
individual wealth and property. The Bagot Commission on Indian Affairs (1842-1844) had 
far-reaching effects on the development of reserves. The commission had stressed that the 
Indians had a right of possession to their lands and to the compensation in the connection 
of surrenders. It recommended a census to arrange the band lists, reserves be surveyed and 
boundaries be publicly announced. In 1850 the Legislatures of Upper and Lower Canada 
passed laws to protect the reservations from outside intruders.201
In the 1850s Governor Douglas created small reserves for Salish Indians on Vancouver 
Island. After entering to the federation, British Columbia laid out 82 small reserves, mostly 
for Salish people. Finally, in 1938, British Columbia fulfilled the terms of s. 13 of the Act of 
Union (1871) by transferring 2,400 square kilometres of land to federal authority to be Indian 
reserve lands.202 
The 1860 Management of Indian Lands and Properties Act moved the administration 
of reserves to the chief superintendent of Indian affairs who was under the aegis of the 
Department of the Secretary of State between 1868-1873, Department of Interior between 
1873-1936, Department of Mines and Resources between 1853-1966 and from 1966 under 
the Ministry of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND).203 
The Department of the Secretary of State aimed at consolidating the legal variety 
to a uniform system. The development of modern Indian legislation began with the 
Enfranchisement Act, 1869, which changed the definition of an Indian. The law aimed, 
among other things, at breaking down the traditional chieftainship on the reserves. To be 
able to become a Canadian citizen, to do business outside the reserve, to buy liquor, to send 
children to public schools and to own land outside the reserve, an adult male Indian had to 
be enfranchised. An enfranchised Indian was to be removed from the Indian register and 
would ceased to be legally an Indian. Also Indian women were separated legally from men. 
If they married a non-Indian, they lost their right to be Indians in legal terms. There were 
established elected band councils, creating federal control of on-reservation governance. The 
chiefs and councillors were elected from over 21 years old male band members according to 
procedures set by the superintendent general of Indian affairs. They could be also deposed 
200 Dickason (1994), pp. 237-238, 255.
201 Crown Lands Protection Act, 1839, s. 1; Dickason (1994), pp. 250-252, 258, 383-385; Armitage (1995), p. 
74. 
202 Tennant (1990), pp. 21-38; Dickason (1994), pp. 262, 325; Stokes (2000). British Columbia has today 1,600 
small reserves (70% of the total number in Canada).
203 Dickason (1994), 252.
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by the governor. He had a right to choose the suitable bands - without their consent - to 
the three-year elective system.The council had limited powers to make bylaws of municipal 
character and to decide on public health, comportment, stock trespass and infrastructure. 204
From the late nineteenth century the patterns of lawmaking and policy in Canada tended 
towards protection policy which made it possible to practice an “out of sight, out of mind” 
policy. In the nearhood of urban centres the policy of assimilation became dominant. It 
followed the American model where the settler-state assumed complete control of daily 
indigenous life through officials holding broad discretionary powers. The Indian Act, 1876, 
was an expression of a civilising mission whose goal was encouraging assimilation on a 
voluntary basis. There was no possibility to return to Indian status once lost. The act collected 
together the federal legislation on Indians and still sometimes regulates, in modified version, 
most Canadian Indians’ daily life. The law included provisions for the definition of Indian, 
the recognition, protection, management and sale of reserves, the payment of monies to 
support and benefit the Indians, the election of councils and chiefs, Indian privileges, criminal 
prosecutions, control of intoxicants and provisions for enfranchisement. The assimilation 
was hastened by an attempt to eliminate the tribal systems. The reserve was defined as a tract 
of land set aside for the use and benefit of a band, whose legal title is vested in the Crown. the 
chief and council had limited decision powers, but the department’s Indian agent kept the real 
executive power. Until 1982 the Band Council, a limited, municipal form of self-government, 
was the only authority granted to Indians. In 1880, the band council’s and Indian agent’s 
powers over the chief were increased.205  
The Indian Act further defined the administrave structure of Indians, based on earlier 
statutes which denied the inherent status and political authority of traditional structures. The 
principal features in administration were the superintendent and his agents and the Indian 
band, supported by the church missions and residential schools. A band was a creation of 
the Indian Act, defined as a body of Indians for whom the Government holds moneys for 
their common use and benefit, or whom the Governor in Council has declared a band for 
the law’s purposes. A band member was a person whose name appeared on a band list or was 
entitled to it. The federal government’s goal was administrative uniformity but it also wanted 
to hasten assimilation by eliminating tribal systems. There was to be one chief for every band 
of 30 members, or one chief and two second chiefs for every 200 members. The maximum 
number of chiefs was six chiefs and 12 second chiefs and councillors. The chief ’s term in 
office was determined as three years and he could be removed at any time for dishonesty, 
intemperance or immorality at the department’s discretion. The Superintendent was given 
wide discretionary powers. He was represented by Indian agents who became the real land 
lords. After many amendments he had finally control over property, schooling, public works, 
hunting, right of assembly, ceremonies and residence. He could also override the elections 
and decisions of Indian bands.206   
204 Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, ss. 6, 11-12; Dickason (1994), pp. 355-359; Armitage (1995), pp. 77-
78; Anaya (2004), p. 33; McHugh (2004), p. 216. To own land the male Indian had to submit to a three-year 
probation period to show his knowledge of European farming. 
205 Indian Act, 1876, ss. 3-22; Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians, 1880, s. 28; 
206 Indian Act, 1876, ss. 61-63; Leslie & Maguire (1979), p. 65; Dickason (1994), pp. 284-285; Armitage (1995), 
pp. 89-90. 
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The Indian Advancement Act, 1884, aimed at transforming the tribal bylaws into 
municipal laws. The number of councillors was reduced to six and the term to offices became 
annual. A major addition to the few bands in the new system was an enlarged bylaw making 
power to tax on reserve lands. In 1899 the elected government became compulsory in eastern 
Canada with three-year offices. The act of 1884 was incorporated into the Indian Act in 1906. 
The band councils persisted because the federal government was dealing through them. The 
responsibilities of thechief and council included: public health; maintenance of roads, bridges, 
ditches and fences; construction and maintenance of schools and other public buildings; and 
the granting of reserve lots and their registration. The real power, however, rested in the 
hands of an Indian agent who paid the bills and controlled the band funds.207
The period 1885-1951 could be characterised as a process of centralising tendencies. The 
Indian Act created a broad Crown guardianship over Indigenous peoples and their lands. The 
Department assumed increasing power in the tribes’ daily life. The Indian Agents’ powers 
were finally overwhelming: they supervised all sectors of public and private life, presided 
over the band councils’ meetings and directed political life. Until the 1950s, most of the 
legal changes had a deteriorating effect on First Nations and Inuit. The local government 
failed in many rural and isolated reserves, where the agency system continued until 1969. By 
complying with the system the bands assured themselves more generous welfare grants. The 
price was depency and paternalism and the weakening of communal activities.208
The Department had a goal from the late nineteenth century to restrict the free movement 
of Indians to other reserves and urban centres. The pass system created to control the situation 
was against the treaties and the Department had to use other means. In 1890 Indian agents 
were empowered as justices of peace to enforce the criminal code’s anti-vagrancy provisions. 
There are several Indian nations living on both sides of United States-Canada border. The 
question of cross-border co-operation is especially important for these peoples, including the 
League of the Six and Wabanaki Confederacy. The oldest document treating the question is 
the Jay Treaty of 1794, which guaranteed a free passage for the Iroquois living along the U.S.-
Canadian border at Akwesasne. A disadvantage of this privilege has been the encouragement 
of smuggling209
207 Indian Advancement Act, 1884, ss. 3-4; Indian Act, s. 1985, s. 74(2). 
208 Tobias (1976), pp. 21, 24; Dickason (1994), p. 288. The most remarkable legal changes were: the Indian 
agents became justices of peace, able to enforce regulations (1881); right to depose immoral, incompetent 
and intemperate traditional chiefs and to prevent their re-election (1884); the prohibition of traditional re-
ligious ceremonies (1884); exclusion of half-breeds (1886); the applicability of provincial game laws (1890); 
Right for Governor in Council to send children to residential schools (1894); right of superintendent to 
remove Indians from reserves, which located in the vicissitude of urban settlements of more than 8,000 
inhabitants if the Exchequer Court so ruled (1905); right to municipalities and companies to expropriate 
parts of reserves in the need of constructing roads, railways and public works, and remove entire reser-
ves if deemed expedient (1911); demand of permit to use aboriginal costume and to perform traditional 
dances (1920); punish children who did not attend the residential schools and their parents with criminal 
penalties (1920); right of superintendent to lease out uncultivated land to non-aboriginals (1918); right to 
the Department to ban hereditary rule of bands (1920); possibility of compulsory enfranchisement (1922); 
revention of funding for Indian legal claims (1927); right to prevent the entrance of an Indian to pool hall 
(1930); right to Indian agents to direct band council meetings and cast a deciding vote (1936); and inclusion 
of the Eskimo (1939). Cf. Indian Act (1881-1939).
209 Indian Act (1890); Snow (1996), p. 201.
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4.3.4.2.  Post-War Reserves: Integration and Survival 
After the Second World War the attitudes began to gradually change. A joint committee 
of the federal parliament was established in 1946 to review the Indian Act and Indian 
administration. Its report two years later increased self-government and financial assistance, 
power to incorporate as municipalities, easing of enfranchisement conditions, cooperation 
with the provinces in extending service to Indian peoples, political voice for women, equal 
alcohol-policy and transfer to general education to advance assimilation. Some of these 
proposals were included in the final revision of the Indian Act in 1951 which aimed to 
integrate the First Nations services, but the primary objective remained assimilation. The 
bands acquired authority in management of surrendered and reserve lands, band funds and 
the administration of bylaws. They could spend capital and revenue funds. Nevertheless, it 
was a culmination point. The Minister’s power as Superintendent was became supervisory 
with a veto right. The bands’ measure of self-control was increased allowing them to be 
incorporated as municipalities. In the same decade the compulsory enfranchisement and 
restrictions on political organisations were repealed. Nevertheless, according to section 88 all 
laws of general application became applicable to Indians, except insofar they are inconsistent 
with the act. This controversial section reflected the increased role of provinces and the aim to 
draw them more actively to the administration of Indian affairs. This principle was confirmed 
in Kruger at al. v. the Queen in 1978.210
The Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons recommended in 1961 that 
the Indian Affairs branch should speed up the process of integrating Indian into the wider 
society. Another commission studied between 1963-1967 Indian life. Its Hawthorne Report 
(1966) gave 151 recommendations, with good reception from the First Nations. According 
to the report, the Indians should not be forced to acquire values of the main society. The 
department should assume a more active role as an advocate for Indian interests both in 
government and society, and Indians should be consulted when major legislation affecting 
their interests was considered. The Indian Act should be preserved, but in a modified form. 
The commission did not believe that the Indian could achieve self-reliance in the near future 
while there was a lack of indigenous organisations. The report took in use the notion Citizens 
Plus when describing the Indians’ special status. It recommended that Indians should retain 
their special privileges of status while enjoying full participation as provincial and federal 
citizens. The federal government should protect their special status and act as a national 
conscience to promote their social and economic equality. The federal authorities oriented 
towards family, extended kinship and traditional groupings.211
The policy changed, when the Liberal Government of Pierre Trudeau gained power 
in 1968. Trudeau wanted to promote equal status of all Canadians with individual rights 
210 Indian Act (1951), s. 87; Indian Act (1985), s. 88; SCC, Kruger et al. v. the Queen (1978), s. 116; Armitage 
(1995), ss. 78-80; The compulsory enfranchisement of Indian women marrying a non-Indian and so-called 
double mother – rule reflected the continuation of assimilative policy; The assimilation policy was visible in 
the policy paper preparing the reform of the Indian Act, which was presented by anthropologist Diamond 
Jenness, a New Zealander: A Plan for Liquidating Canada’s Indian Problem within 25 years.
211 Hawthorn (1966); Dickason (1994), p. 400; Wilkins (2000). As late as 1955-1975, some 2,666 Indians gave 
up their status and 10,484 lost their status due to the double-mother rule. Morse (1985), p. 2.
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replacing group rights. Despite the public hearings of First Nations, Jean Chrétien, Minister 
of Indian Affairs, published in 1969 a White Paper. The document summed up the federal 
Government’s goal: “Special treatment has made of the Indians disadvantaged and apart. 
Obviously, the course of history must be changed.” The Indian would be free to develop 
their cultures in environment of legal, social and economic equality with other Canadians. 
The document proposed structural integration of Indians into Canadian society; repeal 
of the Indian Act and department; gradual termination of treaties; ceding the control of 
Indian lands to Indian people; and increased involvement of the provinces in the delivery 
of social services. In the background were the rising administrative costs, rapid increase of 
indigenous population, failure of residential school system and a growing need for bigger 
social services. The government’s aim was to eliminate the special legal rights and status 
of indigenous peoples. The Crown would offer $ 50 million in five years time for Indians 
economic development. Trudeau’s dream of a culturally and ethnically indifferent society 
met the First Nations’ resistance. The National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) and the Alberta 
Indian Association (“Citizen Plus”) led the campaign. Citizen Plus published the Red Paper, 
which became the official First Nations’ response. They wanted the Indian Act to be revised 
and demanded that the treaties be entrenched as a part of the Constitution Act, 1867. As they 
concluded, “the only way to maintain our culture is to us to remain as Indians. To preserve 
our culture it is necessary to preserve our status, rights, lands and traditions. Our treaties 
are the bases of our rights”. Positive effects of the reserve system were as following: that the 
Indians had free choice over the use of their lands; they received per capita share of the band’s 
funds if they chose to leave the reservation; the system combined considerable freedom 
of individual choice over the use of resources; and protection of the community from the 
disintegrating effects of collective action problems. Minister Chrétien buried formally the 
White Paper in 1971 but the stalemate concerning the Indigenous rights continued until the 
Calder case (1973).212 
Redefinition of the Indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights in 1982 led to new revision 
of the Indian Act in 1985. Although the influence of the Indian Act is decreasing with new 
agreements, it still influences the life of several First Nations. The law has preserved the 
classical definition of reserves: they are set apart and held by Her Majesty for the use and 
benefit of bands. An Indian band can enter into contracts, sue and be sued, and be liable 
for provincial offences. Its status as natural person is limited by the federal and provincial 
government’s rights. Registered Indians who  are band members living on the reserve have the 
following rights: they can vote in band elections and run for office; they can enjoy Aboriginal 
and treaty rights; they are entitled to tax exemptions; and they may enjoy other rights and 
benefits. It signified the end of official assimilation policy in the Indian legislation. The 
changes have included the removal of gender-based discrimination; abolishing the concept of 
212 Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (1969), ss. 1, 3, 7, 12, 19-21; Kymlicka (1989); 
p. 148; Dickason (1994), p. 388; History of Indian Act (1978). Trudeau’s program was influenced by two 
American initiatives: the termination program of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (1952-1970) and the 
General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act (1887-1934) which signified severe attrition of Indian lands. Another 
visible influence was the ideal of racial equality developed in the United States and in the United Nations; 
The White Paper had some influential First Nations spokesmen, like Senator James Gladstone and lawyer 
William Wattunee. 
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enfranchisement; restoring Indian status and band membership to individuals and children 
who had lost them through the operation of discriminatory clauses; and providing bands 
the power to make bylaws. The bands are paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that, based on the Crown’s fiduciary obligation, the monies held 
in trust for the bands must be used for the bands’ best interest. The jurisdictional matters 
of Indian bands include the delivery of social services; resource acquisition and use of 
land for economic regeneration; promotion of distict cultural and language systems; band 
membership and entitlements and federal expenditures according to indigenous priorities. 
Since 2000 all bands have only one chief who together with the Band Council has a fiduciary 
duty to the band, its members and assets. The present Governor in Council’s regulations on 
the Band Councils’ procedure dates from 2006.213 
4.3.4.3.  The Métis Settlements
The Métis’ slow evolution to nationhood was based on trade war between the trade companies 
and the birth of the Red River farming colony. They called themselves under Louis Riel’s 
leadership as the New Nation. The Métis proclaimed in the Declaration of the People of Rupert’s 
Land and the Northwest that “a people, when it has no government, is free to adopt one form of 
government in preference to another, to give or refuse allegiance to that which is proposed.”214 
Riel became the President of the First Provisional Government in December 1869. The Métis 
Government demanded self-government in Canada. The Canadian Government, although 
cautious, recognised the government. The Second Provisional Government in February 1870 
was based on negotiations with the Canadian government and led to the Manitoba Act, 1870, 
which was included into the Canadian constitutional law.215 
The political co-operation between the Métis and newcomers did not succeed well. Many 
promises were broken. Although John Norquay, an English-speaking Métis, was elected as 
the premier of Manitoba in 1878, many Métis were impoverished and frustrated by  broken 
promises. They moved west- and northwards. After the rejection of their rights the Métis 
began to establish their independent settlements. The most significant of them was established 
by Gabriel Dumont north of Red River colony in 1872, around the Catholic missions. It was 
known as the settlement of St. Laurent. The following  year they chose Dumont as President 
and eight councillors to assist him. Dumont negotiated with other Métis communities about 
the self-government plan. They were ready to subsume to British control after the authorities 
were ready to govern, which took place in 1877.216
A new confrontation happened in the 1880s, when the Canadian authority was extended 
from coast to coast. The Métis called Riel back in 1884. He sent a petition to Ottawa and asked 
213 Indian Act, 1985, ss. 12, 18, 72, 74(2), 80; Indian Band Council Procedure Regulations, 2006; SCC, Ermine-
skin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada (2009); Havemann (1999), p. 201; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend 
(2008), pp. 196-198.The other legislation use the term First Nations instead of band. In 2007 the BCCA 
ruled that there is a distinction between the two notions, based on differences in legal definitions. 
214 Declaration of the People of Rupert’s Land and the Northwest (1869).
215 Dickason (1994), pp. 263, 268-272; Sealey & Lassier (1997), p. 33
216 Dickason (1994), pp. 293-296.
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his people to be treated with full dignity. The Canadian government established a commission 
to list the Métis and their claims. Riel was not happy with the meagre results and established 
in March 1884 a provisional government. His goal was to establish two provinces with similar 
guarantees to those in Manitoba. The tensions led to a short rebellion, where the Métis and 
Cree Indians took arms. During the rebellion Riel published a Métis Bill of Rights, where he 
demanded similar land grant rights to the Métis in Northwest Territories; the possibility to 
receive patents to their lands; the transforming of the districts of Alberta and Saskatchewan 
into provinces; legislatures elected on the basis of representation; and respect for the lawful 
customs and usages of the Métis. Some of these ideas continued their life decades later. On 
the other hand, the Métis fight for recognition as a colony with a special status that would 
acknowledge their indigenous rights and distinctive lifestyle was not realised. The Rebellion 
ended in May 1885. Six months later Riel was hanged.217
During the treaty negotiations the majority of Métis who chose in treaty negotiations 
compensation in money became white Canadians. Those few, who took land instead, became 
Indians. This became an important legal watershed among the Métis community. The 
Klondike gold strike changed temporarily federal policy: the federal government proposed 
that Métis would be included within Indians. Most of the Métis, however, resisted the 
proposal and the Crown commission set up a negotiated scrip of $240. In the 1920s and 1930s 
some disappointed Métis, who had given up their treaty status, applied for reclassification. 
An inquiry by the Alberta District Court led to restatement of 129 individuals, whose status 
had been deleted. On the other hand, in 1942 the Department investigated its band lists and 
discharged 663 individuals.218 
In 1895 the Oblate Father Lecombe established the first Métis settlement in St. Paul-des-
Métis, Alberta. Prime Minister Laurier accepted the plan as an alternative to the scrip system 
and to avoid granting a special status. The Crown contributed to the plan with only $2,000. 
Four townships near Saddle Lake Indian Reserve were leased for the project for 99 years at $1 
per year. The reserve was under a syndicate, including three Catholic bishops, Father Lacombe 
and two lay persons. Within a few years there lived 50 families. Difficulties in farming and 
lack of money led the settlement to soon decline and in 1910 it was finally closed.219
L’Association des Métis d’Alberta et des Territoires des Nord-Ouest (1910) aimed at a 
broader programme. In 1934 was set up the Ewing Commission to investigate the Métis 
situation. It found that the farming Métis of south and central Alberta were without a land 
and subsistence base. They were destitute, malnourished, had severe health problems and 
80 % were illiterate. In its final report the Commission described the Métis’ situation as 
unfortunate: many of them lived near white settlements in shacks on road allowances. Even 
the northern hunters were without education and services. The commission saw as the only 
solution the changing of the Métis way of life to conform to that of the dominant society. The 
provincial Government had no legal obligation to help the Métis but there were humanitarian 
217 The Revolutionary Bill of Rights (1885); Dickason (1994), pp. 306-310, 313-314.
218 Dickason (1994), p. 318.
219 Order in Council, 28 December 1895; Sawchuk (1981), p. 166; Dickason (1994), pp. 360-361. The federal 
government  blamed the Métis about lack of interest to project and laziness to make the settlement viable. 
The Métis accused  the government, church and French Canadians together of not fulfilling their obliga-
tions; The Oblates are a branch of the Order of Saint Benedict (Ordo Sancti Benedicti).
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reasons. The Commission found out that a number of former members of the St. Paul-des-
Métis Settlement were successfully farming around Fishing Lake. They had petitioned their 
own land since 1929 and there were plans for the general development of the area. The 
provincial Métis Association had previously proposed to the government 11 possible sites 
for Métis settlements and the commission proposed the establishment of farming colonies to 
good agricultural land near the lakes and forests. The colonies would have to relocate out of 
white interference and there should be provision for possible later expansion of colonies. The 
colonies were considered as a welfare measure. Government-appointed supervisors would 
administer the colonies. The Commission was careful to not define any special Métis status: 
they were to be self-supporting farmers. Later the colonies would through a natural process 
of assimilation dissolve into individual farms. The commission’s report also recommended 
that the northern hunting and trapping Métis would be granted 320 acres of land on the 
same basis as in the southern province. They should be allowed free hunting and fishing 
permits, and a preference in acquiring them in areas where there existed a danger of game 
depletion. As a result, the Alberta Legislature enacted the Métis Populations Betterment Act, 
1938. Three years later the Governor General in Council was empowered to create game 
preserves on the settlements and in 1942 the minister in charge was granted a power to levy 
an annual tax.220 
The Government of Alberta selected in 1938 ten locations from central Alberta for the 
Métis settlement and farming. In the beginning the settlements had an inherent weakness: 
they had no underlying title and the lands were held on leases. Two settlements in difficulties 
were closed in the 1950-1960s but the other eight still exist. Originally each settlement dealt 
individually with the provincial government but in 1975 the Alberta Federation of Métis 
Settlement Associations was created to co-ordinate administration and prevent closure of 
settlements. Problems in administration led to tensions and lawsuits with the provincial 
officials. The provincial Ombudsman, who adjudicated the disputes, urged the provincial 
government to give the Métis more control in the running of their own affairs. This took 
place when the Social Services to Municipal Affairs transferred responsibilities to Métis. At 
the time of constitutional reform, the Government of Alberta established the joint MacEwan 
Committee to review the Métis Betterment Act. Its report (1984) reflected the government’s 
devolution policy. It suggested the following: Métis self-government; transfer of Métis land’s 
title to the settlements; establishment of a Senate of Elders to resolve disputes in each settlement; 
trust funds; and a cultural definition of Métis. Consequently, the provincial Government 
published a paper called Metisism: A Canadian Identity, which asserted the Métis Aboriginal 
rights to land and government. The amended Alberta Act (1985) transferred the settlement 
lands to existing Métis settlement associations or corporate entities, but excluded the mines 
and minerals.221
The provincial Government introduced in 1988 two bills which included constitutionally 
protected Métis lands set aside as settlement areas; settlement councils responsible for local 
government with powers to make decisions on membership and land allocation; general 
council, responsible for addressing common concerns of the settlement councils; and 
220 Dickason (1994), pp. 362-364; Weber (2004), pp. 331-332.
221 Purich (1968), pp. 148-149; Bell (1994), pp. 8, 12-16; Dickason (1994), p. 363.
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consistency of provincial jurisdiction with the protection of the Constitution over lands and 
institutions. The bills were the basis for the final Alberta-Metis Settlements Accord (1989). In 
1990 the Legislature of Alberta passed new laws: the Metis Settlements Accord Implementation 
Act, the Metis Settlements Act and the Constitution of Alberta Amendment Act. The pact 
granted title to 5,120 sq km of land, limited self-government and a cash settlement of $ 310 
million for 17 years. For economic administration the Settlement Sooniyaw Corporation was 
established with a $75,000 contribution from each settlement. A provincial Native Economic 
Development Program agreed in principle to allot $ 4.2 million for an umbrella five-year 
development plan, including the delivering of social services and economic development 
projects. Each settlement is a natural person, having a Settlement Council of five members 
with municipal powers to decide on commercial activities, investments, lending and 
the borrowing of money and make bylaws. A representative corporate body is called the 
General Council. It consists of four elected officers and all settlement councillors, and has the 
authority to enact policies affecting the collective interests of the settlements. It may also ask 
the minister to make regulations specifying that particular policies have no effect to the extent 
of inconsistency. The General Council is administered by a two-part consolidated fund. The 
policy requires the General Council to make a financial allocation policy. The minister may 
also make municipal affairs grants to Métis settlements.222 
4.3.5. Traditional and Alternative Forms of Self-Government
During recent decades in North America the emergence has taken place of supratribal 
identity - “indianization”.223 The First Nations draw their legitimacy from the collective and 
interest rights to self-determination. The search of unity among the Indians has long roots 
that go far beyond the colonial times. The Iroquois Confederacy was established during the 
sixteenth century. The two major proponents against the prevailing system have been the 
League of the Six and the Wabanaki Confederacy, both living across the national border. They 
see the self-determination not just as narrowly defined and mutually exclusive peoples, but as 
segmented political structures defined by kinship, geography and function. The Iroquois base 
their identity on the Great Law of Peace. It is described as a big tree with roots extending in 
four major directions to all peoples of the earth. All are invited to follow the roots to the tree 
and join in peaceful coexistence and cooperation under its great long leaves. The Great Law 
promotes unity among individuals, families, clans and nations while upholding the integrity 
of diverse identities and spheres of autonomy. The Iroquois have preserved up to the present 
time a matrilinear clan system, the Great Binding Law (gayanashagowa) and a political league 
222 Metis Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 3-4, 6-8; Constitution of Alberta Amendment Act, 1990 (Alber-
ta), s. 2; Municipal Affairs Grants Regulation, 2000 (Alberta), Schedule 4, s. 2(1); Métis Settlement Accord 
(1989); Bell (1994), pp. 17-20, 27; Dickason (1994), pp. 364-365; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 
298.
223 Cornell (1988), p. 72.
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of the Six Nations (Hodenosaunee). They assert their independence of Canada and use their 
own passports when travelling abroad.224
A first attempt to build a larger First Nations’ unity took place in the 1780s when the 
Mohawk chief Joseph Brant lobbied for a Pan-Indian Confederation and was able to convene 
35 nations to Sandusky, Ohio. The Indian legislation of 1868-1869 was designed to break 
down tribal forms of government as irresponsible. The Mohawk of the Bay of Quinte were the 
first to introduce a new, elected band council’s model but otherwise the Six Nations strongly 
opposed the elective system. Despite the fact that the Indian Act’s amendment (1880) 
prohibited the hereditary chiefs from exercising power, many bands used the elective system 
to elect traditional leaders. Even if they were deposed by the Superintendent General, they 
could be re-elected. In many communities the two systems coexisted.225
In St. Regis the struggle began in 1892, when the traditional chiefs were after the American 
model replaced by a band council. In 1899, when the elected governments became compulsory 
in eastern Canada, in St. Regis took place an armed conflict and the traditional chiefs were 
arrested and imprisoned. Despite harsh measures the traditional leaders were elected 
again many bands. As a consequence, all future  elections failed until 1908. The Canadian 
Government appointed in 1923 an investigator to examine the question of government on 
reserves. He could not find virtue in tribal government and suggested the institution of an 
elected system at the earliest possible date. The following year, a one-year elected system was 
imposed and the hereditary council was abolished according to an amendment of the Indian 
Act. While the women had a significant role in election of chiefs in the hereditary system, the 
new system did not give them the right to vote. The forced restructuring of the Six Nations 
electoral system raised wide criticism in Canada and abroad. Investigator Scott defended the 
arrangements by saying that the Iroquois could only benefit from British laws which were 
civilising and protective under all circumstances.226  
The hereditary faction did not disappear but advocated for sovereignty.  The supporters of 
the new system (Dehorners) were mainly Christians, while the traditional faction represented 
more often the Longhouse Religion. In the power struggle Cayuga chief Deskadeh finally won: 
he demanded the recognition of Iroquois sovereignty. He appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the Privy Council, without success. Neither did the Iroquois’ two direct appeals 
to King George V have any effect. When there was an armed conflict between the Iroquois and 
the Royal Mounted Police, the Netherlands promised to act as an intermediary and brought 
the case to the League of Nations. Deskadeh asked for home rule for Iroquois Nations. The 
federal government in Ottawa disagreed. It responded that in no constitutional document 
did there exist a special provision for the Indians. When Estonia, Ireland, Panama and Persia 
224 Dickason (1994), p. 359; Anaya (2004), p. 102. There are also other confederations that have claimed sove-
reignty, like the Blackfoot Confederation living in Alberta, Saskatchewan and Montana; The Declaration of 
the First Nations (1990) describes well the growing self-esteem of the indigenous people in Canada: “The 
Creator has given us the right to govern ourselves and the right to self-determination. The rights and res-
ponsibilities given to us by the Creator cannot be altered or taken away by any other nations.”Cf. Declarati-
on of the First Nations (1990).
225 Indian Act (1880); Dickason (1994), pp. 216, 260, 284, 320-321. 
226 Stone (1975), p. 381; Titley (1986), p. 133; Johansen (1996), p. 25. Ironically Ludger Bastien, a traditional 
chief of Loretteville Huron, was elected the same year to Québec’s Legislature. He was eligible because 
tribe’s position was defined with France before the British rule. 
220
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
began to rally to the Six Nations’ cause, the British Government intervened. It accused the 
foreign states of interfering in the British Empire’s internal affairs and the case was dropped 
from the organisation’s agenda in 1924.227 Two years later the British and American Claims 
Tribunal ruled that the United Kingdom could not maintain a claim for the Cayuga nation 
as such under the Treaty of 1814 but that a claim could be advanced only for the Cayuga 
Indians living in Canada on the basis of their British nationality. An Indian tribe had no legal 
personality internationally.228
Despite the early death of Deskadeh the traditionalists continued their efforts. Despite 
the amendment of 1927 of the Indian Act, which banned a right to raise funds without 
permission and prevented the Indians to create pan-Indian political organisations, the 
Iroquois renounced 1928 their allegiance to Canada and the British Crown by declaring 
independence. They petitioned the League of Nations membership in 1923 and the United 
Nations membership in 1977. In 1959 a group of hereditary chiefs in the Six Nations Reserve 
tried to reclaim control of the Reserve Government by taking over the Band Council offices 
and proclaiming an end to the elective system. The RCMP evicted them but the result was 
an approach of elected and hereditary chiefs. In considering Canada’s report in 1992, the 
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) asked in connection to 
the dispute between the Mohawks and the Quebec provincial government whether Canada 
had adopted legislative or constitutional provision concerning the exercise of the right to 
self-determination. The Canadian Government held that the self-determination issues were 
outside the competence of the Committee.229
Another proponent of sovereignty is the Wabanaki Confederacy, located in Eastern 
Canada and New England. It was reconstituted in 1978 by M’ikmaq, Maliseet and Abenaki in 
Canada and Passamaquoddy and Penobscot in the United States. Together with Wampanoag, 
Pennacook, Wappinger, Powhattan, Nanticook and the Leanape Confederacies representing 
the 13 surviving indigenous nations along the eastern seaboard, they have asserted their 
sovereignty over the entire Maritime and New England regions. The Mi’kmaq have tried 
several times to find support for their self-determination. Their Grand Captain attempted 
in his application to the UN Human Rights Committee to show the collective right of self-
determination, protected by the article 1 of the ICCPR. The Committee held that the grand 
captain could not prove representing the Indigenous people: an individual communication 
process cannot be used to vindicate a right of a people. In another case the Mi’kmaq stated 
that the Canadian government had not legally obtained sovereignty over the Mi’kmaq Nation. 
It had deprived the alleged victims of means of subsistence by enacting and enforcing law and 
politics that had a detrimental impact upon Mi’kmaq society. The Mi’kmaq tried to obtain 
recognition of the Mi’kmaq Nation as a state but the application did not succeed. They were 
also rejected a claim on behalf of the tribal society that its rights to political participation 
under ICCPR had been violated by Canada’s refusal to allow a representative of the society 
227 Dickason (1994), pp. 357-358; Horn (1996), pp.102-103; Snow (1996), p. 133, 158-162, 183-184, 191. The 
Longhouse Religion, established by the Seneca prophet Handsome Lake, supported the recovery of Iro-
quois’ traditional structures.
228 American and British Case Arbitration Tribunal, Cayuga Indians (1926), pp. 173, 179; 
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directly participate in discussions on the reform of the Canadian constitution. The Committee 
ruled that the right was not infringed because a number of Indigenous peoples’ associations 
were invited to participate in various phases of the constitutional reform process. They were 
presumed to represent the interests of all indigenous peoples of Canada. The deficiencies in 
the arrangement would be best worked out at the local level.230 
The Cree have created a Cree Confederacy with member communities from six Canadian 
provinces and the United States. They have discussed whether to include the Cree Métis to 
their confederation. The situation in Québec is complicated. The indigenous peoples’ territory 
(Ungava peninsula) was transferred to Québec only in 1912 and covers 2/3 of the province’s 
landspace.  The Crees claim a right to secede, should the Cree people and its territory be 
forcibly included in a sovereign Québec.231
Several First Nations’ final agreements have since the 1980s recognised to some extent the 
existence of traditional forms of government. In British Columbia, the self-governing First 
Nations have stutory traditional forms of government and officials. The Federal Court of 
Canada has developed jurisprudence on disputes arising from customary selection of Indian 
band leaders. The codes for these elections are created by the bands. The procedures for their 
adoption are often contentious. The judges have adapted some general administrative law 
principles, including bias and procedural fairness, taking into account the small size of the 
communities.232
4.3.6.  Emerging Structures
About 50% of all Indigenous people in Canada live in urban centres. The RCAP Report 
identified four approaches for urban indigenous peoples: extra-territorial, where a tribal nation 
takes responsibility for its urban members; tribal nation, taking responsibility or assuming a 
primary co-ordinating function; urban communities of interest-approach, where indigenous 
groups are formed and function for particular purposes; and a pan-Aboriginal model. The 
RCAP observed that all these approaches had problems. Although the report recognised 
that the “territorial anchor” was the basis for Aboriginal nationhood, the geography is often 
against the traditional models. In its response the federal Government showed similarly 
relative neglect to urban dimension and supported the reserve-based model.233
In Toronto Indigenous people run many specific structures, including community 
centres, elementary schoosl, libraries, health clinics, men’s residences, senior citizens’ 
residences and child welfare agencies. In these kinds of communities – the RCAP’s third 
model as communities of interest - it could be possible to co-ordinate all services under an 
230 Mi’kmaq Tribal Society v. Canada (1984), ss. 1-2; Champagne (1994), p. 117; Lawrence (2004), p. 240; Conte 
& Davidson & Burchill (2004), pp. 20, 35. 
231 Bayefsky (1982), p. 339; Radan (2003), pp. 630-631, 638; Lawrence (2004), p. 241.
232 Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 310. Cf. Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, Preamble; Maanulth 
First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 13.3.2; Tsawassen First Nation Final Agree-
ment Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 16.8; For instance, the legislation recognises Nisga’a simgiyut (heredi-
tary chief), sigidimhaunuk (matriarch) and angol-oskw (family hunting, fishing and gathering territory). Cf. 
Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, Preamble. 
233 RCAP (1996), Vol. 4, pp. 248, 519-622; Gathering Strength (1998), ss. 8-11. 
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umbrella organisation. The Nisga’a Nation has an interesting statute-based structure of four 
extraterritorial Urban Locals, which form part of the administrative structure. Elsewhere 
the legislation allows creation of First Nations’ municipal systems in the limits of occupied 
reserves. The municipalities can also extend by agreement their services to First Nations and 
create joint structures, like companies.234  
The RCAP report held it possible that some rural communities with a high concentration 
of Métis could function as key locations to preserve and perpetuate their culture for the 
future. The report speaks even about a national Métis government. The Métis have returned 
to Riel’s dream and advanced towards more centralised structures. They have created 
local and community councils for representation. Each province has a provincial Métis 
organisation, which represents the Métis regionally and undertakes cultural and socio-
economic programming and services. In their governance structure the leaders are elected 
through province-wide ballot box elections. The organisations accountability is maintained 
by holding annual assemblies. The Métis Nation – Saskatchewan has adopted a constitution 
which has established Métis self-government organisations: a Legislative Assembly which 
enacts Métis legislation and regulations, the Senate to oversee citizenship and elections, and 
the Provincial Métis Council as the cabinet with a corporate secretariat. Saskatchewan has 
partly recognised the Métis structures by recognising their distinct culture and heritage 
and contribution, establishing a bilateral process for negotiations and legally recognising 
the Métis Nation – Saskatchewan Secretariat Inc. as a body corporate and administrative 
body with bylaws-giving powers. The provincial organisations have also created increasingly 
different co-operational structures. The Métis Nation of Alberta (MNA) created in 1988 the 
Apeetogisan Development Inc. to support indigenous entrepreneurs and expanding their 
businesses. Its initiatives have spread to the oil and gas industry as well.235
The Métis National Council (MNC) is formed by provincial organisations to mandate a 
national governance structure. The president of each provincial organisation sits as a member 
on the Board of Governors. A national President is elected by the MNC’s General Assembly 
every two or three years. The MNC has two secretariats: the Métis National Youth Advisory 
Council and the Women of the Métis Nation which participate in  the work of the national 
organisation. The  MNC has also a national Government, the Métis Nation Cabinet. The 
President appoints ministers who are accountable for specific ministries and pursue sectoral 
initiatives on behalf of the Métis Nation.236 
234 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 11.9; Municipal Government Act, 1998 (Nova Scotia), s. 60(1); Mu-
nicipalities Act, 2002 (Yukon), s. 27(1); City of Toronto Act, 2006 (Ontario), s. 17(1); Loi sur les cités et les 
villes, 2012 (Québec), s. 29.10; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 300.
235 Métis Act, 2001 (Saskatchewan). ss. 2-3, 5-9; Institutions (2002); RCAP, Vol. 4, pp. 200, 203, 217, 232-233; 
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4.3.7.  Citizenship: Access to Canadian Society 
The enfranchised Indians lost their Indian status and became automatically Canadian citizens 
according to the 1869 law. Otherwise the Indians became citizens with full electoral rights 
only in 1960 when the Citizenship Act was reformed.  Several modern agreements create a 
First Nations or Inuit citizenship. The two most important criteria are ancestry and Canadian 
citizenship. The First Nations can decide who belongs to a nation and who can be admitted 
as a new member. Many of them have created membership codes (citizenship codes) which 
replace the old band membership rules. The respective minister must be informed on the 
code process with a new list. A First Nation’s citizenship is not the same thing as registration 
under the Indian Act, the latter being historically more restrictive. The membership decisions 
by the chief or council may be submitted to judicial review by the courts.237
Unlike the Indians, the Métis became with the Manitoba Act, 1870, Canadian citizens. 
They and non-status Indians became ordinary citizens under provincial jurisdiction in matters 
of property and civil rights. In 1990, during the legislative process in Alberta, the provincial 
government enacted a Transitional Membership Regulation, which required each Settlement 
Council and the Minister to provide the Commissioner of the Metis Settlements Transition 
Commission with a list of settlement members. Those persons with their name in both lists 
are confirmed as members and those with their name on one list as uncertain members. Those 
in the second category had a right to apply to the Metis Appeal Tribunal for confirmation of 
membership. The Metis Settlements Act, 1990, gives to Settlement Councils the authority to 
decide on the following: applications for membership, based on age, residence and proof of 
Métis identity; terminate a membership; and to allocate land to settlement members subject 
to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal. An Indian or Inuit can be a member only if they have 
been registered as members with a settlement bylaw when less than 18 years old, one or 
both parents having the membership and lived a substantial part of their childhood in the 
settlement.Each provincial organisation has a membership list and sometimes also registry. 
Based on those lists there has been created a nationwide Métis citizenship.238
4.3.8.  Enfranchisement and Electoral Rights
The election was introduced for the first time to Indians in the reduction of Sillery by the Jesuits 
in 1640. This was an early attempt to get Indians to govern themselves in European style. It 
took, though, more than 200 years before British rule began to carry out the European model. 
The pre-Confederation Indians had limited provincial voting rights as they were dependent 
on individual land ownership. As wards of the Crown their Indianness closed them outside 
the federal electoral rolls. In 1857 the Gradual Civilization Act confirmed the prevailing 
policy of assimilation: the educated, debt free male Indians over 21 years old and of good 
237 Enfranchisement Act, 1869, s. 16; Act to Amend the Canadian Elections Act, 1960; Nisga’a Citizenship Act, 
2000 (Nisga’a), s. 2; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 230-231. Québec granted the First Nations a 
right to vote in provincial elections only in 1968.
238 Manitoba Act, 1870, s. 17; Metis Settlements Act, 1990, ss. 74-84; Bell (1994), p. 25; Wilson & Mullet (2008), 
p. 334-335.
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moral character could be enfranchised. All others had to go through a three-year qualifying 
period. In practice, there were few volunteers. The Indian Act, 1876, made enfranchisement 
compulsory to Indians who obtained a university degree or became doctors, lawyers or 
clergymen, i.e.they lost their indianness through education and became civilised.239 
The federal franchise was revised in 1920, 1946 and 1950. The last revision still limited the 
voting right to those Indians who had executed a waiver of their exemption from taxation. The 
Indians’ general right to vote in federal elections was enacted only in 1960. As an exception, 
the veterans of both World Wars and the Korean War were granted federal franchise after the 
wars, and with some delay in provinces. In provincial elections Ontario prohibited the on-
reserve Indians to vote in 1876. Also off-reserve Indians were excluded between 1884-1908. 
Similar prohibition to all Indians (New Brunswick, 1889) and to on-reserve Indians (Prince 
Edward Island 1913, Québec 1915) were passed elsewhere. The voting right was returned to 
off-reserve Indians in New Brunswick, British Columbia and Saskatchewan between 1944 
and 1951. After 1960 the provinces quite soon followed the federal example of giving to all 
Indians the voting right, in Québec this did not happen until 1969240, which for a long time 
saw the Indigenous people as a federal question.  
The Enfranchisement Act, 1869, introduced a three-year elective system for bands, which 
were ready to adopt a self-government with limited right to pass their own bylaws. The Indian 
Act’s amendment (1880) strengthened the superintendent general’s position in confirming 
his power to impose the elective system whenever he thought a band was ready for it. All 
chiefs had to be elected. The Indian Advancement Act, 1884, introduced an alternative 
system of annual elections, changing the focus to a municipal model. The chiefs deposed by 
the Governer in Council on grounds of dishonesty, intemperance or immorality could not be 
immediately re-elected. The proposed system became very unpopular. The federal Franchise 
Act, 1885, introduced by Prime Minister Macdonald, gave dominion franchise for all males 
who were British subjects and who met minimum property qualifications. The law gave a 
voting right also to non-enfranchised male Indians in rural areas of Ontario and Québec 
having property worth $ 150. The law was strongly opposed and repealed in 1898 by the 
Liberal Government as derogation to the dignity of people. In 1895 the federal Government 
rendered elections mandatory in 55 bands of eastern Canada and four years later extended 
the system to all bands. A more tolerant policy towards customary elections was used in the 
less organised western parts of the country.241
The different electoral systems were consolidated in 1906, with recognition of four parallel 
electoral systems: one-year, three-year, appointed and hereditary systems. In the revision of 
the Indian Act (1951) the one-year system was repealed and the women were granted a voting 
right in band council elections. By the time of reform the Indian bands were more willing to 
accept the electoral system. In 1951 there were 400 bands with a hereditary system, 185 with 
239 Gradual Civilization Act, 1857, ss. 5-15; Indian Act, 1876, ss. 86-93; Thwaites (1896), Vol. XVIII, pp. 101-
106; Up to 1951, around 5,000 Indians (5%) had been enfranchised. 
240 McHugh (2004), p. 363. Québec later has stressed that the indigenous people form part of its collective 
culture.
241 Enfranchisement Act, 1869, s. 10; Indian Act (1880); Indian Advancement Act, 1884, s. 4; Franchise Act, 
1885, s. 40; Dickason (1994), pp. 320-321; McHugh (2004), p. 258. The “insufficiently” advanced Treaty 3 
bands were still excluded from the electoral system.
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a three-year system and just nine with a one-year system. Within two years the majority 
of bands had changed to an electoral system, but in the early 1970s 1/3 of all bands still 
had a hereditary system. Today most of the bands are elected by secret ballot, although the 
procedures may be authorised by band custom or Indian Act. The Indian Act limited the right 
to participate in band council elections and to hold office to band members who ordinarity 
resided on the reserve. While a remarkable part of band members lived outside the reserves, 
this formed a clear defect in legislation. John Corbiere, a Batchewana chief from Ontario 
brought the case to the Supreme Court, which held that s. 77(1) constituted an unjustified 
discrimination against off-reserve band members. The court suspended its decision for 18 
months to enable the federal government to renew the electoral system. Consequently, the 
Indian Act was amended in 2000 allowing for the first time the band members living off the 
reserve to vote in band elections and referendums.242 
The responsible minister can give orders on the form of elections in bands. A band must 
have one Chief, one councillor for every 100 members of the band (always 2-12). The Governor 
in Council may define whether the Chief is elected by electors or councillors, whether the 
Chief is a councillor, and how the election will take place. He/she may also set aside an 
election which is void. The main rule is that there is one electoral section. A Councillor can 
be elected only among persons living within the electoral section. Each over 18 year-old band 
member is qualified to vote. The Chief and Councillors hold office for two years.243
There have been suggestions to follow the electoral quota system for Indigenous peoples 
or minority representation after the New Zealand and American models. In 1999 Premier 
Thériault proposed in New Brunswick that two seats be reserved for First Nations, which 
the First Nations, rejected because they feared that it would shadow the larger questions 
of self-government. The Electoral Reform Commission and other federal commissions 
have recommended instead adjusting electoral boundaries to create ridings with higher 
concentrations of Indigenous people. The federal Government has not adopted this 
recommendation although there a signicant underrepresentation of Indigenous peoples at 
the federal level: before the creation of Nunavut only nine Indigenous people had been elected 
to the House of Commons. In Manitoba and Alberta officials have to take into consideration 
when fixing the electoral boundaries the Indian reserves and the Métis settlements.244
New self-government models include restrictive electoral regulations. In the Sechelt 
territory, British Columbia, the voting right is limited to Indigenous people despite the fact 
that all residents are under the band’s administration. This has been explained by the will to 
protect the Indigenous rights. In Nisga’a Nation all persons with Nisga’a ancestors are eligible 
even if neither of their parents belonged to one of the tribes.245
242 Constitution Act, 1982, ss. 77(1)-(2); Indian Act, 1985, s. 15(1); Act Respecting Indians, 1906, ss. 172-196; 
Indian Act, 1951, s.; SCC, Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Norther Affairs) (1999), s.; Olthuis & 
Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 196; McHugh (2004), p. 258.
243 Indian Act, 1985, ss. 74-75, 77-79.
244 Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 14(c); Electoral Divisions Act, 2012 (Manitoba); 
Knight (2001), pp. 1065-1077; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 305.
245 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 20; Nisga’a Elections Act, 2012 (Nisga’a), part. 3; McHugh (2004), p. 
393.
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The Métis have been since the mid-nineteenth century Canadian citizens. There has been 
created a special procedure for elections in Métis settlements of Alberta. Each Settlement 
Council has five members for five year terms that have been elected by the settlement members 
in general elections and  who together form the settlements’ common General Council. The 
legislation defines also the Métis Settlement Access Committee, which defines the settlement 
membership. The membership is applied from the Settlement Council and the applicant must 
be an over 18 years old Métis, who has previously lived in the settlement or has resided at least 
for five years in Alberta.246  
The Inuit were excluded from voting in federal elections until 1950. Then the provision 
in the Dominion Elections Act was repealed as a part of the general reform of legislation on 
indigenous peoples. Still there were difficulties at the local level: the residents of the eastern 
Arctic could vote only since 1966 in territorial elections, when the Northwest Territories 
Act was amended. The reform was resisted, as “most Eskimos were unable to speak English 
and wouldn’t be able to cast an intelligent vote”. In the public government model of Nunavut 
all residents of the territory may vote. As a majority, the Inuit do not need special electoral 
protection. The Nunavut Implementation Commission suggested in 1994 a unique system 
of two-member constituencies with gender parity, or an equal number of men and women 
elected to theLegislative Assembly. The political opposition was, however, able to bring the 
plan to a public vote. After significant lobbying the proposal was rejected in 1997.247
4.3.9.  Tax Exemption 
The purpose of tax exemption is to preserve Indian property on reserve. Upper Canada 
excluded the Indian lands in 1850 from property tax. The main reason was to protect the 
Indians from outsiders’ blackmailing. According to the Indian Act of 1876, the lands held in 
trust by the Crown for the benefit of the Indians could not be taxed, except when they held 
property under lease or outside the reserve. The Indian Advancement Act, 1884, granted to 
tribal councils, which had adopted the new system, powers to tax on reserve lands, subject to 
the approval of the Department.248
In 1951 the Band Councils acquired authority to administer band funds. They could 
spend capital and revenue monies for anything deemed to be in its general interest, unless 
the Governor in Council expressed reservations. A band could even fund lawsuits. Full 
control over the funds was given for the first time to the bands in 1958. By the 1960s the trust 
funds included capitalised annuities and moneys derived from other assets. Major sources of 
income were from leases on Indian reserve lands, timber sales, leasing oil and gas exploration 
rights and sale of gravel. The size of trust funds varied considerably. The degree of bands’ 
financial autonomy was directly proportional to their control of revenues. The Six Nations 
had one of the strongest economies. In 1988 the Indian Act was amended to allow the First 
Nations to pass property taxation bylaws for reserves with minister’s approval. They had to 
246 Metis Settlements Act, 2000 (Alberta), ss. 3, 8-9, 12, 74, Schedule 3, s. 2.
247 Duffy (1988), pp. 70-73; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 305.
248 Indian Act, 1876, ss. 29-44; Indian Advancement Act, 1884, s. 11; SCC, Bastien Estate v. Canada (2011), s. 
21-28; Karsten (2002), p. 60.
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be reviewed by the Indian Taxation Advisory Board. In 1990 the Westbank and Kamloops 
Indian bands passed their own taxation bylaws, and soon they were followed by 40 more 
First Nations. The Aboriginal Action Plan (1998) promised a new fiscal relationship between 
the federal and indigenous governments. The plan envisioned common accounting, data 
exchange and standards of accountability. It promised to reclaim legislative initiative over 
judicial initiative.249
No reserve Indian is subject to taxation in respect of the ownership, occupation, possession 
or use of any property. They are also freed of several provincial consumption taxes, including 
the alcohol, tobacco and fuel taxes. Neither a succession duty, inheritance tax or estate duty is 
payable on the death of an Indian on the before-mentioned property. The registered Indians 
living outside a reserve have only partial tax exemption, but have otherwise the same rights. 
Non-member registered on-reserve Indians are only entitled to full tax exemptions and have 
some of the First Nation’s rights and privileges. Finally, a non-registered First Nation’s citizen 
has no tax exemptions, but he/she can enjoy many of the First Nations’ rights and benefits 
and participate in its political life. The Aboriginal and treaty rights for this last group are only 
partial and not always clear.250  
The Indian Act establishes two types of taxes: the First Nations tax and the First Nations 
goods and services tax. They are collected and administered by by Canada Revenue Agency. 
The federally approved First Nations may make laws and bylaws to implement the taxes. On 
reserves all residents pay these taxes. The First Nations Tax applies to sales of alcohol, fuel 
and tobacco on reserves. In 2008 21 First Nations had this tax, but the federal government is 
not willing to enter new agreements. It prefers instead the First Nations Goods and Services 
Tax, which applies to all taxable supplies. An alternative taxation system is offered by the First 
Nations Fiscal and Statistical Management Act, 2005, which has established four institutions: 
the First Nations Tax Commission (advisory board), the First Nations Finance Authority 
(loans and investments), the First Nations Financial Management Board (supervision 
and management arrangements), and the First Nations Statistic Institute. The act imposes 
a third party management on First Nations government in debt or where allegations of 
mismanagement are made. Under third party management the respective minister orders all 
financial operations on specific First Nations to be controlled by appointed firms. The First 
Nations chiefs are accountable both to Indian Affairs and to their own people, while they lack 
control over their own revenues.251   
The Indian Act is not applicable to self-governing First Nations. Each of them has a specific 
power to tax. The Umbrella Agreement First Nations, Tlicho Government and the Nunatsiavut 
Government have adopted Personal Income Tax Agreements, which cover all residents in 
249 Indian Act (1951); Indian Act, 1985, s. 83(1)(a); Dickason (1994), p. 384; Stokes (2000); Richardson & Imai 
& McNeil (2009), p. 298; Cook & Lindau (2000), pp. 26-27.
250 Indian Act (1985), s. 83; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 232-233. Cf. Indian Self-Government 
Enabling Act, 1996, ss. 2, 31-37; Revenue Tax Act, 1988 (Prince Edward Island), s. 20(3); Motor Fuel Tax 
Act, 1996 (Ontario), s. 20.1; Tobacco Tax Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 45(2); Règlement sur les Indiens, 1981 
(Québec), s. 2; Sale of Marked Tobacco on Indian Reserves Regulation, 2006 (Manitoba), s. 2; Sales of Un-
marked Cigarettes on Indian Reserves Regulation (Ontario), s. 2, 4; Fuel Tax Regulation, 2007 (Alberta), s. 
8(2); Règlement d’application de la loi concernant la taxe sur les carburants, 2013 (Québec), s. 12.1R1. 
251 Indian Act, 1985, s. 87(2)-(3); First Nations Goods and Services Tax Act, 2003, ss. 4, 20;  First Nations Fiscal 
and Statistical Management Act (2005), ss. 4, 17, 38, 58, 91.
228
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
their territories, but are harmonised with other federal and terrorial taxes. Also property 
taxation in Nisga’a territory covers all inhabitans. The Westbank Indian Self-Government 
Agreement includes a tax immunity based on the Indian Act. The First Nation, forming only 
4% of the total population, has powers to tax the property of the non-member majority. In 
several provinces the responsible minister may enter into a tax administration agreement 
with a band council and authorise the collection of taxes imposed by band laws.252
In Nowegijick (1983) the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Indian Act. Nowegijick 
had earned his income off the reserve, but lived on reserve and worked for a band-owned 
company whose office was on the reserve. Dickson CJ defended the broad interpretation and 
held that treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and doubtful 
expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.253 
The Akwesasne Mohawks, living on both sides of the US-Canadian border, have refused 
to pay sales tax and customs duties on items imported from the United States. They refer to 
Jay Treaty (1794) which guarantees unrestricted freedom of movement over the river, and 
give to local Indians a special status. The Canadian authorities and courts have held that after 
the War of 1812 the treaty is no longer in force. The case has been made more complicated 
by the fact that the United States has recognised a free passage for Canadian Iroquois. This 
was recognised for the first time in 1927 by the United States Federal Court in McCandless 
case. It and all subsequent decisions were based more on political necessity than Aboriginal 
rights. The United States Congress included the Iroquois’ free passage to legislation in 1928. 
The Canadian Mohawks litigated unsuccessfully in 1956 and 1993. In 2001 Chief Mitchell 
tried to prove that an import duty free over the border is part of the Mohawk distinct 
culture. In Supreme Court McLachlin CJ held, based on Van der Peet’s analysis, that there 
was insufficient evidence that the Mohawk had traded north of the St. Lawrence River. The 
cross-border trade was an important factor for the modern Mohawk and the cases context 
supported it, but the claimed right had to be quantifiable, enforceable and reasonably specific. 
Binnie J (dissent) held that the right Mitchell claimed could not have come into existence due 
to its incompatibility with the existence of Crown sovereignty.254
252 Elliott (2005), p. 175; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 203. Cf. Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, 
s. 16; Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, 2005, s. 8; Treaty First Nation Taxation Act, 2007, s. 4; 
Revenue and Financial Services Act, 1983 (Saskatchewan), s. 71.1; Tax Administration and Miscellaneous 
Taxes Act (Manitoba), s. 95.1(2); Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, 2004 (Newfoundland and 
Labrador), ss. 2, 8; Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 19; Tsawas-
sen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 19; Loi sur l’administration fiscal, 2012 
(Québec), s. 9.0.1; Loi sur la taxe du vente du Québec, 2013 (Québec), s. 541.47.3; Westbank Indian Self-
Government Agreement (2003); 
253 SCC, Nowegijick v. R. (1983), p. 41. Nowegijick is a significant departure from the reasoning in Sikeya, where 
the indigenous rights could be extinguished by general federal legislation.
254 Jay Treaty (1794), art. 3; SCC, Mitchell v. M.N.R. (2001), s. 64; Yablon-Zug (2008), pp. 576, 579, 585. The 
free right of passage is mentioned  in s. 1359 of the Aliens and Nationality Act; The events of 1991 have led 
also the United States to check the freedom.
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Conclusions4.4. 
Indigenous peoples’ self-determination is based on their historical land space. Today only 
a minority of them live in their historical territories, but their claims are closely related to 
the historical situation, which gives them justification as first peoples. The central question 
in different settlements has been the compensation of past greavances. The western colonial 
states have a common cultural, religious and colonial background. Therefore, the methods 
of acquisition have been similar, but at the same time also tailored to local conditions. 
Great Britain and France were from the seventeenth century the main competitors in North 
America, Africa and Oceania, rushing to the same destinations.
The British authorities used as a basic form for acquisition of lands the formal treaties. The 
common law’s doctrine of continuity recognised in most cases the existence of indigenous 
political organisations. In Canada the treaties were first based on equal standings, but later 
with the growth of the settler society the First Nations became wards of the Crown. The treaties 
were used to extinguish the indigenous rights. The British authorities did not recognise the 
Marshall doctrine of sovereign dependent nations, but used the system of reserves to isolate, 
civilise and finally assimilate the Indian tribes. The Métis were despite their early political 
organisation largely abandoned “in-between”. They were neither white nor Indian. The Inuit 
had no contact with Canadian legislation due to their geographical isolation. 
In New Zealand the British authorities met more equal force in the Māori tribes and 
subjugation to British political structures took a longer time. The Treaty of Waitangi recognised 
the Māori rights, although the treaty was soon neglected and there were differences in its 
interpretation while there were two difference language variants. Unlike in Canada, the Māori 
were able to construct parallel structures and the de facto pluralism was in this sense more 
visible. A major difference was also that the dominant society was not able to isolate the Māori 
but tried direct assimilation. They were given also some major concessions in legislation, as 
the Māori seats in Legislature show. 
France used similar methods of acquisition as Great Britain. They used formal treaties 
(New Caledonia, Tahiti, Wallis and Futuna), but also military threat (Tahiti) and terra nullius 
doctrine (New Caledonia, French Guiana). In New Caledonia was used a similar reserve 
system was used with isolation as in Canada, but its methods were more harsh and the 
policy was based more on segregation than assimilation. Even in Tahiti, where there existed 
a developed, parallel legal and political organisation, the French system replaced it. Based 
on the doctrine of spécialité legislative, the local decisionmaking replaced in many cases the 
national legislation.
The Indigenous individuals were defined in legislation for segregation (First Nations in 
Canada) and electoral (Māori) purposes. In both bases blood quota was used to define the 
difference. France generally recognised only the individed French people and neglected the 
ethnic differences. A remarkable exception in this meaning was New Caledonia, where the 
acquisition of land and mineral profits led to the classification of the Kanak through new 
political structures created by the governors’ decisions. In French Guiana the solution was 
different: the existence of Indigenous peoples was totally neglected. 
World War II signified a remarkable change in attitudes to Indigenous peoples globally. 
This was related to the experiences of war, the decolonisation process and international 
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pressure. France made a constitutional reform in 1946, which changed the overseas colonies 
to overseas departments and territories.255 The first-mentioned were tied more closely to the 
mother country while the last-mentioned acquired limited administrational autonomy. In 
Canada the Indian Act was reformed in 1951. It gave more decision-power to First Nations. 
In New Zealand the overseas territories became part of the decolonisation process. They 
gained an associate status in the 1960s and 1970s.
In all three countries the integration policy replaced the assimilation policy. The indigenous 
difference was to be abolished from legislation. Similarly, in all cases, the 1970s signified a 
new change. The indigenous peoples’ position was checked first in Canada and some years 
later in France and New Zealand. All indigenous groups’ constitutional recognition (1982), 
belongs to the same global process of recognition and redress. This includes: the new Indian 
Act (1985), the betterment of Métis status in Alberta, the new legislation, which has largely 
replaced the Indian Act by tailored self-governments, the creation of Nunavut as non-ethnic, 
territorial model and the significant case law in Canada; the new recognition of the Treaty 
of Waitangi (1975), new treaty-related legislation and case law in New Zealand; and the 
decentralisation process (1982), the Accord of Nouméa and the new autonomous structures 
in New Caledonia and French Polynesia in France theu have been less related to the ethnic 
question. In this development Wallis and Futuna is the only exception. It has continuously 
preserved its strong, parallel customary structure. An explination is its relative isolation 
and political/economic insignificance to France. A new, still open challenge to Indigenous 
structures themselves is the urban development. Both in Canada and New Zealand there 
have been attempts to give at least some legal recognition to new political structures, which 
do not follow the traditional, territorial structures.
Electoral rights and citizenship have been used as tools for segregation and assimilation, 
especially in New Caledonia and Canada (First Nations), but also as indirect means to preserve 
political balance (New Zealand). The post-war Western liberal thinking used the same means 
to support the integration policy. The development since the 1970s has again recognised these 
as expression of pluralism and difference. Several First Nations, Métis and Māori have their 
own membership codes and electoral structures, the electoral rights in New Caledonia are 
restricted and the Cook Islands use a resident definition. Similarly, the exemption in taxation 
has been an expression of difference but also immaturity in Canada (First Nations) and France 
(Pacific region). It has developed as a sign of plurality and difference in both countries. In 
New Zealand this difference can be seen in legal concessions to iwi organisations and in the 
semi-independent, although financially dependent, status of associated states.
255 This division is also visible in relation to EU law.
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5.1.1. Customary Family Law
Courts in New Caledonia recognised the existence of customary family law in several decisions 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Since 1967 the territorial authorities have also recognised the 
customary marriages and divorces whose rules, confirmed by regulation in 1978, may vary 
in different customary areas (aire). Customary marriages are still organised by the clans, but 
must be confirmed within 30 days by the local mayor. The mixed marriages produce civil law 
effects. In customary divorces only the husband may start the process and the spouses’ clans 
have exclusive jurisdiction in divorce cases. Customary adoption’s basic requirement is the 
consent of the families. Legitimate, natural or adopted children, whose father or mother have 
customary status, have equal status before the law.1
The customary rules of succession were recognised in 1962. They are related to customary 
lands and are established principally through the maternal uncle. The only exception is 
related to real property acquired in conformity with the civil law and may therefore follow the 
partilinear succession. Anyone with interest in succession may ask the relevant authorities to 
hold a family or clan meeting to discuss the distribution of the deceased’s property. The records 
of discussion may be challenged within 30 days. After this period the provincial official gives 
a certificate of inheritance or title. In Wallis and Futuna the inheritance is divided by the chief 
of the family.2 
In Wallis and Futuna the customary character of marriage is emphasised when there is 
a question about a union between two clans or kingdoms. Then a divorce may raise difficult 
questions on clanic authority and its limits. It is not just a question about the individuals but 
about the Indigenous community as a whole and its material and spiritual well-being. In a 
case where a widow was not granted a pension due to her church marriage, the Tribunal of 
Nouméa has ruled that the church/customary marriage is a valid basis for a pension. Similarly, 
1   Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 10; Arrêté no. 2063 du 20 septembre 1978; Déliberation 
no. 424 du 3 avril 1967 (New Caledonia); Cour d’appel de Nouméa, Tialetagi c. Lie (1999); Ntumy (1993), 
p. 619; Agniel (2008), p. 90. For early decisions, cf. Tribunal suprême d’appel de Nouméa, 11 juillet 1921 
(no. 338), 8 août 1823 (no. 111), Cour d’appel de Nouméa, 19 séptembre 1933 (no. 86); The customary mar-
riages were for the first time recognised by legislation in French Western and Equatorial Africa in 1939; The 
French civil law knows two kinds of adoptions: adoption plenière and adoption simple.The first-mentioned 
is subject to more stringent conditions and its effects are more far-reaching. 
2   Accord de Nouméa, s. 1.1; Arrêté no. 11 du 20 juin 1962 (New Caledonia); Arrêté du 8 septembre 1980 
(New Caledonia); Ntumy (1993), p. 620; Rau (2006), p. 71.
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the customary family law has prevailed in the interior of French Guiana. Until 1969 there was 
no registration of people.3  
The Pomare Code (1819) was strongly influenced by the British missionaries, who aimed 
at reform of Polynesian values. The polygamy, concubinage, divorce and adultery were 
prohibited by law. In 1838 the British missionaries asked the queen of Tahiti to prohibit the 
mixed marriages, which she refused to do.  During the protectorate a Tahitian woman who 
married a French man had to submit the succession question to a Tahitian court. The reason 
was the land property which was still under Tahitian jurisdiction. In 1876 the governor’s 
Administrative Council decided that succession questions would be submitted to District 
Councils. Despite the advance of civil law, the customary adoption has remained strong. In 
French Polynesia there are approximately 4,000 children who are fa’a’amu, or customarily 
adopted. The Court of Appeal of Papeete has ruled that the customary adoption does not 
confer succession rights. On the other hand, the Polynesian fiscal statutes include them 
under territorial taxation under the same rules as legitimate children in law. In Hopu & 
Bessert v. France, UNHRC alleged that France has breached the Tahitians’ right to family. 
The Committee saw that cultural traditions should be taken into account when defining the 
notion of family in a specific situation. The family was interpreted to include the relationship 
between the Indigenous people and their ancestors, as is consistent with Tahitian tradition.4
5.1.2. Education: Tool of Unitary State
Governor Guillain ordered in 1853 that French became the language of instruction in New 
Caledonia and ten years later the use of all other languages at school was forbidden. However, 
the public education was extended in all Pacific territories to more isolated countryside 
communities only after World War II. As part of the new decentralisation, the legislation on 
COMs’ instruction was reformed in 1986.The Agreement of Matignon promised that France 
would educate 400 young Kanak to leading positions. Later the programme has been extended 
to include a broader group. This promise was also mentioned in the Accord of Nouméa, which 
stressed  taking into account the following: local realities; regional environment; the needs of 
balancing the content and method of formation; and mutual educational co-operation with 
the Pacific states. The secondary education and the Centre of Pedagogical Documentation 
have been transferred since 2009 to the control of the territorial government. As a limitation, 
the Constitutional Council ruled in 1994 that the territorial collectivities cannot decide on 
public subsidies of private education.5
In Tahiti the early education was dominated by the Protestant missionaries but soon 
replaced by the Catholic Church. The Tahitian education was replaced by French education 
3   Tribunal de Nouméa, 11 juin 1990, no. 930; Faberon & Doumenge (1999), p. 121;  Arnoux (1996), p. 
1624.
4   Pomare Code (1819, Tahiti), laws IX-X, XII; CA Papeete, 20 janvier 2011; UNHRC, Francis Hopu & Te-
poaitu Bessert v. France (1993), s. 10.3; Newbury (1980), pp. 92, 192-193; Rayboud (1991); Bechtel (2002), 
p. 207; Adoption des enfants Polynésiens – DAP des enfants fa’a’amu.
5   Accord de Nouméa, art. 4.1.1.; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 23, 27; Accord de Matignon 
(1988), Texte no. 2; CC, Décision no. 93-329 DC du 13 janvier 1994; Aldrich (1993), p. 143; Bechtel (2002), 
p. 48; Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
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from 1880 and the school was used as a media of cultural assimilation. In 1939 the Catholic 
Church laid a plan to educate adolescent Polynesian as technitians and teachers. Five years 
later, de Gaulle’s provisional administration promised to promote educational services in 
Polynesia but it took 40 years before French Polynesia obtained control on education (1984). 
Twelve years later the competence was extended to the creation of establishment of secondary 
education, but the highest education is still conditional on an agreement between the state 
and the territory.6
According to the law of 1961 the state has responsibility for education in Wallis and Futuna, 
but in practice the agreements between the Ministry of National Education and the Catholic 
Mission (since 1969) signify that the Catholic Church takes care of all primary education in 
the islands. The state has, however, “hired back” the responsibility for secondary education 
for 30 years from the Catholic Mission. Also French Guiana has exceptional arrangements 
for its indigenous people. Their children are freed from compulsory school attendance by 
permission of the prefect, because many children participate in the seasonal hunting in 
the rain forests with their families, which does not support the demands of sedentary life. 
There have been also efforts to support the Indigenous children’s learning through different 
state-funded projects, e.g. programme of far-distance instruction, co-operation with Brazil 
to support the indigenous children and special structures for Indigenous children with 
handicaps or learning difficulties.7
5.1.3.  Media: Monopoly or Freedom of Expression?
Broadcasting has been a state monopoly in France. Beginning with the telegraph, the monopoly 
was soon extended to radio and television. Even when the state broadcasting network was 
made a distinct corporation in 1959, it remained under strong government influence. Split into 
a number of radio and television channels in 1974, broadcasting remained a state monopoly, 
supervised by the the Supreme Council of Audiovisuality (CSA) and the parliamentary 
Committee for Radio and Television. The CSA controls the use of new frequencies of television 
and radio and gives them authorisation. In 1989 the CSA was given powers, which allowed 
the duration of the licence to be curtailed, and the imposition of a fine. The law gave a right 
to hearing and to challenge a decision before the Conseil d’Etat as well as requiring that full 
reasons are given for any penalty. The monopoly was even strengthened in 1978, and upheld 
by the Constitutional Council, which made it a criminal offence to broadcast in breach of 
the monopoly. In 1982 the council specified the right to broadcast belonging to the freedom 
of expression principle in article 11 of the Declaration of 1789. It drew analogies from other 
texts to reach these ends. When interpreting the pluralism in article 11, it held that the form 
of pluralism is primarily for the legislature to determine. The principle of pluralism justifies 
the competition in media. Pluralism can appear within the public sector or between the 
public and private sectors. It can be internal when a particular media institution is required 
6   Loi organique no. 96-312 du 12 avril 1996, art. 6 al. 11; Loi no 84-820 du 6 septembre 1984, art. 3; Newbury 
(1980), pp. 204, 281, 311; Sem (1996), p. 111.
7   Payé (2001), p. 229; Plan d’action pluriannuel (2000); Préfecture des Îles Wallis-et-Futuna; Guyane 
Française: composition ethnolinguistique.
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to include a variety of opinions within its columns or air waves. The parliament can make 
adequate provisions to guarantee pluralism in the public sector. If a particular area has only 
one authorised frequency, the National Commission of Communication and Liberties may 
require the licensee to undertake obligations to ensure the free and pluralist expression of 
ideas and currents of opinion.8 
The broadcasting was extended to all overseas territories in 1954. Since the beginning 
there has been also programmes in indigenous languages - French Polynesia and Wallis and 
Futuna are in the media characteristically bi-/trilingual. In  New Caledonia a radio station 
was established as early as  1937, and television programmes started both in New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia in 1965, but in Wallis and Futuna only in 1986. Since 1982 the state 
producer of broadcast services has been Société de radiodiffusion et de télévision française pour 
l’outre-mer. In New Caledonia, CSA must consult the territorial government on all decisions 
dealing with the territory. The audiovisual communication has been transferred since 2009 to 
territorial responsibility. The Kanak names, their cultural objects and languages are respected 
and their cultural development supported in the media. In French Polynesia, territory has 
producted and transmitted local social, cultural and educational programmes since 1984. The 
breaking of the state monopoly in 1994 has strengthened the position of Tahitian language 
in the media.9 
5.1.4.  Social Republic: Health and Social Services
In New Caledonia the repeal of Code de l’Indigénat (1946) signified for the Melasian 
population freedom from many restrictions. Largely neglected before, the Melanesian 
population was now included to the social and economic programmes of the Fourth 
Republic, which improved their health. The goal of the state’s policy, continued by the Fifth 
Republic, was to integrate the Kanak into French society and culture which mostly affected 
the narrow Melanesian middle-class.  In 1986 the French government designed for the 
territory an economic revival plan.10 The law of 9 November, 1988 and the guidelines of the 
Accord of Matignon gave to the Congress of New Caledonia a central role in social and health 
questions: the economic development, housing, facilities, youth, sport and social actions 
were given to the competence of the provinces.11 In 1995 the legislation was again modified. 
Accordingly, public health, medical care and social protection belong to the territory. There 
has been created a terrorial social security system in the case of illness, including free medical 
care for low-income citizens varying according to province. The organic law of 1999 stresses 
8   Loi no 86-17 du 28 juillet 1978, art. 71; CC, Décision no. 78-96 DC du 27 juillet 1978; Décision no. 82-141 
DC du 27 juillet 1982; Décision no.86-217 DC du 18 septembre 1986; Vernier (1993), p. 93; Bell (2001), pp. 
167, 173-174, 191.
9   Loi no. 82-652 du 29 juillet 1982; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 27; Décret no. 54-959 du 
14 septembre 1954; Accords de Nouméa (1998), art. 1.3, 3.2; Aubry (1992), p. 136; Sem (1996), p. 122; La 
France première.
10   Ntumy (1993), pp. 598-599; Payé (2001), p. 209; Bechtel (2002), p. 48.
11   Accords de Matignon, Texte no. 1; Accord de Nouméa (1998), art. 4.3.1.; Loi no. 88-1028 du 9 novembre 
1988, art. 1, 9.
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especially social housing.12 The territorial Government has negotiated a Social Pact (2000) to 
create conditions for social peace. The pact uses the notion preventive dialogue to describe a 
more advanced cooperation between the employees and employers. The living conditions of 
the less favoured are promoted by more balanced wage development, improvement of living 
conditions and redefinition of child benefits. The pact also has aimed to create new work 
markets, protect the local work force and to preserve the territory’s vital interests.13
Governor de Géry started in Polynesia a public works programme in 1937. In 1944 the 
French provisional administration promised to promote health services which took place 
with the Fourth Republic’s new social policy in the Pacific. The Constitution of 1946 stressed 
strongly the social policy: to promote the welfare of overseas territories the state’s role 
was increased. The new economic policy included creation of a public welfare system and 
nationalisation programme. New agencies promoted technical and commercial innovations. 
Like in New Caledonia, the health care belongs today to the territorial government. In French 
Guiana it is the responsibility of the Regional Council and only on Wallis and Futuna does the 
responsibility still belongs to the state through its local Health Agency.14 
New Zealand5.2. 
5.2.1. Gender Equality and the Decline of Customary Family Law
With the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 women are allowed to speak after the kawa 
(procedure) of marae, but still in 2005 a female Pākehā probation officer complained about 
the discrimination of women in poroporoaki (farewell) ceremony which was arranged for 
male offenders who had completed a violence prevention programme. The women were not 
permitted to speak or sit on the front row. The process led the Department of Corrections to 
release new guidelines which give all participants equal roles and permits the use of another 
language than Māori while protecting the traditional values.15  Recently the New Zealand Law 
Commission has suggested that gender discrimination in traditional structures should not be 
permitted. 16 The challenges related to the equality of sexes are also evident in the associated 
states. Concerning the Cook Islands, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women has noted that there is still work to do to change traditional attitudes related 
to culture and women’s role in society.17 On the other hand, it has advanced and today also 
women can become ariki.18 
12   Loi no. 95-173 du 20 février 1995, art. 2; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 22.
13   Pacte social (2000), ss. 1.1, 2. 
14   Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 40; Newbury (1980), pp. 301, 311; Aldrich (1993), pp. 
55, 69-72, 135; Préfecture des Îles Wallis-et-Futuna; Région Guyane.  
15 . Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985, s. 6(2); McHugh (2004), p. 572; Baird & Glazebrook & Holden 
(2009), p. 79.
16   Waka Umanga (2006), s. 4.53.  
17   Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Initial Report of States Parties. Cook Islands (2006), 
I.1.2, II.5.
18   Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 176.
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In family legislation there were generally no separate provisions for the Māori, but until 
1951 they were exempted from certain marriage requirements. The Half-Caste Disability 
Removal Act 1860 legitimated half-caste children when the parent married. The courts 
interpreted this provision so that, where the paternity of a mixed-blood individual was 
recognised, the child took the father’s status.19 Justice Salmond introduced the principle from 
American Indian law and it was added later to the Marriage Act 1880. Also the customary 
marriages related to the succession of Māori lands were recognised in the Native Land Act 
1909 and subsequent case law, although there was no formal registration of marriage. The 
validity of customary marriage was strictly limited to this purpose. During the integration 
period the legislation ignored Māori values in the structure and constitution of the family.20 
The child welfare is, however, an area where the legislature has required Māori values to be 
taken into account. The Family and Youth Courts and the director general of social welfare 
have to understand and apply tikanga relevant to kin relationships and the chief execute of 
the ministry may enter into agreements with iwi on child and family support services. A child 
can be placed to custody iwi authorities for a maximum of 28 days. Also joint family homes 
are included to Māori lands.21
Before colonisation there was no system of succession because the title was held 
communally. Only small pieces of land supplying food or small items were defined. 
Nevertheless, the customary rules prevailed and were interpreted by the Maori Land Court 
until 1967, when the Maori Amendment Act, inspired by the integration policy, codified 
succession on Māori freehold land to correspond to the Pākehā rules. The status quo ante was 
returned in 1974, which allowed again a Māori customary succession, defined by the Māori 
Land Court. The Māori freehold land is exempted from succession provisions while the Te 
Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 includes otherwise the Māori freehold land in the general 
legislation. The Law Commission has studied possibilities to recognise Māori autonomy on 
succession but has stressed that the basic objectives must be held in common with wider 
society.22
A customary marriage, which had no other formalities than cohabitation and common 
assent, was recognised in inheritance questions relating to Māori land. The Native Land 
Act 1909 and the subsequent case law confirmed this. For example, in 1932 the Supreme 
Court ruled that “these unions are recognized by the Native Land Courts as sufficient for the 
purposes of succession to the estates of Māoris and half-castes, whether the estate consists of 
land or personal property, and whether the land is customary or freehold”. No such union or 
19   Half-Cast Disability Removal Act 1860, s. 3; NZSC, Renata Ti Ni v. Tuihata Te Awhi and Rotia Hini 
(1921). 
20   Marriage Act 1880, s. 12; Native Land Act 1909, ss. 190-192; Maori Affairs Act 1953, s. 116; Joint Family 
Houses Act 1964, s. 25(2); Matrimonial Property Act 1976; Guardianship Act 1968, s. 23; McHugh (2004), 
p. 275; Young & Belgrave & Bennion (2005), pp. 52-53.  
21   Children and Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, ss. 139, 396, 400-402; Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 
1993, Part IV; Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand (2001), pp. 58, 67-68, 89.
22   Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967, s. 76; Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1974, s. 25; McHugh (1991), pp. 
345-346. The MLC’s basic rule has been: “The persons who succeed are the nearest of kin to the deceased 
owner by that line of descent through which his right to the land was derived being in the first instance his 
natural children.”
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customary marriage, however, is valid for any other purpose. The customary marriages must 
still be registered if they can be ascertained.23
The customary adoptions (whāngai) were legally recognised for a long time due to 
customary land rights. The Privy Council gave opinion in two early twentieth century cases 
on validity of an adoption for the purposes of succession when a Māori couple had adopted a 
Pākehā child. They had done the adoption according to New Zealand statutes. However, the 
Māori customary law did not accept the adoption of a non-Māori. The Native Land Court 
and Native Appellate Court accepted the traditional Māori view. The Privy Council, however, 
reversed these decisions and held that continuing adaptation of Māori customs could enable 
a tribe to modify their customs. A European child adopted by Māori parents could succeed 
Māori land.24
 The whāngai children were gradually excluded from the concept of child. The consolidation 
of legislation in the Maori Land Act 1909 ended the customary adoptions’ legal status and 
the final blow was the family legislation of 1955. The MLC had until 1963 the power to make 
an exceptional adoption order where at least one of the applicants was Māori when all formal 
adoptions were removed to the Family Court. The court has, however, made exceptions to 
the narrow interpretation of law. For instance, the need to return to own cultural context has 
been recognised as basis for custody. Te Ture Whenua Act 1993 has returned to MLC powers 
to make an order which recognises a person whāngai of a deceased owner of Māori freehold 
land and may entitle him/her to success beneficial interests. Although the Law Commission 
recommended the official recognition of Māori customary adoptions in New Zealand in 
2000, it has not led to general recognition.25 Similarly, New Zealand’s legislation extended 
to the overseas territories: the customary marriages and adoption have no force of law in 
associated states.26
 
5.2.2.  Assimilation Through Education and the Recovery
Governor Gray granted in the 1850s funding for missionary societies’ schools for the Māori 
and other Polynesian children. The Native School Act 1862 provided establishment of separate 
Māori schools to each community and the primary, secular education became compulsory in 
1877. The separate Native School Division of the Department of Education existed until the 
1960s when it was disbanded as part of the integration policy. In the 1930s the government 
started educational programmes to fund Māori schools, equipments, material, scholarships, 
23   Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act, 1995, s. 14; NZSC, In re Wi Tamahau Ma-
hapuku (deceased); Thompson v. Mahapuku (1932).
24   JCPC, In re The Will of Wi Matua, Deceased, Ex parte Reardon and Te Pamoa (1908); Hineiti Rirerire Arani 
v. Public Trustee (1919).
25   Maori Land Act 1909, s. 161; Adoption Act 1955, s. 19(1); Family Protection Act 1955, s. 3; Te Ture Whenua 
Act 1993, s. 115; NZCA, Keelan v. Peach (2002), ss. 1, 42; FC, Rikihana v. Parson (1985); McHugh (1991), 
pp. 290-291; Armitage (1995), p. 146. Maori Custom Law and Values (2001), p. 59.
26   Cook Islands Act 1915, ss. 456, 509; Niue Act 1966, ss. 516, 580; Ntumy (1993), pp. 20, 162, 309; In Tokelau, 
kaiga has strict rules on personal relation within a group and with other groups, inclusing the social roles 
and succession to land. Births, adoptions, marriages and divorces are, however, registered according to New 
Zealand’s statutes and regulations.
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benefits and exhibitions. The Maori War Effort Committees took care in the 1940s of education 
and vocational training in Māori communities. Later its work was continued in the Maori 
Women’s Welfare League (from 1951) and trust boards (from 1955).27
The devolution policy of the late 1970s produced Māori language nets and schools, 
staffed by volunteers but supported by the Department. Kōhanga Reo (Māori language nests/
preschools) was established in 1981 as a vehicle for the promotion of the Māori language, to 
stimulate whānau centre and to maintain a Māori environment by using immersion modes of 
learning. Kura Kaupapa Māori (primary total immersion schools) have been established since 
1985. As a state school they can run only after a consultation with Te kaitiaki o Te Aho Matua, 
a Māori advisory body. The schools use the whānau method, stressing knowledge, pedagogy, 
discipline and curriculum. The knowledge is regarded to belong to a whole group or whānau. 
The learning environment includes traditional Māori features. The schools are included in 
the Education Act 1989 and have been since then part of the public school system. The Local 
Boards of Trustees must take into consideration views and concerns of Māori communities 
and to recognise the unique position of Māori culture.28 
It is also possible to establish wānanga establishments, which use ahuatanga Māori 
(Māori tradition) according to tikanga. The Education Amendment Act 1990 concerns the 
tertiary educational institutions. In 1993 two tertiary institutions were established to offer 
degree courses emphasising Māori culture and language and today all tertiary councils have 
to acknowledge the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. In 2004 the government published 
the Māori Potential Framework, a strategic approach to Māori development. The three goals 
of Māori education there are to live as Māori; autonomous participation as world citizens; 
and enjoyment of good health and a higher standard of living. The framework supports the 
realisation of Māori potential as a means to increase their welfare and wellbeing. Its four 
pillars are rawa (resource), mātauranga (knowledge), whakamana (information), and aranga 
(well-being).29  
The latest amendment to the Education Act (2013) recognises partnership schools, which 
are called kura hourua. The responsible minister must appoint an advisory group of one or 
more members to advise the minister in partnership school questions. Kura hourua schools 
focus on the Government’s priority groups, like the Māori and the Pacific Islanders, helping 
them to reach their potential. All schools have private sponsor organisations, where comes 
the name.30
Waitangi Tribunal’s Te Reo Maori Report (1986) stated that Māori children were not 
adequately taught by the system’s own standards. The Waikato Tainui settlement included a 
plan to improve the skill base and educational qualifications of the tribe. While the universities 
were the principal beneficiaries of the nineteenth century confiscation policy, the settlement 
27   Maori Purposes Fund Act 1934, s. 10A(c); Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, s. 24; Armitage (1995), pp. 142, 
146; Havemann (1999), pp. 383, 392;  Smith (2005), p. 87.  
28 Education Act (1989), ss. 62-63, 151, 155, 155A-B; Durie (1998), pp. 62-66. In 2003 there were 526 kōhanga 
reo, 61 kura kaupapa and 14 early childhood centres in New Zealand. on the whole 80% of Māori children 
participate in some form the indigenous educational programmes. 
29 Education (Te Aho Matua) Amendment Act 1999, s. 2; Education Amendment Act 1990, s. 37; Ringold 
(2005), pp. 12-13, 32, 48. There is a growing need for Māori education: in 2003, already 25% of children 
were identified as Māori, but 57% of them had also a Pākehā background.
30   Education Amendment Act (2013); Ministry of Education.
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included a proposal to establish endowed colleges at the universities of Waikato and Auckland. 
The colleges were to be symbols of the pride of Tainui and the means of producing future 
leaders for various branches. According to the plan, 1/3 of the students should be Tainui, 1/3 
other Māori or Pākeha and 1/3 international students. The Waikato University’s catchment 
area in the traditional King Country has the highest level of Māori participation. The 
University of Waikato’s Maori Research Center helps the economic, social and educational 
developmet of tribal groups regionally and nationwide. In 2000 the Tainui opened also an 
endowed Hopuhopu College. In 2005 the Waitangi Tribunal’s Report held as well-founded 
the Aotearoa Institute’s claim, which instructs on iwi basis with Māori methods. In 2007 
New Zealand revised its school curriculum, which takes advantage of the Te Marautanga o 
Aotearoa document and takes into consideration to a larger degree the indigenous structures 
and Māori language in school work. In the  Ka Hikitia plan the Māori education structure took 
between 2008-2012 put more stress on learning, capacity of teachers, placing of resources, 
priority of Māori language in education and an increased role and involvement of whānau 
and iwi authorities. In associated states the local cultures, languages and traditions have been 
included in educational programmes  since the 1960s.31
5.2.3.		 Māori	Media
The first Māori newspaper Te Kurere o Nui Tireni was published in 1842, but most papers 
ceased to appear in the 1930s when the Māori language was loosing ground in society. A new 
coming of Māori media took place only in the 1980s, when legislation began to support the 
promotion of the language. In 1984 the New Zealand Māori Council established Aotearoa 
Broadcasting System (ABS), an independent Māori TV channel. The state-owned Broadcasting 
Corporation of New Zealand promised to provide funding and make transmitting equipments 
available to ABS if they successfully obtained the warrant but the promise was not fulfilled. 
In 1988 the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand was divided into two separate state-
owned companies and the the Radio Communications Act 1989 reserved some frequencies 
for Māori but not in Auckland or Wellington, where one-third of the Indigenous population 
lived.  Although the Broadcasting Act 1989 demanded consultation on Māori interests, the 
broadcasting policy was built on the needs of the market forces. The New Zealand Māori 
Council and other applicants to the Waitangi Tribunal claimed that radio frequencies are 
taonga and guaranteed within tino rangatiratanga. The Tribunal found that broadcasting was 
a vehicle for the protection of the Māori language and that the Māori should have access to 
airwave spectrums. The tribunal recommended a six-month suspension of the government’s 
process and allocation of FM frequences to the Māori. The Māori Council applied to the 
High Court, where Heron J supported its claim and suggested a delay of six weeks in Crown 
sales to give the Waitangi Tribunal enough time to complete its investigations. In the same 
31   Constitution of Niue (1974), art. 69; WT, Te Reo Maori Report (1986), s. 6.3; Report on the Aotearoa Insti-
tute Claim Concerning Te Wānanga o Aōtearoa (2005), s. 5.1; Gilson (1991), pp. 74-75; Alves (1999), pp. 
105, 130-131; Sissons (1999), pp. 13-14, 76; Anaya (2011), 58-60. Up to 2009 Māori participation in early 
childhood education increased to 91%, those staying in school numbered 46% and 21% were qualified to 
attend universities. 
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year a national hui stressed the significance of broadcasting for the Māori and concluded 
that Māori broadcasting required sufficient and independent funding to maintain a Māori 
TV channel, radio network, full news service and strong presence in mainstream media. 
Bilingial and bicultural policies should be pursued in programming and management of 
Māori broadcasting bodies. The hui also suggested establishment of a Māori Broadcasting 
Commission.32 
In 1991 the High Court heard a new case raised by the New Zealand Māori Council and 
iwi of Ngā Kaiwhakapūmau. The Court did not see a breach of treaty in the government’s 
new policy. The court, however, ordered a temporary injunction to the release of television 
assets until a protective scheme would be in place. The Ministry of Commerce produced 
an information booklet and sought Māori opinions in a series of hui. When the ministry 
recommended a time-frame for the development of Māori TV and an extention of Māori-
language programming on commercial television, the High Court removed the restrictions 
on the transfer of assets.33
In 1993 the Privy Council ruled that the treaty principles impose a continuing obligation 
to take reasonable steps to assist in preservation of the Māori language by use of radio and 
TV broadcasting. Consequently, the government created  a new agency called Te Māngai 
Pāho (Māori Broadcast Funding Agency) to promote Māori language and culture by making 
funds available for broadcasting and the production of programmes. The agency received 
a share of the public broadcasting fee (14.4%). Despite the early difficulties, within  a few 
years there were established some 21 iwi-based radio stations. They operated on frequences 
reserved by the Crown for the promotion of the Māori language and culture. Besides these, 
Radio Aōtearoa started to transmit programmes in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. 
In 1996-1997 were launched a national radio service and the Aōtearoa Television Network 
were launched, which made pilot Māori television programmes.34  
The government had planned to auction part of the radio spectrum to international 
companies. In its Radio Spectrum Report (1999) the Waitangi Tribunal held that the Māori have 
a right to a fair and equitable share in the radio spectrum. The Crown has a treaty obligation 
to protect the Māori language and culture. In 2002 the Māori Television Service, received a 
promoted state subsidy of $13 million per year. Finally, following the recommendations of the 
Waitangi Tribunal, the parliament enacted the Maori Televion Service Act 2000 and Maori 
Televion Service (Te Aratuku Whakaata Irirangi Maori) Act 2003. The the Māori Television 
Service’s (since 2004), function is to promote te reo Māori me nga tikanga Māori by providing 
a high quality, cost-effective Māori television service in both national languages, that informs, 
educates and entertains broad viewing audience and enriches New Zealand’s society, culture 
and heritage. The prime time broadcast should be in Māori.35
32   Broadcasting Act 1989, s. 36; Radiocommunications Act 1989, ss. 9-12; Durie (1998), pp. 68-70; Alves 
(1999), pp. 89-90; Cleave (2008), p. 13.
33   Durie (1998), pp. 70-71. 
34   Broadcasting Act 1989, s. 53; JCPC, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General (1994); Durie (1998), 
p. 70; Alves (1999), p. 91; Bell & Allen, p. 119.  In the Act the agency is described as Te Reo Whakapuaki 
Iritangi; Before 1997, 14 legal actions were raised against the Crown on broadcast issues.
35   Maori Television (Te Aratuku Whakauta Irirangi Maori) Act 2003, Preamble, s. 8; WT, Radio Spectrum 
Management and Development Final Report (1999), s. 5.1; Anaya (2011), p. 60; Mutu (2011), p. 128. Māori 
Television has an audience of 1.6 million.
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5.2.4.  Recovering Health and Social Programmes
The Maori Councils Act gave in 1900 the Maori Councils the local authority in questions of 
health, sanitation and the consumption of alcohol. Although in the background was the final 
aim of assimilation to Pākehā society, the new powers gave local communities also positive 
benefits. In 1903 legislation was reformed but few real changes took place. The Māori had a 
certain mistrust of this new attempt to administrate their lives and the first enthusiasm waned. 
There was a lack of workers and funding. In 1916 all health officers became under the Crown’s 
tutelage and three years later the Maori Councils were forced into close co-operation with 
the restructured Department of Public Health where was established the Division of Maori 
Hygiene was established. From the 1920s the health affairs became a social laboratory. In 1929 
the Native Affairs Department was but in charge of providing funds for land development, 
health, housing and local improvement for the Māori and Pacific Islanders which continued 
through the 1930s despite political changes. They included employment and professional 
skills programs for young Māori. All money was still paid to the Maori Trustee Account. In 
1944 a separate welfare division was created which supported in the post-war situation Māori 
housing and rehabilitation of war veterans. The Department’s role further increased through 
various social programmes during the 1950s and 1960s.36
Another line was the establishment of the Maori War Effort Committees (1942), which 
soon dealt with housing and social-security issues. This was a significant start and in 1945 the 
Parliament enacted the Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act. The Maori Executive 
Committees were able to pass bylaws on health, water supply and sanitation. The Act 
established female welfare officers who organised Committees of Māori Women to advance 
the welfare of women and children. The committees were the basis for the publicly funded 
Maori Women’s Welfare League (1951) which has focused on family-centred interests in 
health, housing, welfare and education both at the national and tribal levels. Later the Maori 
Trust Boards Act 1955 gave the trust boards the possibility to participate in activities which 
promoted health, social and economic welfare, education and vocational training by grants, 
loans, housing schemes, medical services, hostels, roading schemes, schools, school material 
and scholarships.37  
The Hunn Report (1960) suggested in the spirit of integration policy full extension of 
all welfare state benefits and services for indigenous people - which also took place. The 
subsequent legislation established Local and District Maori Councils. Committee Offices 
were established to advise and assist the Māori under the ministry in general welfare, health, 
housing, education, vocational training and employment. For the associated territories the 
government had besides the decolonisation policy the Official Relocation Scheme (1960-
36   Maori Purposes Fund Act 1934, ss. 3-4, 10A; Maori Housing Amendment Act 1938, ss. 2-5; Armitage 
(1995), p. 158; Hill (2004), p. 57-63; Smith (2005), p. 136. The Māori health situation was appalling: in the 
1920s their death rate was still seven times higher than the average; The health reforms still had a social 
Darwinist label: “fysical, mental and moral betterment of race”.
37   Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, s. 24; Havemann (1999), pp. 390-393; McHugh (2004), p. 273.
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1967). Altogether 2,700 people were relocated especially from Tokelau to New Zealand. In 
the background were the natural disasters and social problems on the islands.38 
In 1986 the government established the matua whāngai programme to maintain special 
children within the whānau instead of through departmental control. The programme was 
an attempt to recognise Māori values, practices and traditional structures for the nurturance 
of children. A tribal approach was integral in the implementation of the programme and in 
stressing the significance of the blood-ties. The Creation of Area Health Boards: The Treaty 
of Waitangi (1987) by the Department of Health proposed a provision for tribal participation 
in the development of policies, setting of priorities and administration of services. In 1990 
was created, related to the Maori Health Commission, the Health Research Council which 
gathers information on issues affecting the Māori people, especially the cultural issues. The 
National government’s Ka Awatea report (1991) recommended the continued use of Crown-
approved iwi for social service delivery. The chief executive may enter into agreements with 
iwi on social and cultural social services.39
The Treaty of Waitangi was included as terms of reference to the Royal Commission 
on Social Policy from 1984. In 1994 the respective ministry arranged three hui on health 
affairs. The result was a holistic approach in addressing key concerns. The iwi participation 
has indicated the importance of primary health care in giving basic information on health 
matters. The iwi have sponsored immunisation programmes and well-child care programmes. 
In 1998 the National government published a policy paper known as Closing the Gaps. The 
subsequent government carried on the policy and allocated funding for social services and 
employment initiatives, but due to the opposition’s critique about the discrimination in favour 
of the Māori, the programme  was abandoned in 2000. On the other hand, the Parliament 
enacted the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, which was the first law 
containing a treaty principles clause, formulated in terms of rights of process and involvement 
in decision-making. It recognises and respects the treaty principles in mechanisms that enable 
the Māori to participate in the delivery of health and disability services. Whakatataka Tuarua 
(Māori Health Action Plan) and He Korowai Oranga (Māori Health Strategy, both between 
2006-2011) have provided the framework for the public sector to support the health of Māori 
whenua.40 The four cornerstones of Māori health are taha tinana (physical health), taha 
wairaa (spiritual health), taha whānau (family health) and taha hirengaro (mental health). 
Among the means to advance Māori health are: the Te Ao Auahatanga Hauora Māori (Māori 
Health Innovation Fund, since 2013); Hauora Māori Scholarships; the Ka tika ka ora (Māori 
Health Provisional Work Programme); the National Kaitiaki Group (Māori control of Māori 
women’s cervical surveying data); rural health mobile services; in-home services; telephone 
helplines; on-line support; and the Pacific Health Work Programme for the other Polynesian 
minorities.41
38   Maori Community Development Act 1962, s. 6; Maori Welfare Act 1962, ss. 8-16; Armitage (1995), p. 69; 
Sharp (1998), p. 56; Smith (2005), 187.
39   Children and Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989, ss. 199, 396, 400-401; Health Research Council 
Act 1990, ss. 21-23; Ka Awatea (1991); McHugh (1991), p. 395; Durie (1998), p. 224.
40   New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s. 4; McHugh (2004), p. 507; Palmer (2008), p. 103; 
Anaya (2011), p. 63; Mutu (2011), pp. 101-102.
41   Ministry of Health.
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Also alternative health care has some recognition. The traditional healers have formed a 
national association, Ngā ringa whakahaere o te iwi Māori. In 1995 WHO prepared a paper 
for the Ministry of Heath on the framework within which the traditional healing could 
be developed in New Zealand. It proposed cultural integrity, medical pluralism and self-
determination. The Ministry of Health has accordingly made co-operation with this rongoā 
Māori (traditional Māori healing), as formulated in the Māori cultural context.42  
In all three associated states and territories the local public service has responsibility 
for health and social services. The medical service was introduced to the Cook Islands in 
1894. In the aftermath of World War II New Zealand promoted there programmes related to 
social conditions, economy and infrastructure. The motivation was to promote the territory’s 
independent development to transfer more responsibility to the local level. Despite this 
policy, immigration to New Zealand increased in the 1950s. With the self-government the 
Legislative Assembly introduced e.g. the Aged, Destitute and Infirm Persons Act (1966) and 
the Child Benefit Act (1978). The legislature has set limits to benefits: to be eligible for a 
pension one has to be a Cook Islands Māori. In other legislation the condition is either birth 
or residence in the islands. In Niue the Constitution places a duty on the Cabinet to provide 
all necessary services for public health, to secure people’s reasonable standard of living and 
to secure their economic, social and cultural welfare. The Niue Public Service Committee is 
in practical charge of the services.  In Tokelau, MacDermot, New Zealand’s first Resident, 
created a village improvement programme. In 1965 the New Zealand Government started a 
reconstruction and education programme on the islands after the devastating cyclone. The 
other side of the coin was the encourament of islanders to immigrate to New Zealand.43 
Canada5.3. 
5.3.1. Long Way to Gender Equality 
In the midst of the assimilation policy, which began already during the French period, there 
were some exemples of the recognition of customary family law. In Connolly v. Woolrich 
(1867), Monk J of the Québec Superior Court ruled on the inheritance question. William 
Connolly had married in a Cree ceremony a Métis woman and they had children. Later he 
married a white woman in a Catholic ceremony. A son from the first marriage sued the second 
wife for a share in his father’s estate. Monk J declared the Cree customary marriage valid on 
the basis that the Cree law had prevailed in the territory before the English law. Therefore, the 
children from the customary marriage were legitimate heirs of their father. Similarly, some 
modern settlements give the First Nations a say to in statutory indigenous lands in the case 
of divorce.44
42   Durie (1998), pp. 77-78; Ministry of Health.
43   Constitution of Niue (1974), art. 61-67; Cook Islands Act 1915, ss. 38-43;  Niue Act 1966, ss. 21-25; Gilson 
(1991), p. 77; Ntumy (1993), pp. 15, 305; Huntsman & Hooper (1996), pp. 270, 321-322; Cook Islands Gov-
ernment.
44   Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007, s. 16.110; CSQ, Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), s. 79.
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The Indian Act, 1876, created a legal difference between men and women. An Indian 
woman who married non-Indian or non-treaty Indian, ceased to be an Indian. A large 
number of Indian women had lost their Indian status this way and it was almost impossible 
to regain. The situation was different when a non-Indian woman married an Indian man, 
she became an Indian. But for her descendants the rule was different. Based on the blood 
quantum, the so-called double mother rule defined that if their son married a non-Indian, 
their children were no more Indians.45 Further, the patrilinear ideology of the Indian Act did 
not take regard of the fact that a number of Indian tribes were in fact matrilinear in nature. 
A process against the discriminating legislation was started in 1970 by Yvonne Bedard, 
who had lost her status as a member of the Six Nations Reserve in Ontario by marrying a 
non-Indian. She was joined in litigation by Jeanette Lavell, an Ojibwa from Wikwemikong 
Band, Ontario. The High Court of Ontario did not find in Mrs. Lavell’s case the s. 12(1)
(b) of 1951 Indian Act as a matter for judicial determination, but after she had won her 
case in the Federal Court, the High Court re-estimated its stand by ruling that the Indian 
Act discriminatorily treated the Indian women. Both cases were in the Supreme Court in 
1973. Besides section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act of 1951, Mrs. Lavell also referred to equality 
before the law in s. 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960. The Supreme Court rejected the 
application by a narrow margin. It held that s. 12(1)(b) had no general applicability when it 
included only the Indians. The process continued, however, in 1977, when Sandra Lovelace, 
a former Maliseet Indian, took the issue to the UN Human Rights Committee. She alleged 
that the provisions of the Indian Act were inconsistent with ICCPR. The Commission held 
that “to prevent her recognition to the band is unjustifiable denial of her rights under article 
27 of the Convention.” The restrictions must have a reasonable and objective justification and 
be consistent with the other provisions of the Covenant. The UNHRC could not rule on the 
original cause of the loss of status, as the ICCPR was not yet in force at the time of Lovelace’s 
loss of Indian status, but only on the continuing effects of its application.46 
The section 28 of the Constitution Act, 1982, gives the gender equality a constitutional 
status. Consequently, the Band Governments were given the power to decide whether or not 
a woman would lose status when marrying a non-Indian, and three years later the federal 
Parliament decided to remove the s. 12(1)(b) from the Indian Act in 1985. The legal revision 
was also related to another question: whether the band councils should be bound by the sex 
equality provisions of the Charter which guarantee equal rights to male and female persons. 
The revision led to substantial restoration of band membership all over Canada. By 1991, 
70,000 had regained their status after application. The total number of status Indians increased 
to 127,000 people in less than five years.47 
The RCAP suggested in its report that Indigenous womenshould be guaranteed, equal 
participation and recognition of their safety in all reforms concerning the Indigenous 
peoples. One example of challenges is that if the land base is fixed and and over-population 
45   Indian Act, 1876, s. 3; Armitage (1995), p. 89. 
46   Canadian Bill of Rights (1960), s. 1(b); Indian Act (1951), s. 12(1)(b); SCC, Lavell (1973); FCC, Lavell v. 
Canada (1971); OSCJ, Isaac v. Bedard (1972), pp. 552-553; Re Lavell v. Attorney-General of Canada (1972), 
pp. 186-187; UNHCR, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada (1981), ss. 13-14; Bayefsky (1982), pp. 244-265.
47   Constitution Act (1982), ss. 28, 35(4); Hylton (2000), pp. 180-182; Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev (2005), p. 
125. 
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threatens, the rights of non-Indian spouses are often restricted. There are different variations 
on a marriage on reserve and the voting rights of both Indians and non-Indians. They are 
concomitants of the reservation system to protect Indian cultural communities. In connection 
with the Charlottetown process the indigenous women argued both for a constitutional 
recognition of the right to self-government and for an assurance that it would not override 
their federally guaranteed equality rights. Especially the NWAC was highly critical of the 
draft agreement which had been drawn up without their involvement and implied an 
erosion of women’s rights. The RCAP strongly insisted that indigenous communities should 
not use discretionary powers to suspend women’s rights. Also the CEDAW Committee has 
urged Canada to undertake awareness-raising programmes to challenge the indigenous 
communities about women’s human rights.48
5.3.2.  Increasing Responsibility on Family Affairs
The responsible federal minister has still significant powers in question dealing with the 
family. He/she may do the following: apply the executor of wills and administration of estates 
which have belonged to dead Indians; carry out terms of wills; administrate a dead Indian’s 
property, if he/she died intestate; and declare void a will in those bands which are still under 
the Indian Act. This applies also to several self-governing First Nations. Also the care of 
children and “mentally incompetent” is vested in the minister, who can appoint for them 
guardians. The Band Council may determine a payment for an infant child’s maintenance, 
advantage or benefit until the age of majority. The Minister may order annuity or interest 
money payments to the support of Indian’s spouse, common law partner or family.49
Several provinces entitle the Indigenous communities to provide child and family services 
to their members. They have to be provided and the decision-making made in a manner 
which recognises and reflects their values, cultural identity, heritage, tradition, beliefs and 
concept of extended family. Québec has created special youth protection programmes for 
First Nations’ youth and children in danger of alienation. The approved agencies are run 
in Ontario by Boards of Directors, which can use alternative dispute resolutions. Prince 
Edward Island use mediation and joint planning and family group planning conferences as 
alternative approaches. The Yukon has a Child Care Board, which includes a First Nations’ 
representative. The territory has also a child and youth advocate, who has to be a specialist 
in indigenous affairs. Several provinces demand in child custody and adoption cases that the 
48   RCAP (1996); Vol. 4, pp. 7-83; CEDAW Committee (2003); Kymlicka (1989), p. 149; Eisenberg & Spinner-
Haley (2005), pp. 126-127. 
49   Indian Act, 1985, ss. 43-46, 51-52, 68; Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1999, s. 11.116; Tsawwassen First Nation 
Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 4.31.
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bands/communities participate inthe process and be noticed. The child under customary care 
may receive a subsidy from agencies.50
In 1988 Manitoba established the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry which recommended 
the creation of a mandated provincial Métis agency to deal with First Nations and Métis 
child and family services. In 1999 the government established also the Aboriginal Justice 
Implimentation Commission to identify the priority areas. The commission recommended 
that the province would enter into agreements with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs and 
Manitoba Métis Federation to develop a plan to develop their respective child and family 
services. The following year they signed an agreement, which established a joint initiative to 
recognise province-wide Métis rights and authority for child and family services. In 2000-
2003 followed a joint implementation process. As a result, in 2003 was enacted the Manitoba 
Child and Family Services Authority Act. For the Métis were created the Métis Child and 
Family Services Authority, Métis Child, Family and Community Services and a Métis 
Family and Community Institute. The authority began to deliver community-based family 
services to the Métis, to prevent risks and to ensure for children appropriate and safe family 
relationships. The adoptions to Métis citizenship are, however, not included in the legislation. 
The essential question is, whether the Métis membership is a racial or cultural concept.51 In 
Powley, the Supreme Court has held that the adoptees can be rights-bearing Métis through 
the ancestrally connected branch of its test.52  
In most provinces and territories the adoptions must take into account the child’s cultural 
background. For instance, Alberta demands in Indigenous adoptions that the Indigenous 
culture, heritage, spirituality and traditions are all taken into consideration. Some provinces 
and territories recognise in their legislation the customary adoption. Sissons J of NWT 
Territorial Court recognised in 1961 the Inuit customary adoptions as legally valid. The system 
was later accepted by the child welfare authorities in NWT. The First Nations’ customary 
adoption has been recognised in case law on a case-by-case basis, based on the Adoption 
Act, which permits the courts to treat customary indigenous adoptions as though they were 
statutory adoptions, including the adoption rights. The legislation in British Columbia allows 
the adoptions in settlement First Nations. The customary adoptions are also allowed in the 
Yukon and Nunavut. In the Yukon, a court can, on appeal, confirm a customary adoption. 
Similarly, in Nunavut, the parents must obtain from officials a certificate of recognition from 
the Customary Adoption Commission. The customary adoptions are then filed in the Nunavut 
50   Wilson & Mullet (2008), pp. 338-340.  Cf. Family Services Act, 1980 (New Brunswick), s. 85(2); Child Pro-
tection Act, 1988 (Prince Edward Island), s. 1(a); Adoption Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 7(1); Child and 
Family Services Act, 1989 (Saskatchewan), s. 37; Child and Family Services Act, 2012 (Manitoba), Declara-
tion of Principles; Child and Family Services Act, 1990 (Ontario), ss. 1, 13, 20, 34, 37, 58, 61, 212; Adoption 
Act, 2008 (Manitoba), ss. 30, 33; Intercommunity Adoption Act, 1996 (New Brunswick), s. 40(3); Child 
and Family Services Authorities’ Act, 2003 (Manitoba), ss. 4, 6; Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, 
2000 (Alberta), ss. 57-58, 67; Protections, Practices and Standards of Service for Child Protection Cases 
Regulation, 2000 (Ontario), ss. 6, 13; Child and Family Services Authorities’ Act, 2000 (Alberta), Preamble; 
Child Care Act, 2002 (Yukon), s. 4(2), 36; Child and Family Services Act, 2008 (Yukon), ss. 168, 171; Child 
and Youth Advocate Act, 2009 (Yukon), s. 3(l); Loi sur la pretection de la jeunesse, 2009 (Québec), s. 37.5. 
51   Child and Family Services Authority Act, 2003 (Manitoba), s.; Child and Family Services Act, 2012 (Mani-
toba), ss. 3-8, 134; Wilson & Mullet (2008), p. 359.
52   SCC, Powley (2003), s. 32.
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Court of Justice. In all child policy the terrorial legislation lays stress on Inuit principles. 
In Nisga’a Nation the customary adoption is dominant. It is done according to ayuukhl in 
settlement or stone moving feast. Newfoundland and Labrador recognises also the marriages 
according to Inuit laws as valid. 53    
In Grisner v. Squamish Indian Band, the Federal Court decided on a case, where a 
band member had adopted two adults who were the band member’s children. The band’s 
membership code granted membership to a person with one biological parent, but allowed 
only children under 18 years old to be adopted by two band members. The Federal Court 
held that the membership code discriminated between the biological and adopted children 
and was againt section 15 of the Charter. Casimel v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia 
recognised the grandparents’ right to adopt their grandchildren according to customary 
law and they were entitled to insurance benefits. In other cases, however, the right was not 
recognised. Common to all decisions is that instead of earlier non-recognition they integrate 
the indigenous custom within the common law.54 The Canadian legal system is common for 
all, but there are more plural tones than before. 
 
5.3.3.  Indigenous Education: Shadow of Residential Schools
During the French period (1608-1763) the first modest attempts were made to educate the 
Indian tribes of Saint Lawrence Valley and the Great Lakes region. The Jesuits and Ursulines 
established seminaries for indigenous children, focusing on French and religious ideas. The 
languages of instruction were mainly the indigenous languages, but for more advanced 
students also French and Latin were used. The Indians saw the education as a means to give a 
better future for their children. 55 The federal authorities, however, continued the assimilation 
policy. The Constitution Act, 1867, defines the education as a provincial responsibility. 
The Indians are however, under federal responsibility.56 The treaties committed the federal 
government to provide and maintain schools and teachers on reserves. Education became 
the most expensive sector of Indian administration. The Gradual Civilization Act, 1857, 
signified the starting point for the so-called residential schools system, which had deep 
influences on the First Nations and Inuit. The federal Government saw it more economical 
to use already existing structures of missionary organisations. Residential schools were the 
dominant school system for Indigenous children until the 1960s. The federal government 
financed the construction and maintenance of schools, while the Catholic, Anglican and 
United Church took care of personnel and the daily operation of schools. The residential 
schools were esteemed as being a better option in order to advance the central goal of the 
53   Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), p. 127. Cf. Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 20; Aboriginal Custom 
Adoption Recognition Act, 1994 (Nunavut), ss. 1-3; Adoption Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 71(1); Adop-
tion Act, 1999 (Newfoundland and Labrador), s. 3(2); Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, 2000 
(Alberta), s. 67; Family Abuse Intervention Act, 2006 (Nunavut), s. 1; Marriage Act, 2009 (Newfoundland 
and Labrador), s. 8.  Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007, s.21.2.
54   Adoption Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 46; FCC, Grismer v. Squamish Indian Band (2006), ss. 61-83; 
BCCA, Casimel v. Insurance Corporation of  British Columbia (1994), ss. 44-53. 
55   Thwaites (1896), Vol. VIII, p. 227; Vol. XII, pp. 63-65; Deffain (1995), pp. 110, 116-117.
56   Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24).
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programme to civilise the children and to render them Canadians. There were two kinds 
of schools: the boarding schools run on reserves for children aged  8-14; and the industrial 
schools, off the reserves and in urban surroundings, with elaborate programmes for students 
up to 18 years of age. In industrial schools the curriculum provided basic studies, training 
in agriculture, crafts, trades and household duties. The emphasis was on training in trades 
for the labour markets and agricultural work. There was an idea to assimilate the students 
after school into larger society and to prevent them from returning to the reserves. In reality 
they were often neglected and the school costs worried the department. The system’s decline 
began at the beginning of the twentieth century. In its culmination period, there were about 
60 residential schools.57 
At first, the schools were voluntary. A compulsory school attendance for Indian children 
was amended to the Indian Act in 1920. An Indian agent could decide to keep a child at 
the school until 18 years of age. The indigenous children were eradicated of their language 
and culture. A similar system was used in relation to Inuit children in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The last school closed in 1996. Over 100,000 children were taken from their families and 
were prohibited to speak their native languages or practice their traditional customs with 
some exceptions. Although there was strong indigenous resistance, many people lost their 
connection to their ancestors’ culture and language. Many schools were poorly administered: 
the students suffered from poor health conditions, and cultural oppression, physical 
punishments and sexual abuse were common. The Federal Government tried to improve 
the situation with new regulations. New financial arrangements gave more responsibility to 
Indian Affairs, although the personnel were still recruited by the churches.58  
The RCAP Report was the first comprehensive study on residential schools. It made 
recommendations and called for a public inquiry. The federal government, however, did not 
mention the idea about public inquiry in its policy paper Gathering the Strength (1998). 
Instead DIAND promised $350 million of funding to establish the Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation to support community based healing projects. The respective minister issued 
a Statement of Reconciliation, where she apologised for the first time for the devastating 
impacts of the residential school system. When the litigation increased, the department 
began to explore the possibility to use alternative dispute resolution. A series of exploratory 
dialogues were held between 1998-1999. In 2001 the Indian Residential Schools Resolution 
Canada was set up, which announced a National Resolution Framework to resolve the claims 
through an adjudicated resolution process. In 2003 were started 12 ADR pilot projects. The 
House of Commons Standing Committee was, however, unconvinced about the virtues of 
the programme. It suggested in 2005 its replacement by court-supervised and –enforced 
settlements for compensation and the establishing of a national Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. The Committee’s report was a political compromise.59
In the Baxter class-action suit (2005), worth $12.5 billion, over 13,000 survivors alleged 
that they were physically or sexually abused by the church personnel. Externally the 
57   Gradual Civilization Act, 1857, ss. 14-15; Miller (2006), pp. 9-11.
58   Indian Act (1920); Dickason (1994), pp. 333-336; Samson (2003), pp. 9-11; Miller (2006), pp. 41-50.  It has 
been estimated that around 1900, of 28% of pupils died of tuberculosis and other diceases. 
59   Gathering the Strength (1998), s. 4; Branting & Kymlicka (2006), pp. 227, 230-231. 
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residential school redress campaigns persuaded the dominant society to respond to the 
Indigenous communities’ social-welfare needs, and to rebuild and mobilise the fractured 
communities. In 2006 the federal Government and the Assembly of First Nations reached 
the Indian Residential Schools Agreement, which promised that $1.9 billlion would to be 
implemented through court approval and a five-month opt-out period for claimants. All 
former students are eligible for a common experience payment awarded on the basis of 
residential school attendance. Those who have experienced sexual or serious physical abuse 
can pursue additional compensation in an Independent Assessment Process. Health supports 
and councelling services are provided for individuals and additional funding is offered to the 
Aboriginal Healing Foundation to support community based healing projects. A national 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to be established with a budget of $60 million in 
five years to provide a holistic, culturally appropriate and safe setting for former students, 
their families and communities and to promote awareness and public education amoung 
Canadians about the residential school system and its impacts. There is also available funding 
for commemorative events and memorials.60 
In the 1876 Indian Act the maintenance of schools was given to the responsibility of the 
chief and council and free education was included in all numbered treaties. In 1951 the revision 
of the Indian Act gave the opportunity to transfer the responsibility for reserve schools to the 
provinces. Ten years later about 25% of Indian children participated in provincial schools. 
There were, however, also strong voices, which promoted the idea of separate and distinctive 
Indian education. Blue Quills, in St. Paul, Alberta, became the first school run by a band 
in 1970. From 1972 the federal Government officially allowed some bands to control their 
education and DIAND transferred programs and administration to Indian bands.61  
The reservations’ Indian schools are defined in section 114. The Minister of DIAND has 
the final decision decide about the schools, but majority of schools are taken care by the 
bands themselves. The Indian Act give the Governor in Council the right to authorise the 
minister to enter into agreements with the provincial governments, territorial commissioners, 
public and separate school boards and religious or charitable organisations. The minister 
may also regulate on school attendance, buildings, education, inspection, discipline and, 
transportation. He/she may also appoint truant officers to enforce the attendance of Indian 
children at school. In Ontario and Manitoba, the provincial governments made in 1990 an 
agreement to administer the education in their reserves. The Nisga’a in British Columbia 
followed in 2000. Later British Columbia has rendered the practice general and created the 
First Nations Educational Authority and local Community Educational Authorities.62 
Nova Scotia has transferred in agreement with the federal Crown (1998) the local pre-
university education authority to ten Mi’kmaq bands which deliver education services to all 
60   Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), pp. 42-43, 46, 60-61.
61   Dickason (1994), pp. 329, 337. In 1990, there were already 53 band schools with 8,000 students (20%), while 
47% were attending provincial schools. In all, 50% of bands and Inuit communities took part in federally 
funded cultural centre programmes in 72 centres. Cf. Indian and Inuit Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion (1991), pp. 4-5.
62   Indian Act, 1876, s. 63; Indian Act (1951); Indian Act, 1985, ss. 114-116, 119; Mi’kmaq Education Act, 1998, 
ss. 6-8; Education Act, 1990 (Ontario), ss. 12, 185, 188; Indian School Act, 1996 (British Columbia), ss. 10, 
19; First Nations Education Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 2. 
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residents in their territory and can make laws on education. The province has established the 
Council on Mi’kmaq Education, which has an advisory and guiding role. Each community 
has a Community Education Board. The educational programmes and services must be 
comparable to other Canadian systems.63 In New Brunswick the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet 
Nations have a quota in District Educational Councils.64 In Manitoba, the First Nations 
may operate Adult Learning Centers.65 Saskatchewan has a First Nations University and the 
Indian Institute of Technologies.66 In Alberta, the Government is committed to encouraging 
the collaboration of all partners in educational system to ensure the educational success of 
indigenous students. The province consults, supervises and co-ordinates the indigenous 
educational, home education, distant learning, online and outreach programmes, services, 
curriculum, and instruction.67
The federal Crown has made a special agreement with British Columbia on the creation 
of First Nations Educational Authority, which can enact laws on their education. It can 
make contracts and invest or borrow money. The First Nations can own or jointly establish 
Community Educational Authorities, which may operate, administrate and manage the 
First Nation’s educational system. The province has also First Nations Education Steering 
Comittees. The responsible minister may establish and maintain schools on First Nations’ 
land.68  Ontario and Yukon support Indigenous teachers’ education with special training. 
The teachers obtain a certificate of qualification to teach Indigenous students. The teachers 
must have fluency in indigenous languages and knowledge of their history and culture. The 
school boards and Special Education Advisory Boards in Ontario must have indigenous 
representation when there is a sufficient number of indigenous students.69 In Manitoba 
and NWT the indigenous children have the right to student aid based on their ethnicity. 
70 In the Yukon, the school curriculum must include indigenous peoples’ culture, language 
and heritage. The objective is to promote understanding on their history, language, culture, 
rights and values and changing role in contemporary society. The school may also offer an 
opportunity to participate in indigenous cultural or harvesting activity. The minister can 
make a separate agreement on education with a First Nation which creates a Local Indian 
Education Authority.71 In NWT, the District Educational Authorities may give license to 
teach indigenous land skills, knowledge or abilities. The territorial legislation stresses the 
63   Mi’kmaq Education Act, 1998 (Nova Scotia), ss. 5-6, 8; Minority Education Act Regulation, 1997 (Nova 
Scotia), ss. 25-26, 31.
64   Education Act, 1997 (New Brunswick), s. 36.2(3).
65   Adult Learning Centers Act, 2007 (Manitoba), ss. 6-7.
66   Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technologies Act, 2000 (Saskatchewan), s. 6.
67   Education Act, 2012 (Alberta), Preamble; Teacher Membership Status Election Regulation, 2004 (Alberta), 
s. 2(c). 
68   First Nation’s Jurisdiction on Education in British Columbia Act, 1986, ss. 9, 11, 21, 25; School Act, 1996 
(British Columbia), s. 86(3); British Columbia Teachers’ Council Regulation, 2012 (British Columbia), s. 
4.
69   Teacher Certification Regulations, 1993 (Yukon), ss. 6, 8; First Nations Representation on Boards Regula-
tion, 1997 (Ontario), s. 1; Accredition of Teacher Educational Programs Regulation, 2002 (Ontario), s. 
1(4). 
70   Student Financial Assistance Regulations, 1990 (NWT), s. 7(2); Student Aid Regulation, 2003 (Manitoba), 
s. 38.
71   Education Act, 2002 (Yukon), Preamble, ss. 4(g), 7, 22(2), 55, 169(t).
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importance of language, culture and heritage in education. The territory offers to indigenous 
peoples support services, including instruction material.72  
With accession to Canada, the federal Government guaranteed the Métis a separate 
school system which secured in the beginning the French language education in Manitoba. 
The Sisters of Charity of Montréal established a French-language boarding school to St. Paul-
des-Métis, Alberta, on the model of Indian schools. In treaty areas the Métis were mostly 
excluded from the Indian schools. An essential question was whether their families lived 
an Indian mode of life. Even in the Yukon with lesser distinction they were barred from 
accessing Indian schools. The churches defined them as whites, but the non-Indigenous 
school districts rejected them, too. They were left without education until the 1940s, when 
they were allowed to join the Indian schools. The Métis community at Île à la Crosse, 
Saskatchewan, took over the local school in 1973.73 In 1980 the Métis Nation - Saskatchewan 
established the Gabriel Dumont Instite (GDI) to educate through cultural research as a means 
to renew and strengthen the heritage and achievement of local Métis. It is the first wholly 
Métis-controlled, accredited post-secondary institution in Canada. It is overseen by a board 
of directors and funded predominantly by the provincial government. GDI develops and 
publishes Métis-specific curriculum, trains Indigenous teachers through theSaskatchewan 
Urban Native Teachers Program with bachelor of education degrees, maintains libraries and 
information services, and administers and delivers scholarship programmes. In the 1990s 
also the Dumond Technical Institute and Gabriel Dumond College was established with two-
year programmes.74 
The Inuit education was started by the missionaries during the eighteenth century. From 
1873 the mission schools received federal support. This bond lasted until 1947, when the 
introduction of family allowances and obligatory school attendance led the federal government 
to take over the charge in education and establish communal schools.The schools were still 
residential which alienated the Inuit children from their language and culture due to the 
prohibitions and the 10 months of isolation from their home and family. Many children were 
also adopted to the South without their parents being informed. The change began only in the 
1970s when the territorial Department of Education pressed for the teaching of indigenous 
languages in schools and the inclusion in the curriculum of materials relevant to Inuit culture. 
A cultural inclusion programme was set up in some schools with modest results. Only in the 
late 1970s did the Territorial Council set up a special committee to undertake a systematic 
review and analysis of the educational system. It recommended the decentralisation of 
educational control, support of indigenous languages in the schools through a stepped-up 
programme of training indigenous teachers, developing relevant curricula in the Indigenous 
languages and improvement of adult education. The JBNQA established for Cree, Inuit and 
72   Education Act, 1995 (NWT), ss. 60, 70. See also: Education Act (Saskatchewan), s. 92(1); School Act, 2000 
(Alberta), s. 62(2); Education Act, 2012 (Alberta), s. 63(2); Louis Riel Institution Act (Manitoba), s. 4(d); 
K’atlodeeche First Nation’s Educational District and K’atlodeeche First Nation’s Educational Authority Reg-
ulations, 2006 (NWT), ss. 8-9; Teachers’ Qualifications Regulation, 2010 (Ontario), ss. 11, 14; Special Edu-
cation Advisory Commissions Regulation (Ontario), ss. 2, 4. 
73   Manitoba Act, 1870, ss. 22-23; Dickason (1994), pp. 337, 361; Lawrence (2004), p. 95; McIntosh (2009), pp. 
415-416. In the Yukon, a white father’s recognition was decisive as to whether the child became a white or 
Indian.
74   Wilson & Mullet (2008), pp. 341-342. 
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Naskapi the Cree and Kativik School Boards. The Northeast Quebec Agreement created 
a similar arrangement for the Naskapi. They have the responsibility for developing and 
implementing culturally appropriate educational programs in different levels of education. In 
all, 25% of budget comes from the federal government, the rest from Québec and the school 
board is under the provincial education laws. In Frobisher Bay in 1980 a teacher education 
programme was started for the Inuit. Also the use of classroom assistants has improved 
the results. The number of Inuit students in secondary education has increased. In 1983 an 
Indigenous Languages Development Fund was created, which is used for the development of 
language teaching programmes in the schools and to design curricula for their region.75  
The Inuit language and culture are central in the Nunavut’s educational programme, 
which reflects local needs and values. This is also included to the programme of the Public 
College for the Eastern Arctic. At the local level the supervisory of principles in schools and 
home instruction belongs to District Educational Authorities. The Committees of Elders are 
used to monitor, evaluate and report on the carrying out of inuit qaujimajatuqangit duties.76
5.3.4.  Indigenous Media
The indigenous peoples in relation to the media are not expressly mentioned in the Canadian 
legislation.The Canadian Broadcasting Company (CBC) took interest in the north in the 
1950s and set up the Northern Service in 1958. Under the Native Communications Program 
the federal government has provided support for private Indigenous news papers. The 
Native Broadcast Access Program similarly supported the indigenous television and radio 
programmes. Since 1972 the communication satellites helped to reach even the most remote 
communities. Today there are radio stations at several points to offer Inuit programme for 
listeners. After a suggestion by the ITC, the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation for TV and radio 
programmes was established in 1982. A problem was the limited space offered by CBC for the 
Inuit programmes. In 1991 The Aboriginal Television Network was set up.77
75   Loi sur l’éducation publique pour les Autochtones Cris, Inuit et Naskapis, 2012, ss. 569, 601, 687; Décret 
concernant la publication de l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du Québec 
et les Cris du Québec, 2007 (Québec), Préambule, s. 2.8; JBNQA (1975), ss. 16-17; NEQA (1978), s. 11; Mi-
nority Rights Group (1994), pp. 131-133; Duffy (1988), pp. 10, 100; Report of Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2004), 
p. 65. In 1976 Parti Québecois introduced the Bill 101, which promoted the use of the French language in 
public life, including education. The Inuit of northern Québec, who have been traditionally educated in 
English, protested and were finally excluded from the new legislation.
76 Inuit Language Protection Act, 2007 (Nunavut), s. 27.1; Education Act, 2008 (Nunavut), Preamble, ss. 1, 
7, 21, 122; Public College for the Eastern Arctic Regulations, 1994 (Nunavut), s. 7(4). In 2004, only 40% 
of Inuit children attended school regularly. The values on Inuit language and education are inuuqatigiit-
siarniq (respect and care on other people); tunngararniq (fostering good spirit by being open, welcoming 
and inclusive); pijitsirniq (serving and providing services to families and communities); aajiiqatigiinniq 
(decision-making through discussion and consensus); piliriqatigiinniq / ikajuqtigiinniq (working together 
for a common cause); qanuqtuurniq (being innovative, resourceful); and avatittinnik kamatsiarniq (respon-
sibility and care for land, animals and environment). The responsible minister has responsibility to ensure 
that Inuit social values, principles and concepts of inuit qaujimajatuqangit (traditional knowledge) are fol-
lowed. 
77   Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 133-135; Varennes (1996), p. 234.
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5.3.5.  Gap in Health and Social Conditions
In the Kelowna Accord, the federal Crown recognised the troubling gap of education, skills 
development, health care, housing, access to clear water and employment, and committed 
itself to the promotion of Indigenous peoples’ socio-economic conditions.78 The public health 
was trusted in the Indian Act, 1876, to the responsibility of the Chief and Council. The Indian 
Act also patronised the Indians’ consumption of alcohol. Outside the reserves, where the 
Indian authorities or Indian agents had not the power to control, was a general prohibition 
against Indians obtaining alcohol.79 In the late 1960s the Allied Tribes of British Columbia 
started litigation to break down the Indian Act’s prohibition. There followed the only Supreme 
Court’s case in which the equality clause of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, was found 
to be in conflict with a federal statute. In R. v. Drybones (1969) the court held the alcohol 
prohibition provision as inoperative for breach of s. 1(b) of the Bill of Rights. The focus was 
on racial equality.80 The Governor in Council has still the power to supervise and control the 
operation of pool rooms, dance halls and other places of amusements on reserves. Similarly 
band councils may control or prohibit public games, sports, races, athletic contests and other 
amusements.81 Many provinces have legislated on the reserves’ gaming and alcohol licences: 
the First Nations and Inuit decide in referendum or by local government whether to  allow 
them.82 Manitoba has arranged, through the Native  Addictions Council of Manitoba, tailored 
councelling to Indigenous addicts and educational material for Indigenous schools.83
The Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, gave elected band councils powers in building 
and maintenance of roads and public buildings. Similarly, the Indian Act, 1876 trusted to the 
chief and council the maintenance of roads, bridges, ditches and fences and the construction 
of public buildings.84 These are still included in modern agreements: in Nisga’a Final 
Agreement the local Government has legislative power over roads, public works, traffic and 
transportation, but in the case of conflict the federal and provincial legislation of general 
application prevail. Several provinces and territories have made comanagement agreements 
with the First Nations: e.g., in Manitoba and the Yukon on a fire management agreement and 
in Québec on the roads.85 
The Supreme Court overruled the 1962 decision by the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, which accepted the segregation by ethnicity, based on a similar situations’ test. Later, 
in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, a positive discrimination was allowed only 
based on enumerated or analogous grounds justified in the s. 15 of the Charter. In 2005 the 
78   Aboriginal Roundtable to Kelowna Accord (2005).
79   Indian Act, 1876, s. 63.
80   Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960, s. 1(b); SCC, R. v. Drybones (1970), ss. 283, 292-293, 297.
81   Indian Act, 1985, s. 73(e), 81(1).
82   Cf. Liquour Control Act, 1990 (Newfoundland and Labrador), s. 17.1(1); Liquour Control and Licence Act, 
1996 (British Columbia), s. 7.1; Alcohol and Gaming Regulation Act, 1997 (Saskatchewan), s. 26; Nisga’a 
Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 11.112; Gaming and Liquour Act, 2000 (Alberta), ss. 58-59; Gaming Control 
Act, 2002 (British Columbia), s.19.
83   Native Addictions Council of Manitoba Incorporated Act, 1990 (Manitoba), s. 3. 
84   Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, s. 12; Indian Act, 1876, ss. 23-24.
85   First Nation Indemnification (Fire Management Act, 2009 (Yukon); Fires Prevention and Emergency Re-
sponsibility Act, 2010 (Manitoba), s. 36; Loi sur la voirie, 2009 (Québec), s. 32.1; McHugh (2004), p. 482.
254
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
federal and provincial Crowns made with First Nations’ chiefs the Transformative Change 
Accord which focused efforts on closing gaps in education, health, housing and economic 
opportunities and on promoting healthy communities. It was the only outcome of the federal 
Kelowna Accord. The change in federal election made the accord a dead letter elsewhere.86
Treaty 6 included the medicine chest clause which guaranteed assistance in the time 
of famine and pestilence relief.87 In Dreaver case (1935), the Exchequer Court of Canada 
ruled that the clause meant all medical supplies, drugs and treatments.88 Accoringly, the 
Governments of Alberta Saskatchewan later extended free medical and hospitalisation 
coverage of the national health plan to all Indigenous peoples. In 1951 the Indian Act gave 
a choice to transfer the health and social services to provincial care. There were also many 
areas of social policy on which the statute was silent. In the 1960s this devolution programme 
was partly realised. Its purpose was to transfer part of the federal financial responsibilities to 
the provinces. The programme soon met difficulties. The provinces wanted more authority 
over Indian peoples and their resources. A community development programme tried to 
encourage Indian self-management but met with protective bureaucracy.89  Later several 
provinces recognised the indigenous peoples role in planning and delivering health services 
in communities. In the Prairie Provinces, the minister may enter to an agreement on First 
Nations’ hospital and medical services.90 In Ontario the minister may establish Aboriginal 
and First Nations Health Councils, which advice him/her on health and service delivery 
issues. The Aboriginal and First Nation health planning entities form local health integration 
networks on a geographical basis.91  
The Governor in Council has the power to prevent, mitigate and control the spread of 
diseases on reserves, to provide medical treatment and health services and compulsory 
hospitalisation and treatment for infectious diseases among Indians, and to promote sanitary 
consitions in private premises and public places of reserves. He/she can make regulations 
governing commercial or industrial undertakings located on reserve lands. Similarly each 
Band Council may decide on health of residents and prevention of contagious and infectious 
deseases. The Band Councils are in charge on the construction of watercources, roads, bridges, 
ditches, fences, local works, traffic, construction, repair and use of buildings, construction and 
regulation of the use of public wells, cisterns, reservoirs and other water supplies.The Governor 
in Council may order inspection of premises on reserves and, if needed, their destruction, 
alteration or renovation, to prevent overcrowding of premises on reserves, and construction 
and maintenance of boundary fences.92 The provinces can give loans and participate according 
to agreements with DIAND into the betterment of infrastructure and social conditions in the 
reserves and help them to establish standards, and develop social and economic development 
86   SCC, Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia (1989); BCCA, R. v. Gonzales (1962), p. 362; Olthuis & 
Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 160. 
87   Treaty 6 (1876).
88   ECC, Dreaver (1935).
89   Indian Act (1951); McHugh (2004), p. 332.
90   Public Health Act, 1994 (Saskatchewan), s. 4; Hospitals Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 45(1); Regional Health Serv-
ices Act, 2002 (Saskatchewan), s. 29(1); Regional Health Authorities Act, 2012 (Manitoba), s. 5(1).
91   Local Health System Integration Act, 2006 (Ontario), Preamble, ss, 14, 16. See also: Public Health Act, 1998 
(New Brunswick), s. 58(1).
92   Indian Act, 1985, ss. 34, 53, 73, 81.
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programmes, policies, building permits and public work opportunities for Indians. Several 
First Nations can use their customary rights as mortgages for individual members’ house-
building projects.93
The Indian bands receive government funding to administer their reserves and are eligible 
to receive funds to deliver social services and economic development projects. In 1994 DIAND 
published a pilot programme to transfer Indian Affairs programmes in Manitoba to First 
Nations. In 1996 the federal Government signed with the indigenous national organisations 
National Framework Agreements, which were enabling documents for Human Resources 
and Skill Development Canada. The agreements started the administrative devolution of 
indigenous labour market programming to the identified regional affiliates of indigenous 
organisations. The process was renewed in 1999. The organisations signed Human Resource 
Development Agreements with respective provincial organisations. The delivery structures 
administer support services by making strategic investments to meet the training and 
employment needs of Indigenous peoples.94
Also the provinces and territories have transferred social services to Indigenous peoples, 
based on agreements and committed to their welfare.  They also offer them representation 
on respective boards. In Ontario the Indigenous communities can organise Home Care and 
Community Service Agencies and Long-Term Care Homes by making an agreement with the 
responsible minister. They are also entitled to provincial welfare benefits.95 Saskatchewan has 
special employment and training programmes for the First Nations and Métis. The Ministry 
of Economy coordinates, develops and implies provincial policies and programmes related 
to indigenous economy and development.96 British Columbia finances the First Nations’ 
hospital projects.97 In NWT, the Tåîchô Nation has a Community Services Agency, which 
developes plans, politics and programmes on health, education, welfare and family matters. 
Other programmes promote indigenous employment.98 The JBNQA established the Cree 
Board of Health and Social Services of James Bay and Kativik Health and Social Services. 
Today they have hospitals, clinics and different social centres. They decide on their own 
political direction but receive operational direction from the Québec Ministry of Health and 
93   Flanagan & Alcantara (2004), pp. 493, 499. Cf. Indian and Native Affairs Act (Saskatchewan), s. 7; Depart-
ment of Rural Development Act, 1979-1980 (Alberta), s. 8; Local Government Act, 1996 (British Colum-
bia), s. 692(4); Highways and Transportation Act, 1997 (Saskatchewan), s. 7; Home Owner Protection Act, 
1998 (British Columbia), s. 30(1); Disaster Financial Assistance Policies and Guidelines (Public Sector) 
Regulation, 1999 (Manitoba), s. 4.14.1; Public Highways Development Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 19; First Na-
tions Commercial and Industrial Development Act, 2005, s. 3(1); Alberta Mortgage and Housing Corpo-
ration Loan Regulation, 1985 (Alberta), ss. 70-72; Rural Emergency Housing Program Loans Regulation, 
1985 (Alberta), s. 3(1).
94   Elliott (2005), s. 200; Wilson & Mullet (2008), pp. 342-343. 
95   Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), p. 333; Indian Welfare Services Act, 1990 (Ontario), ss. 2-3; Home Care 
and Community Services Act, 1994 (Ontario), ss. 2, 5, 9; Long-Term Care Homes Act, 2007 (Ontario), s. 
129. See also: Regional Health Authorities Act, 2011 (New Brunswick), s. 20; Yukon Act, 2008, s. 49(1); 
Regional Health Authorities Act, 2001 (New Brunswick), s. 13.
96   Employment Program Regulations, 2008 (Saskatchewan), s. 12(1); Training Programs Regulations, 2008 
(Saskatchewan), s. 4(1); Ministry of Economy Regulations, 2012 (Saskatchewan), s. 3(r).
97   Hospital District Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 20.
98   Tåîchô Community Services Agency Act, 2005 (NWT), ss. 3-4; Order Approving Preferential Employment 
Program in Diavik Diamonds Project Socio-economic Monitoring Agreement, 1999 (NWT).
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Social Services. Their task is to define regional health priorities for Nunavik and to allocate 
the budgets for regional strategies and hospitals. The Northern Québec Agreement includes 
also plans for economic development including the creation of employment opportunities, 
based on the Cree Employment Agreement.99
In many communities, native healing circles and lodges are used to address social 
problems. Indigenous health clinics use traditional healers. The federal Government allowed 
the Spallumcheen Band to take over the child welfare by a bylaw. The other bands have been 
able to take some control over their child welfare through intergovernmental agreements. 
The Yukon recognises and protects the indigenous control of their traditional nutritional 
and healing practices as viable alternative for seekers of health and healing services. The 
territorial legislation recognises also the use of traditional medicine and diet. The territory 
has a First Nations Health Commission and First Nations Health Services. The commission 
offers employment opportunities and training, including the First Nations Health Liaison 
and Child Life Worker Programmes and interpreter services. The hospitals’ Board of Trustees 
has three First Nation members. The Equity and Training Policy promote the delivery of 
diagnostic and clinical services to Indigenous communities.100
The Métis were for a long time denied all health and social services. The Ewing Commission 
in Alberta (1934) was the first to hold hearings on Métis health, education and general welfare, 
to submit a report and to make recommendations for the improvement of their situation. 
The consequent Métis Population Betterment Act used a 25 % blood quota to restrict the 
number of those eligible for provincial benefits. In 1943, a Métis Population Betterment Trust 
Account was established, which was transformed into a fund in 1979. A provincial Métis Task 
Force was in place between 1969-1972 and stressed in its report the following: community 
development which belongs to people; community’s ready access to resources; and creation 
of a Métis Development Branch to the Department of Health and Social Services. In 1987 the 
provincial Government of Alberta and the Métis Association of Alberta signed a framework 
agreement to work out plans for the improvement of services and greater participation of 
Métis in providing them. The agreement was renewed in 1992. In 2004 the First Minister and 
Indigenous leaders agreed on the creation of an Indigenous strategy on health questions. As a 
result the Region 10 Child and Family Authority were created. The Métis became for the first 
time equal partne rs in federal health programmes. 101  
When the family allowances and old age pensions were introduced in Canada, the Inuit 
were at first handled differently. They got credit at HBC posts for designated food supplies. The 
game was diminishing and the Inuit continued to die of starvation and dicease. The process 
began in 1934 when HBC was demanded to take responsibility for the Indigenous in the 
north without expense to the department. The post-war Robinson Report paid attention to 
99   Loi sur les Autochtones Cris, Inuit et Naskapis, 2006 (Québec), ss. 5-8; Loi sur les services de santé et les 
services sociaux pour les autochtones Cris, 2012 (Québec), ss. 3, 18; Décret concernant la publication de 
l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, 2007 
(Québec), Préambule, ss. 2.8, 4.19.
100 Health Act, 2002 (Yukon), s. 5(1); Hospital Act, 2002 (Yukon), ss. 5-6; Beaudoin & Mendes (1996), p. 
17.29.
101 Bell (1994), p. 6; Dickason (1994), pp. 359-360, 364; Lawrence (2004), p. 95; Friesen & Friesen (2005), p. 
15. 
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civilisation, education, health, dimished opportunities of traditional economy, and resources. 
The change was, however, slow. The federal government’s public image suffered and it was 
finally forced to act. It airdropped supplies of food and started to relocate the Inuit groups. 
The peak time was between 1958-1962. The Inuit communities’ forced relocation thousands 
of kilometres away was partly justified as a will to offer more efficiently direct services to 
scattered indigenous communities. Nevertheless, the relocation of the Inuit to permanent 
communities created a housing problem which the federal Government tried to solve by 
constructing an inadequate number of uniform houses in the arctic. In 1965, based on federal 
commission’s recommendations in the Eastern Arctic a new Eskimo Housing Program was 
launched, which included massive rental house production. The co-operatives began to 
manage housing projects, retain stores and other commercial ventures. The last hunting 
camp was abandoned in 1970.102      
The federal Government saw first that it has no responsibility of Inuit medical care because 
they had not signed a treaty. After World War II the introduction of the welfare state led to 
a standarised classification of race. The family allowances in the Yukon and NWT were paid 
to Inuit and all people living the Native way in kind, but to the whites and mixed-bloods not 
living like Indians in cash. In 1959 the federal government established the Northern Health 
Services and from the 1960s nursing stations. In 1963 the NWT government enacted several 
ordinances, which transferred to local councils the control of local business, infrastructure and 
public health, funded mainly by the property tax. Also created were development areas under 
Local Advisory Committees to provide control over building from the point of view of health, 
safety, engineering, economic and aesthetic considerations. With the support of the federal 
government’s programmes infant mortality began to decrease rapidly and living conditions 
improve. The downside was the increase in social ills due to rapid social change from semi-
nomads to urban dwellers. The Hamlet Ordinance of 1969 created pre-municipalities without 
a taxbase. The ordinance was incorporated to an amended Municipal Ordinance in 1972. 
Charles Drury’s report (1980) suggested that family allowances, unemployment insurance 
benefits and old age pensions should be left with Ottawa, while all other branches should 
be decentralised and paid by the NWT government.103 JBNQA created two councils for 
health and social services. For Inuit there is the Kativik Health and Social Services Council.104 
Nunatsiavut has the Nunatsiavut Civil Service and the Department of Health and Social 
Development.105
102 Duffy (1988), p. 42; Zaslow (1988), pp. 277-279; Dickason (1994), pp. 396-397; Minority Rights Group 
(1994), p. 113; Eisenberg & Spiller-Halev (2005), p. 286. Still in the early 1960s, 70% of Inuit had tubercu-
losis.
103 Duffy (1988), p. 27; Dickason (1994), p. 368; Hamilton (1994), pp. 110-113; Minority Rights Group (1994), 
p. 113; Lawrence (2004), p. 95. 
104 JBNQA (1975), ss. 14-15.
105 Labrador Inuit Constitution (2005), s. 6. 
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Conclusions5.4. 
Gender has been an important topic concerning the indigenous communities both in Canada 
and New Zealand. In Canada, the Indian Act, 1876 created an unequal system on mixed 
marriages: the First Nations’ women had fewer rights than the men. This was corrected in 
the federal legislation only after the UN case law laid pressure on Canada (1985). In New 
Zealand the case law led similarly in the 1980s to changes in legislation dealing with the 
Māori traditional procedures, which shown themselves as being unequal. In associated states 
the international pressure has influenced the traditional communities. In France the Accord 
of Nouméa has created a possibility to gender discrimination, while the customary rules are 
decided by the customary organs (although confirmed by the Congress). In Wallis and Futuna 
and French Guiana the customary societies have been left predominantly untouched.
The customary family law persisted besides the Western law in the early settler societies. 
In New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna it has continued uninterrupted until today. In New 
Caledonia the courts recognised its existence in the 1920, and the statute based recognition 
of customary marriage and divorce followed in the 1960s. The Accord of Nouméa has given 
the Kanak customary personal law a constitutional status, including also the question on 
inheritance. In Wallis and Futuna France has always recognised the existence of a parallel 
system, which is de facto dominant. In French Polynesia the early codification has led to the 
diminishing of the customary family law. Only customary adoption and inheritance has some 
relevance in today. In French Guiana the customary law prevails without official recognition 
in isolated communities.  
Like in France, the customary family law has been related in New Zealand largely to land. 
The legislator attempted gradually to restrict the scope of custom. Since 1955 only customary 
rules on inheritance and adoption have remained. Since 1993 the Maori Land Court has 
had the discretion to confirm them on a case-to-case basis. Similarly, the associated states 
and territories have followed New Zealand’s legislation: the customary family law has no 
official status. In Canada the customary marriage was recognised in early case law when the 
Indigenous law was still dominant in many areas. Later it was totally ignored until the 1960s, 
when the customary adoption was gradually recognised. It was similarly to France and New 
Zealand related to inheritance.
In all three countries, education has been in all three countries a means to assimilate. The 
civilising mission and social Darwinism have been reflected also in the legislation. In France 
and New Zealand public education was extended to indigenous people early, but in Canada 
for First Nations’ (and later Inuit) children residential and industrial schools were created, 
which from 1920 were compulsory. Their poor management led in many cases to the lost 
of indigenous identity and language, even to abuse.The idea of Western culture’s superiority 
remained influencial until the 1980s in the form of integration policy. Only the Accords of 
Matignon and Nouméa in France, the rise of indigenous school forms in New Zealand and 
the creation of Indigenous schools and the remedial process in Canada have influenced the 
legislation which today supports more or less Indigenous education.
The Indigenous media has been a central question especially in New Zealand’s legislation. 
The weakening of the Māori language was followed by a silent period in the media. The 
tide changed only in the 1970s, when the question of media became topical. The existence 
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of Māori radio stations was included in legislation in the 1980s, but the most remarkable 
event was the creation of statute-based Māori Television in 2004. In France the legislator’s 
opinion was until the 1980s, that the state should have monopoly in audiovisual media. 
The Constitutional Council’s case law reinterpreted the Declaration of 1789 to promote the 
pluralism and freedom of expression. The broadening of legislation has given the overseas 
territories more free hands to develop plurilingual and multicultural media. In Canada there 
is no express legislation on indigenous media, but the process has been similar with regard to 
timing to what happened in New Zealand: since the 1970s there has appeared an Indigenous 
media.
The Indigenous peoples’ health and social conditions have clearly been worse than those of 
mainstream  society. The aftermath of World War I signified a rise of new global consciousness 
in this sector. In New Zealand from the 1920s the legislator began to include the Māori in various 
health and social programmes. What was significant, was that this was done in co-operation 
with the Māori. Especially the alliance of the Labour and Rātanā Parties created favourable 
conditions to for this. The post-war social legislation gave to the Māori increasing autonomy 
in these questions. Similarly, in Canada the socially-orientated government of Alberta started 
the betterment of the Métis’ conditions. The federal government began to gradually promote 
the Inuit conditions. The motives were the country’s international reputation, and strategic 
and economic reasons. In the 1920 in France the officials understood also that the Kanak’s 
situation was deplorable. However, only the change brought about by the Fourth Republic 
since 1946 signified the rise of strong constitutional social emphasis to the forefront. In all 
three countries the change in international atmosphere towards the Indigenous peoples has 
led since the 1980s to remarkable social reforms with regard to Indigenous health and social 
programmes and an increased Indigenous responsibility. 
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Land and Environment6. 
France6.1. 
6.1.1. Customary Lands
In the French constitutional law property is an inviolable and sacred right. Much of the 
conceptual language on property stems from Roman law. The Civil Code adopted most of 
the basic divisions of Roman law: possession, dominium, usufruct and servitude. Neither 
the ancient customary law without influence: the medieval tenure system was swept away by 
the revolution, but the protection of the family and inheritance system was influenced by the 
ancient customs and desire to promote family solidarity.1 
In Civil Code property is described as the right to enjoy and dispose of things in an absolute 
way. The ownership can be acquired by occupation when a property has no owner or if it is 
abandoned; or by acquisition in prescription (usucaption), when a person acquires the title 
to property by possessing it openly and peacefully over a long period of time. In acquisition 
the new owner must take some positive steps to show his ownership, a reason for why he/
she is the person whose title the law should recognise. The acquisition is useful in long-
standing situations. Social order requires the law to recognise longstanding possession which 
has become a settled part of social organisation. A person can acquire title by prescription 
even if he obtained possession in bad faith. Key elements for acquisition are that the claimant 
possessed the property in his or her own right in a peaceful and public manner.2 
The effect of possession must be noticeable and public if the original owner is going to 
have a chance to react and claim the property. Ownership must also be claimed. Once it is 
claimed, it is deemed to have existed from the moment the claimant moved into possession. 
There are three distinct elements in the French registered land transaction: the claimant must 
usually obtain an instrumentum from a notary which records his title. The notary will receive 
the statements of withnesses and record them to demonstrate the right to ownership which 
is claimed.  The prescription period only begins to run from the date on which forceable 
occupation ceased. Following the Roman law tradition, the Civil Code provides that the 
transfer of property is completed simply by the agreement of the parties. The Code contends 
itself with requiring the registration of gifts of property which could be mortgaged.3 
French law recognises also collective property. Property held in common is called masse 
indivise. It is treated as a common asset to be managed for common profit. The fruits of the 
exploitation of the common property belong to masse subject to reasonable remuneration for 
services rendered by one of the co-owners. The common property consists also of debts. The 
1   DDHC (1789), art. 17; Bell (2001), p. 277.
2   Bell (2001), pp. 285-286; Code Civil (1804), art. 544, 712, 2219.
3   Code Civil (1804), art. 1138, 2233; Bell (2001), pp. 287, 290. A property register (publicité foncière) of par-
cels was created only in 1807. 
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normal regime for the administration of common property applies unless there is a specific 
agreement. It is usua that the common property is entrusted to the administration of one 
individual. That person undertakes administrative tasks. The powers of the judge to intervene 
are limited. In agriculture the landhold is kept in common ownership and run as a single 
unit.4
The property rights less that ownership include usufruct and servitudes. Usufruct is 
defined, following Roman law, as a right to enjoy the things which another owns like the owner 
himself, but who has a duty to preserve its substance. During the usufruct the usufructury 
has a right of enjoyment whereas the reversioner has the ultimate interest in the property. 
The reversioner expects to obtain the substance of the property at the end of the interest of 
the usufructury. The usufructury enjoys the property and the benefits coming from it. The 
interests of the usufructury and the reversioner are reconciled by giving the former only 
those rights concerning the daily administration of the property.5 
In New Caledonia French property law has met a special challenge. The Kanak identity 
is based on a particular connection with land. In New Caledonia’s customary system the 
land was communal and a sacred foundation of life and society, related to the clans. The 
property right was vested in the clan chief who exercised control and supervision over the 
land. The individual members of the clan had usufructuary rights over land allocated to them. 
Due to its sacred nature, the customary land has been seen as inalienable. Only a clan chief 
was able to transfer the user rights to an outsider. The land grants to colonists began by the 
colonial administration in 1855, only two years after their arrival. The Kanak were assured 
that only purchased and non-occupied lands would be transferred to the state and granted 
to settlers. The French administration and Indigenous people had different ideas about what 
an occupied land would mean. For French authorities New Caledonia was terra nullius, and 
therefore indigenous people were only users, not owners, of the land. From 1867 the Kanak 
were divided by the governor’s decision on tribes and the following year each indigenous 
tribe was allotted a reserve with limited tribal lands at the will of the state covering only 10% 
of the islands’ land space. On Grande Terre they lost 80% of their lands. Only on the more 
isolated Loyalty Islands were their lands left intact. Most of the customary lands left were on 
the mountains and less fertile eastern coast, and even those territories were completely at the 
mercy of the governor, who could dispossess them.6 
From 1897 the reserve system was intensified, limiting the family lot to three hectares. 
The penal colony became the most important land owner. To encourage colonisation, the 
governors granted land from the main island to many freed prisoners and finally, the regulation 
of 27 May 1884 granted free land to all French immigrants. A granted parcel included fields 
and pasture. It became in force only when the immigrant had accepted obligatory residence, 
had built a house and taken the lands in use. The mass immigration supported by Governor 
Feillet and la Société Le Nickel (SLN) further weakened the Kanak’s situation. The indigenat 
4   Loi no. 76-1286 du 31 décembre 1976, ss. 2, 7-8, 10; Bell (2001), pp. 294-296.
5   Code Civil (1804), art. 578; Bell (2001), 298-299.
6   Vigne (2000), pp. 5-6, 16-17, 19.
262
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
removed the indigenous people to shrinking reserves, as land was required for settlement and 
mining. The French legislator created for reserves a legal category of tribes.7 
Gradually the French Government’s attitude began to change. The Kanak were no longer 
assimilated, but instead integrated into society. From 1930 the state repurchased European 
properties and authorised the acquisition of land for indigenous people under the French 
legislation. The results were meagre due to a lack of capital and credit. After the war the 
state began to grant land in individual title to Melanesian war veterans. But there was not 
enough land on reserves for the rapidly increasing indigenous population. Since 1955 the 
administration of land grants was extended to all Melanesians and first non-veteran grants 
were awarded in 1959. The free grant was given under provisional title for five years and was 
subject to a development programme of cultivation, reforestation or pastoral improvements 
to obtain a full title. It was encouraged to convert reserve land into individual titles which 
possibility a number of Kanak took advantage of, but it was also problematic as it broke 
down the old customary rights. In the 1960s the European population began to rent unused 
lands adjacent to reserves. In 1970 credit facilities were extended to Melanisians and the 
process began to accelerate. A real land reform was started only in 1978 when the clan titles 
(propriétés claniques) were recognised and used as the basis of land redistribution and the 
customary law as the law regulating the clan property. The clan councils were allowed to 
administer the clan property. The customary land was, however, restricted to reserve lands. 
The state took the power of compulsory re-acquisition from the settlers, hurried by the direct 
occupation of lands by the Kanak. In 1986 the charge was given to the Agency of Rural and 
Land Development (ADRAF). Despite the political violence and many difficulties the Kanak 
customary land base increased more than 70% between 1978-98. In Grande Terre the Kanak 
owned collectively 17% of the land, the Europeans 18%, while 65% was still in territorial 
ownership (in 1998). on Loyalty Islands almost all the land was customary land.8
The Accord of Nouméa proposed the registration of customary lands that the parcel rights 
could be more clearly identified, the land reform to be continued and the leases to be defined 
by the Congress and Customary Senate.9 The organic law of 1999 recognises in New Caledonia 
three types of land property: private property, public property and customary lands (terres 
coutumières). The property located in customary lands belongs to those having customary 
status. They are a central denominator of Kanak identity and 95% of them belong to this 
group. The customary lands form three classes: reserves; lands belonging to local group title; 
and claimed land titles. These lands are “inalienable, imprescriptible and sacrosanct collective 
property”. They are defined in French law as G.D.P.L. (groupements de droit particulier local), 
which allows equalise the legal person of civil law with the group’s customary rights holders. 
The customary lands’ control is vested in grand chef. The lands cannot be leased. The individual 
rights include right to use, crops and to leave the land fallow.The transferable lands are those 
7   Accord de Nouméa (1998), Préambule, s. 1; Arrêté no. 13 du 22 janvier 1868 (EFO); Arrêté du 27 mai 1884 
(New Caledonia), art .4; Déclaration du 20 janvier 1855 (EFO); Déclaration du 20 janvier 1862 (EFO); 
Vigne (2000), p.21.
8   Ordonnance no. 82-880 du 15 octobre 1982; Décret du 21 mai 1980; Déclaration no. 18 du 20 janvier 1855 
(EFO); Plan de dévéloppement économique et social en longue terme à Nouvelle-Calédonie (1978), pp. 
305-306; Ntumy (1993), pp. 615-617; Payé (2001),  p. 422. Nouvelle-Calédonie. 
9   Accord de Nouméa (1998), art. 1.4.
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which “have been or are delivered by the territorial collectivities or public land establishments 
to answer to the expressed claims to the title having a relation to land.” The Customary Senate 
may establish a land register for customary lands, create new legal and financial tools to help 
their profitable use, and define the rents precising the relationship between the customary 
proprietor and the user of the customary lands. The state has the right to expropriate the 
necessary land. The criterion is a special need of the Melanesians. To the Agency of Rural 
Development’s functions belong also the development of suburban transformation, because 
the Kanak are increasingly become urbanised. 10  
The Collective nature of Kanak land can create special challenges. For exemple, for an 
investment or construction, there is the need for  all the clan members’ acceptance. The 
Territorial Assembly’s decision in 1970 gives guidance on this question. After the customary 
authority’s opinion there can be created indidual parcels to be used for construction. The 
minutes of negotiations are signed by the Chairman of the Council of Elders or the tribal 
chief, and are thereafter registered before a state’s official. Usually one or two members of the 
builder’s clan act as guarantors of a construction loan.11 
In 1838 the British missionaries asked Queen Pomare IV to start a land reform in Tahiti. 
It needed, however, the influential nobility’s acceptance and was postponed. In the agreement 
of 1842 the French authorities promised that the queen would be left the authority on the 
possession of soil. Tahitian legislation prohibited land transactions between Tahitians and 
Frenchmen and the cession of royal feudal lands (fari’ihau) was forbidden, but otherwise 
the collective customary land was to a great extent individualised during the protectorate. At 
the local level, the District Councils acted as land courts, regulating claims, sales and second 
transfers of title and for first instance hearings of family disputes over lands. When the land 
questions were partly transferred to French courts from 1865, the litigation reached its peak. 
A central question was the boundary demarcations. A large number of cases were dismissed 
due to lack of written evidence. Since 1855 the Tahitian legislation required testimony of 
at least three ra’atira but in 1875 the solution of most land questions was transferred to 
French courts. The Tahitians were annoyed and the declaration of King Pomare V (1880) 
asked to leave the land questions to the Indigenous tribes as had been the case during the 
protectorate. In 1887 the French governor made a compromise with the king (now in a 
nominal position), which preserved the customary title during a transitory period. The title 
would disappear when all land was  surveyed and the individual ownership defined. The land 
register was extended to all territory and the civil law courts were amended in land cases 
with Tahitian assessors. To’ohitu continued as a parallel institution until 1932 and practiced 
often independent policy. With the decree of 1887 all unclaimed lands were transferred to the 
district’s or municipal community’s ownership as faufa’a mata’eina’a (patrimonial land). This 
statute remained virtually unchanged until 1923 when the land legislation of Metropolitan 
France was extended to EFO. The process was finished even in the most isolated parts of 
the territory by 1945, after which date there has not been no customary lands. After World 
War II the French government wanted to promote agriculture in the territory whereby copra 
10   Constitution (1958), art. 75; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 1, 18; Ntumy (1993), p. 617; 
Vigne (2000), 35-43.
11   Déliberation du 28 octobre 1970; Payé (2001), p. 422.
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became the main agricultural product. The territory had a statutory right to unoccupied lands 
between 1957-1984 and again from 1996.12 
Despite the individualisation of customary title to land the litigation has continued 
until today due to inaccurate land registration. The French authorities have used in French 
Polynesia a system where only registered land creates rights and reminds closely of the 
common law countries’ Torrens system. At the same time it has broken traditional family 
structures where the rights are handed down from several generations, which has made it 
very difficult to define the individual rights. The territorial courts have held that one family 
branch is enough to prove a person’s ownership right. In 1990 a project of land experts was 
established and in 1996 the Commission of Obligatory Concialiation. Although today only 
0.5% are agreed common lands (partage amiable), the customary law has proved persistent 
in some narrow sectors. The traditional family structure is still much alive, and the chief of 
the family has a strong say in questions of property and succession. The customary adoption 
– as has been indicated elsewhere – belongs to the same category of questions. A Tahitian 
characteristic is also the importance of land acquisition, which is included in French law by 
the notion of usucaption.13  
In Wallis and Futuna the Bataillon Code (1870) prohibited the selling of customary land 
for a “white man”.14 The law of 1961 does not mention customary lands but included originally 
a provision, which made possible to regulate the customary lands with a degree. Due to the 
customary authorities’ strong resistance the provision was later dropped from legislation 
and the only statute, which mentions the possibility to regulate the customary lands is the 
degree of 22 July 1957.15 The customary chiefs have efficiently prevented all development 
projects they see as a threat to customary title and territory has also preserved a character of 
natural economy with traditional gifts and exchange of goods. The lands based on agai fenua 
(custom) are inalienable and inextinguishable. Each member of a family is a user of the family 
parcels. The rules related to land are flexible but there is a clear hierarchy of legal remedies if 
the families do not reach an agreement in the case of conflict. For example in Wallis they can 
first appeal to the members of kutuga (clan) or its elders. They have a customary authority as 
fakamau’agu (tribunal). The next stages are the village chiefs (puke kolo) and councils (fono 
faka kolo); chief of customary police (pulu’i’uvea);  district chief (faipule) and council (fono 
faka palokia); Council of Ministers (fono laki) and finally lavelua. Relation to land is a blood 
tie: the illegitimate children are excluded from inheritance. Similarly, a widow looses at the 
moment of her husbands’ death the right to land. Fatogia is a “land tax” which guarantees 
together with reciprocal ma’ukava (respect) the ownership of extended families’ lands. The 
12   Loi du 10 mars 1891; Loi no. 77-772 du 12 juillet 1977, art. 44; Loi no. 90-612 du 12 juillet 1990, art. 90 bis; 
Loi no. 94-99 du 5 février 1994, art. 4; Loi no. 96-312 du 12 avril 1996, art. 7 al. 2; Décret du 22 juillet 1957, 
art. 40 al. 5; Pomare Code (1848, Tahiti), laws XII-XIII; Newbury (1980), pp. 91, 184, 192, 216, 290; Aldrich 
(1993), p. 77; Sem (1996), pp. 106. In the high year of 1913 there were 21,000 land claims in queue; The 
Torrens system, used in Australia, New Zealand and Canada, was created by Sir Robert Torrens in South 
Australia during the early nineteenth century.
13   Sem (1996), pp. 236-238; Sage (2007), pp. 60, 75-76; Vannier (2007), pp. 84-86. 
14   L’histoire des institutions à Wallis et Futuna.
15   Loi no. 61-814 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 4 al. 4; Décret no. 57-811 du 22 juillet 1957, art 40 al. 5-7; Payé (2001), 
p. 230.
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strength of these rules has become evident in cases where the former islanders, now living in 
New Caledonia, have litigated to obtain former ancestral lands.16
In French Guiana all “vacant lands” became from 1946 the property of the state (since 
1987 region) and it owns more than 90% of land space. The decree of 27 September 1948 
(renewed in 1960) was the first statute which offered some legal protection to Indians.  The 
state began to grant rights to use collectively the state land. The repeal of the Inini statute 
brought the Indian tribes under the French law but their traditional land claims have not 
been recognised. The decree of 14 April 1987 finally gave some protection for Indians by 
permitting the Prefect of Cayenne to plan zones for Indians where they could ask for free 
collective titles for farming, breeding or living for 10 years after which they could apply for 
a cession for perpetuity. The rules were codified in 1990. There are today 18 zones covering 
6,300 sq km but the application process has appeared to be a dead letter.The access to Indian 
territories is highly restricted and a permit from the Prefect is needed.17
6.1.2.  Fishing and Sea Resources
Fishing belongs to the exclusive competence and is regulated by EU legislation.18 The 
territories may issue fishing licencies to foreign fishermen only after the state has made an 
agreement. The law of 16 July 1976 established the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to French 
Polynesia, extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) from the Polynesian coasts, covering 4.8 
million sq km (the size of Western Europe) where the state obtained exclusive rights to exploit 
and explore the biological and non-biological soil and subsoil resources. The following year 
the territory obtained competence to exploit the sea resources but it was returned to the 
state in 1984. The territory, however, preserved the  possibility to intervene when there is a 
question on exploration and exploitation of the riches of the sea. The law of 1990 preserved 
the competence for the state but conceded it to the territory and in 1996 the territory gained 
competence over all biological natural resources in EEZ. In 1994 the territory was allowed to 
grant fishing licences there. The International Convention on the Law of the Sea was ratified 
by France in 1995. France also signed the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with 
Long Driftnets in the South Pacific in 1990 (Wellington Convention), but has not ratified it. 
According to an association agreement with the European Union the EEZ is within the EU’s 
fishing zone.19 
In Hopu and Bessert v. France, the applicants to UN Human Rights Committee claimed 
that a pre-European burial ground and lagoon was a traditional fishing ground for about 
30 families living next to the lagoon and a development of a luxury hotel threatened the 
right. The hotel company held the land on sub-lease, originated with a government-owned 
16   Aimot & Tamole (2007), ss. 49-57. 
17   Code du domaine de l’Etat (1990), art. R 170-56; Décret no. 46-80 du 16 janvier 1946; Décret du 27 sep-
tembre 1948; Décret du 10 janvier 1960; Décret no. 87-267 du 14 avril 1987; Arnoux (1996), pp. 1624, 1629; 
Bechtel (2002), p. 31.
18   Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (1958), art. 3.
19   Loi du 16 juillet 1976; Loi du 12 juillet 1977, art. 62; Loi no 84-820 du 9 septembre 1984, art. 3; Loi no. 90-
1247 du 29 décembre 1990, ss. 40-43, 45-46; Loi no. 95-1311 du 21 décembre 1995; Loi du 12 avril 1996; 
Arrêté du 7 novembre 1994; Sem (1996), pp. 120-122, 252; Ntumy (1993), p. 618. 
266
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
company which had secured an order of dispossession against the complainants’ claimed 
ancestors before leasing. Because France had reservation to article 27 of ICCPR, the Human 
Rights Committee referred to article 17, which France’s activity had violated. The construction 
of the hotel complex had interfered with local people’s rights to family and privacy. 20 The 
Committee’s carefully chosen ruling can be indirectly interpreted so that France had breached 
its positive duty not to permit a private actor to do something which the state knew would 
harm human rights, or that the private company acted as a government corporation’s agent, 
placing the direct responsibility for the interference on France itself. With broad reading 
there is no relevant difference between activity of public and private corporations where 
human rights interests are harmed. 
6.1.3.  Nickel and Nuclear Testing
With the creation of reserve lands the state reserved for itself the sole possession of mines, 
minerals, water systems and sources. Nickel became from 1863 the main resource of New 
Caledonia. Société Le Nickel (SLN; 1880) became the major enterprise with wide powers 
on Grande Terre. The mines were administered by the Council of Mines and headed by the 
high commissioner. The mining industry was revived in the late 1970s with chrome as a 
new product and the French government put  resource management high on its agenda. 
In the aftermath of the Agreement of Matignon the Kanak of North Province demanded 
control over the resource of nickel because the local mining company (SMSP) was out of their 
control. The Accord of Nouméa established a new planning scheme of mining, controlled by 
the territory and demanded co-operation with the Indigenous population, which was realised 
when two Canadian companies arrived to New Caledonia. The energy policy’s new objective 
was autonomy and balancing, with special attention given to Indigenous rural communities. 
The organic law of 1999 gives the Congress of New Caledonia a competence to pass lois du 
pays on the mining of hydrocarbon, nickel, chrome and cobalt. In 2009 the Congress adopted 
a mining plan and established the Strategic Committee on Industry to develop the field. The 
plan emphasises reasonable and balanced development of the mining industry and metallurgy, 
giving priority to the development of local resources, preservation of environment and giving 
a share of the benefits to the nearby communities. 21 The Congress has also established 14 
zones (194 sq km) as protected areas where the mining is not allowed.22 The mining industry 
must take into consideration also the provisions of the Charter of Environment.23
The law of 13 December 2000 demands the state and territorial collectivities respect, 
protect and support the Indigenous communities’ knowledge, innovations and practices, 
20   UNHRC, Francis Hopu & Tepoaitu Besset v. France (1993), ss. 2, 2.2., 10.2.-10.3.; Eide & Krause & Rosas 
(2001), p. 585; New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
21   Accord de Nouméa, art.  4.2.2.-4.2.4.; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 42; Relève des con-
clusions du VIIIème Comité des Signataires de l’Accord de Nouméa (2010), s. 3; Relève des conclusions du 
IXème Comité des Signataires de l’Accord de Nouméa (2011), s. 2C; Aldrich (1993), pp. 102-103; Bechtel 
(2002), pp. 47-48; Nouvelle-Calédonie.
22   Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 22; ESCAP Virtual Conference.
23   E.g. Charte de Environnement (2008), art. 7 ; CC, Décision no. 2013-308 QPC du 26 avril 2013, § 11. 
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based on traditional life, and their relation to the natural environment and sustainable use of 
biological diversity.24 Similarly, the Accord of Matignon made environmental protection to the 
responsibility of the provinces.25 The Accord of Nouméa demands respect for the protection of 
the environment, i.e. to make the development sustainable.26 Also the association agreements 
with the EU give to the Pacific territories environmental protection and signify an important 
cooperation. An important subject to French Polynesia is the provisions on nuclear materials 
and radioactive waste. The provisions of Euratom Treaty are applicable there. The French 
government and EU have a duty to give information on these environmental aspects to the 
territory. France was under considerable international pressure due to its nuclear tests at 
Moruroa and Fangataufa, which have an influence not only on the territory and its Indigenous 
people, but also on the southern Pacific region in general. Its relations with the Pacific 
Islands Forum were strained. France halted the testing in 1996, and since 1998 the Forum 
members improved their ralations with France. On Wallis and Futuna the environmental 
protection belongs to the local state agencies.27 In French Guiana the legislation recognises 
the existence of a traditional right to use the region’s property for the profit of inhabitants who 
get traditionally their subsistence from the forests.28
New Zealand6.2. 
6.2.1.	 Purchase	and	Confiscation:	Reducing	Māori	Land	Base
The Treaty of Waitangi and the British acquisition of sovereignty over New Zealand did not 
at first remove the pre-existing tribal property rights. In the English version of the treaty the 
British Crown confirmed for Māori their pre-existing sovereignty and land rights, and the full 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their “Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other 
properties.” Article 2 gave the Crown an exclusive right to purchase Māori land. It protected 
the Māori from unscrupulous dealers, but also supported immigration by creating a price 
differential and providing a mechanism for colonisation. The Crown acquired imperium, the 
right to govern, but preserved dominium, the private rights of ownership. Based on feudal 
theory, there was no land without a lord, i.e. the Crown was the ultimate owner of all land in 
its territory by the right of eminent domain, having the legal title to land. Two equity rights 
of ownership in English law were a right to occupy the land and when the right was not 
exercised the right to income generated by the non-owner’s presence on the land.  A fee was 
an estate on land capable of inheritance. The most common form was a fee simple absolute 
in possession, or freehold. The doctrine of Aboriginal title was based on the requirement that 
all settlers’ title to land derived from Crown grant. It divided to territorial title, similar to 
freehold ownership, and to non-territorial title, like hunting and fishing rights.29  
24   Loi no. 2000-1207 du 13 décembre 2000, art. 33.
25   Accords de Matignon (1988), Texte no. 2.
26   Accord de Nouméa (1998), Préambule, s. 1.4.
27   Bechtel (2002), p. 48; Sem (1996), pp. 278-280; Préfecture des îles Wallis-et-Futuna. Australia and New 
Zealand have sued against the nuclear testing of France in ICJ. 
28   Code du domaine de l’Etat (1990), art. R. 710-56.
29   McNeil (1989), p. 79; McHugh (1991), pp. 93-100, 132. 
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In the beginning Native affairs, inclusing land purchasing, were directed from London. 
The colonial secretary intervened in pre-treaty land transactions made by the New Zealand 
Company, the mission organisations and private persons. Based on the Land Claims 
Ordinances 1840-1841 the Land Claims Commission inquired those claims and could entitle 
to a claimant with bona fide transaction a Crown grant. For private persons the maximum 
was 2,560 acres. The New Zealand Company was guaranteed four acres of land for every £1 
spent. In 1841 Lord Russell, the State Secretary, gave instructions to guarantee sufficient land 
for Māori occupation: 15-20% of land sale profits were to be reserved for Māori purposes. 
In fact, the administrative costs took a major part of it and little was done. The loss of Māori 
lands began. The colonial government needed land to expedite the process of settlement and 
the Māori saw in intertribal rivalry the sales as an opportunity to vindicate their claims to 
land. Soon they grew, however, disillusioned. The Crown’s pre-emption right divided the 
authorities both in Britain and New Zealand and Governor FitzRoy was allowed to relax it by 
two proclamations in 1844, which allowed the settlers to buy directly land from Māori and 
to pay ten, later one, shilling per acre to the government but the pre-emption was returned 
by the ordinance of Governor Grey in 1846. It made also illegal to lease lands from Māori 
to graze cattle and sheep. Governor Gray started an efficient Crown’s purchase programne 
which bought almost all South Island and large parts of North Island from Māori in a 15 year 
period with low prices. This opened the way for rapid settlement.30 
The British Government’s original position was that the Māori were true owners only 
of their cultivations, places of burial and habitations. The rest of the country was deemed 
in Lockean terms as waste land of the Crown. With instructions from London, Governor 
Grey issued in 1846 royal instructions that allowed the dispossession of uncultivated Māori 
wastelands. The instruction was overturned by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Symonds (1847). 
It ruled that the right of the Crown to extinguish Native title must be consistent with the 
universal principles of natural law, which recognise the validity of title and the need for the 
owners to consent before any transfer of title can take place. There were in fact two systems of 
tenure within the country: the Treaty of Waitangi was a declaratory of common law rules on 
Native title and the principles of natural law, binding on the Crown. Privy Council confirmed 
the binding nature of treaty in Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker (1901). The statutory regime put in 
place to integrate Māori title into the English landholding system assumed the existence of 
tenure of land under custom and usage.31
The New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 reserved the Crown a pre-emptive right to 
extinguish the Native title by purchase from the Māori owners. The Crown’s pre-emption 
right was repealed only four years later. The Maori Reserves Act 1856 had negative effects on 
Māori when the trust commissioners leased the trust lands for insubstantial sums to settlers 
and the provinces received control from the sale of the Crown lands (until 1876). The resident 
magistrates and rūnanga were given two years later charge to determine iwi, hapū and whānau 
interests in land. Once the ownership had been confirmed by the Crown they could authorise 
the sale of land to Pākeha. The supporters of kingitanga decided in Lake Taupo that they 
would not relinguish their lands any more by sale or treaty grant. The parliament responded 
30   Orange (1993), pp. 104-106; Havemann (1999), pp. 165, 167, 381; Spiller (2001), pp. 140-145.
31   Treaty of Waitangi (1840); JCPC, Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker (1901); NZSC, Queen v. Symonds (1847); Spiller 
(2001), p. 143. 
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by enacting measures to facilitate the privatising of Māori-Pākehā land transfers. Governor 
Browne authorised land sales by individual Māori occupants, a policy supported by the Duke 
of Newcastle, the new secratary of state for colonies.32  
Led by the kingitanga movement, Māori resistance to land sales intensified. Disputed 
Waitara purchase in Taranaki was the final cause of warfare which lasted from 1860 to 1864. 
The land squatters used the war as a pretext to use the Native Land Court (NLC) to validate 
their titles. New legislation (1863) was enacted hastily in the war atmosphere and it left the 
Government a free hands to take through an operation which confiscated 12,000 sq km of 
land from those tribes which had resisted the British rule. The Weld ministry limited the 
confiscations to the end of 1867. The land tenure was changed and the Crown’s supporters 
were rewarded by the Compensation Court (1866-1874). Military settlers were located from 
1865 to the frontiers of confiscations. Parts of the King Country and Urewera were, however, 
able to resist the settlement until the 1880s.33  
The first pre-emption era closed with the war. In 1856 Governor Browne had set up 
a Board of Maori Affairs to report on Māori land tenure and land purchasing. The board 
recommended establishing an indigenous lands registry and giving Crown grants for 
individual parcels of land. These propositions were included in the Native Lands Acts 
(1862-1909), which opened the door for settlers to force Māori to relinquish their land. The 
Native Land Act 1862 recognised Native title to all unextinguished lands but that it was not 
recognisable in courts until the NLC had issued a certificate under the act. The purpose was 
to do away with tribal ownership. The Crown’s pre-emption provision was repealed and the 
Crown’s Native Land Purchase Office was disbanded. The 1865 act moved the focus in land 
sales from iwi and hapū to title of persons to Native land. The land sales required that the land 
of hapū had to be surveyed first. Also the Chatham Islands were investigated in 1870. From 
1870 there was a charge of surveys and court costs: many Māori had to sell their lands to 
cover these and other costs. The Māori-owned land fell from 71,000 sq km in 1870 to 28,000 
sq km in 1915. The individual Māori took advantage of offers made by government officials 
or private Pākeha buyers. Many Māori also turned to their tribal rūnanga and hui for help, 
but the NLC did not recognise their authority - not even after their formal recognition by the 
legislature in 1883.34
The British Crown claimed that its own acquisition of sovereignty over territory included 
underlying title to all the land which the courts upheld. The customary land-based policy 
was superceded by a new juridical formation, the tenancy-in-common. In common law, 
32   New Zealand Constitution Act (1852), s. 73; Karsten (2002), pp. 83-85; Havemann (1999), p. 168; McHugh 
(2004), p. 185. The Colonial Office in London tried to retain the control of indigenous policy as long as pos-
sible.
33   Loan Act 1863, ss. 3-4; Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863, ss. 2-5; Karsten (2002), pp. 85-90; Havemann 
(1999), pp. 167-169; Spiller (2001), pp.  148-149. The new legislation paradoxically recognised the tribes 
as political units but only in negative meaning, to ease the confiscations; According to the doctrine of for-
feiture one cannot hold an estate from the Crown that has been betrayed by treasonable actions. The prec-
edents were found from Ireland and East Cape Colony.
34   Native Land Act 1865, ss. 2-3; Immigration Act 1868, ss. 2-3; Native Lands Frauds Prevention Act 1870, s. 
6; Native Land Act 1873, s. 28; Public Works Act 1873, s. 8; Orange (1993), pp. 166-171; Karsten (2002), pp. 
85-90; Havemann (1999), pp. 167-169; Spiller (2001),  p. 152; Boast (2010), pp. 627-646. A similar process 
for the abolition of customary tenure had previously taken place in Scotland, Ireland and North America. 
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exclusive occupation results in a fee simple estate which is, besides the Crown title, the largest 
permissible interest in land. Under the Native Land Act 1865 the Native Land Court would 
award title to ten or fewer trustees, treated as owners in fee simple with a right to alienate 
the land. In Hawkes Bay the NLC gave titles to few chiefs who were forced then the sell them 
for their debts. The Native Lands Frauds Prevention Act 1870 demanded every purchaser or 
lessee to obtain a certificate from a trust commissioner. The official’s role was to investigate 
the transactions and ensure that the statutory requirements were met. The Fox government 
wanted, however, to speed up the economic development and settlement. The Native Land 
Act 1873 replaced the land acts’ original 10-owner system with a demand for each individual 
owner of land to be listed in memorials of ownership (since 1880 certificates of title) and 
to obtain all of their signatures. The land could be leased for a maximum of 21 years. The 
land purchasing became a laborious project and created a system of fragmented ownership, 
affecting deeply the Māori freehold tenure. The English form of co-ownership of land, dealt 
with a group of freewilled owners tied by contract, replaced whakapapa, or the common 
ancestry, as a determinant, and the ownership rights became the source of turangawaewae 
(right to tribal land)35. Another statute, the Government Native Lands Amendment Act 1877 
empowered the Crown to prohibit private purchasing of a block in which the Crown had 
taken an interest, consolidated in the Native Land Act 1909.36 A short return to the principle 
of Māori communal ownership was the Native Lands Administration Act (1886-1888), 
which repealed the Native Land Act 1873. It stopped individual dealings with Māori lands 
and allowed the incorporation of owners of a block into an elected Block Committee with 
executive powers to determine terms of sale or lease. 37 The Native Equitable Owners Act 1886 
tried to return the ten owners rule by allowing the NLC to make trust orders which inserted 
into the title as tenants in common together with theoriginal granteed.38
6.2.2.  Wi Parata-Era: Denial of Rights and Attempts to Consolidation
The New Zealand courts held until the 1870s that the Crown was bound by the common 
law and its solemn engagements to give full recognition of Indigenous proprietary rights. 
This changed in 1877, when James Prendergast, CJ, ruled in the Supreme Court’s Wi Parata 
case - based on the legal fiction of all-encompassing Crown sovereignty - that the treaties 
with “primitive barbarians” lacked legal validity and must be regarded as simple nullity. The 
Native title was legally non-existent: the indigenous rights were at the most, moral. According 
to Prendergast, the Crown was the sole arbiter of its own justice. The case was a test case 
for Prendergast in policy of transforming New Zealand into “a better Britain”. The case was 
to prevail over 100 years. It prevented Māori recourse to vindicate the indigenous property 
rights guarantee under the treaty. The Supreme Court developed the doctrine in 1881 when it 
ruled that the treaty had not given to Māori customary rights a character of title. This made it 
35   Native Lands Act 1865, s. 23; Orange (1993), p. 220; McHugh (2004), pp. 187, 218, 266, 551; Young & Bel-
grave & Bennion (2005), pp. 14, 18; Spiller (2001), pp. 154-155.
36   Native Lands Amendment Act 1877, s. 6.
37   Native Lands Administration Act 1886, ss. 11, 33. 
38   Native Equitable Orders Act 1886, ss. 6, 8.
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possible to sell some trust reserves in the 1880s. In 1894 the Court of Appeal held that a claim 
of title by the Crown to any land was sufficient to oust the jurisdiction of courts.39 
The Privy Council did not share Wi Parata doctrine. It took a stand on the question in 
two cases, Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker (1901) and Wallis v. Solicitor-General (1902-1903). In 
the first case it indicated that the Aboriginal title to traditional lands was recognised both by 
statute and common law. The Crown lacked unreviewable prerogative power in relation to 
the Indigenous lands. If the Māori could prove that an individual or tribe members had been 
in continual possession and occupation of the lands in dispute under a native title which 
had not been properly extinguished, the applicant was free to maintain an action in New 
Zealand’s courts to protect his title or occupation.40 
The uneasy New Zealand Government responded by Land Titles Protection Act 1902, 
which overruled the Privy Council’s reasoning. But the process continued. The Privy Council 
returned the same year to the subject in Wallis v. Solicitor-General. The solicitor-general 
defended the Wi Parata doctrine. According to him the transactions of traditional tribal 
lands took place in a legal vacuum. The Privy Council rejected this view: tribe’s endowment 
of land was fully justiciable and enforceable transaction. It was the court’s task to determine 
the breach of trust. The Court of Appeal’s position was “certainly not flattering to the dignity 
or the independence of the highest Court in New Zealand.”41
As a response, the New Zealand’s lawyers published its first and only Protest of Bench and 
Bar in 1903. They stated that all Māori cessions of their traditional lands were acts of state 
beyond the cognisance and enforcement of the courts. Sir Robert Stout, the groups’ spokesman, 
left open whether continued appeals to the Privy Council were worth considering.42 Nine 
years later Stout CJ tried, however, to minimise the damages of the break with the House 
of Lords in Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor-General (1912) where he took a more conciliatory 
line on indigenous rights. The Court of Appeal recognised the departure from Wi Parata, 
but only partly. In common law recognition of Native title was returned to the ante 1877 
situation but the court still held that the Crown was the sole arbiter of its own justice and 
could terminate the Native title in court by its own declaration.43 The Privy Council returned 
to the traditional property rights only in 1941, when it rejected the attempts to insulate Māori 
ancestral property rights from legislation.44
Outside this exacerbated atmosphere around the case law, the definition of Māori land 
rights continued also in legislation. The Liberal Party was in power between 1890-1911. In the 
first phase it followed the Australian model by organising a radical land-reform programme, 
based on the following: progressive land and income taxes; compulsory purchase of large 
estates; perpetual leases in place of freehold and cheap; state-subsidised loans for farmers. 
The Native Land Laws Commission (1891) criticised the Crown’s lack of consistent land 
policy and the neglect of tribal structures but its recommendations were mostly overlooked. 
39   NZSC, Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington (1877), pp. 78-80; Mangakahia v. NZ Timber Co (1881); NZCA, 
Tamaki v. Baker (1894), pp. 382-383; Morris (2004).
40   JCPC, Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker (1901), pp. 382-384.
41   Land Titles Protection Act 1902, s. 2; JCPC, Wallis v. Sollicitor-General (1902), pp. 179-180, 188-189.
42   McHugh  (1991), pp. 114-115; Tate (2005), p. 108.
43   NZCA, Tamihana Korokai (1912), p. 345.
44   Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Council (1941), p. 382. 
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The Government established a Validation Court to rule incomplete and disputed land 
transactions. To prevent speculation in Māori land, the private purchase was again limited 
and halted altogether between 1893-1900. In the West Coast Settlement Reserves Act 1892 
was created a public trusteeship for 800 sq km of Māori land, which was offered in farm tracts 
to Pākeha on 21 years leases. The legislation of 1892-1893 enabled the Crown to declare any 
Māori land suitable for settlement and the Crown bought large areas of Central North Island 
for a cheap price. The Māori did not profit from this assistance to settlers.45 
The appointment of James Carroll, a half-Māori as the Native Minister in 1899 changed 
the Liberal government’s policy. The result was a compromise between the objectives of 
government and Kotahitanga. The Maori Lands Administration Act 1900 established Maori 
Land Councils to each Māori district, chaired by a president and having a Māori majority. 
The councils took over part of the NLC’s functions, including the ascertainment of ownership, 
partition, succession, the definition of relative interests and the appointment of trustees for 
Native owners under disability. A council could also manage the alienation of land when there 
were more than two owners and Governor in the Council’s consent, to lease the surplus land 
as an alternative to sale and to investigate land titles through block committees. The powers 
were submitted to the direction of the NLC’s Chief Judge. This promising start was finally 
watered down. The Pākeha accused Carroll of introducing “Native landlordism”. The Maori 
Land Settlement Act 1905 abolished the councils and their functions were taken over by Maori 
Land Boards. The Stout-Ngata Commission (1907-1908) was set to investigate the situation. 
As a result, the Crown’s pre-emption was halted again. The Commission recommended that 
1,600 sq km of Māori land should be leased with the income reserved for the owners to give 
them capital to develop their retained lands.46  
Sir Apirana Ngata and Sir John Salmond drafted together the Native Land Act 1909 
which rationalised and codified the legislation into a more coherent form. The act, 
combining elements of self-management and paternalism, included some new initiatives. 
The statutory extinguishment of Māori customary title demanded the Crown to prove its 
title to land. The new alienation provisions sought to restrict Crown purchase of undivided 
shares. Incorporations received a more secure basis and the resolution to accept the Crown’s 
offer was possible only after a meeting of owners. This signified an attempt to reverse the 
policy of individualisation and returning control to Māori collective bodies. The Maori Land 
Boards had to confirm all sales, leases and mortgages of Māori land and they were given 
wide discretions to refuse alienation. The Crown preserved its advantage in land purchase 
by using proclamations, which prohibited an alienation of a block, to regulate land sales. 
The basic structure of the Native Land Act 1909 was preserved until 1993. On the other 
hand, the act prevented the courts to question or invalidate Crown grant, leases and other 
alienations proclaimed by the governor free of Native customary title. In 1912 the Native title 
question was again in the Court of Appeal with the Tamihana Korokai case. According to Sir 
45   Native Land Purchases Act 1892, s. 2-4; West Coast Settlement Reserves Act 1892, s. 4; Native Land (Valida-
tion of Titles) Act 1893, s. 11; Havemann (1999), pp. 172-174, 391; Spiller (2001), p. 160; McHugh (2004), 
p. 270.
46   Maori Lands Administration Act 1900, ss. 6, 9, 22; Maori Land Settlement Act 1905, ss. 2-3; Havemann 
(1999), pp. 174-175; Spiller (2001), pp. 163-164. A settler could acquire a restricted amont of Māori land 
only by a declaration of intent.
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Robert Stout CJ a statutory recognised title had been created only with the 1909 legislation, 
which was against the Privy Council’s ruling from 1901. The other judges supported Stout’s 
narrow approach. The Crown claim had to be made by following the formalities of the 1909 
act. As the Crown had never made a formal act evidencing the extinguishment of Native 
title, to the NLC was recognised as a jurisdiction to determine the customary owners. After 
this decision the courts accepted the traditional tribal property rights only to the extent of 
statutory recognition.47 
After the ascendancy of Reform Party came to power the policy changed again. The 
consolidation of Māori blocks since 1911 prepared the last great wave of Government land 
purchase (1913-1920). The Native Land Amendment Act 1913 allowed the Government 
agents to purchase undivided shares, even if rejected by a meeting of owners. Poverty 
forced also many Māori to sell their lands. Only from the 1920s was it realised that further 
acquisition of Māori land would drive the increasing indigenous population into landless 
position, relying on the state’s social care. Sir Maui Pomare introduced the Native Trustee Act 
1920 which gave the management of Māori land to an independent Native trustee who would 
provide finance for land development. Between 1922-1953 ten Trust Boards were created 
by tailored legislation to administer raupatu money received from the government, under 
extensive ministerial oversight and audit. First was the Arawa Lakes Agreement (1922). A 
Royal Commission (1927) was established to inquire about the earlier confiscations. The 
result was the first statute based compensations for Taranaki tribes by the Native Purposes Act 
1931. Sir Apirana Ngata became a prominent figure in Māori politics. As the Native Minister 
of the Liberal government (1928-1934) he was able establish in 1929 the statute-based Māori 
Development Schemes through which state funds were made available for Māori farming 
to create a sound economic base for tribes. The programme was unluckily hit by the Great 
Depression of the early 1930s.48   
The Labour Party, in power since 1935 with the support of the Rātana Party, increased 
the state’s role in Māori land management and development. The ascendancy of Peter Fraser 
as Prime Minister signified a new start in negotiations concerning claims, including Ngai 
Tahu, Waikato, Taranaki and Orakei. The Native Purposes Act 1943 offered a more flexible 
tenurial device as an alternative to incorporations in the form of trusts. It became in the 1950s 
the most important means of Māori land ownership. In 1944 the Waikato-Maniapoto Maori 
Claims Settlement Act was passed. The Native Department (since 1945 the Department of 
Maori Affairs) became a large organisation, especially concentrating on land settlement and 
management questions. The administration of large land blocks by the department continued 
until the 1980s when the Ministry of Maori Affairs recognised the importance of whānau and 
hapū working and managing their land themselves.49 The legislation was consolidated with 
47   Native Land Act 1909, ss. 84-86, 209; NZCA, Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor-General (1912), s. 345; McHugh 
(1991), pp. 116-117; Karsten (2002), pp. 92-93; Spiller (2001), p. 167. 
48   Native Land Amendment Act 1913, s. 109; Native Trustee Act 1920, ss. 3-4; Native Purposes Act 1931, ss. 
46-66; Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, Preamble, (9); Havemann (1999), pp. 174-175; Spiller (2001), 
pp. 150, 168; McHugh (2004), pp. 271-272; Smith (2005), p. 149.  Altogether, the Māori lost between 1900-
1930 over 15,000 sq km of land.
49   Native Purposes Act 1943, s. 8(1); Durie (1998), pp. 141-142; Sharp (1998), p. 57; Spiller (2001), p. 173. Sec-
tion 438 allowed the establishment of alienation and utilisation trusts.
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the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955. Unlike the incorporations, a board is able to acquire land or 
interest in land with the prior consent of the minister and sell, sublease or otherwise dispose 
of the land. It is required to keep an updated roll of beneficiaries based on birth-right.50 More 
localised, smaller parcels of land (s. 438 trusts) are defined in the Maori Affairs Act 1953.51 
The Maori Appellate Court (MAC) has defined them as pūtea trusts of one block.52 The 
commercial powers of trust boards are broadened with the Maori Trust Boards Amendment 
Act 1988.53  
 The rapid urbanisation changed the overall situation. The Hunn Report (1960) concluded 
that collective ownership operated as an obstruct to effective economic utilisation: there 
were even thousands of owners for one block. The number of titles added each year was 
equal to 20% of  the Māori population. The Crown should buy up Māori land in trust for 
Māori people which would be opened to Māori farmers on open ballot. The Prichard-
Waetford Committee Report (1965) continued with Hunn’s reasoning. Common ownership 
and economic utilisation were incompatible objectives. The committee recommended the 
removal of a part of statutory protections of Māori freehold land. Despite the Maori Council’s 
counterarguments the National government passed in 1967 the Maori Affairs Act, which 
brought profound changes: the Māori land could be converted to general land if held by not 
more than four joint owners; Māori trustees could sell Māori lease lands to owners even if 
not all owners agreed; shareholders lost their status as landowners and became shareholders 
in incorporation; special arrangement in the entitlement of persons dying intestate was 
abolished; and the MLC’s jurisdiction was again reduced, with 960 sq km of land being 
compulsorily concerted to general land. In 1986 only 12,000 sq km of Māori-owned land was 
left (4% of theoriginal amount). The uninhabitable lands had become national parks.54
6.2.3.  Renewed Importance of Land 
The Crown’s attitude to Māori lands began to change gradually in the 1970s while Māori 
protests increased. Matiu Rata, the Labour Government’s Minister of Maori Affairs, used his 
opportunity to introduce the Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1974 which returned the status 
quo ante. In the following year the Waitangi Tribunal was established which could make 
recommendations to the government on claims by Māori that the Crown had breached the 
principles of the treaty. Only the amendment of the act in 1985 led to real change when the 
tribunal was given retrospective authority to make recommendations on breaches since 1840. 
The reform of Maori Affairs Act took a long time. The Māori rejected the Maori Affairs Bill 
of 1978, but the Maori Council’s request to rewrite the bill was accepted by the responsible 
50   Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, ss. 24, 42-43.
51   Maori Affairs Act 1953, s. 438. 
52   MAC, Re an Appeal by the Ngai Tahu Moari Trust Board (1982), ss. 15-16.
53   Maori Trustboards Amendment Act 1988, s. 3.
54   Maori Affairs Amendment Act (1967), ss. 6, 31; Report on the Department of Maori Affairs (1960), pp. 48-
49, 54;  Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Laws Affecting Maori Land and the Powers of the Maori 
Land Court (1965); Durie (1998), pp. 135-136, 139; Havemann (1999), pp. 172-174, 391. In the late 1990s, 
260 sq. km of Māori lands were leased in perpetuity as farmlands, commercial sites and urban residential 
properties. 
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minister. The new draft was withdrawn by the changes of government in 1984 and 1990. Only 
in 1993 – after several hearings and changes - was the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act enacted. It 
has a significant Māori influence. The status of incorporations is returned and the traditional 
land made difficult to alienate. The incorporations may hold land for investment purposes; 
undertake business or action and enter to transaction, unless the legislation or incorporations’ 
order prevents doing so. They can redefine or amend their objectives by resolution.55
Between 1977-1979 the Orakei Maori Committee Action Group occupied the Bastion 
Point area in Auckland for 506 days. The government had proposed to divide 24 hectares 
of land for residential purposes. The original reserve of Ngāti Whātua had been diminished 
several times and in 1951 they were relocated from the rest of land. The tribe was offered in 
1977 the return of 13 hectares of land and $200,000 in cash which divided the tribe. Finally 
the court gave an eviction notice and the occupiers were arrested by the police. The final 
outcome was a hapū reserve held in common use and benefit. The administrative body is 
the Ngati Whatua o Orakei Reserves Board, which has an equal representation on the trust 
board and Auckland City Council. In 1995 a similar drama took place at Moutoa Gardens in 
Whanganui on a smaller scale. This time the protesters did not gain as much support while 
there was no more novelty value.  Both sides in the question radicalised and the case did not 
receive an immediate solution.56 
A challenge to the Māori was from 1984 the Labour government’s privatisation programme, 
which divided the Crown land to Landcorp (arable land) and to the Department of 
Conservation, the State Owned Enterprises (SOE, urban sites) and Forestcorp (other valuable 
Crown land). The State Owned Enterpises Act 1986 was objected to by the Maori Council. Its 
s. 27 fully protected the availability of Crown land only for claims lodged with the Waitangi 
Tribunal before the act. The parliament amended hastily the law with s. 9 mentioning in the 
general clause the treaty principles. The Maori Council appealed to the Court of Appeal by 
claiming the precedence of s. 9. The court ruled that the principles of the treaty included 
sovereignty, partnership, active protection and consultation. Special provisions were included 
to the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprise) Act 1988 to provide a protective mechanism 
whereby the Crown could sell SOEs off again. The tribunal was granted the power to make a 
binding ruling in respect of land transferred to a state-owned enterprise. All land titles would 
carry a memorial to warn a purchaser that the land could be resumed by the Government 
if there was a successful claim before the tribunal and compensation would be paid. Also 
the SOEs had a right to ask the tribunal to order the memorials be lifted. The tribunal could 
order a memorial be lifted from the title if there were no claims or if it was not well founded 
or upheld. Restructuring of the railways had started before the SOE Act. The Crown avoided 
expensive litigation by creating in 1991 a joint research team of the National Maori Congress 
55   Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1974, ss. 4-5; Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s. 253; Treaty of Waitangi 
Act 1975. 8A-8B, 8D, 8HB-8HF; Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985, s. 3; Durie (1998), p. 136; Have-
mann (1999), p. 392; Spiller (1991), p. 175. In the late 1970s the Labour dominance in Māori politics was 
becoming to end. In 1980 Matiu Rata established the Mana Motuhake party. 
56   Orakei Act 1991, ss. 6, 8, 20, 25; Durie (1998), pp. 124-129.
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and the Crown and tribes to research possible claims.57 The recent amendment (2012) to the 
SOE Act gives an opportunity to establish mixed ownership companies (up to 49% of shares 
can be sold).58
The responsible minister, however, introduced another scheme to accommodate surplus 
Crown properties, known as the Consultative Clearance Process (CCP). This process was 
administered by the Department of Survey and Land Information. It is obliged to notify 
iwi of Crown land intended for disposal. This gave iwi a chance to give a view on reasons 
within one month for withholding the sale. The claim has to be lodged with the Waitangi 
Tribunal. The lands are classified in the claim according to the settlement policy to A, B and 
C lands. Category A lands are essential to the settlement of claims. Category B and C lands 
have no special importance to a claim but they are important to a tribe. The Māori have 
criticised the process as giving too much power to officials in deciding the merits of claims. 
The Crown has further used the CCP to hold strategic lands. The Crown Settlement Portfolio 
holds all surplus properties within raupatu boundaries; claim-specific landbanks hold land 
for a specific claimant and regional land banks where a claim-specific land bank has not been 
established and the land falls outside a Crown settlement Portfolio.59
 By the 1980s the mismanaged Maori Land Boards were near extinction and the Māori 
demanded direct devolution to the tribal system. In the late 1980s’ judgments the Court of 
Appeal required the government to negotiate arrangements with the Māori to protect the 
availability for claims settlement of Crown land and related assets to be transferred to state 
enterprises. The court reserved the right to impose its own arrangements in the event of the 
parties failing to come to agreement.60
The Waitangi Tribunal’s Muriwhenua Report (1997) was in the first case to consider the 
Māori interpretation of early transactions. The Crown had breached the treaty principles of 
protection, honourable conduct, fair prices and recognition. The government had failed to 
properly purchase the land. The tribunal questioned the Crown’s notion of tenure and the 
onus of proof for the Māori. It signalled that it was ready for the first time to use binding 
recommendations. 61
The river, foreshore and seabed rights have been a difficult and important issue. The 
Crown established early that the seabed, foreshore and the beds of estuaries and rivers belong 
to Crown ownership. In 1912 the Court of Appeal ruled that the NLC has jurisdiction to 
investigate a title to the bed of navigable lakes which were equalled to land.62 In 1929 the NLC 
rejected further Crown claims to lakebeds. The two longest cases on rivers and seabed were 
the Whanganui River and the Ninety Miles Beach. The litigation on Whanganui riverbed 
57   State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, ss. 9, 27; Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises Act) 1988, ss. 9, 27; 
NZCA, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1987); Durie (1998), p. 184; Christie (1997), pp. 
47-48; Havemann (1999), pp. 176-177. The Court of Appeal has included in the scope of s. 9 coal, timber, 
railways and educational institution property.
58   State Owned Enterprises Amendment Act 2012; New Zealand Maori Council and Others v. Attorney-Gen-
eral and Others (2013), s. 1.
59   Durie (1998), pp. 134-135.
60   NZCA, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1989); Ritchie (1995), p. 127; McHugh (2004), p. 
358. 
61   WT, Muriwhenua Land Report (1997), s. 13; Mutu (2011), pp. 62-63.  
62   NZCA, Tamihana Korokai v. Solicitor-General (1912), pp. 345-346.
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started in 1938. The Maori Purposes Act 1951 gave the Court of Appeal a special jurisdiction 
on considering in the Whanganui question whether the Māori held the bed according to 
custom and usage before 1903. The court ruled in 1955 that the Māori own a riverbed as part 
of territory, recognised by statute, but seven years later added that the granting of freehold 
title has transformed the traditional rights into riparian rights, as part of the property of the 
owners under the ad medium filum aquae rule, and, therefore, there does not exist a separate 
iwi title to the river. The Māori have the right to enforce their claims only by reliance on 
a statute which recognises their rights. In 1963 the court ruled that the statutes had for a 
long time recognised the ancient customs and usage of Māori rights to lands. A statute land 
placed a burden on the Crown’s paramount title to all land.  The MLC could make a freehold 
order to fix the boundary of land fronting the sea at a low-water mark but otherwise the 
grant took effect to the high-water mark. The foreshore remained with the Crown, which 
was freed from the obligations of the Treaty of Waitangi. In fact, the Supreme Court had 
ended three years previously the practice of MLC to allow titles below high water mark. It 
held that the Harbours Act 1950 demanded a special act to grant foreshore and, therefore, 
excluded the MLC’s jurisdiction to issue a freehold order. Where the title to adjoining has not 
been investigated, the land between the high and low water marks was vested in the Crown. 
The Waitangi Tribunal released in 1999 its Whanganui Report, where it held that the Māori 
customary ownership was never lost and the ad medium filum aquae rule had no application. 
It recommended that the Crown should recognise and protect the Māori rights to rivers. The 
settlement was made in 2009, where iwi co-manages the river with the local council and the 
government agencies in a way, which benefits the cultural, environmental, social, political 
and economic development of iwi.63 
A more recent process of river rights has dealt with the country’s longest river, Waikato 
River. It is for Māori tupuna ara (ancestral river) and wāhi tapu, and the water has mauri 
(force of life). The Court of Appeal has also recognised it as taonga, related to mana. In 
Waikato River Settlement (2010) the Crown has recognised its failure to protect the special 
relationship of the Waikato-Tainui with the river. The river contributes to New Zealand’s 
culture, society, environment and economic well-being. There has been created a vision and 
strategy called Te ture whakaimena o te awa o Waikato (customary law of Waikato River). 
The strategy includes a resource-consent process and is part of the Waikato Regional Politics 
Statement. The Waikato River Authority directs through its vision strategy the following: the 
restoration and protection of health and well-being of the river for future generations; the 
promotion of an integrated, holistic and co-ordinated approach for the implementation of 
vision, strategy and management of the river; the funding of rehabilitation initiatives; and the 
local authorities by giving advice on how to amend the RMA planning, including the Waikato 
River Integrated Management Plan. The Guardians Established Commission is committed to 
cultural, social, environmental and ecological well-being. The river management agreement 
includes provisions on customary acts. The ownership of managed property is regulated, 
63   Harbours Act 1950, s. 150; Maori Purposes Act 1951, s. 36; Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, ss.3-6; Re Nine-
ty Miles Beach (1955); In re the Bed of the Whanganui River (1962); Re the Bed of Whanganui River (1963); 
Re Ninety Miles Beach (1963); NZSC, Re Ninety-Miles Beach (1960); WT, Whanganui River Report (1999), s. 
11; Spiller (2001), p. 179; McHugh (2004), p. 348; Young & Belgrave & Bennion (2005), p. 49; Anaya (2011), 
p. 44.
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based on a co-management agreement. The government transfers to the Waikato Raupatu 
River Trust $1 million annually for 30 years for the funding of comanaged projects. The trust 
has also a first refusal right with regard to Huntly power station and coal and mining permits 
related to Waikato River. The Rauhawa Trust Board and other smaller groups who litigated 
against the Crown on the basis of unequal treatment, settled their claims in 2010. A Waikato 
River Cleanup Trust has been established to secure the recognition of customary acts and 
contribution.64 
In 2006 a settlement was reached on Te Arawa Lakes which preserves the existing 
structures on lakebeds with commercial activities, vested in the local iwi. The settlement has 
established a Rotorua Lakes Strategy Group with bylaw-making powers.  The freehold estate 
in the lakebeds is inalienable. Iwi has the rights to public utilities without authorisation and 
the settlement recognises a fishing redress. On the other hand, the settlement does not grant 
any rights to water or aquatic life. The Crown has also set limits to obligation related to needs 
attached to lakebeds and to liability of contamination. The common law rights of navigation 
and recreational activities are preserved. To some lakes the Minister of Conservation can 
appoint guardians, who give recommendations on environmental, ecological and social 
effects to lakes.65 
In the Ngāti Apa case (2003) the Court of Appeal changed its view on the MLC’s jurisdiction 
to investigate title to land over the foreshore and seabed and answered positively, based on the 
common law doctrine of Native title. A hapu could prove customary ownership of foreshore 
or seabed. The remnant customary rights still subsisted in law over the beaches and seas.66 
The decision had a significant impact in New Zealand. It was a serious test for the government 
on Māori rights because access to the ocean was an essential question of great public interest 
and controversy. There was fear that the Māori could prove their exclusive customary 
ownership over the foreshore and seabed. The government responded by announcing that 
the uncertainty in law would be replaced by a statute which would both recognise the Māori 
customary rights and ensure access for all New Zealanders to beaches. The Māori arranged a 
mass demonstration, a 50,000 strong Hīkoi, against the legislation, which was criticised also 
by WT, but the parliament enacted the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, which transferred the 
public foreshore and seabed to the Crown. The Te Ture Whenua Maori Act applied still to 
Māori freehold land, but not to public foreshore and seabed which could not become freehold 
land. Rūnanga of Ngai Tahu asked the CERD Commission to consider the new act against 
New Zealand’s obligations under the international treaty. CERD found that the legislation 
discriminated against Maori customary rights and recommended the country to resume a 
dialogue with the Māori to seek ways of lessening its discriminatory effects. New Zealand 
Government, whose answer was negative, invited UN Rapporteur, Professor Stavenhagen, to 
estimate the situation in 2006. Also he criticised the law and suggested its repeal or significant 
amendment. The government had again a negative attitude to critique. In 2007 the CERD 
64   Ngati Tuwharetoa, Rauhawa and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010, ss. 4, 10-12, 14-16, 23, 36; 
Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, Preamble, (1)-(2), ss. 4, 9, 12, 23, 
47, 62, 75, 80; EC, Chief Executive of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry  v. Waikari Regional Council 
(2006); NZCA, Paki v. Attorney-General (2005), s. 87; Aho (2006), p. 108; Aho (2008), pp. 240-242. 
65   Conservation Act 1987, s. 6X; Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, ss. 23-27, 31-34, 38, 47, 75, 77.
66   NZCA, Attorney-General v. Ngāti Apa (2003), ss. 106-108, 116.
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Commission returned for a second time to the question by demanding the Government 
to renew its dialogue with the Māori. New Zealand’s foreign minister held CERD’s attitude 
“meddlesome”, but the Government promised finally in 2009 to repeal the act if a suitable 
replacement could be developed.67
 In 2011, the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutui Moana) Act replaced the Foreshore and 
Seabed Act and restored the intrinsic, inherited coastal interests neglected by the previous law. 
The new legislation recognises the exercised mana tuku iho. To obtain a customary marine 
title, a Māori group has to prove that it has used and occupied the area without substantial 
interruption since 1840. The new law includes a burden of proof – clause, where the customary 
interest is deemed not to have been extinguished. There is a period of six years by which to 
assert customary interest claims. Central to all coastal protection and conservation is co-
operation with the local iwi and hapū. To wāhi tapu areas can be appointed wardens.68  
The doctrine of fiduciary duty has been under debate in New Zealand. Despite Sir Robin 
Cooke’s reference to the Crown’s fiduciary-like duties in the SOE cases the doctrine has not 
developed in New Zealand. The courts have occasionally referred to fiduciary duty in situations 
concerning entities charged with administrative assets for Maori. The Treaty of Waitangi 
Fisheries Commission held fishing quota for iwi under broader considerations of equity 
than those which bind the conscience of private trust funds. The Court of Appeal rejected 
the Canadian models when it held that a local authority does not hold a land compulsorily 
acquired and never again used for requisitioned purpose as a fiduciary for the original Māori 
owners. Nevertheless, in general, there are few Maori assets left in direct government control 
in the North American meaning. The doctrine has had also little influence as a tool for 
interpreting the statute law or for shaping the administrative law, as it has been overshadowed 
by treaty principles which are were directly incorporated into the statutory scheme, making 
the other interpretative devices needless. In SOE cases the Court of Appeal held that the 
Crown is responsible for ensuring it safeguarded sufficient assets to make available for the 
settlement of treaty claims. The court demanded the Crown’s retention of assets otherwise 
unencumbered in law by Māori proprietary interest. The talk was based on interpretation 
of s. 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 which subjected the statutory regime to the 
treaty principles.The doctrine of fiduciary duty functioned here as a canon of interpretation, 
mingling with other interpretative devices.69
67   New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004; WT, Report on the Crown’s Foreshore and Seabed Policy 
(2004), s. 5.3; CERD (2005), Decision 1(66), art. 7; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 279; Knefla & 
Westra (2010), pp. 22-24, 192; Anaya (2011), pp. 53-56. 
68   Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, Preamble, ss. 5-6, 45-47, 51, 56, 78-80, 98. 
69   NZCA, Te Waka Hi Ika o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (2002); Attorney-General v. 
Maori Land Court and Proprietors of Tahora 2F2 and Wairoa District Council (1998); McHugh (2004), pp. 
534-535 
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6.2.4.		 Whenua	Tūpuna
Whenua Tūpuna, or ancestral lands, are important to Māori identity. The Maori Affairs 
Act 1953 recognised two forms of Māori land: freehold land and customary land, which 
are inalienable.70  The present legislation lists four categories: Māori customary land, Māori 
freehold land, general land owned by Māori, and Crown land reserved for Māori. The 
customary land is defined as “land... held by Māori in accordance with tikanga Māori...” The 
Māori freehold land’s beneficial ownership is granted by the MLC’s freehold order.71 The 
traditional Māori land was held by hapū. It was necessary to Māori due to: spiritual growth and 
economic survival; contributing to sustenance, wealth, resource development and tradition; 
strengthening whānau and hapū solidarity; and adding value to personal and tribal identity 
and well-being of future generations. Internal, transferable use rights were distributed among 
ancestral descendants. A customary Māori title included take tipu (ancestral land passed 
down according to Māori custom), take raupatu (land acquired by conquest and occupation), 
take ōhākī (land allocated through the wish of a dying chief) and take tuku (gifted land). For 
all land an entitlement was conditioned by occupation and continual presence (ahi kā). After 
1840 ariki used veto over disposition of land in consultation with other chiefs, although it was 
not accepted by the colonial authorities.72 
Māori land rights, based on tikanga Māori, were recognised by the Colonial Office and 
New Zealand’s authorities in the early colonial period. The establishment of the NLC signified 
rapid transformation of Native title lands to Crown-derived tenure. The Native title was 
extinguished either by statutes or by the tribal owners themselves while the expropriatory 
power rested with the Parliament alone. The customary land rights were reaffirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa (2003). Very little customary title is left 
today, although customary tenure has survived in a residual form. Non-territorial Native title 
has survived in some urupā (ancestrial burial sites), in the collection of flora and fauna for 
medicinal and decorative purposes and access to and use of tribal fisheries. These are called 
Aboriginal servitudes.73
Already before the treaty the New Zealand Company reserved lands for Māori during 
the land transactions as tenths. The Native Reserves Act 1856 allowed the native owners 
to consent the Crown’s holding title to the land after which the commissioners could sell, 
lease and administer the land for their benefit without consultation. In 1862 the functions 
of the commissioners transferred to the governor’s responsibility. The reserved lands could 
be vested in the Crown by Order in Council by a declaration of owner assent. In 1882 the 
title to reserves was transferred to a public trustee. The reserve land leases were standardised 
to 21 years by the Westland and Nelson Native Reserves Act 1887. The Māori could obtain 
the title as trustees from 1920. W.L. Rees established a block committee system of land 
70   Maori Affairs Act 1953, s. 2.
71   Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, ss. 4, 129, 145.
72   WT, Ngai Tahu  Report (1991), s. 25; McHugh (1991), pp. 76, 108; Durie (1998), p. 116. According to ahi kā 
(burning fire) a person absent for three generations lost all claims to land. The fire became mātaotao, cold. 
73   Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s. 6A; NZCA, Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa (2003), s. 116; McHugh (1991), 
p. 134; Durie (1998), p. 115. Today 6% (15,000 sq km) of New Zealand’s land space (13% in North Island) 
belongs to Māori freehold land, divided in 26,000 titles. Some 80% is non-arable land.
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management system to the Poverty Bay area to resist the individualisation policy. This led 
to the East Coast Native Trust which developed the land itself. The Native Land Court Act 
1894 allowed incorporation for the purposes of alienation. This was further developed in the 
Maori Land Laws Amendment Act 1903 which defined incorporations as means of Māori 
management of freehold lands under the NLC’s jurisdiction. Apirana Ngata, a Māori MP, 
was an active advocate of this policy. Also Ngapuhi iwi established treaty committees to 
determine the ownership of land blocks before the NLC’s investigations. The Tuhoe iwi was 
able to gain a temporary legal victory in the form of Urewera District Native Reserve Act 
1896 which established the Urewera Native Reserve with 2,600 sq km land determined by a 
joint commission. It provided a system of tribal management for all Tuhoe lands, but finally 
the region was regrouped by the Urewera Consolidation Scheme to blocks between 1919-
1927, which ended the reserve, and most of lands went to the Crown.74      
The acquisition of land continued still after the war to some extent. The long leases of 
Māori lands lasted for generations while the value of leasing rates dropped significantly. The 
rents were revieved every 21 years. The Maori Affairs Act 1953 gave the MLC powers to 
set aside lands as Māori reserve based on historical significance or spiritual and emotional 
association of Māori with the land. The long hand of Wi Parata reasoning was codified to the 
act which prevented attacks against any Crown grants even if the native title was imperfectly 
or partially extinguished.75 The Maori Reserved Land Act 1955 combined 43 statutes and set 
rules for reserved lands on national basis. It covers land whose title is vested in a Māori trustee. 
The tenants are given automatic right of renewal. The lessees are favoured over owners and 
the Māori trustees are given powers to purchase lands for ongoing sale to lessees. The Trust 
Board can appoint a Council of Elders to advice the board in questions related to tikanga, reo 
and kāwa.76 
In 1975 a Crown commission suggested more dense reviewal of rents. The administration 
of the lands should be vested in incorporations. It was recognised that the nature of Māori land 
ownership had changed. Reserved lands were administered by regional organisations remote 
from hapū and traditional interests. A governmental review team (1991) proposed further 
a plan to enable the owners to resume their ownership and to buy back the improvements. 
The following reports were not in the Māoris’s favour as they lacked sufficient compensation. 
Although the Maori Reserved Land Amendment Bill 1996 aimed at fixing these conditions, 
the policy still reflected close collaboration between the settlers and government in a way 
where the Māori lands should be used in a productive manner. The Foreshore and Seabed 
Act 2004 gave the High Court the power to establish a foreshore and seabed reserve to 
acknowledge kaitiakitanga over a specified area and enable it to be held for the common use 
and benefit. A group must show an uninterrupted occupation and use of the area since 1840. 
74   Native Reserves Act 1856, ss. 6, 14; Native Reserves Amendment Act 1862, s. 7; Native Reserves Act 1882, 
s. 8; Westland and Nelson Native Reserves Act 1887, s. 3; Native Land Court Act 1894, ss. 53-60; Urewa 
District Native District Reserve Act 1896, s. 2; Native Trustee Act 1920, s. 4; McHugh (2004), pp. 268-270; 
Spiller (2001), pp. 163, 169.; O’Malley, pp. 227-245. Although a partial failure, thanks to Rees’ plan the East 
Coast has remained one of the major areas still in Māori ownership. Most Urewera lands later became part 
of a national park. 
75   Maori Affairs Act 1953, ss. 158, 439-439A.
76   Maori Reserved Land Act 1955, ss. 3, 5-6. See also: Maori Trust Boards Act 1955, ss. 15, 23; Maori Trustee 
Act 1955, ss. 13-24.
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The members of a reserve board managed the reserve as guardians. The Chief Executive of 
the Ministry of Justice keeps the Public Foreshore and Seabed Register. The legislation was 
renewed in 2011 to strengthen the iwi rights. The respeonsible board in Te Puni Kōkiri has 
been given wide powers of discretion on general land aimed at the benefit of the Māori to 
develop the use of land. When there is disagreement between the Regional Council and the 
reserve board, the board can seek a decision from the Environment Court.77  
The process to stop further alienation of Māori freehold land started with the Māori 
Affairs Act 1974. The final outcome after many revisions was the Te Ture Whenua Maori 
Act 1993. The act reformed the incorporations back into the form of trusts where the 
shareholders are the owners while day-to-day activities remain in the hands of an elected 
committee of management. The act reaffirms Māori concepts of land and represents a legal 
interpretation of whānau and hapū and their joint interest in a particular piece of land. Under 
the act it has become easier for owners to change general land back to Māori freehold land. 
Māori incorporation is commercially designed to manage whole blocks of land. In all, 15% 
of landowners may apply to the Maori Land Court to establish incorporation. It can also 
wind it up. Māori incorporations must have a constitution, defining the general meetings 
of shareholders, voting, committees of management and shares. The shareholders nominate 
and elect the committee members whose term of office is three years. The election must be 
notified to the MLC which can also suspend members. The Māori freehold land can only 
be transferred or sold when 75% of shareholders agree and the MLC confirms it. Further, 
the land must first be offered to the preferred classes of alienee, i.e. members of hapū. An 
exception to restrictions is the investment lands acquired afterwards. The land can in general 
be leased up to 21 years. The longer leases must be agreed by the shareholders’ special 
resolution. The incorporations can mortgage Māori land. There is, however, a risk that in the 
case of insolvency the mortgagee can sell the land on the open market without consulting 
the incorporation or shareholders. The incorporations finances are controlled by the general 
meeting of shareholders, auditor and MLC. There can be paid a dividend to shareholders.78
The Te Ture Whenua Maori Act recognises Māori land as taonga tuku ihu, an asset inherited 
from earlier generations. The purpose of the act is to make sure that the owners of Māori land 
keep the land for future generations. A trust is an equitable obligation binding a trustee to 
deal with property over which he/she has control for the benefit of beneficiaries, anyone of 
whom may enforce the obligation. The trustee may also be a beneficiary. The landowners 
nominate a trustee whose role is either responsible, as a custodian or advisory. In general, 
he/she has to maximise the assets and minimise the liabilities of the trust. Some trust funds 
can be spent only for Māori community purposes. The act recognises five different trusts: 
pūtea trusts are small, uneconomic interests to pool owners’ interests together; whānau trusts 
allow a family to bring together their Māori interests for the benefit of the family and their 
descendants and are together with pūtea share management trusts; ahu whenua is the most 
common trust which promotes the use and administration of the land in the interest of the 
owners; whenua tōpū are iwi or hapū designated to facilitate the use and administration of the 
77   Maori Affairs Restructuring Act 1989, ss. 19, 27-28, 31-32, 47, 62, 64-66, 83; Resource Management Act 
1991, ss. 2, 82A; New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, ss. 10, 36(1)(b), 37(4); Durie (1998), pp. 
139-141; Tribal Customary Rights Orders (2005), pp. 3, 6, 8.
78   Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s. 150B; Maori Incorporations (2002), pp. 8-12, 15-16, 24, 27, 30-31.
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land in the interest of tribes and extended families, often as part of settlements; and kai tiaki 
trusts are available for a minor or disabiled individuals unable to manage their affairs. Their 
establishment follow a simplified form. The MLC has the power to terminate a trust if it falls 
short of expectations.79
 Proof of Māori land rights involves evidence of custom or usage in relation to the claimed 
land at the time of British assertion of sovereignty in 1840. If the claimant group proves 
exclusive occupation, they have title equivalent to an inalienable fee simple estate. Proof 
of customary rights or uses not amounting to exclusive occupation could result in more 
limited interests. Where title has been established before colonial encounter, it is presumed 
to continue until shown to have been extinguished. The continued land alienation has led to 
major challenges in Māori advancement. The social cohesion between whānau and within 
iwi has been undermined by the individualisation of land titles and the forced abandonment 
of collective ownership. There is a challenge of two coexisting systems of land titles and 
land registration. The titles have become increasingly crowded and the land is not used as 
effectively as it could.80 Some modern settlements have revoked the reserves, replaced by 
alternative arrangements.81 
6.2.5.  Land in the Associated States and Territories
The first attempt to land reform in the Cook Islands was made by Resident Moss in the early 
1890s. In 1899 on the main island was established the Rarotonga Land Board. From 1902 
Resident Gudgeon (now also chief judge) and the Land Titles Court began to investigate 
land titles and determine ownership based on “custom or other legal means”. Gudgeon CJ 
wanted to limit the chiefs’ control on land. In the Cook Islands Act 1915, to which the land 
legislation is still largely based, all land is vested in the Crown. The Crown’s title to land is to 
any title vested in any person for an estate in fee simple, or title lawfully held in any person 
by virtue of custom or usage before the commencement of the act. The Crown may take land 
for public purposes against adequate compensation. The Crown may grant land in fee simple 
or grant leases, licenses, easements or other limited estates, rights or interests in any Crown 
land. The interest in land is determined in the Cook Islands by statutes, common law and 
custom. Customary land is defined as “land which is vested in the Crown is held by Natives or 
the descendants of Natives under Native customs and usages of the Cook Islands”. Every title 
to and interest in customary land is determined according to the ancient customs and usage 
of indigenous people. The High Court Land Division has jurisdiction to investigate titles to 
customary land and to determine the relative interests of owners. If the court makes an order 
79   Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, ss. 213-218.
80   Durie (1998), pp. 116-117, 137-138; Spiller (2001), p. 177; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 276-
277.
81   Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, s. 21; Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu Claims Settlement Act 2008, s. 
78. 
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in favour of a person who operates to vest a legal estate in fee simple, the land becomes Native 
freehold land.82 
There is, however, a general prohibition against the alienation or disposition of customary 
land. A will cannot change an interest in customary land. A Native freehold land can be 
alienated only by lease, licence or easement for a maximum of 60 years with a right of 
renewal. The alienations must be confirmed by the Land Division of the HighCourt. The 
native freehold land can also be mortgages as a security for a housing loan, but the mortgagee 
cannot obtain title to the land. A minimum of three persons owing native freehold land may 
apply to the High Court to be incorporated as a body corporate, which has the power to 
occupy and manage the land as a plantation or farm, engage in farming or other operations 
on the land, use the land for the growing, felling, milling or marketing of timber, or to conduct 
other enterprises on the land. The body corporate may mortgage or lease the land under the 
same conditions as individuals.83
The land tenure system in Niue is principally based on custom. The land is exclusively 
reserved to the use of the Niueans. It is vested in the Crown but mangafaoa (family units) 
hold the land collectively on behalf of all its members and leveki mangafaoa (trustee) acts 
on behalf of the family. An individual can belong to several mangafaoa. A title to land is 
determined according to the custom and usages of the Niuean people by ascertaining and 
declaring the mangafaoa of land by reference to a common ancestor. Land may be occupied 
by the cabinet’s order and cultivated and managed on behalf of leveki mangafaoa, owners 
or those interested in land. It can take title to land for Crown for any public purpose and 
the rights vested absolutely in the Crown. The land can be also set aside as a reservation for 
common use of the residents. The owners are entitled to compensation. The cabinet may also 
retain revenue to develop the land. When the land is already in public use, a written consent 
of the owner, trustee or assembly is required.84
In Tokelau all land is vested in the Crown as the ultimate title holder. The three categories 
of land are land held by the Crown (foreshore, land for public purposes and land alienated 
voluntary to the Crown); land held by the Crown subject to customary title (land under pure 
custom, land subject to non-customary rights, land subject to Crown lease); and land subject 
to an estate in fee simple (as 1 January 1949). All customary land is vested in the Crown and 
is held by the Crown to customary title. The alienation of land is only possible according to 
local customs and usages to a Tokelauan or to the Crown. The customary land includes nuku 
(village land), kaiga (family land) and church land. Most of the land is held in communal kaiga 
ownership. A senior male member of kaiga exercises the control over the land in consultation 
with the other members. The disputes are solved by the village councils. The responsible 
ministry has the right to take land for public purpose, which therefore becomes absolutely 
82   Cook Islands Act 1915, ss. 421-422, 445; Constitution of the Cook Islands (1965), art. 40; Gilson (1991), pp. 
84, 93, 116. 
83   Land (Facilitation of Dealings) Act 1970 (Cook Islands), s. 22-24; Cook Islands Development Bank Amend-
ment Act 1980 (Cook Islands), s. 31; Ntumy (1993), pp. 18-19. 
84   Niue Act (1966), s. 462; Niue Amendment Act (No. 2)(1968), s. 11; Land Ordinance 1969 (Niue), s. 44; 
Ntumy (1993), p. 171.
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vested in the Crown. The territorial waters extend to 12 nautical miles and the foreshore and 
seabed under the soil are vested in the Crown.85
6.2.6.  Kai Moana
The closeness of the sea and the importance of kai moana (seafood) have made the fishing 
rights a central question in New Zealand. The Māori had already during the 1840s their first 
confrontations with the settlers on fishing resources. The fishing and food-gathering rights 
were first given some recognition, but since the 1860s the situation began to deteriorate. In 
the River Thames foreshore the Māori were provided purchase of land below the high-water 
mark as compensation. This was an exception and in 1872 James Prendergast, as Attorney-
General, ruled that the title to lands below the high-water mark rested with the Crown.86
In 1877 the Fisheries Act was enacted, which guaranteed the indigenous fishing rights 
and included a reference to existing Māori fishing rights.87 The subsequent acts included 
the same provision until the 1980s, but with very general wording they offered little real 
protection. Customary fishing needs were tolerated as a disappearing tradition. In the 1890s 
North Island’s Maori were able to secure continued use of their eel weirs, access to oyster 
beds and freedom from licence fees for trout fishing. Soon there came, however, setbacks. Te 
Arawa disputed without success over their fishing rights in Lake Roturua. Although the 1908 
Fisheries Act mentioned the Maori fishing rights, they were far from guaranteed. The Native 
Land Act 1909 closed the door to protect customary fishing rights by civil action. The only 
option was a territorial claim to the lake bed or foreshore strip. In 1912 the Māori agreed to 
surrender their claim of customary title to all lakebeds and riverbeds in New Zealand to the 
Crown in exchange for retaining the right to fish in those waters.88 
In Waipapakura v. Hempton (1914) a Māori fisherwoman litigated against the confiscation 
of her nets. She claimed a customary right to fish under the provisions of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. Section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908 exempted existing Māori fishing rights from 
the statute’s regulatory scheme. The Court of Appeal indicated that the section could only 
refer to Māori fishing rights recognised by some other statute. There was no common law 
recognition of Māori rights to traditional fisheries. Further, the Native Land Act 1909 barred 
these kinds of suits and in common law the nonterritorial rights to tidal waters were wested 
in Crown.89  The case was to prevail in New Zealand’s courts for over 70 years. For example, 
in 1965 the Court of Appeal held that the customary rights were extinguished when title 
was granted to adjacent land.90 The doctrine of Wi Parata and Waipapakura was first revised 
by the High Court in Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer (1986). The defence relied on s. 
88(2) of the Fisheries Act which in principle guaranteed the Māori fishing rights. Williams J 
85   Tokelau Amendment Act 1967, ss. 19-20, 23-25; Tokelau Amendment Act  1969, s. 7; Tokelau (Territorial 
Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone) Act 1977, ss. 3-4, 10; Ntumy (1993), pp. 308-309.
86   Orange (1993), pp. 187-188.
87   Fisheries Act 1877, s. 8.
88   Karsten (2002), p. 93; Orange (1993), pp. 188-189. 
89   Fisheries Act 1908, s. 77(2); Waipapakura v. Hempton (1914).
90   NZCA, Wiki v. Inspector of Fisheries (1965).
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rejected Wi Parata reasoning and referred after long neglect to Symonds (1847), according 
to which the local laws and property rights were not set aside by the establishment of British 
sovereignty.  Section 88(2) excluded the customary fisheries from the statutory scheme. The 
common law was admitted again as a source of right for Māori fisheries. Customary non-
territorial property right had never been extinguished, i.e. tikanga Māori was recognised in 
the exercise of customary fishing rights and the validity of aboriginal title was recognised for 
the first time in 1877. The property right is limited to acknowledged members of a local tribe 
and to those fishing under their permission and code.91 WT added to these findings in the 
Muriwhenua Report (1988) that the customary law includes also some commercial use. The 
customary law is not petrified: it can also adapt technological change.92
In the afterwar period the Maori Executive Committees were authorised to control 
fishing grounds.  The Fisheries Amendment Act 1986 tried to create a new system of fisheries 
management by the Quota Management System (QMS) in order to combat the depletion 
of fisheries. The system gave a share of total allowable commercial catch as individual 
transferable quotas (ITQ) to holders on yearly basis. The Māori saw the system as an attempt 
to privatise the fisheries. The solution did not work well: the remaining Māori entitlements 
were extinguished. After the appeal of the Maori Council the High Court issued in 1988 a 
local restraining order which stopped the entire quota system. The Waitangi Tribunal held 
that the legislation was in fundamental conflict with the treaty principles and terms. A new 
agreement was needed to comply with the treaty because the tribes owned the resources off 
the coast. This caused a public outcry against the tribunal. The Maori Fisheries Bill 1988 left 
open whether the tribes had disposed of their fishery rights and as consequence all fisheries 
were still theirs. After criticism the government offered a gradual arrangement. The Maori 
Fisheries Act 1989 offered a 10% fishery quota for four years at a rate of 2.5% a year. The 
government offered $10 million in  fishery assistance. The act also created the Maori Fisheries 
Commission with another $10 million. It formed Aotearoa Fisheries Limited to facilitate the 
entry of Māori into the business and activity of fishing.93
Sir Robin Cooke CJ ruled in the Court of Appeal that customary Māori fishing rights were 
still protected under the treaty; that tribes could still file with the Waitangi Tribunal; and that 
the act of 1989 was not the ultimate solution. In 1992 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd. decided to 
sell 40% of New Zealand’s largest fishing enterprise, Sealord Products. The Maori Fisheries 
Commission asked the National government for a respective fishing quota. The Commission’s 
chairman O’Regan advocated that the quota should be shared separately between tribes. 
Ngāi Tahu had the largest claim, supported by the Waitangi Tribunal’s proposition of 200-
mile fishing zone in South Island, covering a 70% share of all of New Zealand’s fisheries. The 
National government negotiated in late 1992 a deal where it would give the Maori Fisheries 
Commission $150 million to buy 50% of Sealord Product’s shares. The act ended the Māoris’ 
commercial fishing claims and the Waitangi Tribunal’s jurisdiction on it. The Crown would 
legislate to protect customary fishing rights. Accordingly, The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries 
91   NZHC, Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer (1986).
92   WT, Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (1988), ss. 11-12. Williams J. also refered to precedents from the 
Privy Council (Campbell v. Hall, Amodu Tijani) and the Supreme Court of Canada (Calder, Guerin). 
93   WT, Muriwhenua Report (1988), ss. 11-12; Christie (1997), p. 54;  Milroy (2000), p. 65; McHugh (2004), pp. 
273-422.
6. Land and Environment
287
Claims) Settlement Act 1992 agreed to transfer large proportions of the nation’s commercial 
fisheries quota to the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (Te Ohu Kai Moana) to 
manage on behalf of all Maori and to provide funding to enable the Commission to purchase 
the Sealords Product fishing company. The commission leased with discount rate a 20%-
quota of new fish species in QMS to iwi. The commission made also submissions on new 
legislation, the Fisheries Act 1996 and the Fisheries Act Amendment Act 1999, which made 
the statutory management regime more flexible with clearer guidelines. The commission tried 
to find an allocation method to satisfy both iwi and urban Māori authorities, but in 1999 the 
Court of Appeal ruled that the settlement assets could be distributed only to iwi – although 
they traditionally did not own the fishing resources.94  
In its final report He Kawai Amokura (2003), the Commission suggested division of 
shares in fishing equally between the tribal coastline and population, (excluding the Chatham 
Islands) while money would be divided solely on a population basis. The allocation system 
would be guided by tikanga and be technically feasible, transpatent, accurate and robust. Based 
on these outlines the parliament enacted the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 where iwi structure 
has a central role. Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Limited does the following: administers the 
settlement assets; fosters, promotes, commissions and funds the sustainable management of 
fisheries; and protects and enhances the interests of iwi and Māori. Another important statute 
enacted the same year was the Maori Commercial Aquaculture Settlement act, which granted 
a 20% quota of all aquaculture space in the coastal marine area. The Regional Councils 
may identify new space for aquaculture. The allocated space must be of an economic size 
and iwi aquaculture organisation must act to the benefit of all iwi members. It has a Māori 
Commercial Aquaculture Trust, which receives the Crown assets and holds them in trust. It 
has an annual reporting obligation. Its decisions can be applied to MLC.95 
In 1993 the Customary Fisheries Sub-Committee of Te Ohu Kai Moana started 
consultations with Māori, based on the 1992 act. The subcommittee held that the customary 
fishing regulation must deliver tino rangatira over the resource; provide exclusive Māori use; 
and provide limited kāwanatanga for conservation purposes. The subcommittee wanted 
also to link the environmental protection to customary fishing regulations. In 1996 the 
government created exclusive taiapure fishing grounds, based on local committees that allow 
Māori to take kai moana (sea food) for spiritual or cultural purposes without legal restraint. 
The Crown has allocated 20 million quota shares to Te Ohu Kai Moana Trustee Limited. 96  
The legislation was amended by the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 
1998. They cover separately the North and South Island non-commercial customary fishing in 
94   Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992, Preamble, ss. 9-10, 40; NZCA, Te Waka Hi Ika 
o Te Arawa v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (1997); Manukau Urban Maori Authority v. Treaty 
of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (1999), s. 19. O’Sullivan (2007), pp. 139-140. The Court of Appeals’ pre-
sumption of authority to define the principles of the treaty was larger than the governments in New Zea-
land were used to; The UN Human Rights Committee supported in Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand 
(1993) the government’s policy to give specific attention to the sustainability of Māori fishing activities as a 
whole. 
95   Maori Fisheries Act 2004, Preamble, (9)-(13), ss. 10-32; Maori Commercial Aquaculture  Settlement Act 
2004, ss. 6, 10, 22, 32, 36, 40, 54; O’Sullivan (2007), pp. 139-140; Christie (1997), pp. 55-57; Milroy (2000), 
pp. 68, 70. 
96   A Guide to the Fisheries (Kaimoana Customary Fishing) Regulations 1990, pp. 1, 4-6, 9-10, 13.
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accordance with the treaty principles for hui and tangi (funeral). Marae can appoint tangata 
kaitiaki/tiaki as an official to authorise customary fishing in an appointed area. The minister 
of fishery can, however, cancel the appointment. The customary fishers must carry with 
them a written authorisation to prove their right. The Māori official can give a customary 
fishing authorisation also to a non-Māori according to manaakitanga-principle. A tangata 
kaitiaki/tiaki may develop Iwi Planning Documents for fisheries within iwi’s rohe and for 
the development of sustainability measures for them. Mātaitai reserves are areas where the 
Māori manage all non-commercial fishing by making equally applicable bylaws. Reserves 
may only be applied for over traditional fishing grounds by tangata kaitiaki/tiaki and must 
be areas of special significance for Māori. The Ministry of Fisheries gives the approval to 
reserves. Tangata kaitiaki/tiaki may make bylaws on species and their quantity, size limits, 
fishing methods and areas. They apply to all individuals and are submitted to the Minister of 
Fisheries for approval. The conservation legislation does not directly effect the Māori fishing 
rights. The Maori Fisheries Act 2004 holds the assets in trust which has set iwi and hapū in 
competition with each other. In associated states and territories regulations aim at maximum 
protection of indigenous fishing and sea resources rights. Also in each three associated states 
and territories the fishing has have an important role. They have Exclusive Economic Zones, 
which guarantee that New Zealand has the world’s largest fishing space.97
Ngāi Tahu developed Kaikoura whale watching in the 1990s as a major tourist attraction. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that they were justified in seeking to limit the granting of further 
licenses in the area. The whale watching was estimated as a tribal activity. In 1996 the Ngāi 
Tahu Settlement offered to tribe management of reefs, title and use to 32 customary fishing 
areas and first right of refusal for 30% of the harvest rights to five shellfish species. In 2002 the 
Waitangi Tribunal published its Ahu Moana Report on aquaculture and marine farming. The 
tribunal held that the Crown had not taken properly into account the tender coastal space 
that belongs to Māori. The country’s fish stocks have become severely depleted.98
6.2.7.  Crown Forests
Forest land is considered by Māori as taonga. It demands to preserve natural environment, 
landscape, amenities, wildlife fresh water and historical values. In 1988 the Government 
announced its intention to sell the state commercial forestry assets to reduce the national 
debt. The Court of Appeal held that the timber rights are included to the s. 9 rights of State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1987. The government, however, decided to sell the cutting and 
milling rights instead of land. After negotiations the parliament passed the Crown Forest 
Assets Act 1989 which allows the land to remain in Crown ownership until all outstanding 
Māori claims to land are resolved. As the cutting rights are permitted to third parties, there is 
included a provision to guarantee the Māori rights when selling the trees. The Crown Forestry 
97   Tokelau (Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone) Act 1977, ss. 6-8; Conservation Act 1987, s. 267H; 
Fisheries Act 1996, s. 29BA, 174-175; Ngai Tama Claims Settlement Act 2003, s. 72; Maori Fisheries Act 
2004, ss. 36, 79, 93; Ntumy (1993), pp. 19, 309; Kerins (1994), pp. 3, 5; Christie (1997), pp. 55, 58; Palmer 
(2008), p. 103; Cook Islands Government.  Manaakitanga means neighbourhood hospitality. 
98   WT, Ahu Moana Report (2002), ss. 6-7; Durie (1998), p. 202; Mutu (2011), pp. 36-37.
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Rental Trust was established for rentals from licenced Crown forests lands which it holds 
in trust to support claims to the Waitangi Tribunal. Several farms have been reforestated, 
creating 120 forest parks with 17,000 sq km under protection. There have been several claims 
and challenges on allocation of Crown Forest Assets and a process to settle claims to Forest 
Licence Lands. Some modern settlements have also ceased the status of those lands.99 
In 2008 the Central North Island iwi Collective (CNI), was established, which may 
request the company to transfer forest land to iwi or nominees. The company has to transfer 
assets from the Crown’s agreed property to another CNI claimant if the settlement is reached. 
The case law refers to the fact that exclusive Māori rights include rights to standing timber 
and mineral resources. They are equivalent to fee simple. If there is a special and regulated 
sustainable forest management plan on regulated sustainable forest management permit 
as land to which the plan or permit applies, no person can fell indigenous timber on their 
land.100
6.2.8.  Resource Management and Environment
An active resource management policy began in New Zealand during the 1930s. In 1937 the 
Labour government nationalised all petroleum rights. Despite Sir Apirana Ngata’s resistance 
the policy continued. Uranium (1945), geothermal resources (1952-1953), natural water 
resources (1967) and gold and silver (1971) followed in the postwar period. The Crown’s 
settlement policy is that Māori rights to minerals are use and value rights. Later it has, 
however, transferred the ownership of some specific materials, like pounamu, to individual 
iwi. The Māori see themselves entitled to take advantage of advances in technology to exploit 
the resources on their land. The Māori must show that they have used a natural resource 
in 1840 before it can be returned to them. In 1988 the Crown made an agreement with 
Coalcorp which made of the latter an agent of mining rights with surplus properties to be 
transferred directly to private purchasers. The following year the Crown announced that 
it will sell Coalcorp, including many Tainui raupatu lands. The Tainui Maori Trust Board, 
supported by several other iwi, took legal action to stop the sale. The Court of Appeal halted 
the selling of land in Waikato before there would be proof that Tainui would be content. 
As result, the land could not be transferred to SOE without a clause in the land title noting 
their liability to be restored. The Tainui and Ngāi Tahu settlements have given iwi particular 
resource management and representation rights in their rohe and setting enhanced rights at 
the level of communication and notification. An important report of the Waitangi Tribunal 
has been the Petroleum Report (2003), which recognised Māori interests in the country’s oil 
and resources, and the Crown’s royalty entitlements from petroleum. The report also held 
that an 11%-interest in Kupe petroleum mining licences must be available to be included to 
99   Forest Act 1949, s. 67DB; Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s. 8HB(1)(a); Crown Forest Assets Act (1989), ss. 14, 
17, 30-31, 40;  Tutae-Ke-Wetoweto Forest Act 2001, Preamble, (6); Affiliate Te Arawa Iwi and Hapu Claims 
Settlement Act 2008, s. 128; NZCA, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General (1987); Tainui Maori 
Trust Board v. Attorney-General (1989); Alves (1999), pp. 84-85, 138.
100 Central North Island Forests Land Collective Settlement Act 2008, ss. 16, 20; Aho (2007), p. 140. 
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Ngā Hapū o Ngā Ruahine settlement and Ngāti Kahunguru claims. The Crown has ignored 
the report.101
Following the American model, in 1926 the first Town Planning Act was enacted, followed 
by the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. The Resource Management Law Reform began 
in the late 1980s to rationalise the natural and physical resources’ legislation. In Huakina 
Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority (1987) the Court of Appeal used the Treaty of 
Waitangi as an extrinsic aid when considering the existence of spiritual, cultural and traditional 
tribal relationships with resources.102 The importance of treaty principles was also recognised 
in the report of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (1988). The final 
provisions were collected to the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) whose purpose is a 
more sustainable management of natural and physical resources; the safeguarding of life in its 
different forms; and to offer remedies to important national features. The use, development 
and protection must affirm as a matter of national importance the relationship of Māori 
and their culture and traditions with ancestral lands, waters, wāhi tapu and other taonga. 
The governmental decision-makers must have regard to for kaitiakitanga (environmental 
stewardship principle) when they administer the legislation. The municipal authorities have 
to consult with the Māori during the preparation of policy statements or plans and to take 
into account iwi resource management plans. The Māori have to be consulted when they are 
identified as an affected party in the consideration of applications for resource consents.103
The RMA process has been long, and has demanded radical changes in environmental 
management and planning by taking tino use a co-management procedure. Section 33 of 
RMA provides a number of opportunities for Māori involvement in the natural and physical 
resources. It allows any local authority to transfer most of its functions, powers or duties 
under RMA with some restrictions to another public authority, including the iwi. The transfer 
must be publicly notified and it must be appropriate. Although there have been difficulties 
among the local councils with these transfers, the iwi and hapū have made their proper 
environmental management plans; there has been created iwi resource management units, the 
Environmental Risk Management Authority’s Protocol on treaty principles and Conservation 
Management Strategies. There were created several consultation guides, among them the 
governmental Kia Matiratira (1992) for Māori. It stresses the iwi and hapū as developers of 
their lands and resources, and as kaitiaki to protect the environmental values, natural taonga 
and heritage in rohe. The Ministry for Environment has focused on the treaty principle of 
partnership as a key concept.104 
101 Ngāi Tahu (Pounamu Vesting) Act 1997, s.3; NZCA, Tainui Maori Trust Board v. Attorney-General (1989); 
WT, Petroleum Report (2003), s. 5; Alves (1999), pp. 79, 128; Spiller (2001), pp. 179-180.
102 NZCA, Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority (1987), s. 210; Hayward (2003), pp. 61-62.
103 Resource Management Act 1991, ss. 5-8, 66, 74, First Schedule, s. 3, Forth Schedule, s.1; Kaitiakitanga and 
Local Government (1998), pp. 12-14, 16, 21; Spiller (2001), p. 180; There are differing views on the scope of 
consultation. The Environment Court stressed in 1997 a more holistic approach in consultation, focusing 
on wider treaty principle of informed decision-making based on partnership and active protection. Cf. EC, 
Mason-Riseborough v. Matama-Piako District Council (1997), s. 12; The affected party means here a group 
influenced by the decisions. 
104 Resource Management Act 1993, s. 33; Kaitiakitanga and Local Government (1998), pp. 11, 24; Hayward 
(2003), pp. 43, 45, 48-54, 95-97, 101-102. 
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The Māori see the environment as a place where they belong and as a source where 
they have emerged. Many aspects of the natural environment are fundamentally wāhi tapu. 
The litigation to get back the lost lakes, mountains, foreshore and tidal lands began early. 
For instance, in Whakaharatau and Kauaeranga cases (1870) Francis Fenton CJ (NLC) 
declared that the Māori could hold rights to the foreshore goldfields, but these tidal plains 
were suspended by a government proclamation. Similarly the Māori claim to Whanganui 
River was formally commenced in 1938 but led to several setbacks at different levels of court 
which did not take a stand on Māori issues. The Conservation Act 1987 allows conservation 
covenants to be granted or reserved over any land. They have resulted in the return of Mount 
Hikurangi, vested to the rūnanga of Ngāti Porou in perpetuity. Similarly Taranaki/Mount 
Egmont, Mount Taupiro, Aoraki/Mount Cook and Mauao/Mount Maunganui have been 
returned to iwi ownership.105
There are specific, stringent requirements on all Māori resource issues, including the 
coastal marine areas, fresh water resources and utilisation of geothermal waters at all levels 
of government. The Māori give particular value to purity, heritage protection and use. These 
aims are promoted in a large network of participants. The management schemes and plans 
must include acceptable conservation. The responsible minister can appoint guardians for 
certain lakes and fisheries. The guardians can make recommendations on ecological and 
social effects.106 
WT has expressed its concern on environmental protection and emphasised the 
importance of Māori values as part of the landscape in several reports. The Manukau Harbour 
Report (2003) claimed that the Māori have lost the use and enjoyment of land as a result of 
the following: compulsory acquisition of land; urban growth and city development; and the 
use and enjoyment of traditional waters by pollution, major works and commercial fishing. 
The Crown has failed to provide royal protection against them. The reports influenced 
the Environment Act 1986, which requires the responsible ministry to ensure that in the 
management of natural and physical resources a full and balanced account is taken of the 
principles of the treaty and heritage of the tangata whenua. The Conservation Act 1987 has 
incorporated the treaty principles to the level of consultation. The Department of Conservation 
gives assistance in conservation questions, helps to preserve indigenous freshwater fisheries 
and advocates conservation of natural and historical resources.  Some modern settlements 
have revoked conservation areas due to new arrangements.107 
In the Mangonui Sewerage Report (1986) the tribunal criticised the resource management, 
planning and conservation legislation as inconsistent with the treaty obligations. The Māori 
relationship with ancestral lands should always be relevant in land use planning and the 
Māori environmental values should include less tangible matters, historical associations and 
105 Mount Egmont Vesting Act 1978, s. 4; Mauao Historic Reserve Vesting Act 2008, ss. 5, 7; Karsten (2002), p. 
83; Hayward (2003), p. 58; McHugh (1991), p. 235; Aho (2006), p. 109. The sacredness of nature is a com-
mon feature among the indigenous peoples and their pantheistic religious background.
106 Bash (1995), pp. 143-144, 151, 191. Cf. Lake Wenda Preservation Act 1973, s. 5; Conservation Law Refer-
ence Act 1990, s. II B 6X(1); Fiordland (Te Moana o Atawhenua) Marine Management Act 2005, Preamble; 
Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement Act 2005, Preamble, (6), ss. 45, 58; Affiliate Te Arawa 
Iwi and Hapu Claims Settlement Act 2008, ss. 37, 50, 71.
107 The Environment Act 1986; The Conservation Act 1987, s. 6; Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, s. 22; 
WT, Manukau Report (2003), s. 2; Christie (1997), p. 46.
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traditional relationships, as part of normal resource management decisions.108 In the Mohaka 
River Report (1992) the tribunal focused the connection between the right to manage and the 
right to own resources. This means that the tribunal began to challenge the Crown’s ownership 
assumptions and doubt the legitimacy of its management processes.109 The following year the 
tribunal stressed in two further reports the following: Crown’s obligation to protect under 
art. 2 of the treaty the continuing rangatiratanga; Māori management and ownership right 
over the resources; and share in the benefits from the use of particular natural resources. The 
Crown was obliged to protect them equally.110 Waikato River Settlement (2010) deals with 
significant counter effects on environment. The co-managing authority has duties related to 
soil conservation. the Tainui Confederacy has a right of first refusal on Hentley Power Station 
and licenses. The Crown established the Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao Commission, which 
provides advice and assistance to authorities in environmental issues.111
The Māori have also litigated to the Environment Court which holds jurisdiction over the 
RMA, Public Works, Historic Places, Forests, Local Government and Transit New Zealand 
Acts. In most Māori cases the assertions over resource use are closely related to ownership. 
For them the assertion of ownership or mana over resources is linked to the ability to manage, 
control and allocate the resources. The Environment Court, on the other hand, has made a 
clear distinction between ownership and management issues, based on RMA. The allocation, 
regulation and control are simple management functions.112 This creates a clear contradiction 
between the Māori and court views.
The Maori Advisory Committee has been established to inform the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) on Māori perspectives. The legislation requires the responsible 
minister to establish and use processes which give iwi adequate time and opportunity to 
comment on the subject matter of proposed regulations and to notify iwi authorities, 
customary marine title groups and proposed customary rights groups directly of applications 
which may have an effect on them.113
The question of climate change has been central, because it has an effect on the lands, 
waterways, flora, fauna and food sources. The Māori world view is holistic and stresses 
sustainability. The Māori gathered in hui have acknowledged that the Māori ecology must be 
a distinct section and that they must work together collectively, to ensure maximum benefit, 
and that the policy on climate change has to be fair, equitable to Māori, based on a principled 
approach and treaty partnership. The legislation demands the authorities to consult the Māori 
in questions related to environmental change.114 In Flora and Fauna Case (2010) WT has 
dealt with rights related to Māori knowledge on indigenous flora and fauna as guaranteed in 
the treaty. It lists four major categories: mātauranga Māori (traditional knowledge); cultural 
property; intellectual and cultural property rights; and rights to environment, resource and 
108 WT, Mangonui Sevage Report (1986), s. 7.1.
109 WT, Mohaka River Report (1992), ss. 2, 6.
110 WT, Ngawha Geothermal Resource Report (1993), ss. 8-9; Preliminary Report on the Te Arawa Representative 
Geothermal Resource Claims (1993), ss. 1,5.
111 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996, s. 24; Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato Riv-
er) Settlement Act 2010, ss. 61, 76, 81, 85; Hentley has the largest coal power station in New Zealand. 
112 Hayward (2003), pp. 66-67. 
113 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012, ss. 18, 32, 45.
114 Climate Change Responsibility Act, 1982, s. 3A; Aho (2007), pp. 147, 152. 
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conservation management. It has also raised the question about flora and fauna as taonga.115 
Accordingly, the Waikato River Settlement (2010) demands the Waikato-Tainui flora cultural 
harvest plan.116 
Canada6.3. 
6.3.1. Long Road to Recognition: Aboriginal Title
The reserve land in Canada covers approximately 26,000 square kilometres (0.3 % of Canada’s 
land area) - just a fragment of the original land area. Some 80% of reserves have less than 500 
hectars of land. The present situation is a result of a long development. In the French period 
the areas of European settlement were divided into fiefs (seigneurie). In the French system 
the landlord had underlying title and seigneurial rights to the property, while the peasants 
had the usufructuary rights. As Indians were not yet French subjects but allies, the system 
influenced them only in the Catholic missions and réductions. The religious orders obtained 
the control to these lands in about 20 locations. One of the unclear landowning questions has 
continued until modern times. In 1717 King Louis XV granted a seigneury to the Seminar 
of St. Sulpice at Lac des Deux Montagnes, 30 kilometres west of Montréal. The unresolved 
question was, whether the seminary was the sole proprietor or trustee. In 1761 the Iroquois 
had a successful plea against the Jesuits, when the military governor of Montréal returned 
the interests in local reserve to Indians. Later the British authorities, however, held that the 
French Crown had extinguished the possible Indian title. The Iroquois started litigation in 
1781 by showing a Two-Row Wampum belt as evidence of their proprietorship, without 
success. The British issued in 1841 a special ordinance, confirming the Seminar’s title. Most 
Indians rejected in 1853-1854 the Indian Department’s offer of relocation. The litigation and 
acts of violence continued. In 1912 the Privy Council decided in favour of the Seminar while 
suggesting a charitable trust for the Indians that could be enforced.117 
A new change took place in 1936 when the Seminar sold in the financial crisis a major 
part of its possessions to a Belgian real estate company which created sawmill operations. 
Later parcels of land were sold for agricultural development. The Department bought in 1945 
Seminar’s unsold lands and gave them to the responsibility of the Indians. The Iroquois did 
not accept the terms and made in 1975 and 1986 unsuccessful attempts to assert Aboriginal 
title to all the original territory. The modern crisis started in 1990, when the nearby town of 
Oka announced a plan to expand the local golf course in the neighbourhood of an Iroquois 
ancient burial site. The Iroquois warriors blocked the highways to the area. The standoff in 
Kanesatake reserve lasted for 78 days, costing the life of one Québec police officer. Finally the 
federal army was called to resolve the conflict. In September 1990 the federal government 
purchased the disputed area and the siege broke down. An interim agreement was reached 
11 years later. The lands in the interim land base are set aside for the use and benefit of the 
Mohawks of Kanesatake as lands reserved for the Indians. The Mohawks have a capacity of 
115 WT, Flora and Fauna Report (2010), s. 20.
116 Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, ss. 63.
117 Stanley (1950), p. 206; Daniel (1980), pp. 79-82; Henderson (1980), pp. 2-5;
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a natural person in relation to land and its management with limited law-making powers. 
There is a land governance code to set out principles, processes and rules for the exercise of 
jurisdiction.118  
The Iroquois had similar challenges also elsewhere. The Six Nations have had a long 
legal battle since the 1830s, when Grand River near their reserve was opened for navigation. 
Parts of their lands flooded and their fisheries suffered. Further, their funds were used to 
purchase stock and reserve lands were granted to the company, both without the consent of 
the Iroquois. In 1841 their chiefs agreed to surrender their remaining land to the Crown to 
be held for them in trust. The Canadian government evicted all non-Indians from the reserve 
and secured its boundaries for the future. Later, five dams were built in the area. The Iroquois 
lost their case in the Exchequer Court (1948). However, on appeal the Supreme Court of 
Canada found that since the actual investment had not been completed until 1841 there was 
a ground for restitution if the statute of limitations had not taken effect. No remedies were, 
however, offered. The Iroquois of Kahnawaké litigated in the 1950s on 526 hectares lost for the 
St. Lawrence Seaway which passed through their reserve. After losing an island to Montréal’s 
Expo 67 world exhibition the Iroquois evicted in 1973 all non-Indians from their reserve on 
the grounds of overcrowding.119
The early British treaties promised to save for the Maritime Indians their “own grounds”. 
After the annexation of New France, the Crown gave several proclamations in the early 1760s 
to pacify the situation related to land. The first of them was issued in 1761 by the king to 
several governors. It forbade them to grant lands or make settlements that would interfere 
with Indians bordering on colonies. Any settlers found to be unlawfully established on Indian 
lands were to be evicted. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 promised, besides defining the 
borders of British possessions, that all lands not ceded or purchased were to be considered 
reserved lands for the Indians. The Crown reserved itself the right to extinguish Indian 
title. The Proclamation wanted to prevent “unjust Settlement and fraudulent Purchase” of 
Indian lands by slowing down the pace of colonisation to keep the peace on the frontier. 
The proclamation created a personal relationship between the Crown and the indigenous 
people.120 The later case law has indicated that the proclamation confirmed the existence of 
Aboriginal title but it did not create it. It bears witness that the British policy towards the 
indigenous peoples was based on respect for their right to occypy their traditional lands.121
118 Kanesatake Interim Land Base Governance Act, 2001, ss. 4-5, 7, 9; Daniel (1980), pp. 79-82; Halmcrona 
(1999), pp. 9-14; Snow (1996), pp. 211-212; Otis (2005), pp. 62-63.  A prelude to Oka crisis in early 1990 
were armed conflicts in Akwesasne and Ganienkeh, both located in the New York State. Another armed 
conflict took place the following year in Kahnawake, in the outskirts of Montréal. 
119 Daniel (1980), pp. 122-130, 198; Snow (1996), p. 167.The original French grant to the seigneury of Sault St. 
Louis was 180 sq km. The original reserve land has been reduced by more than 70 %.
120 Royal Proclamation (1761); Royal Proclamation (1763); Dickason (1994), pp. 188-189; White & Maxim & 
Spence (2003), p. 252-253; Otis (2005), pp. 60-61. 
121 SCC, Sparrow (1980); Guerin (1984), s. 377; Delgamuukw (1997), s. 114; The Governors of British North 
America were told “to cultivate and maintain a strict Friendship and good Correspondence with the neigh-
bouring tribes and  to Use the best means You can for Conciliating their Affections and Uniting them to 
Our Government”; The extinguishment of Aboriginal title was for the first time included to Virginian 
legislation in 1655; Unlike the courts of Nova Scotia and Québec, following the restricted scope of  Royal 
Proclamation, the Supreme Court has refused in Côté (1996) to take stand.
6. Land and Environment
295
Despite these promises the questionable land sales to speculators became lawful in 1764 
by letters patent. The squatters were soon difficult to control by the officials. The subsequent 
treaties focused on the centrality of land issues, due to the increasing demand of the settlers. 
After the war of 1812 the pressure on Indian lands grew rapidly as the number of settlers 
increased. In 1829 Sir John Colborne, lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, suggested that 
the best way to finance the civilising of Indians would be the leasing and sale of their lands. 
Besides the assimilation policy there were also voices to protect the Indians. In 1836-1837 
a Select Committee on Aborigines sought means to protect the Indians. As a consequence, 
the British parliament enacted the Crown Lands Protection Act, 1839, where the Crown was 
defined as the guardian of Indian lands. The Manitoulin Island plan of Governor Head was 
an expression of this policy.122
The assimilation policy and settler needs finally won the protective point of view. The 
Bagot Commission of 1842-1844 recommended that reserves ought to be surveyed and their 
boundaries publicly announced that all title deeds be registered and considered as binding, 
and the Indians be taught European techniques of land management. The Commission’s 
recommendations were realised in the Gradual Civilization Act, 1857, which proclaimed 
that civilisation could only be achieved through the introduction of individualised property 
and land allotment. Qualified Indians could obtain through enfranchisement 20 hectares 
of hereditary fee simple land. From 1850 a commissioner of Indian lands (after 1860 chief 
superintendent) was set as the Crown representative to set aside land for reserves.123 The 
subsequent legislation continued the new policy. An Act to Confirm title to Indian Lands in 
the Province of Canada, 1866 reserved to the provincial government a right to sell uncultivated 
reserve lands without consultation.124 According to Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, 
individual landholdings carved out of reserves were used to reward enfranchisement by 
means of location tickets that carried with them rights of inheritance.125 
With the creation of dominion, to the Constitution Act, 1867 was included the subsection 
92(24) which states that the lands reserved for Indians belongto federal jurisdiction. A legal 
paradox, however, raises with s. 109 which stipulates that all lands, mines, minerals and 
royalties from land are to be the proprietary interests of the four original provinces. Therefore, 
the provinces have a vested interest in opposing indigenous land claims. At the same time, 
the numbered treaties (1871-1921) were a means to open up Indian lands permanently for 
settlement and development. The undefined Indian title was considered usufructuary, a right 
to use the land. The federal Government aimed at extinguishing Indian title as quickly as 
possible to avoid possible confrontations. The Indian Act of 1873 allowed the superintendent 
to grant allotments on reserve lands in fee simple as a reward for enfranchisement. Otherwise 
the granting of reserve lots and their registration were given to the chiefs and band council. 
The Lands held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of Indians could not be taxed, mortgaged 
or seized in lieu of debt. Western Canada was included to the programme in 1880 although 
most bands resisted the measure. The first four provinces entering to the federation were 
granted control of Crown lands within their borders. The three Prairee provinces gained the 
122 Henderson (1980), p. 10; Karsten (2002), pp. 75, 107; McGee, p. 67.
123 Gradual Civilization Act, 1857, Preamble.
124 Act to Confirm title to Indian Lands in the Province of Canada, 1866.
125 Gradual Enfranchisement Act, 1869, s. 20.
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right in 1930, when the Constitution Act, 1930, transferred the beneficial ownership of land 
and natural resources to the Governments of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. Each 
separate agreement recognised the obligation of the province to make unoccupied Crown 
land available to Canada so that it could fulfil outstanding land entitlements under treaty.126 
In theory, the reserve lands could only be surrendered by the majority of over 21 years 
old male residents at a special meeting. Generally, the Band Councils resisted even limited 
leasing of lands. In 1879 the power to allot reserve lands was removed to the Superintendent 
General. He was empowered to lease undeveloped reserve lands without taking surrender or 
obtaining band consent. An exception was land held by location ticket, where a permission 
of the holder had to be obtained. The superintendent general’s powers were enlarged in 
1898, when he received overriding powers. Superintendent Sifton had an opinion that no 
reserve lands should be opened to any use without Indian consent. Despite his personal 
view, the department sold almost 3,000 sq km of reserve land between 1896-1909. About 
50% of Canadian territory was formally ceded by the Indian tribes to government before the 
twentieth century.127
Tightening control of Indian Act signified that parts of reserves could be erected by 
municipalities or companies for the benefit of public infrastructure. During the First World 
War, the Indian Act was amended to appropriate and farm or lease reserve lands without 
band permission for war production. The three Greater Production Farms were financed 
out of band funds, but the bands had little advantage of them. Entire reserves could also be 
removed from the vicissitude of towns or as “expedient”. The federal government used a direct 
method to limit the Indian protests on land policy. In 1910-1951 the Indian Act prohibited 
Indians using band funds for land claim actions without the approval of the Department, 
which with lack of money led to a long pause in Indigenous court processes in Canada.128 
British Columbia followed its own path in land policy. HBC estimated that the Indians had 
only qualified dominion of occupancy to land as their use of land was unprofitable. Governor 
Douglas saw things somehow diffently and tried to deal with the land question by means of 
treaties in an unequivocal recognition of aboriginal title. His follower, Lieutenant Governor 
Trutch, rejected the policy and started instead the programme of adjustments (1865) which 
took away much of the reserve land set aside for Indians. Next year he issued an ordinance, 
completed with the Pre-emption Act, 1870, which prevented the Indians to pre-empt land 
without written permission from the governor. Left was only the right of individuals to 
126 Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 92(24), 109; Indian Act (1873-1911); Dogrib Final Agreement (2003), s. 2.4.1; 
Morse (1985), p. 356; Dickason (1994), pp. 77, 275-276, 323, 376. Reserve lands for Treaty 8 were defined 
only from 1961 due to First Nations’ resistance. 
127 Tobias (1976), pp. 17-18; Leslie & Maguire (1979), p. 67; Dickason (1994), pp. 249-252. 
128 Indian Act (1910-1914); Dickason (1994), p. 326; Karsten (2002), pp. 77-78. The most famous case of re-
serve lands relocation took place in 1916. After a long dispute between the Saulteaux Indians and t non-
Indians a whole reserve in Selkirk, Manitoba, was relocated by law. St. Peter’s Reserve Act, 1916, confirmed 
individual patents to reserve land held both by Indians and non-Indians. The last-mentioned were prepared 
to pay an additional $1 per acre. The raised moneys were credited to the band. The new location of reserve 
was 105 kilometres north, on the shores of Lake Winnipeg. Only one fishing station was left on the band in 
the old site. The relocation was prepared by a Royal Commission, headed by Hector Howell CJ of the Ma-
nitoba Court of Appeals, who suggested that rather than investigate, the solution was to move the Indians. 
Cf. St. Peter’s Reserve Act, 1916, s.1.
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purchase lands from non-Indians. The settlers were allowed to pre-empt 65 hectares and 
purchase an additional 480 acres. When British Columbia entered the federation in 1871, 
it retained only province control of its Crown lands. It continued until 1908 its policy of 
granting lands to Indians in minimal lots and finally there existed 871 reserves.129 
The Crown and the province established in 1876 a long-lasting Joint Commission for 
the Settlement of Indian Reserves in the Province of British Columbia. The reserves’ land 
space was reduced several times. In the meantime, the Squamish (1906, 1910) and Nisga’a 
petitioned London (1913). The Privy Council was not able to consider the Nisga’a application 
as it did not come from a Canadian court. A royal commission recommended in 1916 that 
the specified reserve lands would be cut off and transferred to larger areas of lesser value. The 
result was that the Indians lost 146 sq km of land and entire reserves were eliminated. In 1927 
the federal parliament’s Special Joint Committee issued a final settlement. It stated that the 
Indians in British Columbia had not established any claim to the lands of British Columbia 
based on Aboriginal or other title. The claims were therefore fictious. The committee suggested 
that the Indians would be granted $100,000 annually as compensation for the lack of treaty 
rights. Finally in 1938 British Columbia transferred based on s. 13 of the Act of Union (1871) 
2,400 sq km of land to federal authority to establish reserves. The Indian were able to pre-
empt land in the province only with special permission until 1953. With the second largest 
First Nations population the province has the fourth largest allotment of land per capita. 
In 2005 the province gave a statement on New Relationship which recognised the inherent 
rights of Indigenous peoples to decide how to use their land.130
Outside the numbered treaties, in 1890 a formal arbitration was attempted with the 
establishment of a board to deal with disputes between Canada, Ontario and Québec. Without 
Indian representation, the board heard about 20 cases on financial matters and grievances 
over land. The board succeeded only in settling three cases. Two other decisions were later 
reversed by the courts. In Manitoba and the North-West Territories the treaty Indians were 
forbidden from acquiring lands by homestead or pre-emption. This aimed at preventing 
them from claiming both a share of a reserve and a homestead. The same happened in British 
Columbia without the protection of a treaty. The Indians left outside the treaties in the north 
were given by the federal government small parcels of land for their use, called residential 
reserves. They were easily relocated because they were not protected by the treaties but in 
some cases they were also actively protected.131 
In the 1951 revision of the Indian Act the bands acquired authority to manage surrendered 
and reserve lands. Nevertheless, the act gave to the bands only rudimentary land use powers. 
The next step was the Indian Claims Commission, established in 1961. Eight years later, Indian 
Claims Commissioner Barber was given a mandate to receive and study grievances and suggest 
the processes by which particular claims could be adjudicated. The mandate, however, did 
not include Aboriginal title. In 1970 the commission’s terms of reference were broadened to 
include comprehensive claims. In its final report (1977) the commission observed that claims 
could only be dealt with satisfactorily when the indigenous peoples would establish their 
129 Tennant (1990), p.20; Dickason (1994), p. 243, 261-262.
130 Daniel (1980), pp. 50-52; Renwick (1991), pp. 53, 56; Dickason (1994), pp. 324-325; Belanger (2008), p. 353; 
Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 160.
131 Dickason (1994), pp. 285, 351, 373. 
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position through research. They had the initiative to establish the claims. A Joint National 
Indian Brotherhood - Cabinet Committee (1975-1978) did not find any further results.132
According to the Indian Act, 1985, the minister may authorise the use of lands in reserves 
for the purpose of Indian schools, administration of Indian affairs, burial grounds and 
health projects, but the consent of Band Council is needed. The minister may with terms 
of legislation also manage or sell absolutely surrendered lands about which the department 
maintains a register. He/she may improve or cultivate uncultivated or unused reserve lands 
and employ there persons with the band council’s consent, and independently operate 
farms on reserves and employ persons to instruct Indians in farming. Individual Indians 
are entitled to compensation.  The Governor in Council may grant loans to Indian bands, 
groups or individuals for agricultural development. The possession of lands is allotted by 
the band councils but the minister can issue for an Indian a certificate on possession of land. 
The property belonging to a “mentally incompetent Indian” or children of an Indian is vested 
exclusively in the minister.133 The modern treaties have removed the Indian lands from federal 
jurisdiction and the Indian Act is no longer applicable to such lands. 
In 1996 the Canadian government and First Nations negotiated a framework agreement 
to provide an alternative land management regime on reservations. The First Nations Land 
Management Act 1999 gives the bands a choice to opt into a different self-governance regime 
over their reserve lands. Some  35 First Nations committed to the process which involved the 
drafting of a new land management code for each community and negotiation of individual 
agreements with DIAND. The drafted land management codes resemble respective municipal 
planning codes, setting out procedural standards. The small size of many reserves makes 
a long-term, sustainable management approach impractical. Some provinces have made 
agreements with DIAND to transfer unoccupied Crown lands to the federal Crown so that 
Canada could fulfil its treaty obligations.134 British Columbia encourages the First Nations to 
develop their farm lands and land planning.135 Saskatchewan co-ordinates with Indian bands 
on land planning and development, and the minister may enter into agreement with Indian 
bands for the establishent, operations, management and maintenance of pastures.136The Indian 
war veterans are a special group which has been granted lands paid by the Minister.137 
The First Nations have developed traditional concepts in contemporary terms. Their 
cyclical and holistic world view in relation to land means that the land is held as common 
property by tribal nation as a whole. The rights have always existed. Tribal members have 
an undivided interest in the land. This social contract embraces all living things: rights to 
use the land belong also to former and future generations and even to other living things. 
Signing a treaty means to Indians a right to control the use of the land’s resources. The First 
Nations Lands Management Act, 1999, does the following: reserves lands to be managed by 
132 Indian Act (1951); Indian Act, 1985, ss. 18, 57-58, 73; Dickason (1994), pp. 352-352.
133 Indian Act, 1985, ss. 18, 20, 23, 51-53, 55, 58, 70-71.
134 Territorial Lands Act, 1985, s. 23; First Nations Land Management Act, 1999; Richardson & Imai & McNeil 
(2009), p. 363.
135 Agricultural Land Commission Act, 2002 (British Columbia), s. 6. 
136 Provincial Lands Act, 1978 (Saskatchewan), s. 20(1); Pastures Act, 1998 (Saskatchewan), s. 6; Planning and 
Development Act, 2007 (Saskatchewan), s. 113(4); Transfer of Lands – Fullfilment of Indian Treaty Obliga-
tions Regulation, 1979 (Saskatchewan). 
137 Veteran’s Land Act 1970, s. 46(1).
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the First Nation; sets out  general rules and procedures for the use and occupation of lands 
by First Nations members and others; provides financial accountability for revenues from 
the lands; provides procedures for making and publishing First Nations land laws; identifies 
conflict of interest rules; identifies community processes to develop rules and procedures 
applicable to land on the breakdown of a marriage; identifies a dispute resolution process; 
sets out procedures by which the First Nations can grant interests in land or acquire lands for 
community purposes; allows the delegation of land management responsibilities; and sets out 
the procedure for amending a land code. A difference to the Indian Act is that a First Nation 
with a land code can make laws of the development, conservation, protection, management, 
use and possession of First Nation land and make environmental laws. In some provinces the 
First Nations may also make agreements with munipalities to use joint services.138
6.3.2.  Aboriginal Title in Case Law
The Aboriginal title is an indigenous right related to land. The concept was used for the first 
time in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. the Queen, which was the first and decisive 
battle on Aboriginal title and provincial rights. The federal government, referring to the Royal 
Proclamation (1763), held that the Indians had been owners of the land in fee simple, but 
subject to the restriction that they could only sell the land to the Canadian government and the 
Indian title to land was extinguished by purchase. Treaties proved that aboriginal communities 
possessed a real estate in their ancestral lands, which included hereditary rights to occupy 
land, cut timber and claim mines and minerals. The government of Ontario disagreed: there 
was no Indian title in law or equity. The Indians’ claim was simply moral. Property was only 
a creature of law, capable of being sustained only as long as the law that created it exists. The 
Indians had no rules or regulations that could be considered laws, and therefore, no title to 
their ancestral territories that could be recognised by the Crown. With no government nor 
organisation they could not be regarded as a nation capable of holding lands. The provincial 
government referred to Calvin’s Case (1608): when the Crown conquered a non-Christian 
people, the Crown’s law immediately replaced the local laws. The Royal Proclamation was a 
provisional arrangement, repealed by the Quebec Act and all possible titles were entirely at 
the pleasure of the Crown. Since Ontario had been granted jurisdiction of Crown lands under 
the terms of Confederation, the clearing of Indian title was in favour of the Crown by right of 
Ontario. Federal jurisdiction over lands reserved for Indians applied only to lands specifically 
reserved for Natives at the signing of the land-cession treaties. Chancellor Boyd had described 
in his earlier decision Indians as characteristically being without fixed abode, moving about 
as the exigencies of life demanded. Indians could treat with the Crown for the extinction of 
their primitive right of occupancy, but the government had perfect liberty to proceed with 
settlement and development of the country, displacing the Aborigines if necessary.139 
After passing all stages, the case finally arrived to the Privy Council in 1888. The Privy 
Council did not accept Ontario’s argument that the Royal Proclamation was obsolete, but 
138 First Nations Land Management Act, 1999, ss.6, 18, 20, 26, 34-35; Municipal Act, 2013 (Manitoba), s. 
250(2); Community Charter, 2003 (British Columbia), s. 13.1(1); Dickason (1994), pp. 352-353.
139 SCC, St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1887), pp. 580-598.
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upheld its legality. The British had by discovery acquired title to Indian lands and, therefore, it 
rested with the Crown even before the treaty. The Privy Council recognised the legal existence 
of Indian interest in land. The Indians have a personal and usufructuary right of occupancy 
to the lands which is dependent on the good will of the sovereign and may surrender the title 
only to the federal Crown.140 
St. Catherine’s was a decisive case in determining the federal Government’s Indian policy 
for 85 years. Like New Zealand, Canada relied on the British constitutional doctrine of unity 
of the Crown and parliamentary sovereignty. Unlike in the United States, the question of 
Indian title and property in general, was separated from the question of self-government. 
The first challenges to St. Catherine’s doctrine came only in the 1970s. Before that the courts 
were sufficient to upheld the usufructuary rights. In Regina v. White and Bob (1965), the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal confirmed them on the basis that they had existed since 
time immemorial.141 The Supreme Court’s Calder case (1973) reopened the doctrine of St. 
Catherine’s, being the first major case to deal with the sensitive land claims question in British 
Columbia. The province did not recognise the existence of Indian title in any form. The Nisga’a 
Nation’s long process on their lands had not led to a settlement. Their tribal council proved 
that their right to land had not extinguished at the time of ascendancy to the Confederation. 
Frank Calder argued that the provincial land legislation was invalid in relation to Nisga’a. The 
British Columbia Supreme Court ruled that whatever rights Indians might have possessed at 
the time of contact, they had been overruled by the enactment of white man’s law. On appeal, 
the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the ruling on technicality. It divided Aboriginal title in 
the question of extinguishment of common law. Hall J drew on Johnson v. McIntosh and held 
that Nisga’a derived their title from their possession of land from time immemorial while 
Judson J held that the title had been extinguished. All, however, agreed that such sui generis 
title was possible in common law and it flows from indigenous peoples’ traditional use and 
occupancy of tribal lands. It encompasses a beneficial interest in lands and conceptualises 
title’s nature and scope. The sole authority to extinguish belonged to the crown, on whose 
goodwill it depended: the rights could be extinguished by general legislation.142 Calder was a 
partial victory to Indigenous rights in Canada and also an important step in the long process 
which led to the Nisga’a Final Agreement. Its broader outcome was the recognition in principle 
of indigenous territorial integrity, including the right of title-associated self-government. 
After a long pause, Guerin (1984) was the first significant Supreme Court’s decision on 
Aboriginal title after the Constitution Act, 1982. The court held that the Aboriginal title 
derived from common law recognition of Indigenous occupancy and use of the land prior to 
European settlement. In R. v. Van der Peet (1996), the court clarified that the aboriginal rights 
are based on two notions: original occupation prior to European settlement and cultural and 
traditional practices. The purpose of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, is to reconcile the 
Indigenous peoples’s prior occupancy of land with Crown assertion of sovereignty. The court 
140 JCPC, St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), pp. 542-548.
141 BCCA, Regina v. White and Bob (1964).
142 BCSC, Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.)(1970); SCC, Calder et al. v. British Columbia (A.G.)(1973), pp. 313, 
328, 336. 
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acknowledged the occupation of the land by Indigenous peoples to fall under the protection 
of the Constitution. The right to land is an inherent element of Aboriginal rights.143  
The Aboriginal title and political dimension were connected in Campbell v. British 
Columbia. Where the title is held communally by an indigenous group with decision-making 
authority, there must be a political structure for exercising that authority. The communal 
title and decision-making authority necessitate self-government in relation to Aboriginal 
title land.144 This was also indirectly recognised by CJ Lamer, who observed in Delgamuukw 
(1997) that Aboriginal title is a collective sui generis right to land held by all members of an 
Aboriginal nation who participate in decision-making. It is in common law a recognised right 
of Indigenous peoples to land itself, which confers the right to use land for various activities. 
He defined the Aboriginal title as an exclusive use and occupation of land, including mineral 
rights and non-traditional uses of land. Their scope can be either broad or narrow. A three-
stage test has to be met for the establishment of aboriginal title: land must have been occupied 
prior to the assertion of state sovereignty to land; the occupation of land must be continuous, 
demanding substantial maintenance of the connection between the people and the land; 
and the occupation must have been exclusive at the time of the assertion of sovereignty by 
the Crown. Factors to determine the physical occupation are the group’s size, manner of 
life, material resources and technological abilities, and the character of the lands claimed. 
Land held pursuant to Aboriginal title can be sold, transferred or surrendered solely to the 
Crown and is inalienable to third parties. The Aboriginal title is held communally, which 
distinguishes it from normal proprietary interests. It is a collective right to land held by all 
members of an Indigenous nation and thus regarding the land are made by the community. 
Lamer took also standing on the question of whether several Indigenous groups can have a 
joint title when occupying land to the exclusion of other Indigenous groups. He suggested 
that shared exclusivity could result in joint Aboriginal title.145 In Haida (2004) McLachlin CJ 
acknowledged that Crown holds legal title to the land, while Aboriginal title is a right to the 
land itself. The title conflicts expressly with non-Crown fee simple land ownership. Aboriginal 
title transcends the right to use the land and is a right to the land itself. As a constitutionally 
recognised and affirmed right it is a subspecies of Aboriginal rights.146
In the double case of R. v. Marshall /R. v. Bernard (2003), the Supreme Court held that 
essential to Aboriginal title is, whether it can be translated into a modern legal right. In cases of a 
lack of historical evidence, an Indigenous group has to provide evidence of present occupation 
as a proof of pre-sovereignty occupation. Continuity must be a substantial maintenance of 
the connection between the group and the land. McLachlin CJ held that the title is established 
by Aboriginal practices that demonstrate possession similar to title at common law. A proof 
of exclusive physical occupation of specific sites is required. Where the exclusive possession 
is not established, a non-exclusive occupation may establish Aboriginal rights short of title. 
McLachlin’s view excluded the right of some nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples’ right 
143 SCC, Guerin v. R. (1984), pp. 377-382; Van der Peet (1996), ss. 38-43; Castellino & Allen (2003), p. 219. 
144 BCSC, Campbell v. British Columbia (2000).
145 SCC, Delgamuukw (1997), ss. 48, 115, 158; Isaac (2006), p. 14; Knefla & Westra (2010), p. 7.
146 SCC, Haida (2004), s. 6; There are several precedents about the joint title in American case law. Cf. USSC, 
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad  (1941).
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to Aboriginal title.147 On the other hand, Lamer CJ had stressed already in Adams (1996) 
that, although the land was central to the prior occupancy of Aboriginal peoples, it was not 
necessarily a particular plot of land.148 McLachlin’s narrow focus on common law concepts 
relating to property interests and the postage stamp theory of considering the Aborinal title 
in respect of small pieces of land was also rejected by Vickers J in Tsilhqot’in Nation (2008). 
He held that even the large tracts of land could be consided subject to Aboriginal title.149 
 The controversial policy of extinguishment of aboriginal title dominated the Canadian 
policy vis-à-vis indigenous peoples until the 1980s. Prior to 1982 the federal parliament had 
the power to extinguish indigenous rights and titles. Judson J held in Calder that Government 
action amounting to complete dominion, inconsistent with conflicting interest, was sufficient 
to extinguish it. 150 Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, recognised and affirmed the 
existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the indigenous peoples. In modern treaties the Crown 
has sought compromises to affirm existing rights while meeting government demands for 
certainty. In Sparrow the Supreme Court defined how indigenous rights could be extinguished. 
By using s. 35(1) it transformed interpretation into a more substantive principle of public 
law. Section 35(1) provides unextinguished Aboriginal right with constitutional protection 
against legislative infringement but an aboriginal right is not absolute. If the government 
decides to infringe such rights when justified by the need of society, there has to be a proof 
of valid grounds to extinguish and a valid legislative objective respecting the fiduciary duty 
of the Crown regarding Indigenous peoples. To verify the government’s clear and plain 
intention to extinguish the aboriginal right, the judicial system applies a two-part test: first, 
the test is based on an assessment of whether legislation would infringe existing aboriginal 
rights and whether such infringement is reasonable; and secondly, whether the infringement 
is justifiable on any grounds. In Sparrow the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving 
extinguishment.151  
In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ held that the federal government has the exclusive jurisdiction 
to legislate on s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and exclusive power to extinguish 
Aboriginal title and rights. He laid a two-step analysis on infringement of Aboriginal title. 
Firstly, it must be in furtherance of a compelling and substantial legislative objective that 
is directed at recognition of the prior occupation of North America by Aboriginal peoples 
and reconciliation of Aboriginal prior occupation with the assertion of Crown sovereignty. 
He specified that the legislation which could infringe aboriginal title has to be based on the 
development of agriculture, forestry, mining and hydro-electric power, the general economic 
development of the interior, protection of the environment or endangered species, building 
of infrastructures, or settlement of foreign populations to support the aims. In determining 
legality of extinguishment of aboriginal title the judicial power is required to assess whether 
the infringement has been minimal enough, fair compensation has been paid and the 
147 R. v. Marshall / R. v. Bernard (2003), ss. 54, 57, 74, 77, 82-83.
148 SCC, Adams (1996), s. 27-28.
149 BCSC, Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia (2008), part 16. 
150 SCC, Calder et al. v. British Columbia (A.G.)(1973), p. 344. 
151 SCC, Sparrow (1990); Castellino & Allen (2003), p. 217.The Human Rights Committee has in its fourth 
periodic report criticised the Canadian practice of using the extinguishment of indigenous rights as incom-
patible with the article 1 of ICCPR.
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affected Aboriginal groups are consulted before the final decision. Secondly, the test requires 
an assessment of whether the infringement is consistent with special trust-like relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples and the honour of the Crown. 152 
The Indigenous land rights have had some constitutional protections that prevent 
its legislative extinguishment and infringement in some instances. Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 places the Indians and their lands within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the federal Parliament. The Supreme Court has held that the provinces have lacked a 
constitutional authority to extinguish Aboriginal title since 1867. The Treaty rights within 
s. 91(24) are immune from provincial laws that would infringe them. Also section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, prevents Indigenous rights to be unilaterally extinguished 
even by Parliament. Since 1982 the extinguishment can only occur with the consent of the 
indigenous peoples. The usual remedy to Aboriginal title infringements is financial. There 
are, however, some exceptions to this main rule when the land is remote, of high significance 
to the indigenous people and where the degree of reliance on land by third parties or the 
public is minimal.153  
The Crown has a constitutional duty to consult which is granted in honour of the Crown 
and is corollary of the Crown’s obligation achive just settlement of Aboriginal claims through 
treaty process. The duty raises when the Crown has knowledge of the potential existence of 
Aboriginal right or title. These give priority to s. 35 rights, prior consultation and other forms 
of expropriation. The three degrees of duty are according to Lamer CJ the “mere” consultation, 
which addresses the concerns of indigenous peoples; “significantly deeper than mere” 
consultation; and obtaining the Indigenous group’s consent. Where the Crown contemplates 
action that could adversely affect asserted Aboriginal rights, it has a duty to consult and 
accommodate the affected Indigenous group. The Crown has to determine the strength 
of the claim to Aboriginal title; the potential impact of the Crown’s actions on Aboriginal 
title; competing societal interests; and the necessity and proper method of accommodation. 
Treaties override the common law duty to consult indigenous people but they do not affect 
the general administrative law principle of procedural fairness, which may give rise to a duty 
to consult the rights holders individually. The constitutional duty to consult is rooted in the 
principle of the honour of the Crown, related to the special relationship between the Crown 
and indigeneous peoples as peoples. The indigenous peoples’ capability to enter into treaties 
is based on the recognition of pre-existence of indigenous institutions before the Crown 
asserted its sovereignty. The duty protects the collective rights of an Aboriginal people, but 
can nevertheless have individual aspects.154
The Canadian courts have developed a doctrine of Crown fiduciary duty to Indian bands, 
which first emerged in relation to the Crown’s disposition of process to surrender reservation 
152 SCC, Delgamuukw (1997), s. 173.
153 Cf. SCC, Sparrow (1990); R. v. Gladstone (1996), s. 43; Delgamuukw (1997), ss. 172-183; R. v. Marshall (1, 
1999); Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage)(2005); R. v. Morris (2006); R. v. 
Sappier/R. v. Gray (2006), pp. 3-4, 43; RCAP, Vol. 2, pp. 527-557; Since 1982 the Canadian Constitution has 
offered better protection against the extinguishment than the southern neighbour, where the Congress has 
still plenary power over Indian tribes. 
154 SCC, Delgamuukw (1997), s. 168; Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation (2010), s. 122; Rio Tinto 
Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council (2010), ss. 31-39;  Behm v. Moulton Contracting Ltd (2013), ss. 28, 
30-33; Isaac (2006), p. 23.
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lands under the Indian Act which allows the indigenous peoples to use unoccupied lands 
until they are required for alternative use. The honour of the Crown is always at stake when 
it deals with Indigenous peoples due to the special historical relationship. The Canadian 
courts have followed the American model in basing the executive liability on the federal 
government’s assumption of comprehensive management powers over tribal property and in 
using the fiduciary relationship as a means of interpreting statutes that had an adverse impact 
on tribal interests. In a co-management regime a commission or board is established with 
indigenous and government appointees. The idea is to facilitate a collaborative relationship 
that embeds indigenous participation. Canada uses co-management boards extensively and 
they are an important feature of all land claims agreements. The jurisdiction and composition 
vary depending on the land claims agreement.155
In Guerin, Dickson J held that the Aboriginal title to traditional lands is based on pre-
existing occupation and control and is independent of government. The title of Aboriginal 
land could only be alienable to the Crown and be used in the interest of the indigenous 
people. The Crown’s liability rested on the mismanagement of band assets. Its nature and 
the surrender provisions of the Indian Act impose an enforceable fiduciary duty on the 
Crown, a burden on the radical or final title of the sovereign which arose at the time of the 
surrender. This arises from the special relationship in which one party is under an obligation 
where is related a discretionary power. The fiduciary duty is sui generis character and has 
historic foundation. It is a trust-like, private law duty which applies to Aboriginal interests 
that are property-like in nature. The duty attaches to interests that are specific, cognisable and 
concrete. It can be enforced by equitable remedies. Still the Crown’s power to manage assets 
comes from the Indian Act and its position as fiduciary arises from the combination of its 
common law and statutory positions. It took the principle of fiduciary obligation to equity 
with novel application to tribal peoples’ assets.156  
In Sparrow the court referred to the unique general relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples. The guiding interpretive principle is the honour of the Crown and the first 
consideration should be the special trust relationship and the responsibility of the Government 
vis-á-vis Indigenous peoples. The common law has a presumption in favour of treaties and 
statutes relating to Indigenous peoples. Where a statute or the exercise of discretion under it 
would infringe an Aboriginal right, the responsible public official is required to demonstrate 
that the Crown owes a fiduciary obligation to Indians in regard to their lands. Section 35(1) 
justification requires proof of a valid legislative objective and proof of adequate Government 
accommodation of the protected Aboriginal or treaty right. The accommodation measures 
may include giving the protected right priority after the valid objective, ensuring minimum 
possible infringement to achieve the objective, consulting where appropriate with the people 
concerned, and providing compensation in cases of expropriation.157
Also in Blueberry River (1995) the Supreme Court held that the subject matter of the 
fiduciary duties was Indian land and resources connected to Indian land. The content of the 
fiduciary duty varies according to the circumstances.158 Gladtone (1996) added to Sparrow’s 
155 Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 13; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 302-303.
156 SCC, Guerin (1984), ss. 383-392.
157 SCC, Sparrow (1990).
158 SCC, Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (1995), ss. 88-92.
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list of potentially valid legislative objectives economic and regional fairness and historical 
resource reliance by non-indigenous groups.159 In Osoyoos the court defined the duty as an 
interpretation guide and formulated an analytical approach for dealing with conflicting public 
and fiduciary duties. Indian interest in reserve land and Aboriginal title are fundamentally 
similar. Both are subject to a fiduciary duty owed by the Crown. Duty applies to expropriation 
as well as surrender situations.160 
In Wewaykum Indian Band (2002) the court made a distinction between the honour of 
the Crown and fiduciary obligation. Section 35 is subject only to reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified and fare in a democratic society. The fiduciary 
duty exists in relation to specific Indian interests. For it to exist, the Crown must have a 
discretionary control with a corresponding vulnerability for the Aboriginal peoples affected, 
and the subject of the duty must be a cognisable specific and significant Aboriginal interest, 
capable of generating a private law duty. The Crown wears many hats and represents many 
interests. The content of the Crown’s fiduciary duty varies with the nature and importance 
of the interest sought to be protected. Before an Indian Act reserve is created, the Crown 
may owe a fiduciary duty in relation to Aboriginal interests in Indian Act land, but if it 
exists, it is limited to loyalty, good faith, full disclosure and ordinary prudence with a view 
to the best interest of the Aboriginal beneficiaries. Once a reserve is created the content of 
the Crown’s fiduciary duty expands to include the protection and preservation of the band’s 
quasi-proprietary interest in the reserve from exploitation. Where there is a beneficial quasi-
proprietary interest, equitable remedies may be available.161
Haida (2004) affirms that the concept of fiduciary duty is the general principle of the 
honour of the Crown which can apply in different ways depending on the context. It is 
limited to specific, cognisable Aboriginal interests. When deciding whether to infringe a 
specific Indigenous interest, the Crown is discharging a public function and must consider 
the interests of all Canadians: the Crown is bound to balance the different interests in making 
decisions that may affect Indigenous claims. Only proven or defined Aboriginal interests 
can attract the Guerin duty, and s. 35 rights the full justification of obligation in Sparrow. 
Therefore, Guerin and Sparrow are two related, but distinct applications of the honour of the 
Crown concept whose scope may overlap. The difference is that Sparrow applies only to s. 
35(1) Aboriginal and treaty rights, while Guerin has its focus on contexts outside the scope of 
s. 35(1). Sparrow duty can extend to claimed, defined or resolved rights, while Guerin duty is 
limited to specific, cognisable Aboriginal interests. Sparrow duty is also broader: it can affect 
also non-land treaty commitments.162
It is still good to mention the recent SCC decision Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. (2013), 
where the majority of Justices held that the honour of the Crown requires the servants of the 
Crown to conduct themselves with honour whenever acting on behalf of the Sovereign. The 
honour of the Crown is engaged in the Crown’s dealings with an Aboriginal people where 
explicit obligation is undertaken to the Aboriginal group. The concept is context-sensitive, 
but when the constitutional obligation to an Aboriginal group exists, the honour of the 
159 SCC, Gladstone (1996), ss. 54-84. 
160 SCC, Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town)(2001), ss. 123-188. 
161 SCC, Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada (2002), ss 74-104.
162 SCC, Haida (2004), ss. 18, 45; Elliott (2005), p. 107.
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Crown requires that the Crown takes a broad, purposive approach to the interpretation of the 
promise and acts diligently to fullfill that promise.163 
6.3.3.  Métis Title
The definition of Métis title has been a more complicated process and Alberta is the only 
province in Canada which has recognised the Métis land title. Their rights were not recognised 
in the Constitution Act, 1867 and their major group in present Manitoba joined Canada only 
in 1870. The Manitoba Act, 1870, having constitutional status, guaranteed to Métis 5,700 sq 
km on land. Despite the promise to respect all existing occupancies, only 43 % was distributed 
to them. In 1874 the federal government offered to half-breed heads of families $160 in scrip 
that could be used to purchase Crown land. In 1876 the grants to children were increased to 
240 acres. Most Métis preferred to take money. Section 31 of the Manitoba Act was finally 
repealed in 1886 in a general consolidation of federal statutes.164 
The Métis considered that their Indian heritage gave them an inextinguishable right 
to land which had developed for them some special features. They had a river lot system 
different from the standard Canadian square survey. When there were no official surveys 
made, the Métis could not make legal claims. Even in Manitoba, where the Manitoba 
Act guaranteed the Métis land rights, most of the claims were rejected due to insufficient 
cultivation. The Royal Commissions worked in 1885-1921 to extinguish Métis land claims. 
The federal government’s view was that the Métis should apply for land on an individual 
basis. In those areas were Indian title had been extinguished, allotments were to be in money 
or land scrip worth 65 hectares for Métis heads of the household. In treaty areas a river lot of 
40 acres could be purchased at one dollar an acre and then the Métis could select 160 acres 
of land for a homestead. The Métis outside the treaty areas could apply for scrip. The last two 
numbered treaties dealt with Métis. In Treaty 11 (1921) they received $240 in cash. Even 
most of the lands granted in the legislation were acquired by land speculators. The Indian Act 
required between 1879-1884 that the Métis refund monies received under treaty. With this 
easement, many Métis gave up their treaty rights. They were also excluded from reserves in 
the amendment of Indian Act (1880).165
When white settlement increased, the Métis were scattered across small, impoverished 
bands. In St. Paul-des-Métis (1895-1908) it was planned that each family receive 80 acres 
of land, livestock, agricultural equipments and access to hay, grazing and woodcutting. 
Farmsteads were soon allotted, but they were located far away from each other. To increase 
the difficulties, the livestock and equipment did not appear and finally the settlement was 
closed. Many Métis moved northward, to the fringes of white settlements.166
163 Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney-General)(2013), ss. 65-83, 91-94.
164 Manitoba Act (1870), s. 31; Dickason (1994), pp. 296-297; 316; Isaak (2008), p. 34. By 1880, 3,186 claims 
had been settled, but there was little benefit for the Métis.
165 RCAP (1996), vol. 4, ss. 293-307; Morton (1938), pp. 236-238; Dickason (1994), pp. 296, 317, 360. During 
the first year there were allowed 1,678 claims, worth $279,000 and covering 55,000 acres; 100 years later 
RCAP Report estimated that the Crown had breached its fiduciary duty in Manitoba. 
166 Dickason (1994), p. 361. 
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The Great Depression of 1929 had disastrous effects on the Métis: they became “road 
allowance people”, living semi-squatting life on marginal lands. In 1931 was organised 
L’Association des Métis d’Alberta, which took up the cause of land settlement projects for the 
Métis. At the end of 1933, more than 300 families had been resettled in Northern Alberta. 
The reform-minded Government of Alberta answered the association’s efforts and agreed 
to a public inquiry. Also DIAND began to survey much later (1978) the impacts of federal 
policy and legislation on Alberta Métis’ life conditions. The Alberta Government’s policy 
paper Metisism (1982) described the Métis title in settlement lands similar to Indian title in 
reserve lands, vesting title in the Crown and beneficial use of the Métis.167 
The Metis Settlements Land Protection Act, 1990, confirms the terms of the grant, 
places limits on disposition and prohibits the use settlement lands as security for debt.  A 
fee simple title to Métis lands is issued to the General Council by letters patent. It is held in 
each settlement area by the corresponding settlement corporation, unless registered in the 
name of a settlement member, one at a time. It is subject to reservations from title set out 
in the letters patent and the Metis Settlements Land Protection Act. The letters patent and 
Metis Settlements Land Protection Act place conditions on the General Council’s title which 
operates to restrict the rights of the General Council and protect the Métis land base. The 
patented lands may be alienated only by the consent of all settlements and the majority of 
settlement members and are expropriated only with the agreement of the General Council and 
payment of compensation. The pre-existing land allocations granted to settlement members 
are extinguished and converted to interests. The application is made to a Settlement Council. 
The pre-existing interest held by non-settlement members may be recorded but not registered. 
If recorded before 30 June 1993, they are enforced with priority over other interests recorded 
prior to the pre-existing interests. Pre-existing interests become registerable interests only if 
they are authorised to be registred by General Council policy. A person entitled to Métis title 
is registered as a holder in the Métis Land Registry. Title to water and subsurface resources is 
retained by the province, but entry on settlement lands is prohibited without the consent of 
the affected settlement council in accordance with the terms of a Co-Management Agreement. 
The last-mentioned addresses issues of access, compatibility of development schemes with 
Métis land use, the establishment of a Métis Access Committee with powers to deny or set 
conditions of access, and Métis economic development rights.168 
The only rights and interests in settlement land are those created by the Metis Settlements 
Act. The Métis authorities have created common law rules governing the interpretation of 
rights associated with the interest. The General Council has the authority to make policies 
in consultation with the Minister concerning the creation, termination, disposition and 
devolution of interests in settlement lands. The minister has the authority to place reservations, 
exceptions, conditions and limitations on entitlement to rights or interests. The General 
Council’s land policy provides the basic system of interests in settlement land, including 
principles governing the creation and transfer of interests and to create a land management 
system that balances the collective rights of the settlement with the individual rights of the 
167 Dickason (1994), pp. 361-362.
168 Water Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 166; Metis Settlements Land Protection Act, 1990 (Alberta), Schedule 3; Metis 
Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta); Land Interests Conversion Regulation, 2003 (Alberta); Sawchuk (1981), 
pp. 48, 162-176; Bell (1994), pp. 8. 16, 25-26, 35-38; Lawrence (2004), p. 95. 
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landowner. The policy creates three distinct Métis interests in settlement land: Métis title held 
by settlement or its member; provisional Métis title, which may be granted for a fixed term 
by members who wish to use and make necessary improvements required for the issuance 
of Métis title; and allotments, which may be granted only for farming, ranch or business. A 
member may own a maximum of 70 hectares but he/she can hold almost the same number 
of additional lands for a fixed term by memorandum of allotment. Further, the policy makes 
it possible to create and transfer lesser interests to both settlement and non-settlement 
members. A holder of Métis title may lease lands, but a lease to non-settlement members 
must be approved by the Settlement Council and leases exceeding 10 years by a bylaw. A 
Settlement Council may force a sale or apply for subdivision of Métis title or an allotment 
if the holder of the interest fails to pay charges, levies or taxes owed to the settlement in 
relation to interest. An interest less than fee simple may be expropriated by the settlement 
if authorised in legislation. The Land Interests Conversion Regulation, promulgated by the 
minister, provides for the conversion and registration of interests by settlement members. The 
Métis land base is protected by restrictions on the taking of security interests in settlement 
lands and limitations on the province’s right to expropriate settlement lands. Provisions which 
conflict with provincial legislation are unenforceable. The Constitution of Alberta prohibits 
the Legislature to amend or repeal the Metis Settlements Land Protection Act, revoking letters 
patent granting settlement land to the General Council, dissolving the General Council or 
changing its composition without the agreement of the General Council. The constitutional 
amendment may be repealed only if the Métis settlement lands are protected by the federal 
Constitution, which has not happened.169 
The minister makes regulations regarding the establishment and operation of a Metis 
Settlements Land Registry, the settlement of disputes arising from the Metis Settlements Land 
Registry Regulation and the application of provincial land titles law. Matters addressed is the 
regulation include establishment of the registry, recording, registration, interests overriding 
the register, compensation, powers of the Appeal Tribunal and courts, administration, 
procedures, document requirements, plans, interests passing on death, and adoption of some 
provisions of the Land Titles Act. The land registry provides for certainty of ownership in land, 
simplify proof of ownership, facilitate economic and efficient disposition of interests in land 
and provide compensation for persons who sustain loss through unauthorised registrations. 
It promotes local monitoring and control over the creation or development of interests in 
settlement lands.170
The Métis’ Aboriginal treaty rights were recognised in the Constitution Act, 1982 and 
in Powley,  but the first court case to address directly whether a group of Métis have an 
Aboriginal title, was Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (2007). In the focus were ss. 
31-32 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, which provided allocations of lands (Métis) and settlement 
of title (all Manitobans). MacInnes J of the Manitoba Court of the Queen’s Bench ruled that 
the benefits under ss. 31-32 of the Manitoba Act were a one-time benefit to certain persons 
then alive and resident in Manitoba in 1870. These persons were aware of their rights at the 
time. Accordingly the claims were time-barred and the action was dismissed. The court also 
169 Constitution of Alberta Amendment Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 2-6; Metis Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 
99, 222; Metis Settlements Land Register Regulation, 1991 (Alberta), ss. 3, 6; Bell (1994), pp. 26-28. 36.
170 Metis Settlements Land Register Regulation, 1991 (Alberta), ss. 3, 6; Bell (1994), pp. 26-27, 42-43.
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held the Manitoba Act not as treaty but merely as an act of parliament and constitutional 
document for all Manitobans. Therefore, the Manitoba Act, 1870, does not constitute 
Aboriginal or treaty rights in the meaning of s. 35.171 The Supreme Court has, however, ruled 
in its recent decision that the Crown failed in the past to implement s. 31 of the Manitoba 
Act, 1870 consistently with the honour of the Crown. Therefore, s. 31 signified a solemn 
obligation of the Crown to a particulat Aboriginal group.172
6.3.4.  Inuit Title
The lands and waters in Nunavut and Inuvialuit are vested in Her Majesty, i.e. are under 
federal supervision. The Inuit have claimed that they have a customary system of tenure, an 
organised and systemic use and occupation of their traditional lands and waters. This Inuit 
title was acknowledged by the Federal Court in Hamlet of Baker Lake (1980). It listed the 
conditions that had to be met to find an Aboriginal title to be valid. The Inuit had to establish 
that: they and their ancestors lived within and were members of organised societies; the 
societies occupied the specific territory over which they were claiming Aboriginal title; their 
occupation was exclusive; and the occupation was in effect when Britain claimed sovereignty 
over the region. Mahoney J said that “an Aboriginal title to that territory, carrying with it the 
right freely to move about and hunt and fish over it, vested at common law in the Inuit”.173
The Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (1993) provides certainty and clarity of rights to 
ownership, use of lands, resources, rights to Inuit participants in decision-making about use, 
management, conservation of land, water and resources, offshore, wildlife harvesting rights 
and rights to participate in decision-making. The agreement also offers the Inuit financial 
compensation, a means to participate in economic opportunities, encourage self-reliance, 
and cultural and social well-being. The Inuit have an Inuit title to 35,000 sq km of land, 
including the mineral and water rights. The Nunavut Planning Commission oversees general 
land use planning. At least 50% of members of any panel dealing with Inuit-owned lands must 
be residents of the Nunavut Settlement Area. In the agreement the Inuit surrendered all their 
claims, rights, title and interests based on their assertion of an Aboriginal title anywhere in 
Canada. The key objective of the agreement was to create a new land and resource management 
system, which is comprehensive, exercising authority over the entire settlement area. The co-
management bodies guarantee a linkage between land and wildlife management. Nunavut 
Water Board supervises the use of water and waste in the territory. Governor in Council may 
establish water management areas to Nunavut and give exemptions for licences. A special 
Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal resolves conflicts between parties.174
171 MCQB, Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)(2007), ss. 430-431, 442; 445-447, 464, 
510; Isaak (2008), p. 39. MacInnes J defined the time of the first imposition of British control as early as 
1670, therefore watering down the Métis claims to land. S. 583.  
172 SCC, Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)(2013), ss. 84-94.
173 Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, 2002, s. 8; FCC, Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister 
of Indian Affairs (1980), s. 95.
174 NLCA (1993), ss. 5-6; Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, 2002, ss. 14, 33, 82, 99; 
Duffy (1988),  pp. 57-60; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 134-135. 
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In the Inuvialuit Final Agreement the Inuvialuit have title in fee simple absolute to the 
beds of all water bodies found on their lands, although the Crown retains ownership of all 
waters and the title remain subject to existing easements, servitudes and rights of way. The 
Nunatsiavut agreement is based on traditional, current use and occupation of lands, water 
and sea ice in accordance with custom. These lands are classified as fee simple lands while the 
other lands are extinguished.175
6.3.5.  Hunting, Fishing and Trapping  
The Porthsmouth Treaty (1713) agreed to save the Indians’ liberty for hunting, fishing and 
fowling, based retrospectively an earlier treaty in New England (1693). The same wording was 
repeated in subsequent treaties, including the Drummer (1725) and Halifax (1752) Treaties. 
The latter acknowledged a right to “free liberty of Hunting and Fishing as usual” and “to 
trade to the best Advantage”.176 Despite this, the 1928 decision of Nova Scotia County Court 
held that the Indians were not competent contracting parties to the Treaty of Halifax and 
therefore there were no specific rights to hunt.177 In Francis the Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
(1969) ruled that the eighteenth century treaties were still valid unless changed by legislation 
in the light of British North America Act, 1867.178  This took place only one year later, when 
the federal Fishing Act was passed. In 1985 the same court gave a favourable decision to 
Mi’kmaq in Simon, according to which the treaty of 1752 was still valid and could only be 
superceded by federal legislation. The treaty right to hunt must be interpreted in a flexible way 
that is sensitive to the evolution of changes in normal hunting practices and it contemplates 
those activities reasonably incidental to the act of hunting.179 The Maritime courts have also 
confirmed the treaty rights of non-status descendant of treaty signatories, although they may 
have an onus of proof. 180
After 1812 the Indians had learnt to negotiate terms of treaties so that the rivers and forests 
remained open and they could continue hunting and fishing. In the Robinson Treaties (1850) 
the Indians were guaranteed “full and free privilege to hunt over the territory ceded by them 
and to fish in waters, except for those portions that would be sold to private individuals or 
set aside by the government for specific uses”, which was confirmed in the Enfranchisement 
Act, 1869.181 The first of numbered treaties to include hunting and fishing rights in the treaty 
area was Treaty 3 (1873). The treaty tribes received also from the government ammunition 
worth $1,500 and fishing nets.182 In 1890 North-West Territories and Manitoba made their 
game laws applicable to Indians, passing the express treaty rights. In the northern areas the 
175 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, 2004 (Newfoundland and Labrador), Preamble, s. 7; IFA 
(1984), ss. 7(4), (43)-(44).
176 Halifax Treaty (1752), s. 4.
177 NSCC, R. v. Syliboy (1929), pp. 313-314.
178 NSCA, R. v. Francis (1969).
179 SCC, R. v. Simon (1985), ss. 42-56; Elliott (2001), p. 75; 
180 White & Maxim & Spence (2003), pp. 252-254.Cf.  NBPC, R. v. Fowler (1993), NBCA, R. v. McCoy (1994), 
R. v. Paul (1994) and R. v. Chevrier (1994). 
181 Crown Treaty 60 (1850); Crown Treaty 61 (1850); Enfranchisement Act, 1869, s. 8. 
182 Treaty 3 (1873).
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mounted police began to enforce regulations against hunting wood buffalo. In 1894 the 
Unorganized Territories’ Game Preservation Act was passed, which prohibited the use of 
poison and the running of game with dogs. It also defined the closed seasons on specified 
game. In 1911 HBC opened its first fur trade post at Chesterfield Inlet. In 1938 the Northwest 
Territories Council restricted trapping licenses in the area to residents of the territories.183 
World War II and the construction of the Alaska Highway ended free hunting and fishing 
in the north. By the 1950s the Indians had to register their traplines in some areas. The collapse 
of white fox markets between 1948-1950 reflected the rapid change in the area. Since 1959 
the co-operatives have participated in harvesting fish, fur and game. On the other hand, the 
officials realised that indigenous people must be encouraged to continue their traditional way 
of life, or otherwise they would degenerate. In 1923 to the north was established two large 
game preserves for exclusive Indigenous use and in 1935 the first reindeers were introduced to 
Western Arctic after the Alaskan model. The Governor in Council may enter into agreement 
with indigenous people on reindeer, which are the “property of Her Majesty”, and can be sold 
to individuals or corporations for herding.184
Based on the Constitution Act,1930, three Natural Resources Transfer Agreements 
(NRTA) were made, which extended the rights of Indians in three Prairee Provinces to hunt, 
trap and fish for food in all seasons on all unoccupied Crown lands and all lands to which they 
have a right of access. Hunting on private land is allowed if there is no visible, incompatible 
land use. The conflicting procincial laws are void. The Alberta Court of Appeal has stressed 
the history of recognition of Indian rights in federal law: when dealing with the Indian tribes 
there is a need to uphold the honour of the Crown. The Supreme Court has held that while 
some provincial laws can affect Indians without being invalid, other provincial laws relate to 
Indians qua Indians and are considered to interfere with exclusive federal jurisdiction under 
s. 91(24).185 
The NRTAs extinguished all commercial hunting rights. In general, the right to harvest 
commercially is possible, if the commercial harvesting activity is proven to have been 
an integral part of the claimant’s society prior to contact. A claimant must prove that the 
commercial activity was a defining feature of a distinctive culture in society. In Horseman 
(1990) the Supreme Court held that the original Treaty 8 rights had included also commercial 
rights but that they had been limited to subsistence rights by the Constitution Act, 1930.186 
Later the Supreme Court returned to the question in Gladstone (1996). Lamer CJ found, 
based on Van der Peet – test, that the Heiltsuk First Nation’s pre-contact trade in spawn had 
been extensive enough to constitute an integral part of a distinct culture. The Heiltsuk had a 
183 Unorganized Territories Game Preservation Act, 1894; Dickason (1994), p. 370.
184 NWT Act, 1985, s. 45; Northwest Territories Reindeer Regulations, 2006, s. 4; Zaslow (1988), pp. 277-279; 
Dickason (1994), pp. 319, 368-372, 378,  382, 395-396; McHugh (2004), p. 153. 
185 Constitution Act, 1930, s. 13; Wildlife Act, 1998 (Saskatchewan), ss. 34-35; SCC, Cardinal (1974); ACA, 
Wesley (1932)
186 SCC, R. v. Horseman (1990); Elliott (2001), pp. 45-46, 82-83. The Constitution Act, 1930 applies only to 
provincial laws in Prairee Provinces and excludes the fishing rights. 
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priority, but not an exclusive right for commercial fishery.187 In Marshall (1, 1999), the court 
recognised limited commercial fishing rights to earn livelihood.188 
At the federal level, the Governor in Council may make regulations for the protection 
and preservation of fur-bearing animals, fish and other game on reserves. The band councils 
have power to make bylaws on preservation, protection and management of fur-bearing 
animals, fish and other game on the reserve. Many treaties contain rights to hunt, fish and 
trap, but they have also extinguished those rights. Further, they have been subject to changing 
regulations. For exemple, in the eve of the new Constitution Act, the federal parliament and 
provincial legislatures passed laws which restricted hunting and fishing rights, although they 
were against the guarantees in treaties. The federal and provincial governments have often 
acted unilaterally to remove lands from hunting terrories.When the rights are not explicitly 
included to treaties or statutes they may survive as Aboriginal rights.  Since 1982 the Aboriginal 
and treaty rights are enforceable against federal and provincial hunting and fishing laws. They 
can be only overridden by the Sparrow test. In treaty territories the hunting and fishing are 
not allowed on occupied and settled lands. Treaty rights may be generally exercised only 
within the boundaries of the tract surrendered, unless there is other historical proof of use. 
The rights in a territory overlapping provincial boundaries may be transferable.189
In the Douglas Treaties (British Columbia) the right to hunt as formerly extends to 
traditional hunting areas, which may be outside the surrendered tract’s limits. In 1874 the 
federal government reminded the government of British Columbia of its obligations to 
protect the customary fishing grounds. British Columbia responded by promising reserves 
for each tribe that included their fishing stations, fur-trading posts and settlements. The First 
Nations became in British Columbia under the provincial hunting and trapping regulations 
from 1915. The subject was reopened in the 1960s when two Indians, Bob and White, had 
been charged of hunting outside the hunting season against the British Columbia Game Act, 
1960. In 1964 the British Columbia Court of Appeal ruled that the Saalequun tribe, which 
had ceded land to Governor Douglas in 1854, had preserved a right to hunt in unoccupied 
areas. The treaty right prevailed over provincial game laws. The decision was upheld in the 
Supreme Court.190 On the other hand, after the enactment of the Migratory Birds Convention 
Act (1960) the Supreme Court established that Indian hunting and fishing rights could be 
taken away by general federal legislation which prevailed over the treaties.191 Also in two 
cases from 1985 the court ruled that provincial hunting laws applied to Indians in non-treaty 
areas.192Today the self-governing First Nations of British Columbia have wildlife committees 
and councils which promote the cooperative management of the resource and advises the 
minister on management and hunting matters. The First Nations may harvest wildlife for 
187 SCC, Gladstone (1996), ss. 16-22.
188 SCC, Marshall (1, 1999), ss. 107-114. Also British Columbia and Ontario have similar cases. All courts 
have, however, not supported the commercial fishery.
189 Indian Act, 1985, s. 73(1)(a), 81(1)(o); Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 45-46, 74-75, 81.
190 BCCA, Regina v. White and Bob (1964); SCC, Regina v. White and Bob (1964); 
191 SCC, R. v. Sikeya (1964), p. 642. See also: SCC, R. v. George (1966), pp. 578-579; Daniels v. White (1968), p. 
539-541; Derrickson v. Derrickson (1976), ss. 60-63; Jack v. R. (1980), pp. 312-315. Today the Indians and 
Inuit have right to hunt migratory birds without a Migratory Game Bird Hunting Permit; The reserves cre-
ated by British Columbia were the smallest in Canada, on average 5 hectares per Indian.  
192 Dick v. R. (1985), ss. 27-45; Jack & Charlie v. The Queen (1985), ss. 29-40.
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domestic purposes in their Wildlife Harvest Areas according to wildlife harvest plan and 
allowable harvest allocations. Their traplines are retained and some of them may trade and 
barter wildlife.193 
Québec was the only province which did not follow the British Columbia’s model. It was 
historically outside the treaty process and claimed a right to regulate all hunting and fishing. 
Only after confrontations on the Restigouche reserve did the province make an agreement 
with the First Nations on fishing rights.194 Even today for all hunting and trapping an 
authorising licence is required.The Iroquois of Kahnawake, who charged licence fees to duck 
hunters and fishermen along the St. Lawrence Seaway located in the middle of their reserve as 
reminiscent of tolls charged in pre-colonial days, have been given in new agreement a right to 
protect and manage the wildlife and fish but it must be consistent with federal environmental 
laws and regulations.195 In the JBNQA category II lands the Cree have exclusive hunting, 
fishing and trapping rights for personal and community use under provincial jurisdiction 
where the harvesting quotas are based on the provincial resource management plans, and 
the category III lands where the rights may continue under Québec’s regulatory authority. 
The rights extend to trade and commerce with all by-products of harvesting activities. There 
is a right to possess and use all equipment needed and to travel and establish the necessary 
camps. There is a number species reserved to exclusive use of the Indigenous peoples. For 
migratory birds, the personal use is limited to the gift or exchange of all harvesting products 
within the extended family to protect them when necessary. In categories I-II they have the 
right to establish and operate commercial fisheries and in category III certain fish species. In 
categories I-II the right needs Indigenous peoples’ consent. The agreement has established 
the Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Committee, composed of an equal number of indigenous 
and government representatives. The committee makes representations to the ministry about 
wildlife management and allocation issues, while the responsible minister has the final say. 
In all categories the rights are subordinated to development needs, but on the other hand, the 
indigenous rights to harvest take priority to legal change.196   
Québec, Manitoba and Saskatchewan created rehabilitation projects to reclaim over-
exploited areas for production of furs and supported the hunting and trapping lifestyles of the 
First Nations and Métis. Saskatchewan combined its fur production programme with farming 
assistance programmes. The western provinces have since the 1940s registered traplines, 
which have been instrumental in controlling trapping and maintaining the traditional way of 
life.197 Alberta has created Indian Fur Management Licenses.198 In the Yukon the First Nations 
must be informed of all changes, which prohibit or restrict the trapping rights.199   
193 Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 11; Tsawassen First Nation Final 
Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 10; Migratory Birds Regulations, s. 5(6); Nisga’a Final Agree-
ment, 1999, s. 9; Dickason (1994), pp. 348-349. Karsten (2002), p. 61. 
194 White & Maxim & Spence (2003), p. 227.
195 Agreement with Respect to Kanesatake Governance of the Interim Land Base, s. 25; Dickason (1994), p. 
358.
196 JBNQA (1975), ss. 5, 24. 
197 Dickason (1994), p. 365.
198 Wildlife Regulation, 1997 (Alberta), s. 103(1).
199 Trappers Regulations (Yukon), s. 21. 
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The Department of Fisheries and Oceans has made an agreement with more than 
50 First Nations, part of them being long term agreements. Nationwide they include e.g. 
licences to sell, trade and barter the marine mammals. The responsible minister may issue a 
communal licence to an indigenous organisation to carry on fishing and related activities.200 
In Alberta and Labrador the indigenous people are licensed to fish for food for personal use 
or for immediate family. In Alberta they may also engage in sportfishing without license. 201 
The Nisga’a and Tsawwassen Fisheries Committees facilitate the cooperative planning and 
conduct of fisheries and enhancement activities. The Lisims Fisheries Conservation Trust 
promotes conservation and protection of fish species, facilitaties sustainable management 
and promotes and supports Nisga’a participation in the stewardship of fisheries. Nisga’a and 
Maanulth have harvest agreements, stewardship, operational guidelines and they participate 
in First Nations fisheries advisory processes. The responsible minister must issue each year 
a Harvest Document to the First Nation.202 The federal and provincial governments support 
the First Nation’s participation in the general commercial fishing industry. The self-governing 
First Nations may fish and acquire plants in their fishing areas and trade and barter them. The 
right is only limited by conservation, public health or safety.203  
In Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories indigenous peoples may fish without a 
licence by angling and other regular methods.204 The Gwich’in Agreement confers the First 
Nation an exclusive wildlife harvesting right to their lands in all seasons, excluding fish and 
migratory birds. The Gwich’in have ancillary right to travel, establish and maintain hunting, 
trapping and fishing camps, and to trade edible products of wildlife inside the indigenous 
community. The purpose is to maintain traditional sharing among indigenous individuals 
and communities.205 In the Sahtu Dene Agreement the right to use water shall not disturb 
any rights associated with a right to fish or hunt migratory game birds.206 Due to their overlap 
with other agreements the Dogrib continue to have the traditional right to harvest wildlife in 
the NWT and Nunavut and vice versa.207 A similar Fish and Wildlife Management Board has 
been included to the Umbrella Agreement. In the Champagne and Aishihik Agreement the 
harvesting for subsistence employing traditional, methods of equipment is allowed together 
with a right to trade, barter and sell fish products. The fishing management is co-ordinated. 
The First Nations have a right of first refusal to new fishing licenses. The right is limited by 
measures necessary for conservation, public health or safety.208
The courts have defined several times the scope of incidental activities. Hunting for food 
outside the traditional territories, fishing without a licence in traditional territory, carrying a 
gun to the hunting ground, teaching youth how to fish, building a fire or a cabin in a park and 
200 Marine Mammal Regulations, 1993, s. 13(2); Report of Rodolfo Stavenhagen (2004), p. 50. 
201 Alberta Fishery Regulations, 1996, s. 13; Newfoundland and Labrador Fishery Regulations, 2010, s. 10(4).
202 Nisga’a Final Agreement, 1999, ss. 8-9; Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Co-
lumbia), ss. 10.1-2, 10.4.; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 9.1-2, 
9.65-66, 9.96.
203 Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences Regulations, 2009, s. 4; 
204 Saskatchewan Fishing Regulations, 1995, s. 4(3); NWT Fishery Regulations, s. 22(1).
205 Gwichin Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (1991), s. 12.
206 Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (2005), s. 20.
207 Dogrib Final Agreement, s. 2.
208 Amendment of Champaigne and Aishihik First Nations Final Agreement, 2006 (Yukon), ss. 4, 6, 9.
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hunting of game dangerous to a community are included in hunting and fishing rights. On 
the other hand, there are justified infringements to treaty rights - foremost health and safety. 
The courts have ruled that for safety reasons no person has the right to have a loaded firearm 
in a powerboat. In night hunting it must be estimated whether it is dangerous in particular 
circumstances. In all restrictions dealing with health and safety matters the governments 
should adequately consult the people affected.209  
The governments and courts have met the question of whether the Métis are included to 
the provisions of the NRTA. Originally drafters used the definition of Indian found in the 
1927 Indian Act which included all persons of Indian blood if they followed the Indian mode 
of life. In Blais (2003), the Supreme Court reasoned that the term Indians in connection with 
the NRTA did not include the Métis.210 In Grumpo (1996) the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
held that the NRTA only accommodates, preserves and amends existing Aboriginal rights. 
There is a need to decide whether the Métis had an existing Aboriginal right to hunt before 
the enactment of the NRTA.211 In Ontario (2004-2006) and Alberta (2004-2007) the bipartite 
negotiations have, following the Powley decision, led to interim harvesting agreements. In 
Ontario the Court of Appeal has demanded the Métis define first the traditional harvesting 
areas before a final agreement could be made.212 The Alberta NRTA has been broadened 
to include the Métis. Their right is limited to harvesting for subsistence purposes subject 
to closures or restrictions implemented for conservation or safety purposes. The Métis 
must obtain licences according to Alberta statutes. The province has adopted the Métis 
organisations’ membership criteria. In the Maritime region the Métis have had less success: 
the court cases in New Brunswick have indicated that there is no official recognition of their 
harvesting rights.213 
In Saskatchewan, the right to fish without licence for food has been extended to the 
Métis.214 Fishing in the Métis settlements of Alberta is subject to residential status or persons 
authorised to fish under settlement bylaws. The resident settlement members may fish for 
sustenance at any time of the year with a Métis Domestic Fishing Licence. The Minister of 
Environmental Protection may authorise a Settlement Council to issue Metis Commercial 
Fishing Licences for commercial purposes. The minister has an obligation to set aside a 
portion of the total designated catch for settlement members. The provincial Crown has 
retained also rights of fishery. The settlement members have also exclusive rights to hold or 
obtain in their lands game birds, and to keep baits for the hunting of wolves and coyotes on 
public lands based on a Métis Trappers’ Licence.215 
209 Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 77, 80. Cf. SCC, Morris (2006), ss. 108-139; Adams (1996), s. 59; 
ONCA, Shipman (2007), ss. 38-47; Meshake (2007), ss. 26-39; The federal Firearms Act demands that all 
gun owners must be licenced and their firearms and ammunition be registred. Several First Nations’ or-
ganisations have challenged the law. Cf. Firearms Act, 1997, ss. 4, 7. 
210 SCC, Blais (2003), ss. 32-35; McIntosh (2009), p. 417.
211  SCA, R. v. Grumpo (1999), ss. 85-87.
212 ONCJ, R. v. Laurin (2007), ss. 28-29. Isaac (2008), pp. 53, 59-61. 
213 Isaac (2008), pp. 53, 59-61. Cf. NBPC, R. v. Chiasson (2001); R. v. Castonguay & Faucher (2002); R. v. Daigle 
(2003).   
214 Fisheries Regulations (Saskatchewan), s. 91.
215 Métis Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), ss. 131-133; General Fisheries Act (Alberta) Regulation, 1997, s. 2; 
Wildlife Regulation, 1997 (Alberta), ss. 80, 85, 103. 
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The Inuit economic, social and cultural needs are recognised. They may harvest 
exceptionally also endangered species for subsistence purposes. The Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement has the most extensive co-management procedure with wildlife management, 
resource management and environmental boards, which offer for Inuit a formal role in 
making recommendations to government decision makers. The Inuit and their spouses 
have an assigned right to harvest quantity of wildlife in the Nunavut Settlement Area. The 
identification is based on enrolment card. The personal harvesting has to respect the Inuit 
customary principles. The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board is the main instrument 
for wildlife management in the settlement area and the main regulator of access to wildlife. 
It creates a system of harvesting rights, priorities and privileges that reflect current and 
traditional Inuit harvesting. The wildlife management in governed by and implements 
principles of conservation. The hunters and trappers organisations and regional wildlife 
organisations oversee the exercise of harvesting. The function of organisations is to manage 
the harvesting among members. The Inuit have free and unrestricted access to all land, water 
and marine areas within the settlement area for harvesting purposes with some limitations. 
The beneficiaries are represented by the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut. The seal hunting 
is a question of continuing controversy between Canada and the EU.216
Northern Québec’s Indigenous peoples have a Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Coordinating 
Committee, which reviews, manages, supervises and regulates the harvesting and advises 
governments on wildlife management which has representatives from federal and provincial 
governments and the indigenous peoples. The province has also created a support programme 
for Inuit hunters, fishers and trappers, administered by the Kativik Regional Government. 
In addition there are the Nunavik Marine Regional Wildlife Board, Planning Commission 
and Impact Review Board. The legislation and agreements demand to take into account the 
traditional pursuits of Indigenous peoples. There are also JBNQA-based, zone-specific rules 
on traplines. The Indigenous peoples have collectively an exclusive right to harvest in the 
area, including trade and commercial activities, outfitting operations, right of first refusal, 
management of hunting, fishing and trapping regulations and an exclusive right to keep the 
wildlife in captivity or to raise it - although the right can be shared by an agreement.217 
The Inuvialuit Final Agreement and legislation give the Inuit preferential harvesting 
rights, excluding the migratory birds, with compensation for losses arising from development 
in the settlement region. The laws of general application are applicable on Inuvialuit lands 
and the federal government retains management and control rights of fisheries, game and 
insectivorous birds. Six committees represent the indigenous hunters at the local level with 
further representation on the Inuvialuit Game Council. The overall charge belongs to the 
Wildlife Management Advisory Councils and Fisheries Joint Management Committee, while 
216 Wildlife Act, 2003 (Nunavut), ss. 16-17, 75, 125; Order Giving Notice to Decisions not to Amend Some 
Species to the List of Endangered Species, 2006 (Nunavut), Annex 1; NLCA (1993), ss. 5, 12; Olthuis & 
Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 136-137; IWGIA (2010), p. 51.
217 Loi sur le programme d’aide aux Inuit beneficiaries de la Convention de la Baie James et du Nord québecois 
pour leurs actes de chasse, de pêche et de piégeage, 2006 (Québec), s. 2-3, 7; Nunavik Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement Act, 2008, s. 7(1); Loi sur les droits de chasse et pêche dans les territoires de la Baie James et du 
Nouveau-Québec, 2009 (Québec), ss. 2, 6-13, 26-28, 32, 40, 48, 54-55; Décret concernant la publication de 
l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, 2007 
(Québec), ss. 2-3. Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, 2008, s. 7(1);
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the enforcement, collecting of scientific data and feedback role belong to local committees 
and the Game Council. The quota setting and restrictions are agreed. The Environmental 
Impact Screening Committee determines whether development proposals have a negative 
impact on the environment or wildlife harvesting and refers development proposals to the 
Environment Impact Review Board for public review.218 
In the Yukon, the Inuit have the right to use traditional methods of harvesting, only 
restricted by public safety. They can without a permit exchange or barter the wildlife products 
among themselves. For the harvest of protected wildlife a minister’s licence is needed.219 The 
Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement has established the Torngat Wildlife and Plants 
Management Board for making recommendation to governments on the conservation and 
management of wildlife and plants in the settlement area. The respective minister has an 
overall responsibility for the conservation and management. The Torngat Joint Fisheries 
Board has similar function for fisheries. The province has also created an aquaculture licence-
system.220
In Sparrow (1990) the Supreme Court of Canada analysed the wording of s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, from a common law perspective. It addressed the meaning of existing 
aboriginal rights, the context and scope of aboriginal right to fish, the meaning of recognised 
and affirmed and the impact of s. 35(1) on the regulatory power of the federal Parliament. 
The court held that s. 35 provides constitutional protection for existing Aboriginal rights. The 
judicial interpretation of an existing Aboriginal right has to be sensitive to the Aboriginal 
perspective on the meaning of the rights at stake and be interpreted flexibly to permit their 
evolution over time. They are affirmed in contemporary form.  Existential and categorical 
meaning of recognised and affirmed aboriginal rights are rights in existence when s. 35 came 
into constitutional effect. The Aboriginal fishing, land and hunting rights have priority over 
later restrictive legislation. On the other hand, the federal and provincial regulations may 
restrict them so long as the regulation rests on valid legislative objectives that are compelling 
and substantial and the limitation is compatible with the Crown’s fiduciary duty to First 
Nations. The regulation exists because of pre-existing and independent aboriginal rights. It 
has to be converged and reconciled with the governmental power. The Court incorporated 
the First Nations’ past to constitutional analysis of aboriginal rights by looking to traditional 
and historical practivces as evidence of the existence of rights. The affected Musqueam band 
had been an organised society, whose right to fish had always been an integral part of their 
distinctive culture.221 
In Van der Peet (1996) the Supreme Court distinguished the Aboriginal rights to harvest 
resources from Aboriginal title. It created a test according to which the Indigenous claimants 
must show that the activity to which they claim a right was an element of a practice, custom 
or tradition integral to their distinctive culture at the time of contact with Europeans, or 
in the case of the Métis, the court has spoken about effective European control. It has also 
defined the Aboriginal rights in connection with fishing rights as group and site specific. 
218 Wildlife Act, 1988 (NWT), ss. 101-102; IFA (1984), s. 7; Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), p. 146.
219 Wildlife Act, 2002 (Yukon), ss. 201-202, 207-208. 
220 Aquaculture Act, 1990 (Newfoundland and Labrador), s. 3. 
221 SCC, Sparrow (1990). The Indian Food Fishery Licence was defined in ss. 27(1), (4) of the British Columbia 
Fishery (General) Regulations. 
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The indigenous treaty rights to trap and hunt are geographically limited and would lose 
their value without preservation of enabling wildlife habitat. Some scolars have criticised 
the court’s decision as paternalistic. There is problem in relation to the Gladstone case, where 
the Heiltsuk Nation, the neighbours of the Sto:lo Nation, was proved to have a large-scale 
historical fishing right, unlike their neighbours. Nevertheless, both bands were members of 
the same traditional trading network. The evidence was based on European records which 
favoured the Heiltsuk. Based on Gladstone, the Heiltsuk have primacy in allocation of fishing 
stocks and fiduciaty freedom to share the traditional resources. Van der Peet, on the other 
hand, demands the rights to be resolved in accordance with federal and provincial legislation 
and must show to be non-extinguished before 1982. The Van der Peet – trilogy divided the 
court, but its policy developed during the process becoming more generous and flexible.222
In Adams (1996) the appellant was able to demonstrate that fishing for food was an 
integral part of the Mohawks’ culture in Québec. There was sufficient continuity in practice 
to establish an Aboriginal right and they obtained the licence.223 In Côté (1996) the Algonkin 
appellants argued that they were exercising a right guaranteed both by the s. 35(1) and the 
Treaty of Swegatchy (1769). Based on Van der Peet, Lamer CJ found that food fishing within 
the lakes and rivers of a restricted zone was a significant part of the Algonkin life but, unlike 
in Adams, the federal and provincial governments have a right to limit the indigenous rights 
which are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution.224 Also BCCA held in Alphonse (1993) 
that existing Aboriginal and treaty rights may be exercised on unoccupied private land.225 
However, the Supreme Court has specified in Badger (1996) that if the private property is 
occupied and visibly used, it may not be accessed by Indigenous peoples to exercise their 
rights. 226 
In Sioui (1990) the Supreme Court ruled that treaty guarantees could prevail over provincial 
regulations, provided that their content was consistent with the general purpose of the enabling 
statute.227 In Marshall 1 and 2 (1999), the court specified the significance of treaties: the 
Mi’kmaq Nation’s fishing rights are based on British local treaties of 1760-1761. In Marshall 1 
(1999) the court held that a trade restriction provision should be construed to contain a 
positive treaty right to hunt, fish and trap goods to the extent that they yielded the Mi’kmaq 
a moderate livelihood. The right was constitutionally guaranteed and could be regulated only 
pursuant to s. 35(1), 1982.228 The decision led to confrontation in fisheries and the Supreme 
Court had to return to the case in Marshall 2 (also 1999). The court specified that the treaty 
right is limited to the historical local communities and comprises only traditional hunting, 
fishing and gathering. The right can be regulated by the government’s restrictions when they 
do not deprive the treaty rights and can be infringed where it is justified for conservation or 
other compelling and substantial public objectives. General historical evidence can be used to 
222 SCC, Gladstone (1996), ss. 16-22; Van der Peet (1996), ss. 46, 73; Barsh (1997), pp. 1001, 1003-1005.
223 SCC, Adams (1996), ss. 50-59. 
224 Côté (1996), s. 83.
225 BCCA, Alphonse (1993), ss. 86-89.
226 SCC, R. v. Badger (1996), ss. 49-53. See also: Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage)( 2005), ss. 2, 45. 
227 SCC, R. v. Sioui (1990).
228 SCC, Marshall (1, 1999), s. 64.
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interpret a treaty text trade restriction clause as a free-standing commercial harvesting right, 
protected constitutionally against restrictions that govern non-treaty resource users.229
The Métis harvesting rights must generally be exercised within the traditional territory of 
a specific community and can be infringed for valid purposes by governments and subject 
to the same general restrictions which apply to rights-based harvesting by other indigenous 
peoples. In Powley (1993) the Supreme Court held that the members of the Métis community 
in the Sault Ste. Marie region had an Aboriginal right to hunt for food and that that right had 
been infringed without justification by the Ontario hunting regulations.230 But as has been 
referred to above, the Supreme Court has limited the scope of Métis rights in Blais (2003), 
where the Métis were excluded from the NRTA licence to hunt deer out of season.231 
The Provincial Court of Saskatchewan recognised in Morin (1996) the Métis rights 
to hunt, fish, and trap. The court held that the defendants, fishing out of season, were 
discriminated against. The Indian and Métis are two similarly situated groups of people and 
should be similarly treated under the fishery regulations. The defendants’ right to equality 
had been infringed and therefore the fishery regulations had no force or effect on them. 
The Governments of Canada and Saskarchewan answered that the Métis rights had been 
extinguished in 1906. Because there was question on scrip, the courts in Saskatchewan held 
that there was no statute or order to extinguish the Métis right to fish. Based on the case, the 
Saskatchewan Environment has published A Guide to Métis Hunting and Fishing Rights in 
Saskatchewan. It limits the exercise of rights to the Northern Administrative District (NAD). 
A Métis must show that he/she is a permanent resident of the area, the ancestry has long-
standing connections to a particular Northern Métis community where he/she resides, and 
that he/she is living a traditional lifestyle. The guide does not exclude the possibility of similar 
rights even elsewhere. The Aboriginal right is based on s. 35.232 
Related to Inuit, the Nunavut Court of Justice found in Kadlak a prima facie infringement 
of an indigenous right, when the responsible minister overruled the Nunavut Wildlife 
Management Board’s recommendation to allow traditional hunting of polar bears. The 
minister’s decision was not justified under the Sparrow test.233 
6.3.6.  Timber Rights
The Biggot Commission of 1842-1844 suggested that a system of timber licensing be 
instituted for reserves. Two laws were passed in 1850-1851 to protect the reserves from 
outer exploitation. In St. Catherine’s Milling (1888) the Crown explained that Indians had 
an inherent right to their resources. In reality, many reserves are too small for efficient log 
229 Marshall (2, 1999), ss. 4, 36-37, 41. 
230 SCC, Powley (1993), ss. 47, 53.
231  R. v. Blais (2003), ss. 39-41.
232 Dominion Lands Act, 1906, s. 6; SPC, R. v. Morin (1997); A Guide to Métis Hunting and Fishing. The Sas-
katchewan Court of Queen’s Bench ruled later on apply that the province’s fishing regulations formed an 
infringement of the Canadian Charter.
233 NUCJ, Kadlak v. Nunavut (Minister of Sustainable Development)(2001), s. 32; Olthuis & Kleer & Townsh-
end (2008), p. 128. 
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harvesting.234 The eighteenth century treaties dealing with the Maritime Provinces’ indigenous 
peoples have led to litigation on logging rights. In 1998 the New Brunswick Court of Appeal 
overruled the lower court’s decision and held that the commercial harvesting of timber is 
not a practice, tradition or custom integral to Mi’kmaq and Maliseet cultures. The Supreme 
Court returned to the question in the double case Marshall/ Bernard (2005). The Mi’kmaq 
Nation lost the case: the court ruled that logging, and cutting wood in the Crown lands was 
not a general treaty right.235 Following the Van der Peet case, the Supreme Court, however, 
ruled in Sappier/Gray (2006) that the Maliseet and Mi’kmaq peoples in New Brunswick have 
an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic purposes. The content of these resource-use 
rights is determined by practices, customs and traditions integral to the distinctive culture of 
the people at the time of contact with Europeans.236.
The Governor in Council may authorise by regulation the minister to grant licences to cut 
timber on surrendered lands, and with the consent of a band council, on reserve lands.237 The 
provinces have entered into agreements with the First Nations on harvesting on Crown lands. 
In Manitoba the logging may be undertaken in First Nations Commercial Development 
Zones only according to agreement.238 In British Columbia the chief forrester must determine 
the allowable yearly cuts. The minister can enter into agreement with the First Nations about 
granting rights to harvest Crown timber in the form of the First Nations woodland licences. 
In the Community Forest Agreement the parties agree about treaty measures to use the 
forest economically. Based on negotiations the minister may grant forestry including special 
standards and free use permits for First Nations.239 The Self-governing First Nations of British 
Columbia own their forest resources. They have exlusive authority to determine, collect and 
administer fees and royalties related to forest resources. It can implement forest management 
standards, provided they meet or exceed provincial standards. Nisga’a can purchase forest 
tenure on an annual level. The Minister of Forests defines the allowable annual cut for the 
Maanulth’s harvesting, who have formed a corporation for harvesting rights.240 The McLeod 
Lake Indian Band Agreement includes provisions on silviculture and reforestation.241 In 
dispute between the Nuu-Chah-Nulth Council and MacMillan Bloedel on logging in Meares 
Island, the BCCA reminded that an agreement must ensure that the importance of resources 
to Aboriginal parties is taken into account.242 In Tsilhqot’in First Nation the BCCA held that 
the imposition of the provincial forestry management scheme removed the tribe’s ability to 
control the uses of the land, created uncertainty about the protection of the land for future 
234 JCPC, St. Catherine’s Milling (1888); Dickason (1994), pp. 249-250.
235 SCC, Marshall/Bernard (2003), ss. 121-122. 
236 SCC, Sappier/Gray (2006), s. 72.
237 Indian Act, 1985, s. 57(a); Indian Timber Regulations, 2002, ss. 4-10; Crown Lands and Forest Act, 1980 
(New Brunswick), s. 4. 
238 Pimitotah Traditional Use Planning Area Regulation, 2011 (Manitoba), ss. 4, 6.
239 Forest Act, 1996 (British Columbia), ss. 8, 12, 43, 47.
240 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 5-6; Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Co-
lumbia), s. 9; Tsawassen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 39; Maanulth Forest 
Corporation Interim Regulation, 2011 (British Columbia), s. 3, 6.
241 McLeod Lake Indian Band Treaty No. 8 Adhesion and Settleement Agreement Act, 2000 (British Colum-
bia), s. 5;
242 BCCA, Macmillan Bloedel v. Mullin (1985).
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use and deprived them of the ability to realise economic gains from harvesting by infringing 
their Aboriginal title.243  
In JBNQA, the right to use the resources of forests in category I was transferred to the 
Cree for personal and community needs and commercial exploitation, extending to third 
parties acting with the consent of the communities and Québec authorities. In category II 
the operations are governed by Québec standards defined by the provincial Department of 
Lands and Forests. In category III the Cree can only apply from department wood to develop 
saw mills. In categories II-III the general forest protection regime is applicable and the dues 
are payable. The agreement between the province of Québec and the Cree Nation (2002) 
established as a co-management structure the Cree-Québec Forestry Board. Later the new 
convention between the provincial government and the Crees has created a detailed co-
management mechanism for forest resources, including a Joint Committee to scrutinise the 
governmental initiatives and adoption of next generation forest plans.244
The Yukon recognises the important role of forests in society, culture and lives. The UFA 
charges the departments to manage harvest management activities. The minister has to consult 
with the First Nations before establishing planning areas and a Joint Planning Commission 
has been established. The Champagne, Aishihik and Teslin Tlingit nations have inititiated 
forest management plans, which must include a description of traditional use of First Nations’ 
forests and take into account their forest resource harvesting, management of customs, fish 
and wildlife harvesting rights, knowledge and experience. A woodlot plan has to include an 
estimation about the value of affected First Nation’s forest resources. Also the Nacho Nyak 
Dun nation’s co-operation with the department has increased forest management capacity. 
Renewable Resources Councils have to be consulted before establishing a new policy which 
affects the resources management of forests, allocation or forestry practices and legislation 
concerning forest resources. This ensures the local input into the management of forest 
resources.245 In the NWT, the Gwich’in Agreement has left the definition of tree harvesting 
for commercial purposes subject to legislation. A final say in licences belongs to Renewable 
Resources Board. Only trees located on Gwich’in lands give right to ownership. Gwich’in 
may gather plant material for food, medicine, cultural and other personal purposes and for 
purposes required in the exercise of wildlife harvesting rights within the settlement area.246
The Métis have had more difficulties in reaching agreements on timber use. In Castonguay 
(2002) the New Brunswick Métis were unable to assert their constitutional right to cut timber 
as they were unable to demonstrate that they were Métis. Despite this example, there has been 
also some advance, too. The government of Newfoundland and Labrador made in 2004 a 
two-year forestry agreement with the provincial Métis organisation.247
243 BCCA, Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia (2008).  
244 JBNQA (1975), s. 5; Décret concernant la publication de l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre le 
gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, 2007 (Québec), ss. 2-3. In MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Mullin 
(1985), the BCCA stressed the importance to find solution to questions through bilateral negotiations, not 
by litigation.
245 UFA, s. 17; Forest Resources Act (2008), Preamble, ss. 7-8; Forest Resources Regulation, 2010 (Yukon), ss. 
2, 5, 15; White & Maxim & Spence (2004), p. 154. 
246 Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (1991), ss. 13-14.
247 NBPC, Castonguay & Faucher (2002); Isaac (2008), p. 62. 
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6.3.7.  Resource Management and Environment
The Constitution Act, 1867, gave in s. 109 to provinces a proprietary interest to mines and 
minerals.248 In St. Catherine’s Milling (1888), the federal Government stressed that the Indians 
had before the extinguishment a right to claim mines and minerals from the land. Later the 
Privy Council described the Indian interest in pre-1867 reserve lands as usufructuary: the 
minerals are vested in the provinces249. Other courts have confirmed that the provinces may 
undertake or authorise projects of development on Indigenous lands after consulting and 
compensating them. A First Nation’s council may require the minister of DIAND to transfer 
the management and regulation of oil and gas exploration and exploitation on reserve 
lands. A band council may also require the payment of moneys held in trust to the band 
in the Consolidated Revenue Fund and there will be made a separate payment agreement. 
Before the transfer the First Nation has to prepare Oil and Gas, and Financial Codes. In 
transfer agreements apply the laws of general application on trusts. The band may also vote 
on ratification of the agreement. The First Nation’s management area will be set apart as a 
reserve, including later amended lands. The First Nation may make laws on the following: 
oil and gas exploration and exploitation in First Nations’ managed area; terms; conditions; 
environmental assessments; protection of environment; consultation; punishable offences; 
inspection; and auditing. The laws must provide the same level of protection as the respective 
provincial laws, and comply with Canada’s international legal obligations.  A Band Council 
may also delegate the management of oil and gas affairs to an executive director, who can 
grant permits, leases and options to acquire permit or lease related to oil and gas rights on 
Indian lands. The Governor in Council may make regulations on the conduct, minimum 
requirements, consultation and bodies’ administration, and exempt the First Nation from 
certain environmental assessments. The holder of lease can drill, product and treat oil and 
gas in the lease area, and transport, market and sell it. The usual period for a lease is five 
years.250
The Governor in Council may make regulations providing for the the disposition of 
surrendered mines and minerals underlying lands in a reserve.  The provincial mining claims 
cannot be extended as such to reserve lands and the development of mining resources and must 
take place in a manner consistent with recognition and affirmation of existing constitutional 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.251 The Indian reserves in British Columbia are in mineral rights 
subject to provincial legislation. An exception are the self-governing First Nations, who own 
the mineral (Nisga’a) or subsurface resources (Tsawassen, Maanulth) of their lands. The Nisga’a 
government may exclusively determine, collect and administrate fees of rents and royalties 
related to mineral resources. An exploration plan must have the Indigenous community’s 
248 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 109.
249 JCPC, St. Catherine’s Milling (1888); Attorney General of Quebec v. Attorney General of Canada (1921).
250 Indian Oil and Gas Regulations, 1995, ss. 3, 10, 23-24;  First Nations Oil and Gas and Moneys Management 
Act, 2012, ss. 6-7, 12, 15-17, 25, 30, 35, 38, 45, 61, 63; First Nations Oil and Gas Environmental Assessment 
Regulations, 2007, s. 11(1); Otis (2005), p. 89. 
251 Indian Act, 1985, s. 57(c); Indian Mining Regulations, ss. 23, 31. See also: Mining Act, 1985 (New Bruns-
wick), s. 24; Mining Act, 1990 (Ontario), ss. 2, 51, 78, 170; Mineral Exploration Standards Regulations, 2007 
(Newfoundland and Labrador), ss. 1-2.
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consent, and there may be arranged hearings concerning the Aboriginal or treaty rights. The 
term of lease is ten years with annual rent and payment of royalties.252 In Saskatchewan, the 
Lieutenant General in Council may set aside and transfer the administration and control 
of Crown minerals to the federal Crown to satisfy the obligations and undertakings to the 
Indian bands. All environmental assessments must consider the environmental effects and 
their significance of effects, comments, techniques and economically feasible measures.253 
In the Yukon and the NWT, the federal government has to inform the First Nations on 
exploitation of minerals used for nuclear energy.254
Indian bands may claim water rights on the basis of both treaty and ownership of riparian 
land. The riparian rights include access to water, use of water, drainage, flow of water, quality 
of water, and accretion. An exception to these common law rights has been British Columbia 
where the right to use water is statutory based and vested in the Crown in the right of the 
province. The province has established for the selfgoverning First Nations ecological, water and 
hydropower reserves.255 In Manitoba, the First Nations have to be consulted on all planning 
processes related to water protection.256 Saskatchewan has entered into tripartite agreements 
on watersheds’ management, administration, development, conservation, protection, control 
and use.257 The water rights are important also in the Dogrib Final Agreement, where the 
First Nation has an exclusive right to use waters that flow through their lands, subject only 
to the North Slave Land and Water Board.258  The Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act 
can extend the federal authority to provincial legislation. The Inuit of Nunavik Statement of 
Claim to the Offshore (1991) was the first Indigenous claim of its kind including overlapping 
areas of use in the offshore with the Inuit areas.259
The Government of Québec made agreements with the Cree and Innu First Nations on 
remedial measures to compensate hydroelectric projects in the area, including compensation 
of hunting, fishing and trapping activities and support to social, cultural and economic 
development.260 In northern Ontario, the government has set out a joint planning process 
with the First Nations, which is consistent with and recognises the existing Aboriginal and 
treaty rights. It aims for sustainable economic development, which benefit the First Nations. 
The First Nations advise the respective minister on questions related to development, 
implementation and co-ordination of land use planning. The government and First Nations 
will prepare jointly a land use plan where the First Nations may attribute their traditional 
252 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 3.19-20; British Columbia Indian Reserves Mineral Resources Act, 
1943, s. 2; Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007, s. 4.1; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agree-
ment Act, 2007 (British Columbia), ss. 4.22, 4.40, 4.96.  
253 Crown Minerals Act, 1984 (Saskatchewan), s. 3.
254 Nuclear Energy Act, 1985, s. 10(4). 
255 Water Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 44.01; Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 4; Maanulth First Na-
tions Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 8; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act, 
2007 (British Columbia), s. 4; Morse (1985), pp. 547-548; 
256 Water Protection Act, 2012 (Manitoba), s. 17(1).
257 Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, 2005 (Saskatchewan), ss. 6, 42.
258 Dobrib Final Agreement (2003), s. 21.
259 Indigenous Legal Traditions (2007), p. 86. 
260 Décret concernant la publication de l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du 
Québec et les Cris du Québec, 2007 (Québec), ss. 2, 7.
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knowledge and perspectives to protection and conservation.261 Manitoba has made a large 
planning initiative for the east side of Lake Winnipeg to enable the First Nations and other 
indigenous communities to engage in land use and resource management planning in 
designated areas of Crown land by giving special protection against adverse development. 
A planning council may develop a plan for the use of land, management and resources in 
the planning area. In planning it may apply traditional knowledge. The First Nations must 
be consulted of all water power projects in the province.262 In Saskatchewan, the cooperative 
planning  with the First Nations and Métis aims at maximal use of human and material 
resources in land use planning and development processes.263 
Although the Supreme Court ruled in Haida Nation that the resource developers do 
not owe an independent duty to consult with the First Nations – which is the duty of the 
Crown – some companies have independently used an impact and benefit agreement (IBA) 
mechanism which are confidential. The IBAs are often negotiated between resource-sector 
corporations and indigenous communities, sometimes also with governments, to alleviate 
adverse socio-economic and environmental impacts that can arise from resource development. 
IBAs operate on a project basis and include provisions covering financial compensation, 
ownership, preferential hiring, preferential procurement of goods and services, education 
and training programmes, environmental protection, mitigation measures and monitoring, 
working conditions, social and cultural support, consent, participation in environmental 
assessment processes, monitoring and implementation and dispute resolution. IBAs may 
supplement official regulation with additional measures to accommodate the concerns of 
affected local communities. The Impacts and Benefits Agreements (IBA) mechanisms for 
building respectful relationships between Indigenous communities and natural resources 
companies are legally required in most modern treaties.264
In 1975 the Métis settlements of Alberta made a joint legal action against the provincial 
government for an estimated $ 100 million in oil and gas revenues from settlement lands. 
In the Metis Settlements Land Protection Act, 1990, the mines and minerals, water, fixtures 
and improvements placed by the Crown prior to the grant are excluded from fee simple 
title. The provincial Crown has right of diversion, use of water, work mines and minerals, 
manage highways and road constructed prior to the grant and access to Crown fixtures and 
improvements. Since 1992 there has been a Surface Rights Board, which is constructed by 
panels of the Appeal Tribunal. The Métis have obtained greater control over subsurface access 
and the Métis may enter into agreements on entry. Even without an agreement a right of entry 
order may be granted by a panel of the Appeal Tribunal. The Co-Management Agreement 
(1990) enables the General Council to negotiate overriding royalties and participation 
options in mineral development agreements. The existing mineral leaseholder must obtain 
the consent of the occupants of the surface or a right of entry order from the Appeal Tribunal’s 
panel. A grant can only be made if it belongs to a class permitted by settlement bylaw and 
261 Far North Act, 2010 (Ontario), ss. 1, 5-7.
262 East Side Traditional Lands Planning and Special Protection Areas Act, 2009 (Manitoba), ss. 3, 10; Climate 
Change and Emission Reduction Act, 2008 (Manitoba), s. 17(2).
263 Statements of Province Interest Regulations, 2007 (Saskatchewan), ss. 3, 6.
264 SCC, Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)(2004), s. 56; Duffy (1988), p. 61; Olthuis & 
Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 379, 386-392; Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), p. 368. 
6. Land and Environment
325
a Settlement Council approves it. In cases of disagreement the existing mineral leaseholder 
may apply to the panel, and further to the Alberta Court of Appeal. The Minister of Energy 
must send a mineral posting request to the Metis Settlements Access Committees under the 
Co-Management Agreement when recommended by the Crown Mineral Disposition Review 
Committee. In some cases the committee may also ask the minister to prepare a Notice of 
Public Offering, which is submitted for  its approval. Its issues may include environmental, 
sociocultural and land use impacts, and employment and business opportunities. An approved 
notice is included in the next scheduled public offering of mineral rights.265
In JBNQA, Québec reserved for itself the mineral and subsurface resources on category 
I lands, but the right to mine is contingent on community consent. The affected indigenous 
persons are entitled to compensation. The indigenous peoples retain the right to use gravel 
and other material for personal and community use after receiving a permit from the 
responsible Québec ministry. In categories II-III the mineral exploitation can take place 
without compensation. The energy companies have specific rights to develop resources there. 
However, there should be avoided unreasonable conflict with harvesting activities and the 
governments have a joint obligation to correct the displacement of population by providing 
programmes and services that will contribute to economic and social development of both 
Native groups.266 
In the Cree-Quebec Final Agreement (2002), the provincial government has set up a Mineral 
Exploration Board to assist the participation of Crees in mineral exploration, development of 
their industries, facilitate and encourage their access to regular Québec programme funding 
and to act as an entry mechanism for offers of service by Crees. There has been also negotiated 
a Mercury Agreement. All mining projects must take into consideration the environmental 
and social protection statutes. The provincial government has offered funding for 50 years 
totalling $ 3.4 billion for community development, environmental administration, trapping, 
outfitting and craft associations.267   
There have been discussions of royalty-sharing arrangements and other benefits. The 
construction projects related to oil and gas production must offer the indigenous peoples 
access to training and employment and have to take into account hunting, trapping, fishing 
and Indigenous culture in the vicinity of areas. The Métis settlements in Alberta have 
negotiated on royalties from mineral rights on the settlements. 268  In British Columbia, the 
Oil and Gas Commission’s duty is to encourage the indigenous peoples to participate in oil 
and gas production processes by agreements. The province has also the Gas Utility Authority, 
which maintains the gas production system and can make agreements with the First Nations 
on gas utilisation.269 In theYukon the control and administration of the onshore oil and 
gas resources was transferred to the territorial government in 1998. To the First Nations is 
265 Metis Settlements Act, 1990 (Alberta), Schedule 3; Metis Settlements Land Protection Act, 2000 (Alberta), 
ss. 4-6; Purich (1968), pp. 148-149; Bell (1994), pp. 35, 66-68. 
266 JBNQA (1975), ss. 5, 28-29.
267 Cree-Québec Final Agreement (2002), s. 5; Décret concernant la publication de l’entente concernant une 
nouvelle relation entre le gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, 2007 (Québec), ss. 2, 4-5. 
268 Dickason (1994), p. 365; Hamilton (1994), p. 23; White & Maxim & Spence (2004), p. 154. See also: North 
Pipeline Socio-Economic and Environmental Terms and Conditions to the Province of Saskatchewan, 
1981, ss. 29, 49, 51.
269 Gas Utility Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 2(3); Oil and Gas Acts Act, 2008 (British Columbia), ss. 4, 6.
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offered the opportunity to obtain shares of oil and gas profits. The individual First Nations 
and territory have signed benefits agreements where the First Nations can determine the 
contents of benefits on category A lands and consider the license applications. They have also 
agreed on co-management of resources and recovery and royalties. The territory has also 
a Subsurface Rights Board with supervisory role.270 The NWT agreements include general 
mining and mineral rights. The Gwich’in Agreement gives various mining and mineral 
rights to 6,000 sq km, divided into existing rights, rights without limitation and so-called 
Aklavik-lands with only subsurface rights.271 In the Sahtu Dene Agreement the government 
has only an obligation to notify on subsurface resource exploration, but a consultation is 
needed on environmental, wildlife and land effects.272 The Dogrib lands include mine and 
mineral rights, which the local government may grant to remove natural resources. The 
government’s right to regulate and manage mining and minerals is restricted to only input as 
a consultant. The federal government retains a right of access to lands and waters and to use 
natural resources when incidental to delivering and managing government programmes and 
services or carrying out inspections authorised by legislation and in emergency situations. 
The Dogrib must also permit access to materials which are used for construction.273 The 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement includes in a smaller area all mineral rights, and in a larger area, 
but no rights to oil, gas, hydrocarbons, coal and sulphur. There is a management structure for 
natural resources.274   
In Delgamuukw, Lamer CJ ruled that the the following are objectives that can justify the 
infringement of Aboriginal title: development of agriculture; forestry; mining; hydroelectric 
power; general economic development; protection of the environment or endangered species; 
building of infrastructure; and the settlement of foreign populations. On the other hand, 
he placed an inherent limit on the uses Indigenous titleholders can perform of their lands 
that was intended to preserve the land for future generations. Lands subject to aboriginal 
title cannot be put to uses that may be irreconciliable with the nature of the occupation of 
land and the relationship that the particular group has had with the land which together 
have given rise to aboriginal title in the first place.275 Also BCCA has developed a test for 
justification of the infringement of aboriginal rights. The court held that the province had 
failed in its obligations to consult and therefore the actions were unjustified infringements of 
the tribe’s aboriginal rights. The environmental degradation posed by a government-licensed 
marina would impermissibly infringe a treaty right to fish.276
In Lubicon Lake, UNHCR ruled against Canada in dispute over natural resource 
development on the ancestral lands of Cree Indians in Alberta. Chief Ominayak alleged 
that Canada violated the right of self-determination by allowing the provincial government 
of Alberta to expropriate band lands for the benefit of private corporate interests. Canada 
270 Yukon Surface Rights Board Act, 1994, ss. 8-10; Oil and Gas Act, 2002 (Yukon), Preamble, ss. 11-12, 68; Oil 
and Gas Licence Administration Regulations, 2004 (Yukon), s. 27(1).
271 Gwitch’in Comprehensive Land Claims Agreement (1991), ss. 18.1-18.2.
272 Sahtu Dene Agreement, s. 22.
273 Dogrib Final Agreement (2003), ss. 18-19, 23.
274 IFA (1984), s. 7(1); 
275 SCC, Delgamuukw (1997), s. 165.
276 BCCA, Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Claxton (1989), ss. 38-40; Tsilhqot’in Nation (2006), part 20.
6. Land and Environment
327
claimed that the continued resource development would not cause irreparable injury to the 
traditional way of life of the band. The Committee avoided the question raised by Canada, but 
held that historical inequities and some more recent  developments threaten the way of life 
and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band, and constitute a violation of article 27. The Committee, 
however, held that an offer of the Canadian government to set aside 95 square miles of land for 
a reserve for the band and a sum of $ 45 million as compensation for the historical inequities 
was an appropriate remedy within the meaning of article 2  of ICCPR.277
The Iroquois have a seven generations’ principle, which requires that one considers the 
effects of decisions on the seventh generation yet to be born. Traditional environmental 
knowledge (TEK) is used generally among the indigenous peoples. In 1994 the Canadian 
Biodiversity Strategy was published, which includes within traditional knowledge the 
harvesting resources, medicinal plants, cultigens and the identification of local biological 
features and their history. Since 2003 the band councils have to ensure that an environment 
assessment of a project is conducted in accordance with the legislation. The Governor in 
Council may make regulations for the destruction of noxious weeds and the prevention of 
the spreading or prevalence of insects, pests or deseases, control and destruction of dogs and 
protection of sheep on reserves. The federal environmental protection legislation takes into 
account the special needs of Inuit welfare, lands, waters and culture. The responsible minister 
may establish advisory committees when needed. 278  In British Columbia the minister may 
enter into agreement with the First Nations on Environmental Assessment. The province has 
also implemented local management plans and fosters the use and development of clean and 
renewable resources in First Nations’ communities.279  
There has been several cases where the federal and provincial conservation legislation 
has contravened with the indigenous hunting, fishing and trapping rights. Generally the last-
mentioned’s rights are confirmed to have priority. Since JBNQA the indigenous peoples have an 
important role in the process of environmental evaluation of development projects. The most 
central environmental bodies are the James Bay Advisory Committee on the Environment 
and the Kativik Environmental Advisory Committee. In the James Bay agreement area the 
indigenous peoples have an exclusive right to harvest all but protected species of wild fauna. 
They have also representation in three environmental bodies: the Environmental Expert 
Committee of La Societé d’énergie de la Baie James; the Environmental Quality Commission, 
responsible for the administration and supervision of the environmental and social impact 
assessment process in matters within provincial jurisdiction; and the Federal Environmental 
and Social Impact Assessment and Review Screening Committee, which monitors all 
development projects or development in the region. The JBNQA’s protection regimes are 
also included to the Cree-Québec Final Agreement. The province has established joined 
277 UNHRC, Bernand Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990), s. 32.
278 Richardson & Imai & McNeil (2009), pp. 341-342. Canadian Biodiversity Strategy (1994). Cf. Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act, 1985, 3; Indian Act, 1985, s. 73(b)-(c); NWT Waters Act, 1992, ss. 15.1, 15.3; Ca-
nadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, s. 6(1); Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, s. 10. 
279 Environmental Assessment Act, 2002 (British Columbia), s. 29; Clean Energy Act, 2010 (British Colum-
bia), ss. 2, 20; Muskwan Kechika Management Plan Regulation (British Columbia). One example of clean 
and renewable resource use is the First Nations Clean Energy Business Fund which shares revenues with 
the communities.
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commissions of environmental evaluation to study the projects’ repercussions and to render 
recommendations for the ministers. Secondly, the agreements have foreseen mechanisms 
for co-management of some resources beyond the development projects’ environmental 
evaluation process.280
Natural resources on First Nations land may be harmed by third-party pollution, emanating 
from places beyond indigenous control. The environmental effects of uncontrolled industrial 
activity came to public notice in the 1950s when it became evident that the Ojibwa Indians in 
Treaty 9 area suffered from mercury pollution. The treaty itself offered little help in resolving 
the damage caused to the environment. In 1986 the Grassy Narrows and Islington Indian 
Bands reached a Mercury Pollution Claims Settlement.281 In 2008 an Ontario Superior Court 
found that Platinex Inc. had caused irreparable harm to the Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug 
First Nation due to loss of land, cultural and spiritual values. The government of Ontario 
paid to Platinex Inc. $5 million and a counterlawsuit was dropped in 2009. The company 
surrendered all its mining claims in the area.282 Similarly, The Labrador Métis Nation won its 
litigation process againt the province in 2007 in a case, where a highway was constructed over 
important wetland and watercourse crossings. The Court of Appeal held that the province has 
a duty to consult the respondents in respect of their asserted Aboriginal rights, based on s. 35. 
Disposal and storage of waste is regulated. The permit must be obtained from the Minister 
and the burning of waste is prohibited. Modern agreements also include penalties against the 
pollution and for the protection of environment.283
The agreements with the self-governing First Nations of British Columbia play a primary 
role in the environmental assessment and protection of project proposals. The environmental 
standards must meet or exceed federal and provincial standards. The agreement protects 
the area against an uncontrolled investment from outside. The other comprehensive land 
settlements have provided jointly controlled resource management institutions. These are 
cross-cultural institutions that allow a co-operation in managing wildlife, forests, water and 
other natural resources.284 In Ontario, the respective minister may enter into agreement with 
the First Nations or other Aboriginal groups on endangered species.285
The north has been especially profiled as the homeland of Indigenous people. The 
Mackenzie Valley Pipeline process was started with an inquiry between 1974-1977 chaired 
by Thomas Berger. Berger recommended putting on hold for ten years a pipeline to allow 
time for indigenous concerns.. Similar commissions were later established in the Yukon and 
Ontario. In Mackenzie Valley the following have been established: the Mackenzie Valley Land 
280 Loi sur la qualité de l’environnement, 2012 (Québec), s. 135; JBNQA (1975), s. 24; Cree-Québec Final 
Agreement (2002), s. 5; Jack et al. v. The Queen (1980); Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 78-79, 
141; Otis (2005), pp. 93-94. 
281 Grassy Narrows and Islington Indian Bands Mercury Pollution Claims Settlement Act, 1986, Preamble; 
Dickason (1994), p. 401; Isaac (2008), p. 62; IWGIA (2010), pp. 64-65. Cf. Indian Reserve Waste Disposal 
Regulations, ss. 3, 5, 10; Amendments of Self-Government Act, 2005 (Yukon), s. 13.6;  
282 OSJC, Platinex Inc. v. Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation (2006), ss. 82-101.
283 NfLCA, Labrador Métis Nation (2007), ss. 36-39, 110.
284 Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 22; Tsawassen First Nation Final 
Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 15.
285 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 10; Endangered Species Act, 2007 (Ontario), s. 19. 
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and Water Board, the Environmental Impact Review Board, and local Land Use Planning and 
Land and Water Boards with bylaw-making powers and with First Nations representation.286 
The Yukon has engaged itself in the goal of encouraging the First Nations’ sound economic 
development which combines modern values with the indigenous traditional economy and 
takes into account the potential cultural, spiritual and traditional importance of their land 
and water resources. The Indigenous peoples’ special relationship with the environment is 
recognised and incorporated into First Nations’ traditional knowledge. The Crown has to 
respect the First Nations’ environmental rights as set out in UFA. The parties to the agreement 
cooperate in development on a geographical basis to meet the standards of environmental 
protection. The territory promotes through its Minerals Advisory Boards the First Nations’ 
exploration opportunities in mining and the benefits.287
Nunavut’s legislation upholds the Inuit traditional values in the management of wildlife. 
The Inuit harvesting rights are governed and subject to conservation principle. The guiding 
principle is inuit qaujimajatuqangit. A designated Inuit organisation has the right of first 
refusal unless the minister declares that the right has lapsed. The legislation protects critical 
habitat and wildlife sanctuaries. The Inuit organisations may participate to joint planning and 
management. The Nunavut Species and Risk Commission must include experts (qaugiminilik 
/ ihumatuyuk) who have appropriate knowledge on the subject. The law created also an 
Elders Advisory Committee (Inutuqait Miamiksijiit Angngutiksanik), which supports the 
use of traditional knowledge in support of environmental decision-making. The territory 
has several bodies for resource and environmental questions. The Surface Rights Tribunal 
has been established to resolve disputes between the Inuit landowners who occupy Crown 
lands and persons holding subsurface rights who wish to access those lands. The tribunal also 
addresses disputes concering the damage to wildlife by development. If there is no agreement, 
the tribunal establishes the terms and conditions of right of access to Inuit- owned lands and 
determines liability and the amount of compensation to Inuit harvesters. The Impact Review 
Board is an environmental assessment agency for the settlement area. It examines the impact 
of project proposals on the land, air and water, and on the people of the settlement area. It 
relies on traditional Inuit knowledge and recognised scientific methods to assess and monitor 
the environmental, cultural and socio-economic impacts of proposals and determines 
whether project proposals should proceed to develop and under what conditions. The Water 
Board is responsible for the use and management of water in the settlement area. The board 
determines whether water applications should proceed to development and under what 
conditions. The Planning Commission gives the Inuit control over all activities on settlement 
286 Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act, 1998, ss. 9-10, 12, 29, 35-36, 38, 54, 56-57, 101, 132; Dickason 
(1994), p. 405-406; White & Maxim & Spence (2003), p. 178. Among the tasks of the boards are land use 
planning, protection and promotion of First Nations’ rights; social, cultural and economic wellbeing; con-
servation, development, utilisation of land and water resources for the benefit of all Canadians; and making 
of environmental impact reviews.  
287 Economic Development Act, 2002 (Yukon), Preamble, s. 10(1);  Environmental Act, 2002 (Yukon), ss. 53, 
70; Yukon Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Act, 2003, s. 5; Forest Management Act, 2008, 
(Yukon), Preamble; Contaminated Sites Regulation, 2002 (Yukon); Yukon Minerals Advisory Board Order, 
1999 (Yukon), s. 2(1); Agreement (Canada-Yukon Environmental Protection), 1995 (Yukon), Preamble, s. 4.
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lands and a say in Crown lands. The commission co-operates with the territorial government 
to establish broad planning policies, objectives and goals for the settlement area.288 
Conclusions6.4. 
Land is the most important single element related to their Indigenous identity. It links them 
to ancestors traditional areas, hunting and fishing and more recently, to resources. In all three 
countries the settler society saw the indigenous relation to land as usufructuary, while the 
first peoples saw the ownership in much broader terms. Also the Lockean idea of profitable 
use of land and confiscation of wastelands was common. 
In the Pacific territories the customary land was first recognised by the French governors/
state’s representatives as the de facto situation but in New Caledonia and French Guyana 
it was soon treated as terra nullius, where the governors were able to confiscate lands with 
regulations. There was no one standard treatment of land questions: spécialité legislative 
guaranteed the autonomy of local decision-making. In New Caledonia the Melanesian 
population was reclassified and pushed to reserves with less arable land. The rich mineral base 
accelerated national active immigration policy. In French Guyana the Indians did not exist 
in law: there was no indigenous land question. Tahiti followed a completely different model: 
the royal house sought actively to westernise the system and had started the individualisation 
of land owning, when the French law gained there ground. Gradually all land owning was 
individualised, but it broke the traditional form of land use and has caused continued 
litigation. Only in Wallis and Futuna was the customary society isolated and strong enough 
to resist the legal change of ownership and and the land policy is still based on customary, 
family-based ownership.
In the two other countries the policy has been at least in theory more unified. Despite 
this, the land legislation in New Zealand has showed great discontinuity. Common law 
recognised the continuity of pre-existent ownership, which was ceded to the Crown with 
land purchase. The legislation was inclined to political changes and the Crown’s and private 
persons’ relationship in land purchase changed several times. The Māori wars in the 1860s led 
to large confiscations of land and Prendergast CJ’s Wi Parata - doctrine rejected the existence 
of Native title. The last-mentioned,   outdated expression of British colonialism prevailed until 
1985. The legislation divided the land to customary land, which has been almost completely 
extinguished, to Māori fee simple land and general land. The collective Māori fee simple 
lands were registered by the Native Land Court as reserves, and from the 1920s the first trust 
boards were established to manage the land space.
In Canada the Indigenous land was in large areas (exluding British Columbia, old French 
possessions and the Arctic) purchased and extinguished by the treaties. The reserve land was 
in the bands’ collective ownership, but the legislation was several times modified to make it 
288 Wildlife Act, 2003 (Nunavut), ss. 1, 8, 10, 104-105; Wildlife Act ,1988 (NWT), ss. 143, 159-160; Olthuis & 
Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 135-136. The Wildlife Act lists 24 customary Inuit principles, which deal 
with respect; guardianship / stewardship on property and environment; practiced skills; working together 
for common purpose; holistic treatment of nature; flexibility; knowledge; hunting only for need; prohibiti-
ons; avoidance of unnecessary sufferance for animals; and avoidance of disputes. 
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easier to purchase or confiscate the remaining reserve land. Like Wi Parata in New Zealand, 
St Catherine’s Milling denied for almost 100 years the existence of Aboriginal title to land. 
Only the Calder case in 1973 opened the way to new policy. 
In New Caledonia the state began to remedy the injustices in the 1930s by buying lands 
back for the Kanak, and in the 1970s the clan-based ownership of land was again recognised. 
With the Nouméa-process France today recognises reserve land, customary common land and 
individual Kanak lands and the state has actively bought lands back into Kanak ownership. 
The situation is very different in French Guyana, which is an integral part of France. The 
Indian peoples’ customary land ownership has not been recognised, but they have been 
offered zones since the 1980s, where they can collectively obtain land for communities’ use.   
New Zealand’s treaty settlements have recognised the injustice of land policy and the 
Crown has returned some confiscated areas to iwi ownership. Still there has been a long 
struggle on rivers, seabed and foreshores.The common ownership of lands is protected by 
the legislation and defined in traditional Māori terms. In associated states and territories the 
legislation has recognised the customary, family-based land ownership. In Canada in 1951 
the reform of Indian legislation gave more say to Indian bands in land questions. The first 
modern agreements still extinguished the First Nations’ and Inuit’s land rights, but Nisga’a 
Agreement (1999) was the first to preserve the indigenous land rights, based on Delgamuukw 
doctrine. The modern settlements have granted to indigenous peoples extensive land rights 
divided into different categories. The case law has strongly stressed the Crown’s fiduciary duty 
to protect the indigenous land rights. New Zealand’s courts have not accepted the doctrine 
as clearly as in Canada. The Métis land rights are still guaranteed only in the settlements of 
Alberta: there is no clear nationwide constitutional or case law-based protection. 
The traditional harvesting rights and forestry have been essential questions in New 
Zealand and Canada. France has also protected the fishing territories, but its legislation has 
no specific reference to indigenous rights. In New Zealand, devolution policy and extensive 
litigation have led to Ngāi Tahu settlement and the national fishing quota system, which 
guarantee to theMāori extensive customary and commercial fishing rights. Similarly, the 
Māori were active during the privatisation policy to preserve their rights to forest as taonga. 
The indigenous rights to Crown forest lands, especially in Central North Island, have been 
protected by legislation. Canada has extensive case law and treaty guarantee on traditional 
harvesting rights, recognising the right in unoccupied areas. More controversial has been 
the commercial fishing rights, where courts have demanded proof of pre-colonial harvest 
practices. Similar doctrine has been developed by the Supreme Court in Powley for the Métis. 
The forest rights are included to several modern settlements.
Resource management and conservation is essential to indigenous peoples due to 
historical and natural values, and profit share. In New Caledonia the post-Nouméa situation 
has opened up to the Kanak an opportunity to participate in the administration of mines. 
France has also extended its conservation policy to indigenous territories. In New Zealand 
Māori participation in resource management is defined in the Resource Management 
Act and other central legislation. The Māori have participated actively in environmental 
questions. Many historical places, like mountains and rivers are for them wāhi tapu and 
are protected by legislation and settlements. In Canada the resource management is still a 
major challenge. The individual settlements have guaranteed locally the Indigenous peoples’ 
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share to profits and management of the mining, oil and gas industry and water use. Central 
questions in conservation have been the prevention of pollution and environmental damage. 
The agreement with the Haida Nation has been a precedent in conservation through national 
parks and nature reserves.
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France7.1. 
7.1.1. Caledonian Identity
The Melanesian cultural awakening started after World War II as a reaction to the French 
policy of integration. The changes were, however, slow. In 1980 the French government 
established the Administrative Office for Melanesian Culture. One of the major principles 
in the Accord of Nouméa is the recognition of past grievances and sufferings: colonisation 
deprived the Kanak of their identity. The political and social organisation of New Caledonia 
has to take into account the Kanak identity. It means in society both geographic and ethnic 
rebalancing - reconstructing of society. The Kanak identity is defined predominantly in 
reference to land. Based on the agreement there has been established the Cultural Centre 
Jean-Marie Tjibaou (1998), which works “as the Kanak culture’s pole of radiation” to promote 
its rehabilitation. The Kanak culture is developed through artistic formation and media. The 
National Film Centre supports these projects. The Kanak Culture’s Development Agency has 
been transferred to territorial responsibility.1
The culture is defined in New Caledonia as a constitutive element of individual identity, 
which creates social bond of conscience about belonging to the community of destiny. It 
demands mutual recognition of cultural diversity. The full recognition of Kanak identity is a 
precondition to the refoundation of social contract. The Customary Senate has responsibility 
for a number of cultural affairs: listing and re-establishing of Kanak place names; identification 
and legal protection of the Kanak’s sacred sites; return of the Kanak’s cultural objects to New 
Caledonia; establishing of the Academy of Kanak Languages; effective protection of writers 
on Kanak culture; and conclusion of a particular agreement on the questions of cultural 
heritage between the state and New Caledonia. The cultural identitity of French Polynesia is 
essentially connected to the language, and was for the first time recognised in the law of 1984 
and repeated in later legislation.2
1   Loi organique no. 99-209 du 13 mars 1999, art. 23; Accords de Nouméa (1998), Préambule, art. 1, 3.4.-1.4.; 
Décret no. 2011-1588 du 17 novembre 2011, art. 3; Ntumy (1993), p. 598; Bechtel (2002), p. 47; Accord 
particulier entre l’Etat et la Nouvelle-Calédonie sur le développement culturel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 
(2002), ss. 6, 8. Cf. the definition of culture in section 1.2.4.
2   Loi no. 84-820 du 6 septembre 1984, art. 1, 90; Loi organique no. 96-312 du 12 avril 1996, art. 1; Accord de 
Nouméa (1998), art. 1.2., 2.1.4; Accord particulier entre l’Etat et la Nouvelle-Calédonie sur le développe-
ment culturel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (2002), s. 1.
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7.1.2. Names and Symbols
The law of 1988 did not recognise the indigenous symbols of New Caledonia although they 
were already widely used. The situation, however, changed with the Accord of Nouméa: the 
indigenous names are listed and returned. The sacred Kanak sites are identified and protected. 
The Kanak names are respected and their cultural development supported in arts and media. 
The name of the territory is also possible to change with loi du pays. The Kanak symbols are 
recognised. The Customary Senate participates in the research of symbols for the territory. 
This took place in October 2010, when the Congress adopted by loi du pays a Kanak symbol, 
flag, motto, parallel anthem and new banknotes to official use.3  
The Polynesian flag was banned after annexation to France in 1880. In 1943 Princess 
Teri’i Nui gave to Tahitian troops in the French army a modified Tahitian Flag. It took, 
however, more than 30 years before the flag was officially recognised. In 1977 the circular of 
the High Commissar allowed the use of the Polynesian flag besides the national flag on public 
buildings. Since 1984 French Polynesia has had a right to freely determine and use distinct 
signs besides the symbols of the republic. This includes the use of the Polynesian flag besides 
the French flag and territorial anthem. The law of 1996 further created territorial order and 
decorations.4 
7.1.3.  Language: Expression of Unity and Pluralism 
All regional languages have been since 2008 included into the Constitution as belonging to 
the heritage of France. Despite this symbolic gesture French is the language of public life in 
all overseas areas. 5 The advance of the French language has influenced also the Indigenous 
languages. In New Caledonia and French Guiana, French is today the dominant language. In 
French Polynesia, French is also dominant, but the position of the Tahitian language is strong, 
and shows signs of strengthening. Only in Wallis and Futuna are the Indigenous languages 
still dominant in everyday life.
Although New Caledonia has a pidgin called Bichlamar, French has gained more central 
role as lingua franca than in other territories. The language of Kanak communication is today 
French. The Roman Catholic missions in New Caledonia used since the beginning French 
as the language of instruction. Large-scale immigration guaranteed its dominance in public 
3   Accords de Nouméa (1998), art. 1.3, 1.5; Loi organique no. 99-209 du 19 mars 1999, art. 5; Loi du pays du 
9 septembre 2010 (New Caledonia); Payé (1993), pp. 271-272; Machellen (2010), p. 16. The Caledonian 
anthem is Soyons unis, devenons frères, and the motto Terre de parole, terre de partage.
4   Loi organique no. 96-312 du 12 avril 1996, art. 3 al. 3; Loi no. 84-820 du 6 septembre 1984, art. 1 al. 5; 
Délibération no. 93-60 AT du 10 juin 1993 (French Polynesia), art. 1; Circulaire no. 67 du 27 septembre 
1977 (French Polynesia); Marrani (2013), pp. 124- 127. The territorial anthem is Ia Ora o Tahiti Nui.Also 
Wallis and Futuna has adopted a flag, which is a version of the French tricolore; Jacques Derrida has de-
fined two violent moments of French language policy: the replacement of Latin in order to consolidate the 
monarchic state and the Revolution, when linguistic unification became authoritarian and repressive. Cf. 
Derrida (1994), p. 47. 
5   Constitution (1958), art. 75-1. 
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life. Because the Indigenous languages are small and scattered, French is today the dominant 
language in the main island.6 
The use of Kanak languages was prohibited at school in 1863. In 1921 also all publications 
were prohibited in Indigenous languages. These sanctions were in force until 1984 when the 
process to find a way out from the blind alley led to concessions to the Melanesians. The 
organic law of 1992 recognised the four largest Melanesian languages - ahië, drehu, mengone 
and paicî - as regional languages. The Accord of Nouméa opened the way again to use the 
Kanak languages as a means of instruction. Their use should be promoted and respected, 
and their cultural development supported in instruction, arts and media. The Academy 
of Kanak Languages is in charge of determining the rules of their use and evolution. The 
Kanak languages were until 2008 the only regional languages with constitutional recognition. 
According to the Accord of Nouméa the Kanak languages are with the French languages of 
instruction and culture. Their place in instruction and media should be promoted. Their 
scientific research and instruction at the university level should be organised to support their 
use in primary and secondary instruction. The Academy of Kanak Languages sets up rules 
on their use and evolution. The organic law of 1999 mentions the languages in relation to 
instruction and culture, but does not specify their status. Based on the Loi Deixonne the 
four major Kanak languages became in 2000 voluntary subjects in kindergartens and public 
schools. This was related to the learning of local cultures. For the lycées and colleges an 
opportunity was given for the voluntary learning of local languages. In 2004, the languages 
became also subjects in the baccalauréat.7 
Although the Kanak languages only limited public status, they may be used in some 
public occasions. The municipal councils in New Caledonia can choose in the strongly 
Melanesian communities to use a Kanak language instead of French in their meetings. Some 
administrative documents have been translated into Kanak languages. The difficulty is that 
there are a large number of languages, but a lack of Indigenous officials.8 
The strong presence of Protestant missionaries and their educational work, started before 
the French arrival, was significant to the survival of the language in French Polynesia. The 
Tahitian book language was created by them in the early nineteenth century. The annexation 
of the islands to France ended the public education in indigenous languages and French 
became the only official language in 1880. The use of language continued in the Protestant 
Church and their Sunday schools. Also the Catholic Church followed the example, unlike in 
New Caledonia, where only French was used.  The French authorities had also doubts on the 
utility of French as a language of instruction in the countryside during the interwar years. 
The promotion of Tahitian (reo ma’ohi) began only in the early 1970s, when also the Tahitian 
6 Cerquigline (2003), pp. 347-348; Nouvelle-Calédonie; In all, 36% (89,000) of New Caledonians speak the 
27 Melanesian languages, while 97% speak French. The largest indigenous language is Drehu (11,000 spea-
kers), spoken on the Loyalty Islands where there is the most vital language community, but 20 languages 
have less than 2,500 speakers. Cf. ISEE.
7   Constitution (1958), art. 75-1; Accord de Nouméa, art. 1.1, 1.3; Loi no. 51-46 du 11 janvier 1951, art. 4, 6, 
9; Décret no. 92-1162 du 20 octobre 1992, art. 1; Arrêté du 13 janvier 2004, s. 1; Sibille (2000), p. 60.
8   Loi constitutionnelle no. 92-554 du 25 juin 1992; Nouvelle-Calédonie.
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Academy was established.9 The Territorial Assembly made in 1980 a decision, according to 
which Tahitian was proclaimed as an equal official language with French but the language 
of courts would remain French. Conseil d’Etat quashed the decision.10 In the legislation the 
indigenous languages were mentioned for the first time in in the organic law of 1984, which 
was renewed by the organic law of 1996, according to which the Tahitian language and other 
Polynesian languages “may be used”.11 
At the educational level, many children had become semilingual both in Tahitian 
and French. Loi Deixonne was extended in 1981 to include the Tahitian language, which 
became optional in kindergartens and public schools. The instruction was extended to the 
baccalauréat in 1985 and to higher education in 1990.  The organic laws of 1984 and 1996 
integrated the instruction of Tahitian and other regional languages and the pedagogical study 
of local language and culture to the school curriculum. This was supported by the creation of 
the French University of Pacific in 1987. The studying and pedagogy of the Tahitian language 
and culture take place in the pedagogical establishments. The national legislator was ready 
to allow in 1996 an obligatory instruction of Tahitian in kindergartens and elementary and 
secondary schools. The countereffect soon came. The Constitutional Council held that the 
instruction may be arranged during the regular school hours but only optionally. Today the 
Tahitian is a subject instructed during the school hours at all levels,12 - a change based on 
gradual change in general French atmosphere towards the regional languages.
 The present status of languages is based on the organic law of 2004.  French is the official 
language of French Polynesia. Tahitian is a fundamental element of cultural identity as cement 
of social cohesion and as means of daily communication. The Polynesian languages are 
recognised and should be preserved “in order to guarantee the cultural diversity, which makes 
the richness of French Polynesia”. French, Tahitian, Marquisian, Paumotu and Mangarevian 
are the languages of French Polynesia (but forgetting the languages spoken on Austral 
Islands). The private physical and legal persons may use them freely in their proceedings and 
conventions; they do not incur any nullity on the grounds of not been drawn up in the official 
language. The Tahitian language is a subject instructed in the frame of a normal schedule in 
kindergardens, primary and secondary schools and higher establishments of instruction. By 
the decision of the Assembly of French Polynesia, the Tahitian language can be replaced in 
some schools or establishments by one of the other Polynesian languages. The legislation does 
not prevent the use of Tahitian as the language of work. In courts interpreters may be used. 
9    Turcotte (1982), p. 10; Aldrich (1993), pp. 140-141; Cerquigline (2003), pp. 317- 324; Debène (2011), pp. 
307-309; In French Polynesia almost all people are bilingual: 75% of the population can speak the Poly-
nesian languages (195,000), while 95% can speak French. Another questionnaire reveals, however, the su-
premacy of the French language: 69% speak French at home, while only 30% speak the Polynesian lan-
guages. Cf. Recensement 2007 (2008).
10  Décision No. 2036 VP du 28 novembre 1980 (Polynésie Française); Décision no. 21 SE du 20 octobre 1982 
(Polynésie Française).
11 Loi organique no. 84-820 du 6 septembre 1984, art. 90; Loi organique no. 96-312 du 1996, art. 115.
12   Loi no. 84-820 du 6 septembre 1984, art. 90; Loi organique no. 96-312 du 12 avril 1996; Loi no. 2000-1208 
du 13 décembre 2000; Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 57; Décret no. 81-553du 12 mai 
1981, art. 1; CC, Décision 96-373 DC de 9 avril 1996; Cerquigline (2003), pp. 325-326. 
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The Assembly of French Polynesia may locally replace the Tahitian by another Polynesian 
language.13 
On 29 March 2006 Conseil d’Etat gave its opinion concerning the standing orders of the 
Polynesian Assembly. The local regulation made it possible to use in plenary sessions Tahitian 
and other Polynesian languages besides French. Conseil d’Etat rejected the regulation as 
contradictory to article 57 of the organic law. At the same time Conseil stressed Tahitian as 
a fundamental element of the cultural identity, social cohesion and daily communication. 
The opinion stressed the strict separation of public and private uses of language. French is 
obligatory in the operation of governmental institutions and the use of another language 
than French by an elected representative is therefore prohibited in public connection, but the 
Polynesian languages are important to guarantee cultural diversity.14 In 2006 the members of 
the Academy of Tahiti sent to the French government an open letter, where they demanded 
official status for the Tahitian language and the modification of article 2 of the Constitution. 
They referred to Wallis and Futuna, where the public use of regional languages is more flexible. 
In French Polynesia, French would be seen even more than before as a “forced language” 
and an expression of colonial irritation.15 The decision of Conseil d’Etat was litigated to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which unanimously rejected the petition in 
2010. It held that a matter dictated by historical or political considerations in a part of a state 
belongs to the exclusive competence of the state.16
Despite the legislation and case law, the Polynesian languages are used in public life. The 
members of the Assembly use the Polynesian languages in speeches and public debates, and 
the high commissioner has silently accepted the practice. Some 48 municipal councils hold 
debates in three different Polynesian languages. Also Conseil d’Etat checked its standing in 
2007, when it allowed the casual use of the languages in public, including the Assembly. 
The standing orders must indicate that French is the official language. The civil servant may 
answer to a customer in another language than French if the customer uses first that language. 
In tests for Polynesian public service the Polynesian languages may be optionally used.17 The 
Administrative Tribunal of Papeete has ruled that the Polynesian languages may be used 
besides the French in civil law cases and the public use of Polynesian languages is in general 
possible. Polynesian expressions can also be used to indicate distinctions or administrational 
functions.18 The Cassation Court has further ruled that the petitions may be formulated in a 
Polynesian language in either written or spoken form. The use of interpreters in the courts 
has been allowed since 1986.19 
13   Loi organique no. 2004-192 du 27 février 2004, art. 57; Sibille (2000), pp. 63-64.
14   CE, Haut commissaire de la République c. F.B. et M. Edouard Fritch, 29 mars 2006.
15   Fakama ‘uliga o te ‘u ka fakapolinesia (2006). 
16   ECtHR, Birk-Levy v. France, 21 septembre 2010; According to ECtHR the European Human Rights’ Con-
vention does not guarantee language freedom or right of elected representatives to use language of choice. 
The application was therefore inadmissible ratione materiae.
17   CE, M. Edouard Fritch et al., 22 février 2007; Société Civil Immobilière Caroline; Code de procedure civil 
(2007), art. 6; Arrêté no. 1266 CM du 20 octobre 1986 (French Polynesia), s. 1; Debène (2011), p. 320.
18   Tribunal administrative de Papeete, 14 octobre 1999.
19   Cour de Cassation, arrêt du 22 juillet 1986; Haut commissaire de la République en Polynésie Française c. As-
semblée de la Polynésie Française, 29 avril 2003.
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In Wallis and Futuna the only legal guarantees of Indigenous languages are the 
Constitution’s regional language - clause and the law of 2 August 1984 - which allows the 
Regional Councils to determine on complementary programmes related to language and 
culture. Due to extensive emigration, the majority of native speakers live today in New 
Caledonia. The two Indigenous languages are de facto dominant in daily life although French 
is the official and public language and the clear majority are bilingual. The debates in the local 
assembly and its plenary session are generally conducted in Indigenous languages before 
conclusion and decisions, which are announced in French. The latest convention between 
the Ministry of National Education and the Catholic Mission includes a possibility to arrange 
limited instruction in indigenous languages during the school hours in kindergartens and 
elementary schools, while French remains the proper language of instruction.20 
According to the law of 13 December 2000, the regional languages in use in DOM 
make part of the nation’s linguistic heritage. The state and territorial collectivities should 
promote those languages and to make their use easier.21 In French Guiana are spoken six 
Indigenous languages. The state’s local Directory of Cultural Affairs takes specially regard 
to multilingualism and spoken culture. The Ministry of Culture has also set as a goal the 
development of knowledge on Indian languages, their codification and their use as pedagogical 
tools for instruction. Some modest steps have been taken based on general legislation to 
use the Indian languages in instruction. There are some bilingual Carib kindergartens and 
some teaching material has been published in four indigenous languages. In public life, the 
municipal council meetings need not necessarily be conducted in French because in certain 
municipalities in the Amazonian forests not everyone speaks French.22 
The use of regional languages in media was almost non-existent until the 1970s. The law 
of 1 August 2000 allows broadcasts in regional languages as “part of cultural and linguistic 
heritage of France in all its regional and local diversity”. Based on the law, television and radio 
programmes  are provided for most Indigenous languages. Also the largest Indian languages 
in French Guiana are served by some public radio programmes.23
20 Constitution (1958), art. 75-1; Code générale des collectivités territoriales (2007), art. L.4433-26; Conven-
tion portant concession de l’enseignement primaire à la Mission Catholique (2006); Marrani (2013), p. 124. 
In Wallis and Futuna, where the European population is small, Wallisian (Uvean) is spoken at home by 60% 
of population (9,000), Futunan by 29% (4,500) and French by 10%. Some 89% can speak an Indigenous 
language, 78% French.   
21   Loi no. 2000-1207 du 13 décembre 2000, art. 34.
22   Rouland (1998), p. 544; Sibille (2000), p. 58; Cerquigline (2003), pp. 276-292; The European Charter for 
Regional or Minority Languages and the French Dilemma (2002), p. 59; Plan d’action pluriannuel (2000); 
Préfecture de la Région Guyane; Guyane Française. According to one estimation (2005) the language with 
the largest number of Indigenous speakers is the Carib language (2,100), which is spoken also by Kalina’a. 
Altogether the number of different Indigenous speakers is shown to be as low as 3,900 (2.3% of total popu-
lation), but the number may be much higher. Most of the Guianese speak French Creole (63%) while only 
14% are estimated to speak proper French. 
23   Loi no. 2000-719 du 1er août 2000, art. 3; Cerquigline (2003), pp. 281, 287.
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7.1.4.  Cultural Objects
The state supported the return of the Kanak’s cultural objects from French and foreign 
museums to New Caledonia. The Kanak cultural objects are respected and their cultural 
development supported in the arts and media. The state supports special policy in protection, 
conservation and development historical, artistic, archaeologic and ethnologic heritage. The 
state supports a scientific and technical programme both at the territorial and provincial 
levels for the inventory and return of cultural objects and the promotion of co-operation 
between the cultural institutions. The archives are reconstructed according to the models of 
Metropolitan France. The instruction and practive of Kanak art and music is promoted and it 
should be also visible in the media. The state has established the Territorial Music School and 
the Art School of Nouméa for this purpose. French Polynesia funds artisans in traditional 
arts and crafts and audiovisual professions which take in consideration the richness of the 
Polynesian natural and cultural heritage. In Wallis and Futuna the state’s Service of Cultural 
Affairs is responsible for  the conservation of historical and cultural heritage, including 
the maintenance and management of archaeological sites. In French Guiana the state has 
programmes to preserve immaterial heritage and the region has an inventory service for 
cultural heritage. The region supports the Museum of Guianese Cultures, which collects, 
conserves and studies material testimony of cultures, ethnic groups and traditional societies 
of Guiane.24  
In Hopu and Bessert v. France, the UNHRC determined that France violated ICCPR by 
authorising the building of a hotel complex on the historical burial grounds of Indigenous 
Tahitians. The Committee held that the construction work did interfere with local people’s 
right to family and privacy according to article 17 of the ICCPR, which has to be interpreted 
broadly. Despite this,  the hotel complex was later built. 25 
7.1.5.  Religion Challenges the Secular State
The strong position of religion among the Indigenous peoples and the constitutional ideology 
of secularism in France seem quite contradictory. There are four major exceptions to the 
strict separation of religion and state in France: in Alsace-Moselle and French Guiana the 
Concordat of Napoléon I is still in force; in Maoytte the Islamic law partly coexists with 
the civil law; and in Wallis and Futuna the rights of the Catholic Church are guaranteed by 
law.26 
24   Délibération no. 2007-45 APF du 25 septembre 2007 (French Polynesia), art. 1; Délibération no. 2009-55 
APF du 11 aout 2009 (French Polynesia), art. 2; Accords de Nouméa (1998), art. 1.3.2. Accord particulier 
entre l’Etat et la Nouvelle-Calédonie sur le développement culturel de la Nouvelle-Calédonie (2002), ss. 1, 
4-5; Préfecture des Îles Wallis-et-Futuna; Préfecture de la Région Guyane; Région Guyane.
25   UNHRC, Hopu and Bessert v. France (1993), ss. 2, 2.2., 10.3.; Anaya (2004), p. 258. 
26 Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), pp. 335-326. In Wallis and Futuna the indigenous people are 
Catholic; in French Polynesia 55% are Protestant, 25% Catholic and 10% Mormons; in New Caledonia the 
Kanak are 50% Catholic and 50% Protestant; and the Indians of French Guiana are partly Catholic, partly 
adherents of traditional religions; Mayotte’s Islamic law is based on fourteenth century Syrian Chafaite di-
rection of Sunnism.
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The Protestant missionaries arrived in Tahiti in 1796 and in 1819 King Pomare II 
converted to Protestantism and the missionaries became politically influencial in the 
kingdom. The Pomare Code, created the same year, was also influenced by them. It included 
provisions prohibiliting polygamy, adultery, human sacrifice and infanticide. Tattoo, which 
had magic-religious significance as protection against evil forces and spirits and as a sign 
of initiation, was forbidden. The code compelled also observance of the Sabbath. Reverend 
Pritchard became the dominant force in local politics and succeeded in asking the king to 
expel the Catholic missionaries from the islands. Later the Catholic Church returned and the 
official France promoted it until the strengthening of the anticlerical elements in the national 
government. In the early twentiethcentury the religious communities’ status was for three 
decades unclear, but the decrees of 16 January and 16 December 1939 finally stabilised the 
situation by regulating the status of Catholic and Protestant missions in the Pacific Region. 
The selection of the missions’ Presidents and the members of their Administrative Councils 
must be submitted for the High Commissioners’ decision.27  
There have been, from time to time, controversies between the official policy and the 
strong influence of religion in Polynesian society. In 2003 the territorial authorities funded 
the reconstruction of an Evangelical Church rectory, which was damaged by a cyclone. The 
Appellate Administrative Court of Paris ruled that the territorial authorities had a right to 
make an exception to the strict policy of laïcité due to the special role of religious communities 
in the territory, the isolation of the population, lack of public services which the religious 
communities supplemented, and the use of the building for public purposes.28 Another 
exemple is from 2009, when the Assembly of French Polynesia decided to erect a large crucifix 
on the wall behind the speaker’s chair.29 religion plays a central role in Polynesian life and the 
principle of laicïté is interpreted rather flexibly, in case law’s limits.
Wallis and Futuna was for a long time a “Marist theocracy”. All Residents (representatives 
of France) were Catholic priests between 1886-1910. Related to the battle on religion in 
Metropolitan France, the new resident asked the King of Uvéa in 1910 to expel the head 
of the Catholic mission from the islands. This led to political uproar and the attempt was 
revoked. Even in legislation the Catholic Church dominated for a long time. The Code of 
Monseigneur Battaillon (1870) controlled the moral conduct of islanders strongly until the 
1940s. Those who did not attend masses, showed disrespect to priests, and performed non-
Christian behaviour could be fined.30 The legislator had to recognise the strong dominance 
of the church in the law of 1961, which  “guarantees to the population of the territory of the 
islands of Wallis and Futuna the free exercise of their religion, as far as the respect of their 
beliefs and customs is not against the general principles of law or provisions of the present 
law.”31 Although religious practising must, at least in theory, follow the republican principles, 
27   Décret du 16 janvier 1939, art. 2; Décret du 16 décembre 1939, art. 2; Newbury (1980), p. 204; Ntumy 
(1993), pp. 637-638; Rayboud (2001). 
28   CAA, Haut-commissaire c. Territoire de la Polynésie-française, 31 décembre 2003.
29   Machellen (2010), p. 2.
30   Aldrich (1993), p. 136; Ntumy (1993), pp. 622-623; Daughton (2006), p. 125. The Marists, or Society of 
Mary (Societas Mariae), is a Catholic order devoted to missions.
31   Loi no. 61-812 du 29 juillet 1961, art. 3. 
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especially equality, and be in consonance with the law of 1961, the dominance of the Catholic 
Church is guaranteed in indigenous communities and public education.
 
New Zealand7.2. 
7.2.1. Preserving the Cultural Identity
In 1840 the British Consul Hobson gave an oral statement, later known as “the fourth 
article” of the Treaty of Waitangi. It was understood by Māori as general and binding, but 
by Pākehā as a time-related personal promise. Only WT has returned the statement back 
to the forefront. The Māori political activism in land legislation at the turn of the twentieth 
century was able to preserve Māori culture and identity in the remaining whakapapa-
based land areas. The Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 stressed instead 
of plain assimilation integration to mainstream society by guidance and collaboration. The 
law promised to advance and preserve Māori culture, gave the tribal Executive Committees 
powers to make bylaws on the protection of marae houses and burial grounds. The Hunn 
Report (1960) continued this policy by suggesting integration of the two parts of society by 
preserving distinct Māori culture.32
The Maori Affairs Act 1953 allowed the MLC to set aside land as Māori reservation when 
it had historical significance or spiritual and emotional association to the Māori.33 Later WT 
obtained a significant role in its recommendations. Waikato Day was created to commemorate 
the treaty’s role as a public holiday.34 The Historic Places Trust has the power to declare a site as 
traditional or archaeological site after which they can be protected by heritage convenants.35 
In Manukau (1983) and Kaituna (1988) Reports the Waitangi Tribunal stressed the cultural 
and spiritual values to be taken into consideration in environmental questions. The treaty 
gives Māori values an equal place with British values and a priority when the Māori interest in 
taonga is adversely affected.36 The Crown Forests Assets Act 1989 allows protective covenants 
for sites having historical, spiritual, emotional or cultural value to be enforced by the Minister 
of Conservation. This policy is confirmed in modern settlement legislation.37
The Bill of Rights Act guarantees for all persons who belong to ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities the right in the community with other members to enjoy culture, profession, 
practice of religion or use of minority language.38 The wording reflects the international 
conventions’ individual right and has no direct reference to the Treaty of Waitangi or Māori.
32 Maori Social and Economic Advancement Act (1945), s. 35; WT, Muriwhenua Land Report (1997), s. 13; 
Armitage (1995), p. 145; E mea an ate Kāwana ko ngā whakapono katoa a Ingarani, o ngā Weteriana, o Ro-
ma, me te ritenga Māori hoki e tiakine ngatahitia e ia / The Governor says that the several faiths of England, 
of the Wesleyans, of Rome, and also of Māori custom shall alike be protected by him. Cf. Māori Customary 
Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (2001), pp. 72-73.
33   Maori Affairs Act 1953, ss. 439-439A.
34   Waikato Day Act 1976, ss. 3-4.
35   Historic Places Act 1980, ss. 2, 43-48, 52. 
36   WT, Kaituna Report (1984), s. 10; Manukau Report (1985), s. 9. 
37   Crown Forest Assets Act 1989, s. 18; Ngati Awa Claims Settlement Act 2005, Preamble, (16).
38   New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s. 20; 
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The Recource Management Act 1991 enables any interested body corporate to apply to the 
Minister for approval as a heritage protection authority. An authority may require a heritage 
order to protect places with special significance to Māori for special cultural or historical 
reasons. The territorial authority must be notified and the requisite information, public 
notification, submissions and hearing must be obtained.39 Similarly, the New Zealand Historic 
Places Trust has to be advised on all construction projects concerning a wāhi tapu site. The 
trust funds can be used for cultural welfare and historic reserves have been established. The 
trust maintains a register of historic places and areas, and wāhi tapu areas. The Maori Heritage 
Council ensures that the trust meets the needs of the Māori in a culturally sensitive manner. 
It also develops Māori programmes for the identification and conservation of historic/wāhi 
tapu areas and assists the trust to develop and reflect a bicultural view in the exercise of its 
powers and functions and gives recommendations.40 
The settlements have included the following: concepts of cultural redress, consisting of 
guardianship of sites of spiritual and cultural significance; access to traditional foods and 
resources; recognition of special and traditional relationships with the natural environment; 
greater participation in management and decision-making on natural resources and the 
environment; and visible recognition of mana. The cultural redress package includes the 
transferring of ownership of significant sites, creation of reserves, and the creating of camping 
entitlements. Many more disadvantaged Māori groups have, however, felt that they have been 
forgotten in the shadow of more preferential groups in negotiations. 41 
The same year the first international conference was arranged on the cultural and 
intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples at Whatakane. It connected the rights to 
the right of self-determination and they are inseparable from the claims on territorial rights. 
Its Mātaatua Declaration asks the states to repatriate indigenous knowledge and devise a 
comprehensive intellectual property rights regime. It qualifies the rights as collective and 
individual. The priority to them belongs to direct descendants of those who have assured the 
transmission of traditional knowledge.42
On the Cook Islands the centrality of traditional culture has been officially recognised. 
The inauguration of local chiefs is still performed in investiture ceremonies which have 
great symbolic value. They strengthen ties with the traditional past. The Ministry of Cultural 
Development (since 1974) encourages the performance of these ceremonies and other 
customary expressions of culture.43 
 
39   Resource Management Act 1991, ss. 6(e), 152, 154(1).
40   Historic Places Act 1993, ss. 22, 85; Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s. 218; Building Act 2004, s. 399(1).
41 Ngati Tuwharetoa (Bay of Plenty) Claims Settlement Act 2005, Preamble, (5)-(6); Waikato-Tainui Raupatu 
Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, s. 66; Treaty Negotiations (2003), pp. 36-38. One example 
is Ngāti Korokī Kohukura, which lost its wāhi tapu in 1946 when a dam flooded their sacred sites. They 
were not allowed to transfer their ancestral wheua (bones) and the historical Kurāpiro Rock which was a 
centrepiece of their identity was destroyed. Cf. Aho (2008), pp. 243-244; In its Kaituna Report (1986), the 
Waitangi Tribunal has extended the cultural and spiritual values to water resources (s.9).
42   Declaration of Mataatua (1993), art. 2.5-2.6.
43   Sissons (1999), pp. 60, 73-74. 
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7.2.2.  Names and Symbols
The United Tribes of New Zealand designed a flag in 1835 to express their sovereignty. It 
was replaced by the Union Jack only five years later. Similarly, on the Cook Islands the short-
lived federation had a flag of its own before the islands were annexed to New Zealand. The 
Democratic Party government created a new flag in 1978 to stress the islands’ own character. 
A referendum arranged in 1994 wanted to preserve the English name for the islands.44
The settlement process includes as part of the cultural redress package a possibility 
to change place names so they are bilingual or sometimes to Māori alone. The Ngai Tahu 
settlement restored 88 original Māori place names on the South Island besides the English 
names, including Mount Cook/Aoraki. The New Zealand Geographical Board collects Māori 
names and recommends them be used on official charts and maps, and encourages their 
use.45 
 
7.2.3.		 Te	Reo	Māori
The Māori language (Te Reo Māori) is one of the core elements of mana.The written Māori 
was created early (1815), but the decline of the Māori language began in the late 1850s when 
it became a minority language. From 1867 school instruction was permitted only in English. 
The assimilation policy led soon to a general prohibition to speak Māori at school and the 
children were punished even outside the school hours of speaking their mother tongue. 
From 1909 Māori was allowed again as an optional subject and the language and culture 
returned gradually to schools from the 1920s thanks to the Māori politicians’ lobbying. 
Māori remained the dominant home language among the indigenous communities until 
World War II and to the legislation was included the preservation of the Māori language, but 
rapid urbanisation soon changed the situation. The language change accelerated from the 
1960s and the language was predominantly used in isolated rural communities and the Māori 
gatherings, while most of the families used English for communication. The Hunn Report saw 
it as a mere relic of ancient Māori life. In 1973, Ngā Tamatoa iwi collected a petition of 30,000 
Māori for the government to legalise the use of the Māori language at all levels of schools. 
Also the Land March of 1975 wanted to promote the status of the language. Still there was 
little legal protection for the Māori language and very little space to use the language in public 
before the late 1980s. In 1984 the Māori activists laid their claim to the Waitangi Tribunal. 
Two years later the Waitangi Tribunal delived its Te Reo Maori Report. It held that under 
article 2 of the treaty the language was an essential part of culture and taonga. The Crown 
had an obligation to protect the language on the basis of treaty-based guarantee. The tribunal 
recommended that Māori should become a language of the judiciary and administration 
at all levels; there should be a supervising body to foster the use of language; there should 
44   Reforming the Political System of the Cook Islands (1998), p. 88; Sissons (1999), p. 13.
45   Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, ss. 162-166; Te Uri o Hau Claims Settlement Act 2002, Schedule 
14; Ngati Awa Claims Settlement Act 2005, s. 115; Te Arawa Lakes Settlement Act 2006, s. 71; Affiliate Te 
Arawa Iwi and Hapu Claims Settlement Act 2008, ss., 84, 86; New Zealand Geographical Board (Nga Pou 
Taumaha o Aotearoa) Act 2008, s. 6; Durie (1998), p. 202; Treaty Negotiations (2003), p. 39.
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be an inquiry on education of the language; the broadcasting policy should recognise the 
treaty responsibilities; and bilingualism should be a prerequisite to some appointments of 
state service. Despite these guarantees the tribunal was reluctant to establish absolute rights 
for the Māori language.46
The subsequent Maori Language Act 1987 made Māori an official language of New Zealand. 
It recognised the language as taonga and conferred a right to speak Māori in legal proceedings. 
The Maori Language Commission (Te Taura Whirii te Reo Māori) was established to promote 
the Māori as a living language, to advise and assist the Crown on its implementation as an 
official language and to hold inquiries, hearings and meetings.47 The State Sector Act 1988 
requires the chief executives of Government departments to recognise the aims, aspirations 
and employment requirements of the Māori people.48 Despite these reforms the legislation did 
not demand the public authorities to speak Māori and there was no demand of language skills 
for high officials. In 1997 the government published five Māori language objectives: a larger 
number of Māori speakers by increased opportunities to learn the language; increased rate of 
Māori proficiency; increased opportunities to use Māori; developing the Māori language at 
all levels of modern activities; and fostering positive attitudes so that bilingualism would be 
valued as part of New Zealand society.49 
The public schools started bilingual instruction in primary and secondary education 
schedules in 1978 after the Department of Education’s directions. The devolution policy of the 
department began to promote the Māori through kōhanga Reo (language nest, preschool). The 
first of them was established in 1981, and today they number is more than 500. The programme 
has imparted language to new generations and also enculturated the environment. Four years 
later started Kura Kaupapa Māori (total immersion school), combining the objectives of 
Māori language promotion and primary school education, which were formalised under the 
Education Act in 1989 and included in the state education system on the minister’s discretion. 
As a result, within ten years time two-thirds of Māori children were learning their language. 
The act also demands the Boards of Trustees arrange instruction of Māori on voluntary basis 
in public schools if parents ask it.50 
In the media the goal has been to protect and render the Māori language available at in all 
levels of the national and local media. The Māori began to lobby for the change in the 1960s. 
46   Native Schools Act 1867, s. 21; Maori Purposes Fund Act 1934, ss. 4, 10A; WT, Te Reo Maori Report (1986), 
s. 4; Stephens (2011), pp. 243-246. Bell & Harlow & Sharks (2005), pp. 67, 71-72; Baird & Glazebrook & 
Holden (2009), p. 74; Cleave (2008), p. 11; Kawharu (2003), p. 31. The Māori language is threatened. In 
2006 28% of Māori (157,000) knew the language, but only 9% of adult Māori were fluent speakers. The 
estimate on native speakers – mostly elderly people – was estimated to be 70,000. Another version of the 
language, the Cook Islands Māori, was spoken by 39,000 people, of whom 17,000 lived in the Cook Islands. 
Niuean (8,000) and Tokelauan (3,000) are more distant West Polynesian languages. All associated states’ 
and territories’ indigenous languages are predominantly (60%) spoken in New Zealand and Australia due 
to massive migration. The Moriori language of the Chatham Islands became extinct during the nineteenth 
century.Cf. 2006 Census Data. 
47   Maori Language Act (1987), Preamble, ss. 3-4, 6-7, Schedule 1.
48   State Sector Act 1988, s. 56.
49   Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s. 68; Durie (1998), p. 62. The major model in drafting was the Welsh 
Language Act 1967 (comisiynydd y Gymraeg), especially concerning the media and education; The Schedule 
of 1987 law lists 16 courts and tribunals where the Māori is allowed to use.
50   Education Act 1989, s. 63; Durie (1998), pp. 63-64; Bell & Harlow & Sharks (2005), pp. 19, 73.
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The objective of Te Māngai Pāho was to guarantee that at least 50% of all programmes would 
be broadcast in Māori. The iwi radio stations network started in 1989, and now covers most of 
the islands. Ruia Mai broadcasts five hours every day in Māori language in Auckland. In the 
same year a Crown agency called Te Reo Whakapaaki Irirangi,was established which promotes 
the Māori language and culture by making funds available for broadcasting, produces 
programmes to broadcast and archives programmes. In 1997 the Aotearoa Television Network 
started, using the Māori language in programmes. The recommendations of the Waitangi 
Tribunal on the continuing obligation to take reasonable steps to assist in the preservation of 
te reo Māori by the use of radio and TV broadcasting led to the Maori Television Service Act 
2000. The use of Māori words and phrases has increased in other media, too.51 
Since 1908 all official documents in Māori have to be translated in English but Māori 
language expressions, including legal vocabulary, have become an important part of New 
Zealand’s public life.52 Since the 1980s a large number of laws which include a reference to the 
Treaty of Waitangi or Māori rights, have used Māori legal terminology. In 2007 the Faculty 
of Law at Victoria University started a project to create a legal Māori dictionary. It is part of 
the official policy to give the Māori more prominence in the public sphere and to reverse the 
language shift. In 1985 the Standing Orders of the Parliament were reformed which allowed 
an MP to address the speaker either in English or Māori and to speak in the House in Māori. 
Oaths have an equal effect in Māori. The entrance of the Māori Party has increased the use of 
the language. In 2009 simultaneous interpretation services were made available in Parliament. 
The use of Māori words in legislation has since the 1980s become widespread which shows an 
increased understanding of Indigenous culture and expressions.53 
The District Court (1948) allowed translation in Māori, but the difficulty was the number 
of different language versions. The Maori Language Act 1987 confers a right to speak Māori 
in certain legal proceedings. It however limits obligatory use to the Waitangi Tribunal and to 
a number of special tribunals. The Dispute Tribunals Act 1988 lists those parties which may 
ask the right to use the Māori language in court. When there is controversy over translations 
the opinion of the preciding officer is decisive. The right to use the Māori language in the 
courts is not automatic. This was also confirmed in Mihaika v. Police, which denied the right 
to speak Māori before the courts, but several other court decisions have granted the right 
based on s. 4 of the Maori Language Act 1987.54 The conclusion is that only spoken Māori can 
be used in a limited number of courts and in limited conditions.
51   Broadcasting Act 1989, ss. 53A-B; Maori Television Service Act 2000; Broadcasting Amendment Act 2000, 
s. 595(1); Maori Television (Te Aratuku Whakauta Irirangi Maori) Act 2003, s. 3; Broadcasting Amend-
ment Act 2008, s. 10; Alves (1999), pp. 90-91; Bell & Harlow & Sharks (2005), p. 111; Baird & Glazebrook 
& Holden (2009), p. 75; Palmer (2008), p. 99. 
52   Deeds Registration Act 1908, s. 20.
53   Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s. 4A(1); Standing Orders 151(104, 1985); Bell & Harlow & Sharks (2005), 
pp. 13-14, 144; Ahu & Hoarc & Stephens (2011), p. 201; Magallanes (2011), p. 260; Stephens (2011), pp. 243, 
253-254.
54   Maori Language Act 1987, ss. 3-4; Dispute Tribunals Act 1988, s. 4; NZCA, Mihaika v. Police (1980); Alves 
(1999), p. 87; Stephens (2011), pp. 249-252, 255. In 1979 the Court of Appeal ruled that a person who could 
speak and understand English could not use Māori in the court. This interpretation was based on the Plead-
ings in the English Act (1362), a medieval statute which was in force in New Zealand from 1858.  
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In the Cook Islands both Māori and English are public languages. Both are used also 
in education. In the Outer Islands Māori is the predominant language of instruction.  All 
parliamentary bills must be written both in Rarotongan Māori and English (since 1946), 
but the parliament can also decide that only English be  used and in conflict situations the 
English language prevails.55 In Niue, both Nieuan and English are official languages. The 
island’s Constitution is equally authentic in both languages and all bills and acts are written 
in both languages.56 In Tokelau the written language of public life and the church was for a 
long time Samoan. Today the education is both in Tokelauan and English.57 Still the Pacific 
languages are threatened. The majority of islanders live in New Zealand where they have 
rapidly assimilated to the Anglophone community. The Ministry of Pacific Islands Affairs 
is running the Mind Your Language project to support the languages and the Ministry of 
Education has prepared curriculum guidelines for the languages.58
7.2.4.		 Taonga	Tūturu
New Zealand’s legislators understood early the value of Māori artefacts (taonga tūturu). Since 
the 1930s the collecting changed to encouragement, research and instruction of Māori and 
Pacific arts and crafts. Each found artefact is prima facie the property of the Crown. The 
MLC determines the ownership according to custom and is empowered to vest the object 
in trustees and to enforce and police the trust. The sale of artifacts is limited to registered 
and official persons and institutions. Also Ngati Kuri has claimed against the use for profit of 
Māori designs, images and traditional material exported without Māori permission. Similarly, 
the Declaration of Mataatua has demanded the return of human remains, and funeral and 
cultural objects from museums. New Zealand recognises in arts rohe of Māori as tangata 
whenua and the role of the Pacific Islands peoples arts. In some modern settlements the 
attainability of stone materials, like purangi (green stone), for artistic use is guaranteed. The 
national Arts Council and Arts Boards give funding for indigenous arts. The New Zealand 
Maori Arts and Craft Institute formulates and impliments policies in respect of furtherance 
and assistance to Māori culture, arts and crafts, make grants, and arrange and undertake 
exhibitions.59
55   Constitution of the Cook Islands 1965, art. 42; Cook Islands Amendment Act 1946, s. 15; Cook Islands 
Constitution Act 1964, s. 35.
56   The Constitution of Niue (1974), art. 23; Niue Constitution Act 1974, ss. 4, 23; Ntumy (1993), p. 297.
57   Bell & Sharks (2005), pp. 298-316; The situation in Tokelau has been influenced by the strong presence of 
missionaries. 
58   Baird & Glazebrook & Holden (2009), p. 75. 
59   Maori Antiquities Act 1901. s. 4; Maori Purposes Act 1934, ss. 4, 10A; Maori Social and Economic Ad-
vancement Act 1945, s. 12; New Zealand Maori Arts and Craft Institute Act 1963, s. 15; Protected Objects 
Act 1975, ss. 11-13; Arts Council of New Zealand Toi Aotearoa Act 1994, s. 5(b); Ngati Ruanui Claims 
Settlement Act 2003, s. 111; Declaration of Mataatua (1993), art. 2; Alves (1999), p. 85; Crawford (2008), 
p.246. 
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7.2.5.  Wairuatanga
Everything in the Māori world has a spiritual dimension, wairuatanga. The encounter with 
British settlers challenged this view. Due to the Māori wars and the continuous land loss there 
was social demand for indigenous, prophetical and millenarian movements, which were 
based on indigenous, Judaic and Christian influences. Some of them described the Māori 
as a promised people or the lost tribe of Israel. They were often political and sometimes 
also violent. This uncontrolled form of Māori activism and uncertain medical techniques 
worried both the educated Māori and the British officials. A particular feature of indigenous 
spirituality in Aōtearoa was tohunga, Indigenous priests and faith-healers. The initiative to 
suppress tohunga came actually from the educated Māori, who were afraid that the fragile 
balance in land policy and social reform would falter. Dr. Māui Pōmare suggested in 1904 
legislation against the practices of tohunga. James Carroll, the Native Minister finally 
introduced the bill in1906. He used it as an excuse to protect his own land reform policy. New 
Zealand’s authorities were also irritated by the unwillingness of Maori Councils to co-operate 
in the surrender of wastelands and their protection of tohunga.60
Already the Criminal Code Act 1893 included a provision against the exercise or use of 
witchcraft, sorcery, enchantment or conjuration. Those who fraudulently claimed knowledge 
or skill in the occult or crafty science could be imprisoned for up to one year. 61 Also the 
Indicent Offences Act 1894 gave fines of £5 or one month imprisonment for the same crimes.62 
The Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 classified the offences as follows: to gather persons by 
practices of superstition or credulity; mislead by supernatural powers in treatment or cure 
of disease; mislead by supernatural powers in foretelling of future events or other wises. 
The courts were, however, unwilling to apply the law. The law was used for the last time in 
prosecution in 1955.63 
Since the late 1980s the concept of wāhi tapu and spiritual interests have been included 
to legislation, including business, conservation, construction, land transport, mining, and 
resource management. And wāhi tapu can also be justified by common law Aboriginal 
servitude where certain characteristics of the original Aboriginal title survive over certain 
land to bind the holder of legal title but there is a difficulty of proof. The Department of 
Conservation manage the national parks in negotiating with the Māori on the protection and 
management of sacred sites and gathers information on them. The difficulty has been the 
unwillingness of Māori to reveal the sacred sites. Instead there were suggested “silent files”, 
60   Stephens (2001). Two of the prophetic movements have survived until present: Ringatū (16,000 members) 
and Rātana (50,000) Churches. The last-mentioned has significant political and social influence in Māori 
society; In the racial theories of the late nineteenth century the Māori were also called “Aryans of Polynesia” 
or “Vikings of the Sunrise”. Cf. Smith (2005), p. 12.
61   Criminal Code Act 1893, s. 240. Four tohunga were convicted based on this law. Cf. Stephens (2001).
62   Indicent Offences Act 1894, s. 49.
63 Tohunga Suppression Act 1907, s. 2; Stephens (2001); Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law 
(2001), p. 24. Only three persons were imprisoned: the longest sentence of six months was for the “white 
tohunga” Mary-Ann Hill (1914). The law did not end the tohunga practices which are still used today. Cf. 
Stephens (2001).
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to be kept by Māori tribal units. They could be used during the development projects.64 The 
Waikato River Settlement (2010) recognises the role for customary authority in traditional 
burial. The Māori may carry out on Waikato River fangihinga (funeral ceremony) and hari 
tuupaapaku (translation of human remains).65
The legislation has also opened the door for litigation. The Environmental Court halted 
in 1995 the preparation of a sewage treatment to wetland as an alternative had not been 
considered and the project was against the spiritual values of Māori as wāhi tapu. Later the 
court gave a license to build a prison near Ngawha Springs, although the Māori applicants 
claimed that taniwaha (spirit being) of the site would be harmed. The court estimated that a 
prison be a restorative element and due to geographical distance from the springs would not 
affect the taniwaha. Otherwise the court did not want to make a finding based on metaphysical 
elements.66 
Canada7.3. 
7.3.1. Distinct Cultural Test: What is Indigenous Culture?
The Constitution of 1867 established a bicultural nation, with dominant British and French 
elements, only mentioning the Indians as federal wards. Canadian society began to change 
rapidly during the 1950s. The development in Quebec, the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960), the 
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and the failure of Trudeau’s White Paper 
and unification policy paved the road to de facto pluralism, which was recognised in 1971, 
when Canada became the first country in the world to proclaimed itself as multicultural.67
 The federal government promised to do the following: assist all cultural groups that have 
demonstrated the desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute 
to Canada to overcome barriers to full participation in Canadian society; to promote creative 
encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national 
unity; and to continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of the official languages in 
order to become full participants in Canadian society.68 The focus of policy, soon included to 
federal legislation, continued the policy of integration. 
The multicultural character of the nation is also mentioned in the Constitution Act, 1982, 
Schedule B, s. 27, according to which “This Charter shall be interpreted in a manner consistent 
64   State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, s. 27D; Conservation Act 1987, s. 27; Education Act 1989, s. 214; Crown 
Minerals Act 1991, s. 51(2); Land Transport Management Act 2003, s. 18C; Building Act 2005, s. 399(1); 
Marine and Coastal Area (Takutui Moana) Act 2011, s. 51(e); McHugh (1991), pp. 231-234; 512, 613; Also 
Tokelau is, like Wallis and Futuna, a strongly religious community (half-Catholic, half-Protestant). The 
strict observance of Sunday and moral codes form an essential part of the islands customary law.
65   Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, ss. 56, 60;
66   EC, Te Runanga O Taumarere v. Northland Regional Council (1996); NZHC, Friends and Community of 
Ngawha Inc. v. Minister of Corrections (2002). 
67 ”All citizens are equal. Multiculturality ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in 
their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-
confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures.” Cf. What is Multiculturalism?
68   Breton (2005), pp. 262-275.
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with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”69 In 
the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1985 further objectives are defined as: the protection of 
cultural and racial diversity, support for the characteristics of Canadian heritage and identity, 
the equal existence and treatment of communities, the encouragement and assistance of 
social, cultural, economic and political institution, the promotion of understanding and 
creativity, the acceptance of diverse cultures of Canadian society and encouragement in 
using the minority languages.70 Canada has committed respecting multicultural difference. 
This means support to protect collective rights, cultural integrity and dignity of the ethnic 
groups in Canada.  June 21 has been declared as the federal National Aboriginal Day and 
several provinces and territories have decided to celebrate official days to commemorate the 
Indigenous peoples’ significance in the nation’s history and in the present.71 
Québec uses instead of multiculturalism the expression interculturalism (la culture de 
convergence). Its special features are the recognition of the French language as the language 
of public life, respect for liberal democratic values, including civil and political rights and the 
equality of opportunity; and respect for plurality, including openness to and tolerance of other 
difference.72 All provinces and territories recognise the significance of indigenous cultures and 
their traditional way of life. The provinces have created heritage sites and cultural conservation 
areas for social, ceremonial and cultural uses. The archaeological sites and Indigenous 
human remains are under special protection.73 Nova Scotia has created Mi’kmaq educational 
programmes, resources and learning material on history, heritage, language, culture and 
tradition.74 Several provinces and territories have committed to the cultural heritage of the 
indigenous peoples, and to the preservation and enhancement of the plurality of its residents’ 
cultural heritage.75 British Columbia has special rules of wills for the devolution of cultural 
property, which is regulated by the self-governing First Nations’ legislation. The province 
has created the First Peoples Heritage, Language and Culture Council, which finances and 
supports the First Nations culture, initiatives, programs and services.76 Tåîchô Community 
Services Agency creates social programmes and services on Tåîchô language, culture and 
69   Constitution Act (1982), Schedule B, s. 27.
70   Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1985, Preamble.
71   Proclamation Declaring June the 21st of Each Year as National Aboriginal Day, 1996; Beatty (1994), p. 97.
72   Loi sur l’exercise des droits fondamentaux et des prerogatives du peuple québecois et de l’État du Québec, 
2001 (Québec), s. 14; Décret concernant la publication de l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre 
le gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, s. 2.2; Charte de la langue française, 2011 (Québec), 
Préambule. 
73   Archaeology Act, 1988 (Prince Edward Island), s. 14(5).
74   Education Act, 1995 (Nova Scotia), s. 3(1).
75   Wanuskewin Heritage Park Act, 1997 (Saskatchewan), s. 9; National Parks Act, 2001 (New Brunswick), s. 2; 
Heritage Conservation Act, 2009 (New Brunswick), ss. 1, 7, 45.
76   Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 17.36-39; Estate Administation Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 2.2; 
Heritage Conservation Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 4; First Peoples Heritage, Language and Culture 
Act, 2012 (British Columbia), ss. 3, 6, 8; Park Act, 1996 (British Columbia), s. 4.2; Wills Variation Act, 1996 
(British Columbia), s. 1;  Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 3.95-103; Maanulth First Nations Final 
Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 20.
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way of life.77 Nunavut recognises and promotes Inuit culture and values which underlie the 
Inuit way of life. The territory acknowledges inuit qaujimajatuqangit as the framework for its 
values in public and individual life. The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights are protected. 
The Nunavut’s Human Rights Tribunal oversees that Inuit culture and values which underlie 
the Inuit way of life, are respected and can give sanctions.78 
All Prairee Provinces recognise the role of the Métis people and their culture in society. 
Saskatchewan recognises the distinct culture and heritage of the Métis people and their 
contribution to the province.79 Manitoba has rehabilited Louis Riel due to his unique and 
historical role. The Louis Riel Institute promotes Métis education and the cultural institutions 
and fosters the understanding and appreciation of the culture, heritage and history of Manitoba 
and Métis people to the benefit of all Manitobans. It performs research, supports various 
programmes and acts as a resource center. The province recognises the role of Métis people 
as the first citizens in Manitoba.80 Ontario and the Prairie Provinces offer library services and 
representation on library boards for Indians and Métis.81
The Indigenous peoples have stressed their unique character as first peoples. This was 
recognised only in the Constitution Act, 1982, after strong indigenous lobbying. SCC has 
defined the indigenous culture and identity in several cases. In Sparrow (1990) it ruled that 
the Crown has to offer constitutional protection to those practices and customs of indigenous 
cultures that pre-dated the arrival of Europeans and the contemporary expressions of those 
cultures.82 The doctrine was developed further in Van der Peet (1996) where Lamer CJ created 
the distinct cultural test. The test aimed at determining whether a given practice was part of 
constitutionally protected rights. It has two parts: 1) characterisation phase: the judge must 
examine the historical roots of the challenged practice and the challenged practice must be 
adjusted to make it cognizable to the imported legal system. It aims to comprehend if its 
scope and nature qualify it to be treated as an aboriginal right. The first test has three parts: 
a) the nature of action claimed done pursuant to an aboriginal right, b) the nature of the 
governmental legislation or alleged to infringe the right, and c) ancentral traditions and 
practices relied upon to establish the right; 2) integral test, asking a) integrality and centrality 
77   Tåîchô Community Services Agency Act, 2005 (NWT), s. 4(1). See also: National Aboriginal Day Act, 2001 
(NWT); Yukon Day Act, 2002 (Yukon); Human Rights Act, 2002 (Yukon), Preamble, s. 2; Amendment of 
Champaigne and Aisha First Nations Final Agreement, 2006 (Yukon), s. 1.1.1.
78   Human Rights Act, 2003 (Nunavut), Preamble, ss. 3-4, 16, 34.  
79   Métis Act, 2001 (Saskatchewan), s. 2.
80   Louis Riel Institute Act, 1995(Manitoba), ss. 2-4.
81   Public Libraries Act, 1990 (Ontario), ss. 10, 30; Public Libraries Act, 1996 (Saskatchewan), s. 48(1); Librar-
ies Act, 2000 (Alberta), ss. 13, 16; Public Libraries Act, 2006 (Manitoba), s. 41. 
82   SCC, Sparrow (1990).
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to pre-colonial culture and continuity with colonial law and b) relation between particular 
modern behaviour and pre-contact in tegral practices, customs or tradition (continuity).83 
Lamer J used a purposive approach to ensure that the recognition and affirmation of 
aboriginal rights are consistent with the fact that they are rights. The decision has been 
criticised from several viewpoints. The doctrine creates an oppositional polarity between 
the majority and Indigenous cultures. It also disconnects the definition of Aboriginal rights 
from pre-contact First Nations jurisprudence. McLachlin J found in dissent the integral test 
was too categorical for constitutional rights. Instead, she suggested a historically-based test 
for aboriginal rights which relies on interests and customs recognised in common law and 
Canadian history. L’Heureux-Dubé J suggested a dynamic rights approach to distinctive 
cultures. She saw “distinctive” as a problematic notion when used only in regard to individual 
acts.84 
Bastarache J has explained the test in Sappier /Gray (2006), stressing flexibility when 
engaging an analysis because the object is to provide cultural security and continuity for the 
particular indigenous society. He describes the “culture” in broad terms. The culture is an 
inquiry into the pre-contact way of life of a particular indigenous community, including their 
means of survival, socialisation methods, legal systems and trading habits.85
The test has been used in various cases: in Pamajewon (1996) the Ojibwa defended their 
gambling activities by explaining that they derived from Aborinal title or the broader inherent 
right to self-government and was constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court did not see 
gambling to be significant enough to be an integral part of the distinctive culture of the bands. 
Neither did it accept that a traditional practice could be a source of contemporary wealth. The 
Ojibwa had no right to establish high stake gambling facilities based on the Aboriginal power 
of self-government.86 Only four years later the court saw, however, that the contract between 
the Province of Ontario and the First Nations bands on casinos and the delivery of their 
profits to registered Indian Bands in Ontario was in accordance with the affirmative action 
programmes defined in 15(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982.87
83   SCC, Van der Peet (1996), ss. 44-47, 63; Van der Peet test has been problematic to Métis due to its demand 
of pre-European contact Aboriginal societies. This was corrected in Powley (2003), which determined the 
entitlements of Métis under s. 35, by asking about the following: the characterisation of  the right; identi-
fication of the historical and contemporary rights-bearing community; verification of claimant’s member-
ship;  identification of the relevant time frame;  determination of the practice’s integrality to the claimant’s 
distinctive culture; continuity between the past practice and contemporary right; determination of extin-
guishment; assumption of rights existence and infringement; and determination as to whether the infringe-
ment was justified. Cf. SCC, Mitchell v. M.N.R. (2001), s. 15; Powley (2003), ss. 19, 23-29, 37, 41-47.  
84   SCC, Van der Peet (1996), ss. 68-74, 154, 260-275. John Borrows has criticised van der Peet doctrine for 
freezing indigenous societies to the past. The test is retrospective, inviting  stories about the past but not 
telling what is significant to the survival of communities today. His alternative is based on  common law 
recognition of ancestral laws  and customs. The adoption of new practices, traditions and laws  in response 
to new influences is for him integral to the survival of Indigenous communities. Cf. Borrows (2002), pp. 
56-72. After Delgamuukw, the distinctive culture test does not include anymore Aboriginal title questions.
85   SCC, Sappier/Gray (2006), s. 33.
86   SCC, Pamajewon (1996), s. 40.
87   SCC, Lovelace v. Ontario (2000), s. 83-84, 90-92, 109-111. 
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7.3.2.  Names and Symbols
From the early 1960s, Québec changed its policy on the northern part of the province, for a long 
time it had neglected, due to the rise in nationalism. To strengthen its claims to sovereignty 
over the territory, the provincial government began systematically to change the indigenous 
place names to French versions. The Charter of the French Language (Québec) allows today 
the First Nations and Inuit to use their traditional names and signs in Northern Quebec 
treaty areas.88 In British Columbia, some key geographic features are renamed with Nisga’a 
and Nuu-Chah-Nulth names. Similarly, the Queen Charlotte Islands have been, based on a 
reconciliation protocol, renamed as Haida Gwaii.89 In Nunavut, all public signs, maps, posters 
and commercial advertising must be displayed in Inuktitut besides the other languages. Also 
other modern agreements have similar goals to reintroduce the traditional names.90 
7.3.3.  Indigenous Languages
Most of the indigenous languages in Canada are threatened.91 No province has an indigenous 
language as the official language, but many of them recognise their role.92 In British Columbia, 
the Nisga’a, Hul’q’umi’num and Nuu-Chah-Nulth languages are recognised in the First 
Nations’ own constitutions and have local status. Their status is, however, second to English. 
The Tsuwassen and Maanulth laws can be published in the indigenous language, but only the 
English version is obligatory.93 Manitoba recognises that the Aboriginal languages are vital 
to the survival of the survival of the culture and identity of indigenous people. They promote 
their self-esteem, community well-being and cultural continuity. The government’s role is to 
recognise them and to promote their preservation and use.94
88   Charte de la langue française, 2011 (Québec), Preambule.
89   Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999 (British Columbia), s. 11; Haida Gwaii Reconciliation Act, 2010, s. 2; 
Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 20;
90   Inuit Language Protection Act, 2007 (Nunavut), ss. 3, 6; Amendment of Champaigne and Aisha First Na-
tions Final Agreement, 2006 (Yukon), s. 1.1.7; Scott (2001), pp. 53-54.
91 There are 55 Indigenous languages spoken in Canada. Only 18% of (207,000) indigenous people spoke nati-
ve languages as their first language in 2006, in comparison with English (74%) and French (8%). The largest 
number of fluent speakers are on reserves amd among the Inuit. The largest languages are Cree (78,000), 
Inuktitut (34,000), and Ojibway (18,000). Most languages are diminishing. According to the census of 2006 
only the number of Inuktitut, Dene (11,000), Mi’kmaq (8,000) and Atikamekw (6,000) speakers has inc-
reased. The indigenous languages have best survived in Nunavut (71% of total population), NWT (14%), 
Saskatchewan (4%) and Manitoba (3%). The geographical isolation and late contact with the European 
population have better preserved some western and Arctic languages. The only exception is the Mi’kmaq-
speakers in Maritime Provinces, where  contact took place during the eighteenth century. Cf. Statistics 
Canada 2006; The RCAP’s report has stressed the importance of a land base for the survival of indigenous 
languages and cultures. Cf. RCAP, Vol. 2(2), p. 451. 
92   Cf. Official Languages Act, 1985, s. 7(3); Métis Act, 2001 (Saskatchewan), s. 2; Décret concernant la publica-
tion de l’entente concernant une nouvelle relation entre  le gouvernement du Québec et les Cris du Québec, 
2007 (Québec), s. 2.2; Charte de la langue française, 2011 (Québec), Préambule. 
93   Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 2.7; Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act 2007 (British Co-
lumbia), s. 13.5; Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act 2007 (British Columbia), s. 16.16.
94   Aboriginal Languages Recognition Act, 2010 (Manitoba).
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The Yukon recognises the significance of indigenous languages and promotes measures 
to preserve, develop and enhance them. Everyone has a right to use the indigenous languages 
in debates and procedures of Legislative Assembly. The assembly or its commission may 
make an order to translate official documents in indigenous languages.95 The government 
of Newfoundland and Labrador has recognized Inuktitut as the first official language of 
Nunatsiavut territory.96 
The Indigenous languages have an official status only in the Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut. Since 1988, the NWT has 11 official languages: Chippewyan, Cree, English, French, 
Gwich’in, Inuinnaqtun, Inuktitut, Inuvialuktun, North and South Slavey and Tlicho (Dogrib). 
The Aboriginal Languages Reception Board supervises the indigenous languages’ status. 
Although English has dominant position in the Northwest Territory, all official languages 
have an equal status in the Legislative Assembly. All government and legal documents are 
translated to those languages and they may be used in the courts. The court decisions and 
public services at the territorial level are offered in either English or French as the lingua 
franca, but the indigenous languages may be used as well. The territory has a language 
commission, which supervises the use of official languages.97 
The official languages of Nunavut are Inuktitut, English and French. Inuinnaqtun has the 
same status locally. The territory recognises the past grievances and need for remedy, and the 
role of elders and other guardians of the indigenous languages. The language is a fundamental 
medium of personal and cultural expression through which the Inuit knowledge, values, 
history, traditions and identity transmit. The language is connected to the development of 
dynamic and strong individuals in communities and institutions of Nunavut. The daily use of 
language is promoted at all levels of governmental, public, educational, social and economic 
sectors of life. All public institution must use as the work language Inuktitut, including 
the Legislative Assembly and all public services when requested. The innovative use and 
development of Inuktitut terminology are encouraged. In Nunavut all official documents, 
including public contracts, must be published in Inuktitut. All official languages can be used 
in courts, although English and French are the languages of decision. The situation is the same 
with administrative bodies, wher Inuktitut is optional. Inuit Uqausinnik Taiguusiliuqtiit (Inuit 
Language Authority) offers expertise on language and makes decisions about language use, 
development and standards. Members of authority must have indepth knowledge in Inuit 
language and culture. It may investigate language violations and apply to the Nunavut Court 
of Justice for remedy. The main principles of language policy are the same as in the school 
policy described above.98 
The Métis have had traditionally three languages: French, English and Michif. The 
Manitoba Act (1870) guaranteed the language rights of the French-speaking Métis community 
in Manitoba in s. 23 including the equal status in the Legislature and the Courts but did 
95   Language Act, 2002 (Yukon), ss. 1, 3.
96  Labrador Inuit Constitution  (2005), ss. 1, 11.
97   NWT Act, 1985, s. 43.2; NWT Official Languages Act, 1988 (NWT), ss. 4, 8, 12-13, 18-23. The NWT’s leg-
islation has a provision that a marriage is not valid if there is no interpreter present at the wedding in the 
cases where either of the spouses does not understand English. Cf. Marriage Act, 1988 (NWT), s. 12(1). 
98   Inuit Language Protection Act, 2007 (Nunavut), Preamble, ss. 2-4, 12, 15-16, 20, 27.1; Eisenberg & Spiller-
Halev (2005), p. 286; Loukacheva (2007), p. 71.
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not define the language of education.99 During the 1880s the settlers overwhelmed the Métis 
and the status of the French language began to deteriorate rapidly. The Manitoba School 
Act, 1890, was a logical consequence to the development. It practically abolished the official 
status of French life in the province. The act caused a bitter cultural battle inside the country 
between the Anglo- and Francophone communities.100 Although SCC was in favour of the 
Manitoba Act, the Pricy Council preferred the School Act. Its reasons were the wording in s. 
91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, according to which the education was primarily under the 
provincial jurisdiction.101 
The French language was returned to a  limited extent to public schools in 1896 after a 
compromise between the federal and provincial governments. The Catholic clergy plead to 
Pope Leo XIII, who to their dissatisfaction believed that the governments’ remedial actions 
had “been inspired by the love for equity and good intentions.” The status of French as an 
educational language had different fates in the following years. The years between 1916-1955, 
based on the Thornton Act, were a low ebb with reduced language rights. The educational 
status of French began gradually to recover  from1955 but bilingual education on equal terms 
was allowed only in 1967 when immersion classes were created. In 1970 the French language 
gained an official status in Manitoban schools.102
In the 1970s began a process to overturn the School Act of 1890. In 1979 the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal ruled that the School Act of 1890 was invalid. The following year the Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision in Bilodeau.103 In 1985 the Governor in Council referred in Re 
Manitoba Language Rights SCC to a question, that asked if the province of Manitoba had 
unconstitutional legislation, when neglecting the s. 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, and s. 
23 of the Manitoba Act, respective of the bilingual legislation and documentation. SCC ruled 
that section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, demands bilingual enactment that English 
and French texts of law must be equally authoritative, and that there is a requirement of 
simultaneity in the use of both languages in law enactment. Therefore, all provincial laws 
between 1890 and 1985 were invalid and inoperative until they would be translated into 
French.104 
The change was made in a transitory period by the provincial government. The Bill 113 
(1981) returned the Francophone governmental services. Today the Métis have a right to 
use the French language in the legislature. Also all laws must be published both in English 
and French. Later the province has increased the scope of services in French. The City of 
Winnipeg, where most of the French-speaking Métis live in the province, became bilingual 
in the public services sector in 1992. The Métis’ special needs for bilingual services, especially 
in family services, are guaranteed.105 
99   Manitoba Act, 1870, s. 23. Michif is a mixture of French and Cree, spoken by less than 1,000 people.
100 Manitoba School Act, 1890; Rodriquez (2006), p. 53.   
101 Rodriquez (2006), pp. 57-67.
102 Leo XIII (1897); Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91; Rodriquez (2006), pp. 57-67. 
103 SCC, Bilodeau v. Manitoba (A.G.) (1980), ss. 15-21; MCA, Forest v. Manitoba (A.G.), 1979. 
104 SCC, Re Manitoba Language Rights (1985), ss. 1, 124-128, 149.
105 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 133; Manitoba Act, 1870, s. 23; City of Winnipeg Charter (2002); French Lan-
guage Services Regulation, 2005 (Manitoba), s. 1(c); Bilingual Service Centers Act, 2012 (Manitoba), s. 
2(3); Rodriquez (2006), pp. 61-67.
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Already in the eighteenth century Abbé Pierre-Simon Maillard had used Mi’kmaq symbols 
to create an indigenous writing system. A more successful project was that of the Methodist 
missionary James Evans, who created in early nineteenth century Manitoba a syllabic form 
of writing to Nothern Cree, using already known symbols. In the early part of the nineteeth 
century the Cree had one of the highest levels of literacy. The first official document, where 
an indigenous language was used in Canada, was in Treaty 9, where the Cree chiefs indicated 
their acceptance by using the Cree syllabics. Reverend Peck, an Anglican missionary 
transported a syllabic system from Ojibway Indians to the Arctic. In Western Arctic other 
missionaries took in use the Latin scripture. In 1960 linguist Raymond Gagne was hired to 
create a standard orthography. He recommended dropping the syllabic system and replacing 
it with Latin script. The Eastern Inuit did not want to give up the old system. An answer was 
a dual orthography developed by ITC where two orthographies can be used interchangeably 
which has enabled the development of Inuit literature.106
The federal Hawthorne Report (1966) stressed the opportunity to use the indigenous 
languages in instruction. Between the 1960s – 1980s, Québec nationalist policy stressed that 
the public language in all province was French. Thereafter, the stand has softened: the Charter 
of the French Language recognises the right of the First Nations to preserve and develop their 
original languages and cultures.Their reserves are excluded as federal domain from Québec’s 
language legislation. The majority of First Nations reserves use English as the language of 
instruction, although the use of Indigenous languages has been promoted, too. Only the tribes 
in St. Lawrence Valley speak French. In 1990, after the Oka uprising the Iroquois won a right 
to use English in the provincial courts. In the 1980s a large network of cultural education 
centres was established to offer programmes in Indian languages and cultures. In 1985 there 
were 65 of them.107  
In the north of the province, JBNQA established the Cree School Board and Kativik 
School Board with instruction in Cree and Inuktitut, respectively. The North East Quebec 
Agreement gives the same recognition to the Naskapi language. Section 88 of the Charter 
of the French Language recognises the right to early primary instruction in Cree, Inuktitut 
and Naskapi, but the higher education has an objective to use French as the language of 
instruction. Indigenous leaders have sought a right to use other language than English or 
French in public services and education. They want to limit the advancement of official-
language infrastructures to preserve their own culture. The Cree and Naskapi languages may 
be optionally used in council meetings and bylaws, while the primary languages are either 
French or English.108 
New Brunswick promotes the use of the Mi’kmaq language in education and its 
introduction among the non-Native students.109 In British Columbia the school boards can, 
based on an agreement, provide instruction in Indian languages. The Stó:lō Nation has revived 
106 Dickason (1994), p. 241. Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 135-137. The birth of Cree syllabics related to 
the millenarian indigenous religious movement of the 1840s.
107 Règlement sur la langue d’enseignement des enfants qui résident ou ont résidé dans une réserve indienne, 
2003 (Québec), ss. 1-2; Charte de la langue française, 2011 (Québec), Préambule, s. 88; Dickason (1994), p. 
337, 359; Scott (2001), p. 53; Bredimas-Assimopoulos (2005), p. 244.
108 Cree-Naskapi (of Quebec) Act, 1984, ss. 31-32; JBNQA (1975), ss. 16-17; NEQA (1978), s. 11. 
109 Minority Education Act Regulation, 1997 (New Brunswick), s. 31.
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in British Columbia their traditional language Halq’eméylem as the language of alternative, 
customary justice.110 In the Yukon, the Minister may authorise an educational programme 
to be provided in a First Nation’s language. The indigenous teachers are under under the 
supervision of the local school board.111 In the NWT, the District Educational Authority may 
determine the language of instruction, which is one of the 11 official languages. In schools 
which use English as the language of instruction, they must have also part of the educational 
programmes in another official language and vice versa. The authority may give also the right 
for home instruction in a language other than the school district’s language of instruction.112 
In Nunavut, the use of Inuktitut has gradually been allowed in schools since 1955, when the 
indigenous school assistants came to public schools. Today, the government has, in a manner 
consistent with inuit qaujimajatuqangit, a duty to arrange instruction in Inuktitut at all levels 
of education. There must be arranged individual educational plans and language materials. 
The government has also to promote early childhood Inuktitut language development at 
the community level. All parents have a right to give their children education in Inuktitut. 
The Education Act guarantees to all children bilingual education in Inuktitut and English 
or French. In 2000 the Nunavut Department of Education published the Aajiiqatigiingniq 
Language Research Paper, which expressed concern about the indigenous languages’ future 
and set as the objective a fully functioningbilingual society. The report suggested three kinds 
of schools: qulliq (Inuktitut as the main language of instruction), insinnaqtun (immersion 
schools) and mixed schools. There are still no unilingual Inuktut schools.113 
The federal government started in 1958 to support indigenous language newspapers and 
and radio programmes. Many of CBC’s radio programmes in Nunavut are bilingual. Since 
1982 the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation has also transmitted TV programmes in Inuktitut 
for five hours per week. A nationwide Aboriginal Peoples TV Network started in 1992.114 
7.3.4.  Cultural Objects
An ordinance by the governor of Vancouver Island (1865) against the looting of Indian 
graves was a rare example of the nineteenth century protection policy. Only the latter part of 
the twentieth century has brought understanding towards the indigenous cultural property 
and human remains. The First Nations and Arctic territories have protected the traditional 
artefacts and archaeological and paleontological sites. In Mackenzie Valley the authorities 
must notify the First Nations if they suspect a historical or archaeological site, or burial 
ground to be found. The federal government and western provinces have attempted to correct 
the past injustices by helping Indigenous groups to set up their own museums and repatriate 
110 School Regulation, 1989 (British Columbia), s. 14.
111 Education Act, 1995 (NWT), ss. 70-71, 73-74.
112 Education Act, 2002 (Yukon), s. 50.
113 Education Act, 2002 (Nunavut), s. 17; Inuit Language Protection Act (2008), s. 8; Report of Rodolfo Staven-
hagen (2004), p. 63; Summary of  Aajiiqatigiingniq. 
114 Minority Rights Group (1994), pp. 134-135; Varennes (1996), p. 234; CBC/Radio Canada. Aboriginal Peop-
les TV Network  reaches 10 million people. Some 56% of programmes are in English, 16% in French and 
28% in different indigenous languages. 
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sacred ceremonial objects, many of whom were sold to the United States. The negotiations to 
get them back have met, however, many difficulties.115
In 1959 the first Inuit co-operative was introduced to Northern Québec. The co-operatives 
spread all over the Arctic and began soon to prepare handicrafts and arts. Legislation and 
agreement give to Inuit the right to use stone material for traditional arts and crafts as the 
property of the indigenous people. In Québec the indigenous peoples may acquire a special 
permit from the Department of Natural Resources, but which is subordinated to possible 
mining developments on land.116
Several statutes and agreements are meant to protect Indigenous cultural values. In 
Nisga’a territory important cultural sites are protected through heritage site designation.117 
The Yukon has established the Yukon Heritage Resources Board, Yukon Historical Resources 
Application Board and Arts Advisory Council, which provide support for educational 
programmes, promote the recording and preservation of traditional languages, history, 
legends and cultural knowledge, and supervise the distinctive needs of First Nations’ art. 
The minister can make an agreement, including a written consent, with a First Nation to 
designate a historical site. The territory acknowledges historical artistic objects’ importance 
for identity, tourism and economic opportunities. UFA includes departments to manage 
and administer heritage resources in the settlement lands. The Gwich’in Agreement allows 
as cultural purpose the nation to trade plant material with other Indigenous persons for 
personal consumtion. The legislator must consult the nation on all restrictions and give 
them a preferential right of gathering.118 In the NWT Heritage Parks have been established 
to preserve and protect significant cultural or historical sites. Respective minister can limit 
and restrict tourism, which could harm archaeologically, historically, culturally or spiritually 
significant sites. The NWT has established a committee to promote the preservation and 
beneficial use of prehistorical and historical places.119
The Maa-nulth First Nations has made an agreement on the harvest of monumental cedar 
and cypress on provincial Crown lands for cultural purposes.120 In Kitkatla (2002) another 
British Columbia band argued that the provincial law demanded protection of culturally 
modified trees on Crown land. The band claimed that law on heritage objects had a differential 
impact on Aboriginal peoples. The Supreme Court rejected the argument. Provincial law’s 
main thrust was to protect heritage objects. It contained special protection for existing 
Aboriginal rights and set a careful balance between competing resource and conservation 
115 Maanulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), ss. 20.1-2, 20.5; Tsawassen First 
NationFinal Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 14; NWT Archaeological Sites Regulations, 2001, 
ss. 3-5; Nunavut Archaeological and Paleontological Sites Regulations, 2001, Mackenzie Valley Land Use 
Regulations, 1998, s. 12; First Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects Repartiation Act, 2000 (Alberta), s. 2(1); 
ss. 3-7; Dickason (1994), pp. 261, 327.
116 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, ss. 7, 17; Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act, 
2002, s. 150(5); JBNQA (1975), s. 5; Zaslow (1988), pp. 277-279. 
117 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, 1999, s. 17. 
118 Arts Act, 2002 (Yukon), Preamble, ss. 3-4; Historical Resources Act, 2002 (Yukon), ss. 4-5, 8, 10, 15, 28, 73. 
Gwithin Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (1991), s. 14: UFA (1993), s. 13.
119 Historical Resources Act, 1988 (NWT), s. 2; Tourism Act, 1988 (NWT), s. 12.
120 Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement Act, 2007 (British Columbia), s. 21. See also: Territorial Parks 
Act, 1988 (NWT), s. 3.
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needs. As the legislation fell under the provincial property and civil rights power in the 
Constitution Act, 1867, it was valid.121
7.3.5.  Old Faith in Modern Society
In New France royal power, trade and religion went hand in hand. The Charter of King Louis 
XIII (1628) supported the policy of Jesuits and other religious orders to convert the Indians, 
supported by trade and military alliences. The Catholic Church lost its monopoly only when 
New France became a British Colony in 1763. When the Dominion of Canada was born, to 
the Constitution Act, 1867 was included special provisions for denominational, Catholic or 
Protestant minority schools in Ontario and Québec which are still in force in Ontario.122 An 
Indian child who is Roman Catholic, may not attend a Protestant school and a Protestant 
child may not attend Catholic school, except by written direction of the parent. When the 
majority of band members belong to the same religious denomination, the teacher in the 
reserve school has to belong to that denomination. A Protestant or Roman Catholic minority 
may have a separate school or dayschool classrooms on the reserve.123
Even today, the relation of state and religion in Canada could be described as legally 
disestablished religiosity. The Constitution Act, 1982, mentions God as the protector of 
Canada. Nevertheless, the indigenous peoples’ religious expressions were early restricted. The 
war against the traditional religion and ceremonies began during the period of New France, 
when especially the Jesuits tried to ban the expressions of traditional religious expressions 
and habits. They saw the territory as New Jerusalem, where their task was to convert the 
Indian nations to Christianity. The main means were the missions, schools, reductions and 
privileged trade relations. Later the British missionaries continued the policy by pressing the 
federal government to ban the traditional religious ceremonies. In British Columbia were 
forbidden the potlatch (gift giving) feasts connected to gift giving and supernatural dances 
in 1884. The potlatch was regarded as incompatible with Western economic practices and 
inimical to the concept of private property. The missionaries tried also to remove totem poles 
as symbols of an undesirable faith and way of life. Neither did the Crown authorities accept 
their ceremonial endurance features. The Traditional customs and religious ceremonies 
were generally forbidden by the Indian Act in 1884. In 1895 followed the thirst dances of 
Prairie Indians and in 1906 all ritual dances were banned. In 1914 the revision of Indian 
Act prohibited even the public use of Indian costumes to perform dances without the prior 
written approval of the department. The rituals continued underground and the missionaries 
complained about the secret rituals. The RCMP raided the reserves and confiscated ritual 
121 SCC, R. v. Kitkatla (2002), s. 78. 
122 Constitution Act (1867), s. 93; Eccles (1990), pp. 43-46; Rouland & Pierré-Caps & Poumarède (1996), p. 
368.  
123 Indian Act 1985, ss. 118, 120-121; Loi sur l’instruction publique pour les autochtones Cris, Inuit et Naska-
pis, 2012 (Québec), s. 23.
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paraphernalia, which was often further sold. The anti-potlatch and anti-dance provisions 
were repealed only in 1951.124 
 A response to restrictions was the rise of prophetical and healer movements. One of 
the first was the Iroquois Handsome Lake (Skanyadariyoh). His visions strengthened the 
attendance of traditional ceremonies, the nuclear family and morality of Iroquois society. 
His reform movement was soon called as gai’wiio, the New Religion. Also among Ojibwa 
(Midewiwin), Cree (prophets Abishabis and Wasitack) and Sioux (the Ghost Dance) raised 
similar movements with profound social and millenarian aspects. 125
Later the Crown has recognised that the right of exercise of ancestral customs and religious 
rights flows from binding treaty obligations. In 1991 the Province of Ontario recognised that 
the inherent right to self-government of the First Nations “flows from the Creator and from 
the First Nations’ original occupation of land”. In British Columbia, a judge found that the 
Stó:lō Nation had an Aboriginal right to use tobacco for religious purposes. The Nation’s 
members were excluded from custom duties and taxes in this context. 126  Prince Edward Island 
allows those under 19 year olds to receive tobacco as a gift related to traditional Aboriginal 
spiritual or cultural practice.127 Similarly, New Brunswick allows exceptions to legislation for 
traditional Aboriginal spiritual or cultural reasons.128  
But there are also cases when the courts can set limits to cultural and religious practices, 
when those practices seem to involve an abuse or mistreatment of some members of the 
community. The BCSC had to resolve this question in a case, where a group of men from the 
Coast Salish Indian band in British Columbia were accused of having assaulted, battered, 
kidnapped and imprisoned a member of the community, who was without his own will 
initiated in a spirit dance ritual. The representatives of the band withnessed that according 
to custom the initiations can occur on a voluntary or involuntary basis and the violence is 
symbolic. The court restricted the initiation ritual to a voluntary basis.129
The Supreme Court took a different stand in relation to the treaty of 1760, where the British 
commandant of Québec promised to Huron Indians free exercise of their religion, customs 
and trade. The court set aside convictions, where the Huron were charged with cutting down 
trees, camping and making fires in a provincial park in contravention to Québec’s legislation. 
The Supreme Court held that the Huron were engaged in a traditional ceremony and the 
rights guaranteed by the treaty could be exercised over the entire territory as long as the 
carrying on of the customs and rites was not incompatible with the particular use made by 
the Crown.130
124 Constitution Act, 1982, Title; Indian Act (1884-1906); Dickason (1994), pp. 286, 315, 327; Örücü (1996), p. 
7. “Whereas Canada is founded upon the principles that recognize the supremacy of God...”. Cf. Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, Title. 
125 Dickason (1994), p. 237, 242; Snow (1996), pp. 158-162. 
126 Olthuis & Kleer & Townshend (2008), pp. 47, 160.
127 Tobacco Sales and Access Regulation, 1988 (Prince Edward Island), s. 4(6).
128  Smoke-free Places Act, 2011 (New Brunswick), s. 2(2). 
129 BCSC, Thomas v. Norris (1992). In the United States some Indian tribes could be described as theocracies 
with an official religion. The other denominations’ freedom to worship is limited and there has been cases 
related to discrimination. Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978). 
130 SCC, R. v. Sioui (1990). 
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Conclusions7.4. 
The notion culture has been approached here broadly, including indigenous identity, names 
and symbols, language, cultural objects and religion. Understood this way, the different 
aspects of culture have been important to indigenous survival in settler societies. Although a 
“pro culture” nation, France has stressed until recently that there is only one French culture 
and heritage, and the local expressions of people’s life have been just variations of larger 
pattern. Therefore, the Accord of Nouméa has signified an important reform. It started the 
construction of new Caledonian identity, including both Kanak and French elements. The 
legislation supports also actively the preserving of Kanak traditional culture.
In New Zealand and Canada the indigenous cultures were for a long time seen as inferior 
to dominant western culture and only since the 1970s the legislation and case law have 
supported their survival. The Supreme Court of Canada has developed its case law to define 
the historical cultural practices of First Nations (Van der Peet) and Métis people (Powley) to 
define the scope of their rights. These definitions have been at the same also formal: they have 
been criticized to be “frozen rights”, which do not take into consideration the Indigenous 
peoples’ modern needs. 
In all three countries has taken place since the 1980s a recovery of names and symbols. 
Old, historical names have been returned by legislation and the Indigenous symbols have 
been raised besides the state’s symbols in New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Nunavut and 
elsewhere. Only in New Zealand the symbolism has been present more or less all the time, 
which describes the country’s constitutional background as a union of two founding peoples. 
After confiscation and injustice, the protection of Indigenous peoples’ cultural objects has 
been recognised in all three countries’ legislation, first in New Zealand.
Language is one of the most important determinants of Indigenous difference. The 
Indigenous languages have also suffered of long oppression and are today endangered. 
France is the only country which has constitutionalised its language policy. French is the 
only public language. The recognition of Kanak, Tahitian and other “regional languages” has 
been cultural recognition. The effect of changes in public life and education has been modest, 
but legislators’ and judges’ attitude is no more negative, and the interpretation on regional 
languages’ public use has become more tolerant and broad.
New Zealand and Canada used especially school as means to unify the countries’ linguistic 
map. The use of indigenous languages was even prohibited, like in France, to the latter part of 
the 20th century. In New Zealand the change took place through case law and active lobbying 
and finally in 1986 the Māori became the second official language. The reform left, however, 
half-way, and the process is still going on. The education and media have been important fora 
to promote the use of the language. Similarly, in Canada several tailored modern agreements 
and territorial legislation have recognised the Indigenous languages an official status. Their 
education and public use have advanced.
Religion and traditional ceremonies have been problematic to settler societies’ legislators. 
France – constitutionally secular country – has tried first to limit the churches’ influence but 
became soon to make co-operation. This is especially true in Wallis and Futuna, where the 
Catholic Church has been guaranteed by law and agreements recognised status in society and 
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education. Elsewhere the case law has been flexible when there has been challenge to state’s 
secular identity. This confirms the doctrine of spécialité legislative. 
New Zealand and Canada have been in this question different to France and also different 
between each other. Similar was the battle against millenarian movements. In both coutries the 
legislation aimed at suppression on traditional form of religiosity. Often there were, however, 
in the background other motives than the protection of Christian unity. The difference has 
been the strong influence of religious movements and aspects in New Zealand’s daily life: 
in politics, legal reforms and omnipresence of sacred. Also Canadian case law has in recent 
decades recognised the importance of Indigenous world view and religion to their culture, 
but has also set limits to acceptable forms of rituals in modern society.
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General Concluding Remarks8. 
In this comparative research I have approached the unitary state’s relation to indigenous 
people in the macro level through three different countries: France, New Zealand and Canada, 
which represent a classical unitary state, bicultural nation and multicultural federation, and 
respectively, civil law, common law and hybrid legal systems. Their common background 
is in Western European legal and political heritage. They have also interacted in the same 
geographical theatres, in the Americas and Oceania. The two key notions – unitary state and 
different Indigenous peoples have raised here three approaches to comparison: This has been 
a study of change, which means historical understanding of legal plurality’s development in 
society. The presumption of plurality has led to finding out how the plurality appears and 
works, and what its place has been in the legal and political change.  
I have approached the forms of legal pluralism though different sectors of law and 
dimensions of society, which are based on two central international legal instruments – 
ILO Convention No. 169 and the UN Declaration on Indigenous peoples - expressing the 
essential questions for Indigenous peoples: law, justice, administration, self-determination, 
family, education, media, social affairs, land, resources, environment, culture, identity, 
language and religion. I have also attempted to indicate that the contextual factors – history, 
geography, culture, language and religion/morality have importance, when approaching the 
legal pluralism and legal change including the Indigenous question. It has helped also to 
understand the complexity of the three legal systems compared. 
The direction of legal change vis-à-vis the Indigenous question has led from unitary state 
towards an asymmetric, plural system with differentiated rights, and the existence of a de 
facto legal pluralism and its forms. To pluralism I have included here the legal difference, or 
Indigenous peoples’ right to difference in larger society, but also the existence and survival of 
indigenous legal expressions, or custom. 
There exists an evident tension between the unitary state’s ideology and the quest for 
difference. Although the legal positivism is still the dominant force in law, all three compared 
societies have moved in a more pluralistic and asymmetric direction. My hypothesis has 
been the existing legal plurality in these countries. The legal positivism excludes in its pure 
form the difference and pluralism as “non-law”, when it deals with social and ethical factors. 
When taking a look at the Indigenous communities this approach is not very useful. I have 
abandoned here also the traditional functional theory of comparative law. Although this 
research has a function, to study the challenge of unitary states vis-à-vis the indigenous quest 
for difference, I see too narrow the functional theory’s tertium comparationis, which stresses 
in the spirit of the positive law only similarities and excluding the contextual factors outside 
the scope of research.
Legal pluralism has a long history. Even in Europe it has been a historical fact until the 
nineteenth century and beyond, and has experienced a new coming with globalisation. 
Several scholars have proved that law as phenomenon is more rich and plural than the mere 
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positivist theory might indicate. The legocentric Western law represents also only one corner 
of the global legal variety. The old, Eurocentric family tree taxonomies have given way to 
a more dynamic global view, law in move, which is mixed and mixing. The Indigenous 
understanding of law is very different from Western positive understanding, but still exists 
more or less within the unitary state. 
My approach is macro-level comparison, which takes into consideration contextual 
factors: history, geography, culture, language and religion. The different sectors of broadly 
understood elements of law intertwine and form the total image of legal culture. Similarly, I 
have approached the legal reality with plural hypothesis: the legal pluralism is and has been 
out there. To understand the present situation it is important to understand the development 
in the past. There are also different speeds of development – at individual, social and 
fundamental levels. Also geography, language and moral questions/religion have shaped and 
influenced the plural societies. That is, the law and society are intertwined. And different legal 
families do not live in a vacuum: they have influenced each other. 
After the downfall of the West Roman Empire, there were forces in  feudal Europe 
which sought unity. The Catholic Church was challenged by ascending royal houses. The 
sixteenth and seventeenth century theorists prepared the road to centralised nation state and 
absolutism. The natural state was replaced by the sovereign’s power based on social contract. 
Later this sovereign was replaced by people and parliamentary sovereignty, which paved the 
way to the breaking of old structures. 
To the age of rising nation states was also linked the Age of Discoveries. The explorers met 
“the Other”: strange, non-Christian cultures. The Catholic theology defined the indigenous 
people as human beings, who are capable of making agreements. The European ideology 
had during the early Modern Age two main schools: the indigenous people were either ideal 
children of nature as noble savages, or ignorant children. The level of development in societies 
(in European eyes) defined the nature of early encounter. Either they were treated as allies or 
the virgin soil was terra nullius, whose population was ignored. In the case of New Caledonia 
and French Guyana the latter policy was evident.
The colonial states’ self-understanding has influenced strongly the encounter. France has 
strong tradition of revolutionary, even missionary, idealism. In the background were the break 
with the royal, Catholic and pluralist past. The major touchstones of this policy have been 
equality, language and secularism. The radical disengagement with the past was, however, 
only partial.The old elements did not disappear and there had to be made compromises. 
In fact, two Frances have coexisted throughout history: the republican, secular, centralised 
and French-language France, and the royalist, religious, decentralised and plurilingual 
France. This dichotomy has also influenced the overseas. Further, the unitary France has 
always had due to this dichotomy seeds of federalism. At the same time, the contradiction 
is visible in the decentralisation process: there is administrative and cultural pluralism, but 
political and linguistic unity. The overseas – as later acquired and geographically separated, 
are, however, another France in the legal, cultural and administrational meaning. They are 
treated differently, but ought to join the common ideals of the republic, the glue of the unitary 
state, as the Constitution refers. 
New Zealand is based on the Treaty of Waitangi, which created a new nation, including 
two elements: Pākehā and Māori. The British authorities hurried in competition with the 
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French and the Americans to find a solution which would give them a justification to acquire 
the land for  the Crown. The Māori were a far too strong element to be treated as tabula rasa. 
At the same time the process united the indigenous tribes, which were far from united before. 
The treaty was largely ignored for over 100 years by the settler society, but returned in the early 
1970s to the forum as the nation’s founding document. It is still today without constitutional 
status and has legal standing only through the legislation which expressly mentions it. 
Nevertheless, it has strong symbolic and moral value, which has given justification also to 
Māori’s demands and is still an ongoing remedial process.
The pan-Canadian identity has been challenged and confronted from various directions. 
The federation was born as a British counter-force to the United States, when the Loyalist 
colonies (including the territory of modern Québec) joined together. The difference to 
France or New Zealand is that Canada has neither been a classical unitary state or a nation 
originally based on indigenous heritage. The federation of Canada was established as a union 
of two dominant elements: the Anglo- and French Canadian societies. The independent 
colonies guaranteed that the federation was based on division of power between the central 
power and the provinces. Since the 1960s the disintegrative elements began to gain ground. 
This ethnically based movement has been the most influential in Francophone Québec. 
Paradoxically, it forms the nuclear area of New France, the settler society in Canada. Also the 
western provinces and the Indigenous peoples have activated to demand a more asymmetric 
model, but the demands have seldom reached the level of Québec. The solution in Canada 
has been a gradual change to the multicultural state: first at the  ideological, and since 1982 
also in constitutional level. Indigenous peoples’ road to constitutionally recognised groups 
was long and complex. The repatriation of the Constitution rendered the First Nations from 
wards to more equal citizens. The most difficult the process of recognition has been for the 
Métis, whose fate was to fall “in-between” the white and indigenous worlds. After the renewed 
settlement process and two failed constitutional reforms the indigenous peoples’ place in 
Canadian society is still under formation.
In general, the legal development and the presence of pluralism in these three countries in 
relation to their indigenous peoples could be described with several different denominators. 
I begin the analysis with the contextual factors. The historical change is essential in 
understanding the European-indigenous relations. Both British and French colonial powers 
went through five, partly overlapping major phases: the more or less equal encounter, 
assimilation/segregation, integration, reconstruction and the urban phase.
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The levels of legal change are:
level France Canada New Zealand
encounter co-operation, 
agreements (1840-80) 
alliance, agreements 
(1610-1850)
co-operation, 
agreement (1840-60)
assimilation/
segregation
reserves, assimilation, 
terra nullius,toleration 
(1850-1946)  
reserves, segregation, 
neglect, assimilation 
(1850-1951)
extinguishment, 
assimilation 
(1860-1920)
integration social and land 
programmes, centralisation
 (1946-1982)
reform of Indian Act,
Alberta Métis, Inuit, White 
Paper (1938-73)
social programmes, 
Māori structures, Hunn 
Report
(1920-1975)
reconstruction Accord of Nouméa, 
decentralisation 
(1982-)
Constitution Act, 1982,
constitutional conferences, 
Nunavut, modern 
agreements, case law
(1973-) 
associated states, 
Waitangi Tribunal, 
MLC, MAC, devolution, 
settlements, case law
(1965-)
urban growing challenge, no legal 
recognition (1946-)
some recognised 
structures, search for non-
territorial forms (1950-)
urban structures, some 
recognition (1945-)
In the first phase, encounter, New Zealand’s Māori, the Kingdoms of Tahiti, Wallis and 
Futuna, the Maritime and East Canadian Indian tribes and the Métis were treated respectfully. 
In Tahiti there existed a parallel legislation, in New Zealand the legislation included a theoretical 
possibility of parallel customary law system and in Wallis and Futuna it existed practically.
The engagement was much shorter in New Caledonia and in Western Canada, where the 
solemn promises were soon abandoned. In French Guiana and the Canadian Arctic this 
phase was passed altogether. Generally, this early period was possible because of the balance 
of power: the settler state was still too weak and had to make consessions. The situation, 
however, changed as quickly as the settlers became the dominant element in society. The most 
brutal and direct system was in the French colonies of New Caledonia and French Guiana, 
where the legislation and regulations were used to subjugate the indigenous population to 
forced labour and dislocation or were completely ignored. The longest the transfer took place 
in French Polynesia, where the Polynesian population had a well-developped legal system 
and ethnic dominance. Only Wallis and Futuna has been able to preserve as dominant the 
Indigenous customary law until today due to the territory’s geographical isolation and the 
French state’s low material or strategic motivation to change the situation.  
The second phase was that of assimilation/segragation. The end result in all studied 
countries was similar. Even the more developed legal systems, like among the Māori, Iroquois 
and Tahitians, were subjugated to the European legal system, which was not, however, able 
to destroy completely the social glue of customary societies. Of course, they were invited 
to enfranchise (Canadian Indians), to become true Frenchmen or New Zealanders, but all 
were not treated in law equally. Those who had shown strength (the Māori, Indian tribes, 
Polynesians) were given legal consessions, which meant for First Nations and Kanak also 
isolation while the South Americal Indians were forgotten and abandoned. A sad story is also 
366
From Unitary State to Plural Asymmetric State...
the fate of the Métis in Canada. They had a strong political and legal structure, but as half-
breeds they were discriminated against and doomed to poverty. They were in “no man’s land”: 
neither really white, nor indigenous. The case law both in New Zealand (Wi Parata) and 
Canada (St. Catherine’s Milling) led to lengthy non-recognition policy of Indigenous title. The 
French non-recognition was more based on constitutional ideology of one and indivisible 
republic.
 The third phase, integration, began earlier in New Zealand due to educated Māori’s 
growing political influence and post-World War I social consciousness. Similar signs 
were also in French colonies, but World War II became the true monitor of change. The 
establishment of the United Nations, the decolonisation process and movement to individual 
rights influenced all three countries. In France the colonies became DOM/TOM, and the 
Constitution of 1946 had a strong social flavour. In New Zealand the Māori legislation was 
reformed to integrate them more properly to society. In Canada the Indian Act’s reform in 
1951 signified an end to the weakening of First Nations’ rights. During the integration period 
the difference and pluralism was not, however, of high prestige. Like during the assimilation 
period, the indigenous people were to be made part of settler society, although in more 
human means. The continuous centralisation and immigration in France, the Hunn and 
Hawthorne Reports and the White Paper in New Zealand and Canada were expressions of 
Western liberal society’s faith in individual rights and belief in disappearance of differential 
group rights and ethnic differences.
In the 1970s the global thinking was warming towards a more plural society. New Zealand 
had offered since the early 1960s options of full sovereignty or different levels of autonomy to 
its overseas territories. The Cook Islands and Niue chose association, later gradually followed 
by the Tokelau. The Māori, as integral part of New Zealand, had to wait ten more years. The 
strong Māori lobbying and political alliance led to the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal. 
The case law was leading the way to legal reforms, which took place especially between 1987-
1993. Despite these reforms the Treaty of Waitangi did not obtain constitutional recognition. 
The Māori took, however, advantage of the country’s fundamental devolution process, which 
together with treaty settlements increased iwi’s decision power. Similarly in Canada the case 
law opened the process. The repatriation of the Constitution, the tailored new agreements and 
court cases, which recognised the Aboriginal title and the Crown’s duties towards Indigenous 
peoples, signified a new page in the Indigenous question. Both in New Zealand and Canada 
the case law in the 1980s ended the long period of non-recognition of indigenous rights. 
France resisted the change longest and restricted the overseas territories’ self-government. 
In France the political change included a promise of decentralisation, which first, however, 
promised more than realised. Only after violent confrontations in New Caledonia was 
France politically forced to recognise the indigenous difference – tailored – in New Caledonia 
and give minor concessions to other territorial collectivities. In all three countries the land 
question has been central to the process of reconstruction and recovery.  
The early enthusiasm promised even radical changes to Indigenous peoples’ status, but 
since the early 1990s Realpolitik and the countereffect to protect the settler societies’ unity 
began to influence the legal processes and case law. In Canada, two constitutional drafts 
and in New Zealand two attempts to reform the Māori self-government have failed and the 
workload of settlement processes has been underestimated. There are also different views on 
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how the process should be continued. There have been also signs of hardened government 
policy towards Indigenous peoples in several common law countries. A good example is the 
Foreshore and Seabed Act, which received plenty of international attention. Also the case law 
has become more conservative in New Zealand and Canada. In France, although the Nouméa 
process goes on, the most active period of reforms is over. On the other hand, in all three 
countries the legal reforms take place at a more local level than before.
A Fifth phase of legal change could be described as urban pluralism. It is still in early 
formative stage. On the other hand, it shows legal systems’ dynamic side: law and structures 
are still on the move. This non-territorial, or personal model, will probably be the next great 
change in indigenous law. The future evolution of indigenous urban communities as political 
and legal entities is an important question. The traditional structures are challenged – and 
they often resist the change.  There are some signs of the emergence of extra-territorial 
indigenous structures, while the legislation has supported the traditional territorial entities. 
The most favoured structures by the states have been the municipal or institutional (personal 
structures) with limited decision-making powers. Some units, like the Nisga’a Lisims or 
Nunatsiavut government, represent more extended structures, combining several elements.
Following Braudel’s classification of historical change, the individual time has been 
turbulent especially in New Zealand. The legislation has been seemingly sensitive to political 
changes. The legislator has repealed on almost an annual basis land legislation and even 
central projects of self-government. The Māori have been on the surface level change an 
active pressure group. In rejection of the Iwi Rūnanga Act, the Treaty of Waitangi’s inclusion 
in the Bill of Rights and in the Waka Umanga process the Māori groups themselves have 
influenced strongly the political decision-makers. A similar surface storm was evident in 
New Caledonia in the 1980s, when there were even three territorial laws in the same year. 
The reason was again political and ethnic: the political interest groups and ideologies were 
not able to speak with each other.
The social time is slower, more unconscious change. The deterioration of territorial rights 
during the Fifth Republic in France as an expression of a strong Gaullist state and as a counter-
measure to the threat of decolonisation, the deterioration of Indian status in 1880-1950 in 
Canada as part of assimilation/integration policy, or the long influence of Labour/Rātanā 
cooperation in the politics of New Zealand are examples of this kind of legal development, 
which is partly unknown to the wider public. And finally, geographical time is related to 
fundamental changes. They need time and signify an essential change in state ideology. This 
kind of change has been the recognition of pluralism and difference in all three states. It took 
place in Canada during the early 1970s, in New Zealand in the mid-1980s and in France 
in the latter part of the 1980s. In all countries this legal change, or recognition of legal fact, 
has also caused countereffects. The unitary state aims to protect its unity by restricting the 
acceleration of plurality and continuing demands. While the globalisation has increased the 
variations of already existing legal pluralism, the politicians and judges of systems, leaning 
on legal positivism, fear the consequences of an “all doors open” policy. Instead, they have 
built on settler society’s continuity, where the concessions to Indigenous peoples are based on 
careful historical and tailored considerations.
The legal space is also influenced by geography. Some indigenous peoples have had the 
“blessings of isolation”. This is especially true in Nunavut and Wallis and Futuna. Nunavut 
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was first touched by the Canadian law and order in the 1920s. Only in the 1950s, due to 
geopolitical, strategic and resource reasons did the Canadian government begin to interfere 
with the traditional societies. Their life and legislation changed rapidly in the 1960s, but 
then the ideology was also changing. They had passed the period of assimilation, and almost 
the integration, too. In Wallis and Futuna, the isolation worked somehow differently. The 
encounter was early, but the geographical isolation and the poverty of resources did not invite 
the Frenchmen to active intervention. The French state saw the loose relation to traditional 
society as the best solution. This peaceful coexistence has continued until these days. A third 
example of a geographical factor is French Guyana where inaccessibility  and lack of material 
interest left the legislator inactive. There was no real need to legislate for people who did not 
exist officially. The social consciousness rose only later.
It is difficult to give an exhaustive definion of culture (cf. s. 1.2.4.), but it is well present in the 
legislation. France has used culture to promote the French civilisation. Therefore, Indigenous 
people have been part of the French heritage, whether they knew that or not. The Accord 
of Nouméa included a radical change to this ideology. The Kanak culture was recognised to 
have independent worth of its own. It was a break with official republican ideology. In New 
Zealand the Māori culture has been longest recognised in legislation by the historical artefacts 
and their protection. The forms of culture have been included to legislation only in the 1980s, 
thanks to the Waitangi Tribunal’s case law. In Canada the relation to Indigenous culture was 
at the turn of the twentieth century negative: many traditional practices were prohibited. 
Only since the 1980s have the indigenous cultures been actively promoted in legislation. 
The monolinguistic paradigm has been an important tool in the unitary states’ legislation. 
The official languages have been used as a tool to advance the assimilation and integration. In 
France the development has been gradual: the French language was promoted to constitutional 
status only in 1992. The use of indigenous languages is restricted to private use. The case law 
has, however, interpreted broadly the public use of languages when they do not threaten the 
use of French. In New Zealand the Māori was for a long time neglected, but especially the 
Waitangi Tribunal’s case law has led to the officialisation of Māori. It is not, however, equal 
in public life with English and seeks its place in society. In Canada the indigenous languages 
have gained ground as territorial or local public languages since the 1980s. Especially Māori, 
but also Inuktitut have increasing significance as legal languages.
Religion and morality have influenced the legislation and case law in all three countries. 
France has a constitutional principle of secularism, but even the metropolitan France has 
geographical exceptions to the rule. French Guyana is still influenced by the Concordat 
of Napoléon and in New Caledonia and French Polynesia the government has guaranteed 
the religious freedom. Wallis and Futuna forms again a major exception: the legislation 
recognises indirectly the special status of the Catholic Church, and the primary education has 
been completely granted to the Catholic Mission. In New Zealand the educated, Westernised 
Māori made at the turn of the twentieth century an initiative to suppress the representatives 
of traditional Māori religion and healing, who were influential in Māori communities. The 
legislation had little real significance. The legislation and case law have recognised since 
the 1980s again the Māori spiritual values. In Canada the Indigenous traditional religious 
expressions were also first suppressed in legislation by the initiative of missionaries. Later 
8. General Concluding Remarks
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the spiritual values have returned back to First Nations’ legislation as an expression of their 
identity. 
What is the role of legal pluralism in these societies? The legal pluralism has a different 
scope in France. It is visible especially in the family and land questions, language and other 
legislation related to culture, but almost non-existent in social affairs. In France the customary 
private law is recognised in New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna. This customary status is 
applicable in all French territory. It includes customary land, customary marriage and divorce 
and customary succession. In Wallis and Futuna the customary law has also an unrecognised 
influence in public life. Some customary rules exist, like adoption in French Polynesia, exist, 
though are only slightly recognised in case law. On the other hand, the national legislator 
does not recognise much difference in education, media or health and social affairs.
In New Zealand and Canada the emphasis is more on social questions. New Zealand 
is much more restrictive to exceptions in family law, but recognises the Māori difference 
in education, media, health and social affairs. Canada has since the 1960s given limited 
recognition to customary adoption and succession, and takes into consideration the 
indigenous peoples in education, health and social affairs, but leaves the indigenous media to 
the private sphere. In New Zealand and its associated territories the customary law is today 
limited to land property and succession, also indirectly to adoption. In Canada the customary 
law has importance in local self-governing communities. The scope of customary law has, 
however, recently increased. Since 1920 in France, the 1980s in New Zealand and 1997 in 
Canada, the customary law has been applicable in the courts. New Caledonia has customary 
assistants in courts. Canada has since the 1990s indigenous courts for communities’ internal 
questions, which are based on the Supreme Court’s Gladue decision. All three countries use 
alternative dispute resolution. In France it is indirectly referred to in the Accord of Nouméa. 
The customary land is recognised and promoted in New Caledonia and exists de facto in 
Wallis and Futuna. Also New Zealand and Canada recognise the customary land and Native/
Aboriginal title. The customary/freehold legislation is most developed in New Zealand, 
where the question has been long-established, while the harvest question and the theoretical 
status of Indigenous land property has been a central question in Canadian case law. In all 
three countries the Indigenous resource management and conservation is regulated/statute-
based.
The legal transfers have long roots. The Human Rights legislation in France and Canada has 
American (also First Nations) influences, and Canada has further influenced New Zealand. 
New Zealand has influenced Canada in the land purchase process, dispute resolution and 
settlement policy. France has followed in Tahiti and New Caledonia the Australian and North 
American examples in land owning, while the reserve system in Canada is based on French 
religious villages, which themselves have copied the Jesuits’ religious model villages of South 
America. And globalisation is influencing to an increasing extent the legislation in all three 
countries. The domestic law is therefore possible to question as an intrinsic value.  
Finally, the unitary state has moved in all countries in an asymmetric direction. There 
is no longer a classical unitary state – if there has ever been. There have been always legal 
exceptions and differences, based on historical, geographical, cultural, linguistic or religious 
motivation. As much they have been expressions of civilian and military power politics and 
material benefits. Nevertheless, the last 30 years have signified a deepening of this process. 
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It receives gradually new ingredients, and the process is far from over. In this pattern he 
public governments form their own category: Nunavut, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, 
Wallis and Futuna, Cook Islands and Niue all represent structures, where the indigenous 
peoples are dominant or an important element in decision-making. Elsewhere the legislator 
has preferred the municipal or function-based models with tailored features, which are easier 
to integrate into the national administrative system.
While most of Indigenous self-governments are demographically weak and economically 
dependent, it is probable that they will remain part of their framework states. Therefore, a 
possible way out from the present dead-lock is a more flexible, asymmetric unitary state. In 
Canada this would mean the realisation of the RCAP’s and two constitutional accords basic 
ideas: the recognition of distinct societies inside the federation and sovereign dependent 
nations in the federation. Canada has moved towards legal pluralism which has a common 
legal system, but which leaves space to the oldest law in the country: the customary law in local 
and territorial level. In New Zealand tendencies to develop Māori self-government can be 
found, which would better take into consideration their traditional structures and offer better 
participation in legislation, including the customary values. The unitary France already has 
experience of semifederal structures during the Fourth Republic. The regional co-operation 
has increased e.g. in the Pacific and Caribbean regions. While tailoring the legislation to meet 
the local need also France has moved towards a more asymmetric model. Concluding this 
vision of “plurality in unity” both the states and their Indigenous people have advanced – 
through hardships - toward common solutions in asymmetric unity, or creative diversity.
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